HOLLYWOOD GOES TO WAR

Military Heritage Presents:

WWII HISTORY

www.wwiihistorymagazine.com

Curtis 02313

9th Armored at The Battle of the Bulge

Operation Matterhorn: Air Assault on Japan

Sinking of USS Chicago

Mark Clark's North Africa Mission

Wartime Baseball

Amphibious Warfare Pioneer

PLUS: OSS Wainwright Rescue, Books, WWII Games, and more!

WWII HISTORY • NOVEMBER 2006 Volume 5, No. 6

NOVEMBER 2006

$4.99US $6.99CAN

0 74808 02313 4

RETAILER: DISPLAY UNTIL OCTOBER 23



Cover: Captain Clark Gable was photographed in 1943 in his capacity as captain of gunnery at an American bomber station somewhere in England. Photo by Fred Ramage. Courtesy of Getty Images.

WWII HISTORY

NOVEMBER 2006

FEATURES

COLUMNS

WWII History (ISSN 1539-5456) is published bimonthly by Sovereign Media, 453 Carlisle Drive, Herndon, VA 20170. (703) 964-0361. Periodical postage paid at Herndon, VA, and additional mailing offices.

Subscription services, back issues, and information: **(800) 219-1187** *or* write to WWII History **Circulation, WWII History, P.O. Box 1644, Williamsport, PA 17703.** Single copies: $4.99, plus $3 for postage. Yearly subscription in U.S.A.: $18.95; Canada and Overseas: $23.95 (U.S.). Editorial Office: Send editorial mail to WWII History, 453 Carlisle Drive, Herndon, VA 20170. WWII History welcomes editorial submissions but assumes no responsibility for the loss or damage of unsolicited material. Material to be returned should be accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope. We suggest that you send a self-addressed, stamped envelope for a copy of our author's guidelines. **POSTMASTER: Send address changes to WWII History, P.O. Box 1644, Williamsport, PA 17703.**

Discovery of lost submarine USS *Lagarto* brings speculation about its fate to a close.

Fifty-two submarines of the United States Navy were lost while on patrol during World War II. The circumstances surrounding the losses of some of these have been well documented. For others, their locations and the events that led to their sinkings have been shrouded in the proverbial fog of war.

For one of those submarines on eternal patrol, the book is now closed. Assumptions are confirmed, and after six decades of uncertainty the families of 86 sailors know the final resting place of their loved ones. USS *Lagarto* (SS 371), a *Balao*-class submarine on patrol in the Gulf of Thailand, was last heard from on May 3, 1945, as she prepared to attack a Japanese convoy.

In 2005, a British diver reported discovering the wreckage of a submarine sitting upright in 225 feet of water off the coast of Thailand. While it appeared very likely that the *Lagarto* had been located, the U.S. Navy endeavored to make its own positive identification. A great deal of research and preparation, including a visit to the USS *Torsk*, a sister of *Lagarto* that is now a floating museum in the Inner Harbor of Baltimore, were undertaken before the salvage ship USS *Salvor* headed to the site. During six days of diving, 500 digital photographs and 10 hours of video of the wreckage were taken.

Divers had been briefed to look for a twin five-inch gun mount, a starboard anchor, and the propeller where the name of the submarine might be engraved. They found the gun mount and the anchor hanging to starboard. In addition, after scraping away decades of coral and marine growth, the letters "LA" were revealed on the propeller.

Lagarto was one of 28 submarines built in Manitowoc, Wisconsin, and the city's name was completely visible on the propeller as well. Three other Manitowoc-built submarines, USS *Golet*, USS *Kete*, and USS *Robalo*, were lost during the war. None of these was in action near the location of the wreck.

Navy records indicate that the USS *Lagarto* left Subic Bay in the Philippine Islands on April 12, 1945. Her skipper, Commander F.D. Latta, received orders to proceed to the Gulf of Thailand on April 27. This was the second war patrol for the submarine, having operated against Japanese picket boats in the Nansei Shoto islands. On her first sortie, *Lagarto* had sunk the Japanese submarine *RO-49* on February 24, 1945, and participated with the submarines *Haddock* and *Sennet* in attacks against enemy surface ships—sharing credit for sinking two of them.

On the fateful morning of May 3, 1945, *Lagarto* made contact with another submarine, USS *Baya*, to coordinate an attack against the enemy convoy which included at least one tanker, an auxiliary vessel, and two destroyers. Persistent attacks were driven off by radar-equipped escort vessels. *Baya* withdrew, and there was only silence from *Lagarto*. Japanese records indicate that the minelayer *Hatsutaka* reported sinking an American submarine in the area, and it can be concluded with certainty that this attack was the one that doomed *Lagarto*.

Initially, a wreath was dropped into the ocean above the wreck site. On the final day of diving, a brass plaque was affixed to the submarine's capstan. Crewmen of the USS *Salvor* conducted a memorial service and read letters from family members of the lost *Lagarto* sailors.

"We owe a great debt to these men, and to all of the World War II submariners," remarked Rear Admiral Jeffrey B. Cassias, commander of the U.S. Pacific submarine force. "In the world's darkest hour, they faced the greatest risks and demonstrated the most noble courage to preserve the freedom of our nation."

The final resting place of *Lagarto* and her crew is one of many war graves scattered across the globe. Certainly, there are many more such dark and silent locations, on land and sea, that are yet to be discovered.

Michael E. Haskew

WWII HISTORY
VOLUME 5 NUMBER 6

CARL A. GNAM, JR.
Editorial Director, Founder

MICHAEL E. HASKEW
Editor

LAURA CLEVELAND
Managing Editor

SAMANTHA DeTULLEO
Art Director

KEVIN HYMEL
Research Director

Contributors:
Eric T. Baker, John Domagalski, Charles Gutierrez, Al Hemingway, Jon Latimer, John Mancini, Jon Mikolashek, John Kennedy Ohl, Roy Morris Jr., Mason B. Webb, Flint Whitlock

ADVERTISING OFFICE:

JEFF KIGHT
Advertising Director
(570) 322-7848, ext. 117

MARK HINTZ
Vice President & Publisher

TINA POUST
Comptroller

KATHY PAULHAMUS
MARY NOLAN
SANDRA HILLYARD
Subscription Customer Services

KEN FORNWALT
Data Processing Director

CURTIS CIRCULATION COMPANY
Worldwide Distribution

SOVEREIGN MEDIA COMPANY, INC.
453 Carlisle Drive, Herndon, VA 20170

SUBSCRIPTION CUSTOMER SERVICE AND BUSINESS OFFICE:
The Hart Building, 30 W. Third Street
Williamsport, PA 17701
(800) 219-1187

PRINTED IN THE U.S.A.

Battle Off Samar

Dear Editor,

In the September 2006 issue of your magazine there is, on page 42, an article about the Battle off Samar. The interview is excellent and the action of the Taffies, especially Taffy 3, was indeed magnificent, and probably beyond our power to fully describe and appreciate.

However, in the introduction to the article, the last sentence of the paragraph reads: "On that fateful afternoon, all that stood between the big Japanese guns and the defenseless transports was Taffy 3." I have seen this statement or one like it in numerous presentations about this battle. It is wrong! With the transports were two fire support groups, the very force that had destroyed, just the previous night, the force coming through the Surigao Straits. This force consisted of six battleships, four heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, and 27 destroyers. Other destroyers and PTs were also available.

You may check some of the details of this by consulting Samuel Eliot Morison's *History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. XII, Leyte*—especially pages 294-296. (The Appendices list the ships involved.) Why Morison's comments and information seem to be ignored (regularly) I have never understood. Even if you disagree with him, they should be noted.

Such claims that "All that stood in the way was Taffy 3" seem, at best, to be sloppy research and reporting; at worst, it is telling lies and rewriting history. I am extremely disappointed in sloppy editing that lets this get published. Don't you think this should be corrected?

There are many "what ifs" that could be considered with this situation, but I will leave that to others. Let it be noted that Taffy 3—actually, all three Taffies—were in the way and gave a heroic account of themselves. They don't need any "beefing up" of their action.

Kenneth C. Haydon
Eureka Springs, Arkansas

Cambridge Spy Ring

Dear Editor,

The news these days is that North Korea may test a nuclear weapon that can reach the West Coast of the United States. The "Top Secret" column in the September 2006 issue, about the Cambridge Spy Ring, ties into this. John Costello, in his 1990 book *Mask of Treachery,* says that at the outset of the Korean War, the English asked Truman if he would nuke the Chinese Communists if they entered the war. Truman said that he would not. Maclean passed this information on to the Chinese, who then fought us. So we did not conquer the North Koreans. That brings us (with Bill Clinton's nuclear aid to them) to where we are today.

Philip F. Martin
Kempton, Pennsylvania

RAF's Eagle Squadron

Dear Editor,

I would like to make a technical point concerning David Johnson's very fine article on the Eagle Squadron in the September 2006 issue. On page 15, he states, "The Eagles were, after all, the first Americans to fight Hitler." Obviously, he meant during World War II; however, four years before Pearl Harbor and two years before England entered the war, American volunteers of the LaCalle Squadron of the Spanish Republic Air Force were engaging Hitler's airmen (the Condor Legion) in the skies over Spain. Of these combat pilots, Frank G. Tinker

of Arkansas stands out as a true ace. Tinker shot down five German planes (three Heinkels and two Messerschmidts). The American volunteers flew mostly Polikarpov I-15 biplanes that more than held their own with the more modern German fighters.

Phil Milani
Barnegat, New Jersey

The Capture of U-505

Dear David Alan Johnson,

I read with interest your article dealing with the capture of *U-505* ("High Seas Capture," September 2006).

Some years ago, I toured the Museum of Science and Technology in Chicago where *U-505* is exhibited. I remember that there was a sloping tunnel from the museum to the submarine and the captain's quarters. A few weeks ago, there was a program dealing with *U-505* on the Discovery Channel. It showed some former German sailors who had served on it touring the Chicago exhibit. If I recall correctly, *Time* magazine had an article on *U-505* some years ago. The article said that Lieutenant David, who led the boarding party, had passed away, but it did not say whether it was in the war or from natural causes. I presume that *U-505* was hidden until the end of World War II.

I served in peacetime in the 1950s aboard a Canadian frigate, HMS *Swansea,* which sank four U-boats during World War II. The *Swansea* was scrapped and its wheelhouse was on display in the old Canadian War Museum in Ottawa.

I toured *U-190* in late 1945 when it was brought into Halifax harbor. I can recall the strange odor of cabbages and diesel oil in the sub. Unlike *U-505,* it was painted yellow and sent to the bottom of the Atlantic as target practice for Canadian naval guns. Later, it was revealed that *U-190* had sunk a Canadian ship in April 1945 in the approaches to Halifax harbor with an acoustic torpedo. I believe that by 1943 the acoustic torpedo was no longer a serious threat to the Allied navies.

My uncle was a purser on three ships before World War II began. The ships served the Canadian-BWI export and tourist trade, traveling between Halifax and the West Indies before jet travel became available. They were called the "Lady" boats, the *Lady Rodney, Nelson,* and the third ship's name escapes me. One of them, used as a troop transport, was torpedoed in the harbor at Kingston, Jamaica, in 1942. At least one of the sailors on the ship sunk by *U-190* had served on the "Lady" boats prior to the war.

An American friend and colleague who served in the Navy during WWII told me that when word of an American submarine being sunk was received at Pearl Harbor, the bell on the base was tolled. I remember an article in the *Saturday Evening Post* which said that in the Pacific, the Japanese Navy did not adjust their depth charges properly and were not sinking American submarines. The article said that an American senator mentioned this publicly and the Japanese heard about it and fixed their depth charges. The article said 800 American naval personnel died because of his loose talk.

Thanks for a most interesting retrospective.

William J. Curran
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada

NOTE: Opinions expressed in "Dispatches" do not represent the opinions of the writers, editors, or staff of *WWII History* or Sovereign Media. *WWII History* welcomes your letters which must be signed and include a telephone number for verification. If your letter is published, only name, city, and state will appear; telephone numbers will not be published. Letters must be brief and of general interest to our readership. Write to *WWII History,* 453 B Carlisle Drive, Herndon, VA 20170; fax to 703-964-0366, or e-mail:dispatch@wwiihistorymagazine.com.

During its attempt to capture the fortress city of Metz, the U.S. Third Army employed chemical smokescreens.

BY JON LATIMER

National Archives

Smoke billows from a generator employed at Ludwigshafen along the banks of the Rhine River. The ruins of the city of Mannheim, Germany, are visible in the background.

With the defeat of the German Seventh Army and the closing of the Falaise Gap in the summer of 1944, the Allies pursued the retreating enemy across France. During the advance, their supply lines were stretched to the breaking point. The distance from the beaches and the only open port of any size, Cherbourg, meant that the diverging directions of the Allied advance could not be sustained equally. These logistical concerns heated up a debate over strategy. A single thrust into the heart of the Ruhr was strongly supported by the British, led by Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery. The Supreme Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, favored a broader front. As Lt. Gen. George S. Patton's Third Army charged east toward the Meuse and Moselle Rivers, Eisenhower assured Monty that despite the broad-front strategy he was adopting, the need to open up ports on the Channel coast would dictate that the British-led forces receive priority supplies. Patton and his superior, Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, protested strongly because this approach would halt to their own headlong advance.

"My men," declared Patton, "can eat their belts, but my tanks have gotta have gas." Bradley also wanted to turn the First Army eastward, and the combined pressure eventually produced a compromise. "We finally persuaded General Eisenhower to let V Corps of the First Army and the Third Army go on and attack the Siegfried Line as soon as the Calais area was stabilized," said Patton, who later reported that he obtained "permission to seize crossings over the Moselle ... whenever I could get the fuel to move."

What Patton did not reveal was that one of his corps had just captured 110,000 gallons of the precious fluid, enough to take it to the Moselle. Unfortunately for the Allies as a whole, this concession was untimely. The Germans, who had regarded Patton as the greater threat, had already been discovered concentrating forces to check him on the Moselle. Now, he had sufficient resources engage in battle, but the fuel supply remained insufficient for

National Archives

Testing an M-2 smoke generator along the banks of the Seine River in France, members of the 161st Chemical Company produce a thick pall of oily concealment.

his tanks to cut through quickly or win an encounter.

On September 3, 1944, Hitler ordered Field Marshal Walther Model to concentrate powerful forces on the Upper Moselle with the aim of producing a counterattack into the flank of the Americans. This was never a realistic option, rendered still less so by the rapid advance of the British and Canadians to Brussels and Antwerp. The enormous gap that now opened up between the German Fifteenth Army along the coast and the Seventh Army in full flight ahead of the Americans after the closing of the Falaise Gap presented the Reich with a crisis. Committing reserves appeared to be the only way to maintain an adequate defense. While the barrel was scraped for every available man—convalescents formed invalid battalions, training establishments were scoured, and garrisons were stripped—Luftwaffe chief Hermann Göring blithely announced that he had six parachute regiments.

These regiments were combined with Luftwaffe ground staff and troops and were formed into the First Parachute Army, which was brought into the line in the Netherlands. Germany, however, not only had a crisis of manpower, but of equipment as well. Although all 88mm antitank guns, Tiger II heavy tanks, and Jagdpanther tank destroyers were directed to the west, the mobile Panther medium tanks and most of the heavy self-propelled assault guns went east, leaving the German commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Gerd von Rund- stedt, without an armored reserve powerful enough to counter another Allied breakthrough. He had to prevent the battle from becoming fluid again. The best chance of achieving this lay in holding off the most immediate threat at the Meuse long enough to man the fixed defenses of the Siegfried Line on the German frontier.

As the Germans faced disaster, so the argument over the strategy of the Allied advance continued. Eisenhower persisted with his idea of a broad front with emphasis in the north. Bradley took this as the opportunity to allow Patton to continue advancing and allocated him half the available supplies so that he could "cross the Moselle and force the Siegfried Line."

What Patton did not appreciate was the change in the ground he was covering. Having swept across open farmland, he was now approaching the traditional battleground between France and Germany, Alsace-Lorraine. Three major rivers and innumerable tributaries carved the landscape into wooded, hilly tracts, difficult enough for infantry and totally unsuited for armored operations. Since Roman times, this had been the natural route for armies to take in both directions. Fortifications had been built and improved upon throughout the centuries.

While some had assumed that the tank and the airplane had rendered static fortifications obsolete, it became apparent that the advancing Americans would be forced to contend with the region's fixed German defenses. The French had begun refortifying strongpoints in the area in the 1860s, and the work was continued by the Germans after their victory in the Franco-Prussian War. As artillery improved, so did the works throughout the period before World War I.

These fortifications bore no relation to the medieval idea of a lump of stone dominating the landscape. They aimed at concealing, armored artillery batteries, infantry shelters, and pillboxes, all often connected by tunnels and trenches to subterranean hospitals, mess halls, power stations, and every necessity of command and control.

Many fortifications were surrounded by thick barbed wire, unscalable fences, and deep minefields. They were also designed so that losing a foothold in one corner would not reduce the complex's effectiveness. Eight of these fortifications were built around the city of Metz and more around Thionville. All were positioned to block any advance from the Moselle. They were garrisoned by troops gleaned from officer and noncom training establishments, battle-hardened from the Eastern Front. Meanwhile, Allied headquarters, surprised as it was by the speed of the advance, was unable to supply anything other than Michelin tourist maps at a scale of 1:100,000. While they showed the main roads, they were useless for close analysis of terrain or for meaningful planning.

Because they would be facing somewhat unconventional defenses, the advancing Americans eventually resorted to a seldom-used technique to deal with the strongpoints: generating a large forward smoke screen.

Smoke had been used successfully in the North African and Italian campaigns, but never before in northwest Europe. Twelve smoke generator companies were assigned to the European Theater of Operations, but only four were available for forward operations and only two of these were actually operational. The remainder were stuck in rear areas on transport, security, and other duties. They had all been trained for rear-area antiaircraft support duties and they had never operated under continuous and heavy fire.

The unit chosen to undertake this hazardous mission was the 84th Smoke Generator Company attached to the 5th Division and under the operational control of the 1103rd Engineer Combat Group. These formations had no experience working with smoke.

On September 6, Patton resumed the advance, deploying a strong reconnaissance force with the aim of forcing the Moselle at Metz. This was preceded by a light cavalry screen that, after encountering serious opposition, was forced to retire by elements of the 17th SS Panzer Division, which was retreating in front of them. By September 8, however, the Meuse was crossed and the Americans were almost into Bastogne, having already taken Liége.

Model reported to von Rundstedt that "there is only a very thin and inadequate defense line

... the enemy enjoys almost complete freedom of movement as far as the West Wall [Siegfried Line], which is held—to the rear of Seventh Army—by only seven or eight battalions on a front of 120 kilometers." Unless Seventh Army were substantially reinforced, a strategic breach would be opened on the German frontier. When the Americans reached the Moselle, they found that all the bridges had been blown. After four or five fordable crossing sites were reported, the reconnaissance force headed toward these.

The Moselle runs lies in a deep valley, and the roads down to it run through ravines. All of these were covered by German troops. It was difficult enough to get the first American troops down to the water's edge. Then came a delay while engineers and bridging equipment were brought forward. When the 5th Infantry Division was ordered to Dornot to make a crossing, the troops found the 7th Armored Division already in place and creating an appalling traffic jam. As the units piled up behind each other, rain and sleet added to their misery.

Facing the Americans across the river were two forts, Sommy and St. Blaise. Like most older forts noted on the Michelin maps, they were marked inaccurately and usually discounted by the advancing troops as ancient monuments. As dawn broke on September 8, they burst into life, pouring fire into the crowded units across the river.

By afternoon, a force from the 11th Infantry Regiment managed a crossing in assault boats, and two companies set out to capture Fort St. Blaise. They advanced up a hill and through a wooded area without opposition until they found themselves suddenly outside the fort. One company commander was shot by a sniper, driving the rest of the soldiers to ground. Ahead of them were five rows of barbed wire, a 13-foot steel fence, and a dry ditch approximately 50 feet wide and 16 feet deep. A prisoner they had taken on the way added to their woes by describing the garrison as 1,500 SS men.

The battalion operations officer decided this was too much for two companies to deal with and pulled them back to allow artillery support to assist. The fire unfortunately fell short and caused a number of friendly casualties. The fort responded in kind, and a German counterattack forced the remainder back into their bridgehead. A request by the division to pull them back over the river was denied.

Meanwhile, the 2nd Infantry Division, advancing north of Dornot, had also run into a string of forts. Artillery was unable to effectively engage many of these positions because they were on reverse slopes. By the evening of

National Archives

Screening an advancing Army column, an M-2 smoke generator mounted on a Jeep belches a plume of chemical fog.

September 9, the commander of the 2nd Infantry Regiment, reporting casualties of 14 officers and 332 men, protested bitterly against sending infantry against "twenty odd forts." He suggested an air attack, which was carried out the following day by three sorties of P-47 Thunderbolt fighter bombers armed with 500-pound armor-piercing bombs. Little damage resulted, and the following infantry attack fared no better than its predecessors.

The chosen crossing site was at Arnaville in the narrow valley bottom of the Moselle. Through this gap runs a canal, a river, and a railroad in a belt approximately 400 to 500 yards wide on the western side with a flat strip of land on the eastern shore about 1,000 yards wide, beyond which lay the high ground occupied by the Germans. A small stream, the Rupt de Mad, flows beneath the railroad and canal joining the Moselle. Roads running north and south of the river marked the boundary between the flat land and the rising hills. On a clear autumn day, the visibility was five or six miles to the south in the direction of Metz and three or four miles upstream toward Arnaville and including the proposed crossing sites.

One of the keys to success in such operations is the speedy reinforcement of the bridgeheads, and this in turn depends on bridges. However, the Germans maintained excellent positions including casemated artillery in Fort Driant overlooking the west bank, and they could call on further artillery support.

The American forces decided that a smokescreen might provide the best protection for combat engineers and infantry at the bridgehead. Some of the excellent meteorological assets available to the U.S. forces were utilized in a careful study of the area by 5th Division's chemical officer with artillery and air force assistance. This assessment, coupled with interviews of local residents, confirmed a prevailing wind direction as westerly with generally low velocity. Consequently, the chemical officer and the commander of the 84th Company decided to deploy the smoke generators on a line behind Hill 303 some 2,300 yards west of the crossing site. Thus, the prevailing winds would carry the smoke over the crossing site, covering the troops involved in the bridging operation and the flat land to the immediate east of the position. The wind was not expected to change direction, so no effort was made to place generators close to the site itself. This would prove to be a serious and costly mistake.

A secondary reason for placing the generators so far from the crossing site was concern about the behavior of the Smoke Company troops under fire. It was believed that the hill would provide them with cover from artillery and small arms fire and help to steady them as they prepared their equipment. To further enhance this protection, observation posts were to be established on Hills 303 and 331. Radio communications would link these posts with the 5th Division's chemical officer, who would be deployed at the crossing site. In the meantime, tactical control of the smoke operations was the responsibility of the engineers.

Smoke generator units, first organized shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, were initially deployed to protect the Panama Canal, the locks at Sault Ste.-Marie, Michigan, and aircraft plants along the West Coast. The first generator developed was the M-1 or ESSO model. Its principal drawback was its size. It weighed 3,000 pounds and consumed 100 gallons of fog oil every hour. Fog oil was a petroleum distillate that produced an exceptionally long-lasting smoke similar to natural fog. It could easily hold its form for up to five miles downwind of the generation point and would obscure a target day or night.

The 84th was equipped with some of these models, but their main equipment was the new mobile M-2 mechanical smoke generator. This weighed just 172 pounds and drew its fog oil from an external source, usually a 53-gallon drum. The drum would supply it for an hour, and it could generate its first smoke in about a minute as opposed to the three to five necessary for the M-1.

During the night of September 9, the company moved into position. The required fog oil was held at the Third Army supply depot in

Troyes, some 180 miles to the rear. Because the 84th did not possess sufficient transport to bring up the large quantities needed, the 5th Division's quartermaster trucks had to haul the fog oil up to the company supply area some four miles to the rear of the position; the drums were then brought forward by the company's own trucks. A total of 48 generators were available for the operation; 12 were in position, and spewing smoke on schedule at 0600 on September 10.

The assault troops consisted of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 10th Infantry Regiment, which advanced easily under the cover provided by the smoke and succeeded in crossing the river to begin their advance on the far side. The engineers, meanwhile, had not yet brought forward their bridging equipment. At around 1000, the wind shifted to the north-northeast, exposing the site to the full fury of the defenses.

In an effort to reestablish the screen, four generators were now moved to another site closer to the river near to an abandoned railroad embankment, and smoke cover was produced again by noon. However, operations were becoming confused, and the generators were running short of oil. When the assistant division commander and the division chemical officer searched for the company commander, he could not be found, and the executive officer was doing a recon of possible positions on the far bank.

Meanwhile, the company had deserted its first position and abandoned its oil and equipment. The first sergeant was located and was able to organize the movement of oil, generators, and spares to the new position. When the company commander appeared in the late afternoon, he was duly relieved. That night, the Dornot bridgehead upstream was finally withdrawn, the troops having suffered 200 casualties and with only two officers still fit for duty.

To maintain the screen regardless of the wind direction, positions were set up in a variety of locations. A third position, parallel to the Arnaville-Noveant road, was augmented by a jeep-mounted generator that moved back and forth along the road to fill any gaps. Eight generators were taken across the river during the night to a fourth location to be ready for operations by the following day. Further emergency positions were located south of Arnaville, but these were not needed.

On the morning of September 11, the generator crews in the third position began to produce an effective smokescreen so that crossing activities proceeded without interference from the enemy. The engineers had finally brought bridging equipment forward and were ready to begin construction. At around 0900, an engineer officer, noting the lack of effective enemy fire, ordered the smoke generators to be switched off because the smoke slowed the bridge builders down.

National Archives

In an effort to protect First Army troops crossing the Roer River at Nideggen, Germany, a smoke pot pours a dark cloud to obscure the enemy's view.

When the Germans found the target revealed, they plastered it with every available weapon and succeeded in destroying some of the heavy equipment and disrupting the efforts of the engineers. Smoke cover was reestablished as quickly as possible, and the bridging site was now moved some 300 yards downstream to account for the enemy's probable pinpointing of the original position.

In the face of fierce German opposition, it became clear that it would require a major effort to force the river line. Further plans to make the major offensive effort in the north prompted Bradley to warn Patton on September 12 that he might have to "hold the west bank of the Moselle defensively." Patton therefore proposed to get so heavily involved on the far side that Eisenhower would be unable to call a halt. Bradley gave him until the night of the 14th to do this.

Meanwhile, control of the smoke operations was removed from the engineers and placed in the hands of the division chemical officer, who answered directly to the commander. This resulted in a fierce debate as to the relative merits of the smokescreen. The engineer commander argued that too much reliance had been placed upon it and that it greatly interfered with his men's ability to carry out their task. The divisional commander decided that it would remain and cited the damage caused by the Germans on the bridging equipment on September 11 as evidence of its necessity. A balance clearly had to be struck between Patton's urgency and the tactical benefits provided by the smoke.

The engineers completed their task late on September 14, and the dominating heights were captured on the following afternoon. The same day, as Eisenhower reaffirmed his intention to advance on a broad front, he assigned a high priority to support the Anglo-Canadian forces on the left until the Rhine bridgeheads were won. Significantly, however, this support could not be provided until crossings over the Moselle had been secured. This compromise was fine with Patton who wrote, "By the evening of the fourteenth, I had made good my promise to Bradley and had secured in both his opinion and mine, a good bridgehead across the Moselle."

With the bridgehead secured, the requirement for smoke did not end. The Germans retained dominating positions at Fort Driant and close to Metz. The 161st Smoke Generating Company relieved the 84th on September 21 and continued producing smoke to cover the bridge site for another four days. With the decision by XX Corps to cease smoke operations, the Germans promptly destroyed the treadway bridge and a pontoon structure was also damaged, stopping all traffic. The 84th was rapidly recalled to reestablish the smokescreen. Utterly inexperienced troops at the start, they had rapidly developed into the foremost exponents of the art of making smoke and had contributed greatly to the success of Patton's advance.

Unfortunately, this left Eisenhower in an

extremely weak position. With only 54 divisions of all types to hold a front of 600 miles, he did not have the strength to concentrate anywhere, and the Germans were able to affect an amazing recovery as the autumn progressed. They held up the Allies further before the final defenses of the West Wall and the Rhine were breached. However, a valuable technique had been added to those of the offensive. The 84th Smoke Generator Company had proved that smoke could be used effectively in an assault and, in particular, a bridging operation. Still, lessons would need to be drawn from the experience. The casualties in the operation included 725 in the 10th Infantry, 13 killed and 100 wounded in the 1103rd Engineer Combat Group, and two killed and seven wounded in the 84th.

The operation had been plagued from the beginning by logistical problems. As commanders from all levels downward were learning, logistics is the art of the possible and the lack of transport organic to the 84th could only be overcome by temporarily putting them at the top of the divisional priority list. However, problems with moving men, equipment, fuel, and supplies continued. Essential to the operational effectiveness of their task was the placement of the generators close to the objectives. This did not occur initially, nor was control clearly established early in the operation.

Meteorological intelligence was critically important in the deployment of smoke to prepare for rapid changes in wind direction. The soldiers had been inadequately trained for a combat support operation. Operators were in short supply as were trained technicians capable of repairing the generators.

Unquestionably, the use of smoke to screen a difficult river-crossing operation had been a welcomed development. Unfortunately, the longer term outlook was not so good. The Metz forts would lead to the first reverse suffered by Patton's Third Army since its official inception in Normandy on August 1. Eventually, the city was surrounded and bypassed on November 22 before it actually surrendered.

The last of the forts to capitulate was Fort Ste. Jeanne d'Arc, on December 9, its garrison having finally run out of food and water. Plans to reach the Rhine now bogged down in the autumn rains, and the great river was not crossed until almost six months to the day after Patton's troops had first closed upon the Moselle. □

Frequent contributor Jon Latimer writes on a number of World War II-related subjects from his home in Wales, United Kingdom.

In the 1940s, the American film industry rallied like never before or since to support the war effort.

BY FLINT WHITLOCK

After Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and America's formal entry into World War II, isolationist sentiments in the United States were swept away and millions of men and women of all backgrounds rushed to recruiting centers to volunteer for military duty.

The American movie colony in Hollywood was no exception. Many established stars, directors, cameramen, and other technicians put aside their safe, cushy, high-paying jobs for the duration and offered themselves up to the recruiters. Their example inspired thousands of other young men and women to also selflessly enlist and put themselves in harm's way. Others, without knowing that they would become stars after the war, also joined up without hesitation.

While it would be impossible within the scope of this article to honor all those who served their country, here is a brief sampling.

In the late 1930s and early 1940s, there was no bigger movie star than Clark Gable, who had captured the hearts of millions of women with his portrayal of Rhett Butler in the 1939 blockbuster film, *Gone with the Wind*. Yet, despite the fact that he was 41 years old in 1942 and technically no longer eligible for the draft, Gable enlisted as a private in the Army Air Corps in August 1942. Many speculate that the death of his beloved wife, the glamorous actress and comedienne Carole Lombard, prompted Gable to enlist.

Returning to California from a war bond tour of the Midwest on January 24, 1942, Lombard was killed when the TWA plane she was on crashed in Nevada. Her death shattered Gable, stunned the nation, and prompted President Franklin Roosevelt to remark, "She gave unselfishly of time and talent to serve her government in peace and war. She loved her country. She is and always will be a star, one we shall never forget nor cease to be grateful to."

Gable qualified for Officers' Candidate School and came out in October 1942 with second lieutenant's bars. He then attended aerial gunnery school and was assigned to the 351st Bomb Group in Polebrook, England, where he flew several operational missions in B-17s over Europe. Hitler reportedly offered a reward for any German who could capture him alive. In October 1943 he returned to the States as a major and was taken off active flying status. His service was recognized with the Distinguished Flying Cross and Air Medal. In 1948 he played an Air Force general in *Command Decision*.

Swashbuckler Douglas Fairbanks, Jr., one of Hollywood's hottest "properties" before the war, had already served in the Navy in the 1920s and was a member of the naval reserves. With the outbreak of World War II, he was sent as an exchange officer to England, where he participated with the British in several cross-Channel commando raids. After working with Lord Louis Mountbatten's staff to develop deception devices designed to fool the Germans, he lobbied his superiors to create an American unit that would similarly specialize in tactical cover, diversion, and deception operations.

The result was the formation of Beach Jumper Unit 1. Although Fairbanks did not command the unit, it was first successfully employed during the invasion of Sicily in 1943. As a naval officer, the actor, however, did take part in the invasions of Sicily and Elba. Eventually several more Beach Jumper units were organized and deployed around the world. Fairbanks was working on deception plans to support the scheduled British landings on Singapore when the war ended. After the war, he was awarded the Silver Star, British Distinguished Service Cross, and the French Legion of Honor. He retired from the Navy with the rank of captain.

Lanky Jimmy Stewart had already made several hugely successful pictures such as *Mr.*

All photos National Archives

After OCS and gunnery school, Clark Gable was assigned to the 351st Bomb Group in Polebrook, England. Here he demonstrates the techniques for handing a waist gun.

Major James Stewart briefs members of the 453rd Bomb Group before a mission.

Smith Goes to Washington and *The Philadelphia Story*. He was considered one of Hollywood's top leading men but gave up the glitz and glamour to enlist (at age 32, nine months before Pearl Harbor) as a private in the Air Corps; he had earned his civilian pilot's license a few years earlier. He qualified to fly B-17s, eventually becoming commander of the 703rd Bomb Squadron, 445th Bomb Group, which deployed from Iowa to Tibenham, England, in November 1943.

There, Stewart flew 20 dangerous combat missions over Europe, for which he received numerous decorations, including the Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Flying Cross with Oak Leaf Cluster, and Air Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters. After being promoted to major in January 1944, he was transferred to the 453rd Bomb Group and made Group Operations Officer. In June 1944, Stewart was promoted to lieutenant colonel and became the chief of staff of the 2nd Combat Bomb Wing, 2nd Air Division, Eighth Air Force. In December, he was made the operations officer for the 2nd Combat Air Wing and, a month later, chief of staff of the wing. Promoted to full colonel in March 1945, he went on to command the 2nd Combat Bomb Wing.

Returning to Hollywood, he resumed his movie career and was even more popular than before. He starred in dozens more films (including 1955's *Strategic Air Command*), and never lost his love of military flying. He continued to be an active member of the Air Force Reserve and reportedly flew B-52 bombing missions during the Vietnam War. He retired as a brigadier general. Stewart's son, 1st Lt. Ronald W. McLean, was killed in Vietnam in June 1969.

Henry Fonda was also a recognized star before the war began, having earned considerable acclaim in *Young Mr. Lincoln* (1939) and *The Grapes of Wrath* (1940), in addition to many other pictures. After Pearl Harbor and against the wishes of his studio, 20th Century Fox, he enlisted in the Navy. He later played in several military-themed pictures, including the title role in *Mr. Roberts* (1955), *In Harm's Way* (1965), *Battle of the Bulge* (1965), as General Teddy Roosevelt in *The Longest Day*, and as Admiral Chester Nimitz in *Midway* (1976).

Many British stars, too, served with distinction. One of the greatest English actors of his generation, Lawrence Olivier, served as a pilot instructor in the Royal Air Force but was relieved from instructor duty after crashing five planes within a seven-month period. He played a memorable role as Dr. Spaander in *A Bridge Too Far* (1977) and narrated the award-winning BBC documentary series *The World at War*.

Richard Todd, who played glider-borne commando leader Major John Howard in *The Longest Day*, had been a paratrooper on D-Day. As a member of a pathfinder unit assigned to light a drop zone, he reportedly was the first man to jump from a transport into France on June 6. He later was engaged in the brutal fighting at Arnhem during September 1944.

Richard Burton was a Royal Navy veteran of World War II who appeared in *The Longest Day*. Richard Attenborough, who directed *A Bridge Too Far*, served with the Royal Air Force. Dirk Bogarde, who played Lt. Gen. Frederick "Boy" Browning in *A Bridge Too Far*, served with distinction in the Queen's Royal Regiment. After the war, Bogarde returned to civilian life after being discharged with the rank of major.

Dashing, debonair David Niven's war service was exemplary. After graduating from Sandhurst and receiving a commission, he served in the Highland Light Infantry, saw action on Malta and at Normandy, headed a commando unit, and reached the rank of lieutenant colonel by war's end. The son of an Army captain who was killed at Gallipoli in World War I, Niven appeared in many war films, including *The Charge of the Light Brigade* (1936), *Dawn Patrol* (1938), *The True Glory* (1939), *Spitfire* (1942), and *The Guns of Navarone* (1961).

Alec Guinness, unforgettable as Colonel Nicholson in *The Bridge on the River Kwai*, for which he won the 1957 Best Actor Oscar, served in the Sicily, Elba, and Yugoslavia operations and reportedly skippered a British landing craft to the invasion beaches of Normandy on D-Day.

Donald Pleasance, who played the Royal Air Force soldier who goes blind while a POW in *The Great Escape* (1963), was actually an RAF pilot who was shot down by the Germans and held in a POW camp until the end of the war.

Although not a member of the military, 50-year-old Leslie Howard, who portrayed Ashley Wilkes in *Gone with the Wind*, lost his life on a commercial airliner when it was shot down by German fighters off the coast of Spain on June 1, 1943. There is some evidence to suggest that because the Germans thought British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was aboard the flight, the attack was an assassination attempt. Howard did, however, have connections with British intelligence, and the actor's manager, Alfred Chenhalls, who was aboard the plane, greatly resembled Churchill, which may have led spies to conclude that the prime minister was among the passengers.

Captain Henry Fonda served on the USS *Curtis*.

Other British actors who served in the military during World War II include Rex Harrison of *My Fair Lady* fame, Christopher Lee,

Kenneth More, Ralph Richardson, Peter Sellers, and Peter Ustinov, who served as Lt. Col. David Niven's batman.

Once peace returned in 1945, so did the celebrities, many of whom went on to play roles in war films—films that often eerily reflected their own combat experiences.

Robert Montgomery was such an actor. One of prewar Hollywood's top draws, the debonair Montgomery joined the U.S. Naval Reserve in 1941. He enlisted in the British military before America was drawn into the war and drove ambulances in France until the Dunkirk evacuation. He returned home and joined the active Navy, first serving as assistant naval attaché at the American embassy in London, then going on to command PT boats in the Pacific. He next served as operations officer aboard a destroyer during Operation Overlord, the June 6, 1944, invasion of France. He reprised his real-life role of a PT boat commander in the taut 1945 Pacific War drama *They Were Expendable*, with John Wayne.

Jane Wyman salutes 2nd Lt. Ronald Reagan of the U.S. Army Air Corps.

Not all of the actors returned home to resume their acting careers. The movies' first Lone Ranger, Lee Powell, joined the 2nd Marine Division and saw action at Tarawa and Saipan before being killed on July 30, 1944, on Tinian in the Marianas. He is buried in the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific, also known as the Punchbowl, in Honolulu. Another B-Western actor, Richard Fiske, who also played in some Three Stooges comedies, lost his life in action in France in August 1944.

Directors, too, often found themselves under fire. John Ford, appointed chief of the Photographic Branch of the Office of Strategic Services with the rank of lieutenant commander in the Navy, filmed battle scenes at Midway, where he was severely wounded. George Stevens, Frank Capra, John Huston, and studio heads Darryl F. Zanuck and Jack Warner were all involved in the making of documentaries as well as training films. George Roy Hill, who would become a director after the war, flew fighters for the Army Air Corps.

The war turned some men into movie stars, the most notable being Audie Murphy who, with his boyish features, Medal of Honor, and unofficial title of Most Decorated American Serviceman of World War II, was signed by the movie studios, mostly for B-Westerns. He starred in two memorable war films, however, the Civil War drama *The Red Badge of Courage* (1951) and 1955's *To Hell and Back*, in which he played himself.

Harold Russell had been a paratroop instructor when he lost both hands in a training accident in 1944 at Camp Mackall, North Carolina. He was cast as a war-wounded Navy veteran named Homer, trying to readjust to civilian life in William Wyler's *The Best Years of Our Lives*, for which Wyler won the Best Director and Best Picture Oscars in 1946. Russell won the Academy Award for Best Supporting Actor and a second, special Oscar "for bringing hope and courage to his fellow veterans." He is the only actor to win two Oscars for the same role. He later served three terms as Commander of AMVETS.

A 10-year Army veteran in his pre-acting life, Neville Brand, the officer who points out the window at the burning Pacific Fleet and tells a stunned Richard Anderson, "There's your confirmation, captain," in *Tora, Tora, Tora* (1970), earned the Silver Star when he wiped out a German machine-gun nest in the Ardennes in December 1944. In April 1945, with his unit pinned down at the Weser River in Germany, he was badly wounded in his right arm. Had he not been rescued in time, he would have bled to death. Brand also played Duke, a POW with a hair-trigger temper, in *Stalag 17* (1953).

Several other featured players in *Stalag 17* also wore khaki in real life. William Holden, who won the 1953 Best Actor Oscar for his role in the film, was a lieutenant in the Air Corps. He also starred in 1957's Oscar-winning *The Bridge on the River Kwai*. Peter Graves served two years, also in the Air Corps, and starred in the hit TV series of the 1960s, *Mission Impossible*.

Graves's brother, six-foot-seven James Arness, who starred as Marshal Matt Dillon in the TV series *Gunsmoke* and played the alien in 1951's *The Thing*, was badly wounded in the leg at Anzio, Italy, while serving with the 3rd Infantry Division. He received the Bronze Star in addition to the Purple Heart.

Handsome Tyrone Power was a Marine pilot who ferried troops and supplies into Pacific island bases and evacuated the wounded. Equally handsome Robert Taylor interrupted his

film career to become a flight instructor for the Navy and also directed 17 Navy training films.

Already a leading man, Van Heflin, who starred as Major Sam Huxley in the 1955 film *Battle Cry*, served as a combat photographer with the Ninth Air Force in Europe. Other actors with military experience in *Battle Cry* include Tab Hunter (Coast Guard) and gravel-voiced Aldo Ray (ex-Navy frogman).

Otto Preminger's 1965 film *In Harm's Way* also featured two other stars with World War II backgrounds: Kirk Douglas (Navy) and Burgess Meredith (Air Corps). Douglas was a communications officer on a submarine and was wounded during a depth charge attack by a Japanese destroyer. After the war, he starred in *The Heroes of Telemark* (1965), *Is Paris Burning?* (1966), and two of Stanley Kubrick's films, *Paths of Glory* (1958) and *Spartacus* (1960), as well as innumerable others.

Ernest Borgnine joined the Navy in 1935 and was a chief gunner's mate aboard a destroyer during the war. His military movie roles included featured parts in *From Here To Eternity* (1952) and *The Dirty Dozen* (1967). He also played in TV's *McHale's Navy* and the movie of the same name.

Ronald Reagan, who would later become president of the United States, served as an officer in the Army Air Corps but was not assigned to flight duties due to a severe hearing loss. He made training films.

Jason Robards, Jr., a radioman in the Navy, just missed the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as his ship, the cruiser USS *Northampton*, was at sea during the aerial assault. Robards did not miss the rest of the war, however. On November 30, 1942, off Guadalcanal, the ship was sunk and 1,000 survivors had to be rescued; Robards was one of them. He went on to participate in 14 major battles and was awarded the Navy Cross for heroism at Tassafaronga. He played General Walter Short in *Tora, Tora, Tora*.

Other stars and soon-to-be stars would also see action at sea. Paul Newman served as a Navy radioman in the South Pacific. Victor Mature, star of the 1949 hit *Samson and Delilah*, was a petty officer in the Coast Guard. Others in Coast Guard service were Alan Hale, the Skipper on *Gilligan's Island*, and *Roots* author Alex Haley.

Many other future stars also served in uniform. George C. Scott, who would win an Oscar but refuse to accept it for his portrayal as *Patton* (1970), served in the Marine Corps from 1945 (upon graduation from high school) until 1949, but never saw combat. Karl Malden, who played opposite Scott in *Patton* as General Omar Bradley, served as an enlisted man in the Air Corps. Charles Bronson, outstanding in *The Dirty Dozen*, was a gunner on bombers in the Pacific and flew 21 combat missions while serving with the Twentieth Air Force; he received the Purple Heart for wounds received during one operation.

Sterling Hayden had appeared in a couple of films before joining the Marines on the eve of Pearl Harbor. He served with the OSS in top-secret missions inside Nazi-occupied Yugoslavia.

Mel Brooks, of *Blazing Saddles* and *The Producers*, was a combat engineer who cleared German mines after the Battle of the Bulge.

James Whitmore, who played in *Battleground* (1949) and *Battle Cry* (1955), was a Marine Corps officer in World War II. Art Carney served in a machine-gun squad with the 28th Division in Normandy and was wounded in the leg near St. Lô. Rod Steiger lied about his age to get into the Navy, where he served as a torpedoman. Jack Lemmon, who played the manic Ensign Pulver in *Mr. Roberts*, was an ensign in the Navy aboard the carrier USS *Lake Champlain* at war's end. Walter Matthau was a gunner on B-17s with the Eighth Air Force and earned eight battle stars. Martin Balsam, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel in *Tora, Tora, Tora*, also served in the Army Air Corps.

Returning heroes (l to r): Lt. Cmdr. Robert Montgomery, Major Clark Gable, and Lt. (jg) Robert Taylor with MGM executive Eddie Mannix.

Rod Serling, screenwriter and creator of the hit TV series *The Twilight Zone,* was a paratrooper with the 11th Airborne Division, fought in New Guinea, and was wounded in the leg during the invasion of the Philippines.

Eddie Albert, who played Colonel Thompson in *The Longest Day* and starred in the *Green Acres* TV series, was a decorated Navy officer and saw action during the invasion of Tarawa. Assigned as a salvage officer, he accompanied the second wave to the beachhead to examine military equipment abandoned on the battlefield to see if it was worth retrieving. In addition to the debris, he found wounded Marines and, while under fire, evacuated them to ships offshore. He earned commendations for his bravery.

Lee Marvin, well known by war-film buffs for his role as Major Reisman in *The Dirty Dozen*, was wounded at Saipan while serving with the Marines. Brian Keith was a gunner on Marine Corps planes in the Pacific. Richard Boone, TV's *Paladin,* served on Navy torpedo planes.

Gene "The Singing Cowboy" Autry, star of countless Westerns, served as a flight officer with the Air Transport Command, which shuttled troops to and from their Pacific and Asian combat areas. He also made several flights in C-47s over the dangerous Burma Hump. Former child star Jackie Coogan joined the Army in 1941 and, as a glider pilot, transported Chindit units in Burma.

Before earning fame as a brawny character actor, Charles Durning landed at Omaha Beach on D-Day with the 1st Infantry Division and was wounded six months later during the Battle of the Bulge; he earned the Silver Star.

Charlton Heston, who had the title role in *Ben-Hur* (1959) and played Moses in *The Ten Commandments* (1956), dropped out of college to become an Air Corps radio operator stationed in the Aleutians. Although only 16, Gene Hackman lied about his age to join the Marines. He trained as a radio operator. *Star Trek* creator and producer Gene Roddenberry flew for the Army Air Corps during the Battle of Guadalcanal. Dick Van Dyke served in the Army Air Corps but failed to become a pilot because he was underweight. Tony Curtis, who earlier had been wounded at Guam, watched the Japanese surrender ceremony in Tokyo Bay through binoculars while serving aboard a submarine tender.

Maurice Evans, an English actor who had come to America to seek his fortune, organized

a troupe of performers to provide comedic, dramatic, and musical entertainment close to the front lines. Known as the Central Pacific Theater of the Army Entertainment Section, Evans's unit featured such headliners as Mickey Rooney, Red Buttons, William Holden, and Carl Reiner.

Werner Klemperer, the son of symphony conductor Otto Klemperer, and best known as the POW-camp kommandant Colonel Wilhelm Klink in the long-running *Hogan's Heroes* series, escaped Germany with his family in the 1930s. He joined the U.S. Army in 1942 and served as a military policeman in the Pacific before being recruited for Evans's troupe. He played a powerful role in the 1961 film *Judgment at Nuremberg*.

Jack Palance required complete facial reconstruction after he was seriously injured in the crash-landing of his Army Air Corps B-24 bomber while patrolling the California coast. Other sources say he was wounded in combat or crashed in England. He starred with Eddie Albert and Lee Marvin in *Attack!* (1956).

TV legend Johnny Carson was a Navy officer who had the grim task of removing the dead and mangled bodies of fellow sailors following a Japanese attack on his ship. His TV sidekick Ed McMahon was a Marine fighter pilot who served in both World War II and Korea, flying a total of 85 combat missions.


Lt. Col. David Niven


Marlene Dietrich

George Kennedy, the burly star of the *Airport* and *Naked Gun* movies, as well as *The Dirty Dozen,* spent 16 years in the Army and was an officer in Lt. Gen. George Patton, Jr.'s Third Army. He went on to play Patton in 1979's *Brass Target* and was the military advisor for *The Phil Silvers Show.*

Women, too, performed wartime duties admirably. Nancy Kulp, the skinny spinster Jane Hathaway on *The Beverly Hillbillies* TV series, served as a lieutenant in the WAVES. Martha Raye, in addition to entertaining the troops near the front lines with the USO, also pitched in as a nurse to help the wounded. Marlene Dietrich left Germany before the war and became a U.S. citizen. During the war, in addition to entertaining American troops, she promoted the sale of war bonds and made anti-Nazi broadcasts in German. Bea Arthur, star of TV's *Maude* and *Golden Girls*, served in the women's Marine Corps.

Black cabaret singer and expatriate Josephine Baker remained in France after the Nazi takeover and worked as a spy, providing intelligence information to the Allies.

Teenager Audrey Hepburn, who was vacationing with her Dutch mother in Holland when the Germans invaded, was stuck in Nazi-controlled Arnhem and spent much of the war serving as a courier between Dutch resistance groups.

A number of stars saw more combat on the back lots and sound stages of Hollywood than they did on any real battlefield. Several legendary actors were exempt from World War II military service, including Marlon Brando (knee injury), Gary Cooper (bad hip), Peter Falk (glass eye), Errol Flynn (heart condition), Jackie Gleason (overweight), Van Johnson (injuries sustained in a car crash), Danny Kaye

(bad back), Peter Lawford (shoulder injury), Dean Martin (hernia), Frank Sinatra (perforated eardrum), Richard Widmark (same condition), Gregory Peck (old rowing injury), and Bob Hope, Fred Astaire, and George Raft (too old). Some actors avoided service, such as Cary Grant, Dick Haymes, and John Wayne (bad knee from a football injury, although some less-than-charitable accounts claim that The Duke deliberately avoided military service).

Humphrey Bogart, an established star who had served in the Navy in World War I, tried to enlist but was rejected for service in World War II because the draft board said he was too old (43 in 1942). His roles in *Action in the North Atlantic*, *Sahara*, and *Casablanca* (all 1943), however, inspired a generation to the idealistic calling of national service.

Several Canadian actors served during World War II as well. James Doohan, best known as Scotty in the *Star Trek* TV series, was shot seven times and lost a finger while serving as an officer with a Canadian artillery unit on Juno Beach in Normandy on D-Day. After recovering, he switched branches to join the RCAF and served as a pilot/artillery spotter. Other notable Canadians who answered their country's call include Raymond Massey; Glenn Ford, who served with the U.S. Navy; Leslie Nielsen, and TV game-show host Monty Hall.

German Oskar Werner, who won international acclaim in Francois Truffaut's *Jules et Jim* (1961), tried to avoid military service but in December 1941 was drafted into the Wehrmacht. A dedicated pacifist and anti-Nazi, he acted like an incompetent soldier, deliberately falling from his horse and pretending not to understand how to operate an artillery piece. As a result, instead of being sent to the Russian Front, he was put to work in a garrison in Austria peeling potatoes and cleaning latrines. While still a soldier, he married a half-Jewish woman with whom he had a daughter. During an Allied bombing of Vienna, he was buried under rubble for three days. On December 8, 1944, with his wife and baby, he deserted from the Wehrmacht, hiding in a shack in the Vienna Woods until the Russians closed in.


Air Corps Lieutenant William Holden

Japanese actor Toshiro Mifune, the star of *Rashomon* (1950) and *Seven Samurai* (1954), was drafted into the Japanese Army and transferred to an air force squadron stationed in Manchuria. An experienced photographer, he was soon put in charge of the squadron's aerial photography unit. At war's end, he was stationed at a *kamikaze* base. In 1969, Mifune and Lee Marvin starred together in *Hell in the Pacific*.

Sessue Hayakawa had planned on a naval career, but a hearing loss prevented it. He is best remembered by American audiences as Colonel Saito, the Japanese officer in *The Bridge on the River Kwai*, a performance for which he received an Oscar nomination.

Several fine books chronicle the military lives of the celebrities, including *Khaki: Movie Actors in the Army and Air Services* by James Wise and Paul Wilderson; *Stars in Blue: Movie Actors in America's Sea Services* by James Wise and Ann Rehill; *Stars at War* by Michael Munn; and *International Stars at War* by Scott Baron.

All the books convey a certain nostalgia for a time when the country was in grave peril from a world full of foreign enemies and hundreds of Hollywood stars, and those destined to become stars, gave up their careers and put their lives on the line. □

Flint Whitlock is a frequent contributor to WWII History. *He is the author of several books, including* Soldiers On Skis, The Rock Of Anzio, *and* The Fighting First.

The OSS Cardinal Mission located General Jonathan Wainwright at a Japanese prison camp in Manchuria.

BY JOHN MANCINI

National Archives

Lt. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright and British General Arthur Percival watch as General Douglas MacArthur signs the instrument of surrender in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945.

On May 6, 1942, in the Malinta Tunnel, Corregidor Island, General Jonathan Wainwright waited for the Japanese to respond to his surrender offer with a cease-fire. The courageous Army officer took the remaining time before entering into captivity to send a last message to President Franklin Roosevelt: "With broken heart and head bowed in sadness, but not in shame I report to Your Excellency that today I must arrange terms for the surrender of the fortified islands of Manila Bay. If you agree, please say to the nation that my troops and I accomplished all that is humanly possible and that we have upheld the best traditions of the United States Army. May God bless and preserve and guide you and the nation in the ultimate victory. With profound regret and continued pride in my gallant troops I go to meet the Japanese commander. Good Bye, Mr. President."

The 59-year-old professional soldier had been promoted to lieutenant general and appointed commander of all American and Filipino forces in March 1942 just prior to General Douglas MacArthur's departure for Australia. He graduated from West Point in 1906 and followed his father's legacy by requesting assignment to the cavalry. General Wainwright was a combat veteran of World War I and was posted to the Philippines on the eve of war in December 1941.

Wainwright continued to lead American and Filipino forces in the battle for the Bataan Peninsula until overwhelmed by numerically superior Japanese units, forcing a withdrawal to Corregidor Island in Manila Bay where the fight continued for another month. Thousands of Americans and Filipinos were taken prisoner by the enemy and endured torture and appalling hardships for the next three years. General Wainwright's captivity lasted 39 months and took him from the Philippines to Formosa, Japan, Korea, and ultimately Manchuria.

On August 6, 1945, an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, and three days later a second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. By August 12, Japanese surrender seemed imminent. Both military and public concern now shifted to the welfare of Americans who had been taken captive during the early days of the war.

Many prisoners had already been freed with the liberation of the Philippines, but many were still not accounted for. Of special interest to Americans was the fate of General Wainwright. Allied intelligence was aware of several POW camps in North China and Manchuria and believed that Wainwright was held in one near Mukden, Manchuria. There was also evidence that other high-ranking Allied officials were held in the camp, such as General Arthur E. Percival, the former commander of Singapore. Despite Japan's readiness to surrender, there were still over a million Japanese troops in North China and an entire army group in Manchuria.

The reaction of Japanese field troops to the surrender was unpredictable. There was a possibility of a POW massacre such as occurred in the Philippines prior to the raid on the prison camp at Cabantuan in which a force of Army Rangers, Alamo Scouts, and Filipino guerrillas stormed the notorious camp in January 1945.

Further complicating the situation for Allied planners was the declaration of war by the Soviet Union against Japan on August 8, 1945, which was followed by an invasion of Manchuria.

The Allies developed plans to insert OSS (Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of the CIA) teams to liberate and protect Allied prisoners held by the Japanese. The six-man teams organized for rescue and humanitarian operations became known as Mercy Missions.

Contact Teams had been used in Europe to assist in the liberation of German POW camps, but the operations in China faced a special challenge. There would be a significant lag time between the contact and rescue of POWs and the linkup with friendly ground forces.

Nine teams were organized for missions throughout North China and Manchuria. Of these, the Cardinal Mission became the highest profile operation. The mission launched a parachute drop of a carefully selected OSS team into Manchuria, 900 miles from the Allied headquarters at Chungking.

Major Robert F. Hennessy, a 27-year-old West Point graduate, was selected as leader. Major Robert F. Lamar, a 31-year-old physician, was second in command. In early August, Hennessy and Lamar, along with four other OSS men, parachuted into Manchuria in the vicinity of a prison camp at Hoten near the city of Mukden. Wainwright, however, could not be found. The camp commander advised the OSS officers that the general was held 100 miles to the north at the Sian POW compound. Hennessy directed Lamar and Sergeant Harold Leith, a linguist fluent in both Russian and Chinese, to travel to the Sian Camp and locate Wainwright.

After a long and arduous nocturnal train ride, Lamar and Leith arrived at the Sian Camp on the morning of Sunday, August 19. The two OSS agents met with the camp commander, and after a short but confrontational discussion General Wainwright was summoned. A poignant meeting between the Americans occurred a few minutes later. General Wainwright suddenly appeared in the doorway of the commander's office. The emaciated American hero stood silently in tattered clothing. The OSS men stared at each other with stunned disbelief.

Wainwright broke the silence. "Are you really an American?" he asked.

"General, you are no longer a prisoner of war. You're going back to the States," Lamar responded.

Wainwright, however, was conflicted. He had survived over three years of brutal captivity and was afraid of what his fellow Americans thought of him. Would he return to the United States in disgrace and live the remainder of his life in shame?

Wainwright responded slowly, his voice cracking with emotion, and asked the question he had agonized over for three terrible years. "What do the people in the States think of me?"

"You're considered a hero," Lamar replied.

The tired old general nodded silently but was still not convinced.

Lamar immediately tried to communicate the news to Hennessy in Mukden, but his radio was not working and the Russians had cut the telephone lines. The OSS officer felt the urgency to get General Wainwright and the other liberated prisoners back to Mukden for air evacuation to the safety of Chungking. Japanese units in the area were still armed and dangerous, despite the surrender of the Empire.

National Archives

ABOVE: General Douglas MacArthur (left) embraces General Jonathan Wainwright after Wainwright's return from a POW camp in Manchuria. BELOW: On August 28, 1945, General Jonathan Wainwright steps down from a C-47 transport in Chunking, China, after three arduous years in a Japanese prison camp.

National Archives

Lamar was afraid that General Wainwright and other high-status prisoners such as General Arthur Percival, the former British commander at Singapore, could be kidnapped by rogue Japanese or Russian units and used as hostages. The only course of action for Lamar was to return by train to Mukden and come back to Sian with a convoy of transport vehicles. He estimated his return time to be two days. Leith, because of his fluency in Chinese and Russian, was left with General Wainwright.

Three days passed without the arrival of Lamar and the rescue convoy. The general feared that the OSS officer had been killed before he was able to report the location of the liberated prisoners. Lamar had arrived in Mukden, but the Russians were now in control of the city and on a drunken rampage. The Soviet military had no interest in assisting the Cardinal team in the rescue of the freed POWs. Hennessy and Lamar were powerless to obtain the needed vehicles from the uncooperative Russians.

Meanwhile, General Wainwright and the other prisoners were gripped by frustration and desperation. They were technically free but were still confined to their prison. Ironically, the prison wire now provided some protection from rogue Japanese infantry and uncontrolled Russian troops.

On the afternoon of August 24, the prisoners' emotions soared as a column of American-made vehicles approached the compound. But, as the convoy got closer, large red stars were spotted on the trucks. It was a Russian unit driving U.S. Lend-Lease equipment.

General Wainwright greeted the Russian commander and, using Sergeant Leith as a translator, requested help in getting to Mukden. The Russian replied that his unit was going to Mukden and the liberated prisoners could join them if they provided their own transportation.

The old general reflexively reverted to his precaptivity command personality and quickly organized the liberated POWs while giving orders to his former captors to obtain the needed transportation. By 6 PM, the Russian convoy rolled out of the Sian prison camp with General Wainwright's contingent. The freed prisoners hoped to be in Mukden the following morning. However, the Russian commander became lost on the Manchurian backroads. Adding to the problems, a torrential rainstorm struck on the afternoon of the 25th, turning the roads into a muddy quagmire.

The prisoners' vehicles became stuck in the thick mud, and the Russians threatened to leave them. However, a rail line was discovered nearby and a short time later a small engine pulling three cars appeared. The Russian commander wanted to rid himself of the POW burden. He halted the train and forced the Japanese crew at gunpoint to take General Wainwright and his group. Misfortune quickly followed. The engine jumped the track a short distance from the Russian unit. The frustrated commander stated that he had to continue on but would send help. Wainwright and his exhausted comrades spent a sleepless night in the small passenger cars.

The Russian officer kept his word. He commandeered another train and sent it back to pick up Wainwright's group. Eventually, the exhausted but liberated prisoners arrived in Mukden at 1:30 AM on August 27. The 100-mile trip had taken three days.

Meanwhile, U.S. Army headquarters in Chungking feared the worst. Lamar and Hennessy had reported the situation and the response was to send search aircraft over Manchuria for signs of Wainwright's party. Nothing was seen from the air. The worst fears of the Chungking headquarters and the Cardinal team had apparently come true. Wainwright was thought to be a hostage of the Japanese or Russians.

Leith quickly left the train and reported to Major Lamar. The OSS officer found General Wainwright at about 3 AM and informed him that two planes were waiting to fly him, General Percival, and a selected group to Chung-king.

In Chungking, the general was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. Tears rolled down his sunken cheeks as the citation was read. On the August 31, Wainwright landed in Yokohama to meet with General MacArthur. Wainwright was apprehensive, fearing his old commander's reaction to the general who had surrendered American armed forces to the Japanese. When MacArthur spotted the weary old soldier, he rushed across a crowded dining room and embraced him. The tough veteran soldiers fought back tears, and spoke in whispers for several moments.

General Wainwright's final vindication came on September 2, 1945. Approximately 250 American warships lay at anchor in Tokyo Bay. Aboard the battleship USS *Missouri,* MacArthur stood by a small table with Wainwright and Percival in positions of honor slightly to his rear. He solemnly directed the representatives of the Japanese Empire to come forward and sign the formal articles of surrender.

When they had finished, MacArthur sat down and signed the document. He gestured to Wainwright to come forward and accept the pen. A second pen was handed to Percival.

General Wainwright received his fourth star and was awarded the Medal of Honor. He remained on active duty until his retirement in 1947. He died September 2, 1953, eight years to the day following the formal Japanese surrender. □

A veteran of the U.S. Army Medical Corps and the Marine Corps Ready Reserve, John Mancini is an instructor at a community college in Sierra Vista, Arizona.

Rare Out of Issue U.S. Commemorative Coins

HONOR OUR VETERANS

Many of the U.S. Mint's most desirable silver commemorative coins honor the men and women of our Armed Forces. These low mintage, out of issue, silver dollar commemoratives will only become more valuable with time – start your collection today! All coins come with original U.S. Mint presentation packaging with Certificates of Authenticity. Quantities are very limited. Please use your credit card and order today **1-800-835-0008, or on the net at uscoins.com**.

1991 Korean War Memorial Silver Dollar Proof Coin

Commemorates the 38th Anniversary of the end of the war and those who served in combat. The coin pictures an Army Infantryman in full gear. Very low mintage **$29.95**

-2005-

Marine Corps Anniversary Proof Silver Dollar

Celebrates the 230th Anniversary of the U.S. Marine Corps and depicts the raising of the flag on Iwa Jima. This popular U.S. Mint Commemorative sold out within weeks of issue and is now selling on a popular home shopping channel for over $125. Our special price only **$89.95**

DEALERS IN RARE COINS SINCE 1934

EASTERN NUMISMATICS INC.
642 FRANKLIN AVENUE, GARDEN CITY, NEW YORK 11530
1-800-835-0008 USCOINS.COM

Mail orders will be filled in a timely basis. Send check or money order payable to ENI. Please include $7.00 for postage insurance and handling. Prices are subject to change. *NY State residents please add sales tax.*

Unpredictable Pete Ellis was the father of amphibious warfare.

BY AL HEMINGWAY

He suffered from acute alcoholism and severe bouts of depression. As a result of his heavy drinking, he would wander about for days yelling incoherently. His bizarre actions produced momentary fits of rage that resulted in his throwing a Japanese man down a flight of stairs and punching a hole in his hotel room wall.

Lieutenant Colonel Earl Hancock "Pete" Ellis, however, was a military genius. It was he who foresaw the growing Japanese threat in the Pacific and wrote about the island-hopping campaign that the Marine Corps needed if it was to defeat them. And of all of this occurred more than two decades before it actually happened.

"Pete" Ellis was born in Iuka, Kansas, in 1880. After enlisting in the Marine Corps in Chicago in 1900, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1901. Ellis attended the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, from 1911 until 1913. The Marine Corps Commandant, Brig. Gen. Charles Haywood, agreed with the General Board of the Navy in 1900 that the mission of the Marines was to secure advance bases for its landing forces. Ellis concurred as well. But it was he who perfected the concept of amphibious warfare. While at the War College, he wrote a number of essays on this subject.

When he was stationed on Guam in 1915, Ellis and a party of other leathernecks transported a 3-inch artillery piece across the reef to Orote Point on the island. It was the first time that a large cannon was taken ashore from a naval ship.

World War I interrupted Ellis's advance base theory. He served in France under the legendary General John A. LeJeune. His planning abilities were put to the test when he devised a strategy for the Marines to capture Mont Blanc Ridge. The operation was a resounding success. For his extraordinary efforts, Ellis would be awarded a Navy Cross and French Croix de Guerre.

After the conflict ended in November 1918, Ellis was sent to the Operations and Training Division by the new commandant, Maj. Gen. LeJeune, who had seen Ellis's potential when he served under him in France. It was here that the brilliant Ellis wrote his masterpiece: *Operations Plan 712-H: Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia* (an island group in the North Pacific Ocean) in 1921.

National Archives

In his work, the former farm boy accurately predicted that the United States would fight a major war with the Japanese Empire. In their book *Pete Ellis: An Amphibious Warfare Prophet,* Dirk A. Ballendorf and Merrill L. Bartlett wrote, "Ellis predicted three phases in such a naval campaign: first, the reduction of the Marshalls; second, seizing of the Carolines as far west as Yap; and third, the taking of the remainder of the Carolines, including the Palaus."

It was as if Ellis had peered into a crystal ball and watched the Marines storm the beaches at Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Guam, and Iwo Jima. He said that the naval service needed a better base than Guam and suggested Hawaii (Pearl Harbor soon followed). He said pre-invasion bombardment from the fleet was essential to the success of the landings. Ellis's paper catapulted him into the forefront of Navy/Marine Corps strategy for the future. It was a "radical departure from accepted doctrine."

A dark cloud hung over his rising fame, however; Ellis experienced nervous breakdowns and severe bouts of depression, which at that time were described by the medical community with such terms as "neurasthenia" or "psychosthenia."

Also, Ellis was an alcoholic, and his condi-

United States Marine Corps

U.S. Marines train for an amphibious landing at Culebra, Puerto Rico, in 1924. The experimental landing barge shown in the photo proved to be unseaworthy and impractical. INSET: General John A. LeJeune recognized Pete Ellis's potential during World War I.

tioned worsened as the years passed. His hospital stays became more numerous and lengthy as well. Due to the camaraderie among Marine officers during this period, people with drinking problems like Ellis's were protected. Alcoholism was not considered a disease as it is today, and it was largely overlooked. No doubt LeJeune knew of Ellis's heavy drinking but obviously chose to ignore it and keep him in long-range strategic planning.

"Graphologists analyzing Ellis's handwriting at different stages in his life have also called attention to evidences of confusion and disturbance," wrote Dr. Dirk Anthony Ballendorf, Director of the Micronesian Area Research Center at the University of Guam. "[He was always] fighting an inner battle with himself. Possibly his motivation for joining the Marines had something to do with trying to resolve inner conflicts and feelings of inadequacy.... [H]e always strove to excel."

Ellis's work, however, would soon propel him into another field and cause him to embark on a strange trip—a journey that remains surrounded by controversy to this day.

When World War I began, Japan took possession of Micronesia from the Germans after signing a treaty with Great Britain that would have them "chase the German fleet out of the Pacific if war broke out in Europe." When hostilities did begin, the Japanese moved quickly to acquire all German territory north of the equator. When the war was over, the Japanese gained the territories under a mandate that said no military installations would be constructed, and that Japan had to join the newly formed League of Nations.

The Japanese agreed to all the terms of the Treaty of Versailles but promptly "denied access to foreigners in Micronesia." This action aroused the suspicions of the United States. What were the Japanese up to? Were they building fortifications for use in the event of war?

During the early 1920s, the only way to obtain this type of information was by firsthand accounts. Someone had to be on the scene to get data on Japanese activity in the Pacific, and human intelligence was the key.

Enter Pete Ellis. Little is known of the secret meetings LeJeune and Ellis must have held. Certainly Ellis's drinking and deteriorating physical condition must have been discussed at great length. Despite all his shortcomings, Ellis convinced LeJeune to allow him to undertake the mission.

Soon after, at the behest of LeJeune and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and under a cloud of secrecy, the moody Pete Ellis gave the commandant an undated letter of resignation (so as not to embarrass the Marine Corps, it was later learned) and took a long leave of absence.

United States Marine Corps

A young Pete Ellis poses in uniform. Ellis predicted war with Japan and championed the concepts of Marine warfare.

First, all monies needed for the trip were deposited in his personal bank account. Under the guise of posing as a buyer of copra (dried coconuts) for the Hughes Trading Company out of New York City, the intrepid Ellis set sail in August 1921 for Micronesia. He carried with him maps, charts, and navigational and confidential notebooks. All of this was without the official sanction of the Marine Corps and the ONI. If Ellis failed, he was on his own.

Ellis arrived in San Francisco in August 1921 and boarded the liner SS *Maheno* for the first leg of his journey. He made stops in Australia, Samoa, and Fiji. He procured a visa to visit the Japanese islands, then headed for the Philippines.

From the outset, the mission was doomed to failure. Ellis's drinking soon landed him in the hospital in Yokohama. While in a drunken delirium, he blurted to the head of the naval hospital, Commander Ulys R. Webb, that he was on a secret mission. For the next several months Ellis was a familiar sight at the hospital. In mid-September he entered the medical facility for "delirium tremens and hallucinations."

Webb ordered Chief Pharmacist Mate Lawrence Zembisch to attend to Ellis and report to the Naval attaché at the U.S. Embassy, Captain Lyman A. Cotton, on his condition. When Ellis became well enough to travel, Cotton and Webb told him to return to the United States.

If he returned, Ellis would be dishonored and forced to retire. Instead, embarrassed by his actions, he decided on another course of action. He withdrew all his money from a bank account he had established in New York and left the hospital on October 4, 1922, severing all ties with the military. In essence, he was absent without leave. Ellis must have realized that his excessive drinking would soon kill him, and he wanted to gain as much knowledge of the islands as he could and get the information back to LeJeune.

Ellis traveled extensively in Micronesia, visiting as many islands as possible—Saipan, Yap, Koror, Truk, and Pohnpei. On Palau, one islander recalled how he "sought out the high places and looked out over the sea." All the time, he took meticulous notes of his findings. He was also followed by the local authorities who then reported directly to the Japanese. They kept a watchful eye on the prying American's movements.

Unfortunately, Ellis's drinking was in fact his demise. In late 1922, he was looked after by a U.S. missionary named "Mother" Jesse Rebecca Hoppin, whom the islanders respected tremendously, on Jaluit in the Marshall Islands. It was a full-time job, she learned, trying to keep Ellis from purchasing liquor from the island merchants. "Mother" Hoppin reprimanded them, but Ellis somehow managed to secure whiskey, which he kept hidden from her.

While Ellis was recuperating on Jaluit, his houseboy, Benjamin Lajipun, also became his guide, taking him all over the island. Whenever one of the tiny sailing vessels was scheduled to make a run delivering supplies, the always curious Marine officer also made the journey. He observed and documented in his journal the extent of reefs, the size and population of the various islands, and any buildings and structures he saw there. Observing his keen interest, the Japanese police shadowed him even more closely.

Periodically, Ellis gave letters, presumably explaining his whereabouts, to individuals returning to the United States. One such dispatch he gave to Victor Hermann in March 1923 with instructions to mail it once he reached America. He confided in Hermann and informed him that he would "then go southward to Menado" in the Celebes.

On Koror, Ellis was looked after by his Palauan wife, a beautiful woman named Metauie, who was 25 years his junior. He became violently sick and lapsed into periods of babbling about his "secret mission," refusing all medical aid. Then on the afternoon of May 12, 1923, he suddenly died. He was 43.

The Japanese authorities didn't report Ellis's death for a week. The Japanese apparently con-

fiscated all his notes, charts, and codebooks.

When reports of Ellis's demise reached Washington, his fellow Marines were both shocked and suspicious. LeJeune was deeply distraught by his friend's death. He wrote condolence letters to the Ellis family and disregarded his undated resignation letter. ONI officers questioned Victor Hermann, one of the last Americans to see him alive. He, however, had no intimate knowledge of Ellis's death. Soon, Ellis and his mission faded from public view.

Rumors have circulated that the Japanese poisoned Ellis. Ballendorf and Bartlett, who interviewed people who knew him while he was on Palau, found no evidence of any wrongdoing. If anyone poisoned Ellis, it was Ellis himself with his overindulgence in alcohol. Despite their findings, the rumors persist to this day.

In Japan, the U.S. naval attaché, Captain Cotton, under the pretense of obtaining Ellis's remains, sought more information. He sent Ellis's watchdog, Chief Pharmacist Zembisch, to garner any additional facts on Koror. While there, Zembisch talked to all who knew Ellis. The Marine officer's remains were exhumed and cremated for their return to Japan.

Upon Zembisch's arrival in Yokohama, a strange event occurred. He had to be carried off the ship and taken to a hospital. It appeared that he had had a nervous breakdown due to the rigorous trip. Unfortunately, while his condition was improving, a catastrophic earthquake struck on September 1, 1923, killing Zembisch and further shrouding the mysterious Ellis mission in mystery.

Ellis's "amateurish" attempt to play spy and find out what the Japanese were planning in Micronesia failed miserably. Unknown to the Americans, the Japanese probably did not begin to fortify the islands until 1935. Ellis's snooping turned up no concrete evidence that the building of military bases began any earlier. If he did, the evidence was lost or destroyed by the Japanese.

"But Ellis' belief in, and commitment to, his cause is undeniable and borne out, albeit tragically, by his experience," wrote Ballendorf in 2002. "Ellis' war prophecies have outlived the mystery of his mission. Although he was by no means alone in recognizing that the balance of power in the Pacific had shifted with Japan's acquisition of Micronesia, his unique contribution was that he knew what the Marine Corps should do about the threat, and he acted on that belief." □

Al Hemingway is a U.S. Marine Corps veteran of the Vietnam War. He has written numerous articles for WW II History.

OPERATION MATTERHORN

Most writings about World War II tend to attribute the success or failure of military operations to the skill with which generals and admirals handled their forces in battle and to the fighting abilities of soldiers, sailors, and airmen. While usually dramatic and entertaining to readers, these writings frequently ignore, or at best treat in a cursory manner, the crucial role of logistics in the conduct of the war. ■ Logistics encompasses almost everything related to military activities besides strategy and tactics; however, at its most immediate level, it is essentially the art of moving military forces and keeping them supplied. Logistics has always been a concern of military leaders. In earlier times, it was a relatively humdrum activity that often entailed little more than armies living off the land. More recently, as nations have engaged in greater and greater struggles and as technology has made warfare increasingly complex, logistics has become a major endeavor. Modern armies, navies, and air forces possess ravenous appetites for men and materiél. Many times during World War II, victory or defeat in a military operation depended on the ability to provide these forces with proper logistical support. ■ Operation Matterhorn, the U.S. Army Air Forces' (AAF) first strategic bombing campaign against Japan, illustrates the pivotal role logistical support plays in the outcome of an operational plan. Matterhorn was conceived in the fall of 1943 when the AAF's most advanced bomber, the Boeing B-29 Superfortress, went into mass production. Designed as a long-range strategic weapon that could penetrate the very heart of the enemy's homeland and destroy its war machine, the B-29 had a much longer range (4,100 miles at a maximum speed of 358 mph) and a larger payload capacity than any other bomber in service. Originally, the B-29 had been earmarked for the air offensive in Europe, but production delays postponed the date of quantity delivery to the point where it was deemed too late for the plane to be a decisive component in the bombing of Germany. ■ The AAF then turned its attention toward the use of B-29s in a war-winning air assault against Japan from bases in the Mariana Islands in the western Pacific. These bases, however, were not expected to be ready before the end of 1944. Rather than see the B-29 committed to tactical operations, from which it might not be redirected to the strategic air war against Japan, the AAF devised a new plan for the bomber's introduction to combat.

BY JOHN KENNEDY OHL

Established on a shaky logistical foundation, a major Allied bombing offensive against Japan failed—almost before it began.

Dubbed Matterhorn, the plan called for B-29s stationed in India to attack Japan from staging facilities in China, the closest base area to Japan then under Allied control. Matterhorn missions, scheduled to begin in the spring of 1944, would weaken Japan's war-making capability by striking vital industrial targets. Also, by inflicting punishment on the Japanese homeland, the B-29 raids would signal the ultimate triumph of the Allies. In this respect, Matterhorn missions would hopefully shore up the flagging morale of the Chinese Nationalist forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, which many feared might soon collapse because of war weariness.

From the outset, the Joint Logistics Committee of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Joint Staff Planners of the JCS, and Maj. Gen. Claire Chennault, commander of the China-based U.S. Fourteenth Air Force, argued that Matterhorn was logistically unfeasible. The operation called for a massive commitment of a new bomber in a theater—the China-Burma-India Theater (CBI)—that had a comparatively low priority in the Allied war effort, possessed excessively long supply lines, and had been pushed to the limit to meet its existing logistical requirements.

Calcutta, India, the theater's principal port, was choked with materiél slated for other Allied operations. Airfields to accommodate the B-29s would have to be built in India and China at a time when Allied service units were straining to complete a number of difficult construction projects, including the building of roads, docks, and bridges and the laying of pipelines. And the only supply line from India to China, the 1,200-mile "Hump" air route across the Himalayan Mountains, was already overtaxed by the demands of the Allied air and ground units that were fighting the Japanese in eastern China.

To minimize the B-29s' impact on the CBI's resources, Matterhorn was to be completely self-sustaining. Relying mostly on local labor, special airfields for the B-29s would be constructed in India and China. In addition, the XX Bomber Command, the AAF headquarters charged with carrying out Matterhorn, would be responsible for meeting all of its supply needs in India and for transporting its fuel, bombs, spare parts, and ammunition over the "Hump."

Despite the concerns of skeptics, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt saw Matterhorn as an opportunity to do something for Chinese morale, while General Henry "Hap" Arnold, AAF commander, viewed it as a way to further his dream of autonomous strategic air power. Contending that Matterhorn was "bold but entirely feasible," they won the support of Chiang and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at the Sextant Conference, held at Cairo, Egypt, in the fall of 1943. Combined Chiefs of Staff and JCS approval quickly followed.

Matterhorn began with the construction phase. In the case of India, the planners in the XX Bomber Command decided it would be most profitable to bring existing airfields and those being built up to B-29 specifications. Southern Bengal, because of its position vis-à-vis China with relative security from Japanese air attack, the port facilities at Calcutta, and good rail and road communications, was chosen as the base area. Eventually, the planners settled on the airfields located in the flatlands west of Calcutta at Dudhkundi, Piardoba, Kharagpur, Chakulia, and Kalaikunda, the latter to serve as a transport base. All had concrete runways, 6,000 feet long, that could be lengthened and strengthened to handle B-29s, which required runways of 8,500 feet capable of supporting 70 tons. When construction lagged, the airfield at Charra, which had handled Consolidated B-24 Liberator bombers, was temporarily used for Matterhorn by extending its 6,000-foot runway with two 900-foot mats.

National Archives

ABOVE: Army Air Forces commander General Henry "Hap" Arnold inspects a B-29 at a Consolidated Aircraft manufacturing facility in Fort Worth, Texas.
BELOW: Brigadier General Kenneth M. Wolfe, commander of the U.S. XX Bomber Command, led Operation Matterhorn prior to being relieved by General Hap Arnold.



National Archives

Problems quickly developed. Because of shipping shortages, the first contingent of engineer units assigned to Matterhorn, half the required force, did not reach India from the United States until mid-February 1944, two months later than originally planned, effectively postponing the May 1, 1944, date set for all of the airfields to be operational. Thus, when Brig. Gen. Kenneth M. Wolfe, commander of the XX Bomber Command, came to India in January 1944, he found only Indian workers on the job, both men and women attempting to move 1.7 million cubic yards of earth in wicker baskets balanced on their heads. They were, he later said, "making mud pies."

Desperate to speed up construction, Wolfe persuaded a reluctant Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, commander of the CBI, to divert two engineer battalions from other CBI projects to aid in the preliminary work. With the arrival of the initial contingent of Matterhorn engineer units, AAF officers hoped to have at least two airfields barely operational by March 15 to accommodate the first B-29s as they flew in from the United States. The other engineer units arrived in India in March and April, and by the end of April there were close to 6,000 American troops working on the airfields. They were assisted by 27,000 local workers, many of them "untouchables," who were provided by India's Central Public Works Department. The Indians did the jobs that could be accomplished by hand, while the Americans did those requiring skilled labor and heavy equipment.

Making the best use of the local workers was not always easy, and it soon became apparent that native customs would have to be followed if work were to proceed smoothly. At Chakulia, for example, the American engineers, unaware that the Bengalese considered the quarrying of rock as man's work and the screening of it as woman's work, bulldozed stockpiles for both sexes to screen, causing everyone to walk off the job. Religious considerations also came into play, compelling the Americans to stock seven types of rations for their Indian coworkers. Given these problems, progress was slow, and it took much "expediting" by the Americans to overcome the traditional slowness of native methods and a complicated requisition system to meet all of the necessities of the Indians.

The first large part of the Indian bases to be completed was a pipeline system to carry gasoline to the airfields from a tanker terminal at Budge-Budge on the Hooghly River. It consisted of a six-inch pipeline strung 100 miles to

Dudhkundi, four-inch pipelines running from Dudhkundi to the other airfields, and internal lines and storage tanks at each base. Four petroleum distribution companies began work on the system on January 15, and two months later they had gasoline flowing to the three airfields that were almost ready to receive the B-29s. Later they finished the whole system.

Completing the runways was far more difficult. Many engineer units arrived from the United States without the heavy equipment required for grading the strips, forcing them to borrow equipment from American units working on airfields in Assam in northeastern India and on the high-priority Ledo Road, which was to connect Assam with the Burma Road in northern Burma. Instead of the 8,500-foot runways envisioned in Washington, those in India were shortened to 7,500 feet to make them operational as soon as possible. New concrete pavement was 10 inches thick; old pavement had an additional seven inches poured on the surface. As far as raw materials were concerned, sand was available in streams near each airfield, and gravel and crushed basalt for the course aggregate were found in the neighborhood. Indian cement was both scarce and inferior, however, and thus large quantities of cement had to be imported from the United States. The concrete was produced with the equipment on hand and laid and spread by Indian workers using hand tools.

Through the spring of 1944, work went ahead on the airfields on a schedule that was far in arrears of early plans. Chakulia and Kharagpur were the first to be operational, and by June 30 four airfields were ready, although all were not completed until September. By using the airfield at Charra, known to the Americans as "Hell's Half Acre" because of its sloping runway and intense heat, the XX Bomber Command was able to receive and house the initial combat groups as they arrived in their B-29s in April and May. The total cost of the five airfields was $20 million.

The forward bases for Matterhorn were placed near Chengtu, China, in Szechwan Province, about 200 miles northwest of Chungking, the Nationalist capital, and 1,900 miles from southern Japan. At this distance they were barely within the B-29's maximum range. While the Americans had bases in China closer to Japan, Chengtu was selected because of its greater security from Japanese air and ground attacks. In early 1944 it was decided, on the basis of the availability of materials and labor and the minimal amount of interference with the local irrigation system, that the Chengtu bomber airfields would be situated at Hsinching, Kiunglai, Kwanghan, and Pengshan. To protect them from Japanese air raids, five fighter airfields would also be constructed in the Chengtu area.

Under an agreement negotiated by Roosevelt and Chiang, the United States was to provide the planning, overall supervision, and funding for the airfields, while the Chinese would supply the labor and materials and direct the construction forces. Because it was impractical to fly heavy equipment over the "Hump," almost all of the work would have to be done by hand.

In January 1944, the Chinese directors and American officers estimated that a labor force of 240,000 workers would be required. Within two weeks more than 200,000 were on the job, and later, to catch up with the construction schedule, another 100,000 were put to work. James Stewart, an American correspondent in Chungking, provided a colorful description of the workers' arrival: "The roads for miles around were jammed with men, simple farmers in blue cotton trousers and jumpers and straw sandals, each with two long poles over his shoulder and enough rice to last until he arrived at one of the sites. When they got there, they set their poles in the ground, tepee fashion, and covered them with rough sheaves of straw—that was each man's shelter for months."

Most of the workers were Chinese peasants conscripted by the governor of Szechwan. They came from villages within a radius of 150 miles of Chengtu, with village quotas set at 50 workers per 100 households, and were organized into work units of 200 that preserved something of the village structure. To these conscripts were added 75,000 contract workers. Taking into account the inevitable turnover, it is quite possible that 500,000 Chinese peasants worked on the Chengtu airfields at one time or another. Given the magnitude of the work force, Western observers were quick to liken the construction of the airfields to the building of the Great Wall of China and the Great Pyramid of Cheops.

The cost of the airfields quickly caused friction between American and Chinese officials. At Sextant, Chiang had demanded that Roosevelt grant China a billion dollar loan in gold to ease China's financial plight and that the United States pay for the airfields at the official exchange rate of 20 Chinese dollars to 1 American dollar, even though the black market rate

In this painting by Peter Hurd, Indian laborers watch a B-29 approach for a landing. The airstrip at Agra, India, had to be reinforced to handle the great weight of the aircraft.

by early 1944 was 240 to 1. He backed up his demands by threatening to stop providing food and housing for American forces in China and to withhold Chinese participation in an upcoming Burmese campaign if the United States did not meet his terms. American officials were infuriated by Chiang's demands, seeing them as nothing more than a blatant attempt by Chiang to maximize his possible take from the United States.

Roosevelt refused to grant the loan; however, after pleas from the White House, Chiang consented to some Chinese participation in the Burmese campaign. The airfield matter was not settled so easily. American officials estimated the airfields would cost $800 million if the Chinese held to the 20 to 1 rate instead of the approximately $20 million they should cost.

Map © 2006 Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis, MN

The Treasury and State Departments wanted to insist on the black market rate. But Arnold, fearful the dispute might delay the completion of the airfields, pushed for a compromise.

Eventually, Chiang and American officials agreed that the United States would accept a temporary rate of 100 to 1 pending the outcome of negotiations for a permanent arrangement. The negotiations proceeded at a desultory pace, and in November 1944 the U.S. Army finally settled the account for the airfields and several other claims at $185 million. The actual amount designated for the airfields is unknown.

Notwithstanding the immense cost of the Chengtu airfields for the United States, many Chinese suffered financially. Landowners whose property was taken for the airfields had to sell at government prices and accept in payment currency that was rapidly depreciating in value because of inflation. Workers were paid about 25 Chinese dollars a day (nine cents in American money), barely enough for food. Many would have died of starvation if their families had not provided them additional food. In all likelihood a substantial sum of money that should have gone to landowners and workers ended up in the pockets of corrupt Chinese Nationalist officials. Americans were fearful these conditions would spark serious riots, but in general there were few disorders.

Actual work on the airfields began in January 1944. The land where they were to be situated had been rice paddies, and on January 24 Chinese workers started to drain them. At the time, it was expected that two airfields would be operational by March 31, and the other two by April 30. The financial dispute and the failure of the Chinese to find enough trucks for hauling materials prevented the schedule from being met. Nevertheless, the initial B-29 landed at Kwanghan, the first available airfield, on April 24, three months to the day after the paddy walls had been breached. By May 1 all four airfields were open to traffic, and by May 10 all runways were finished. Three fighter strips were completed more nearly on time.

The bomber runways were built to a length of 8,500 feet and a thickness of 19 inches; the fighter strips were 4,000 feet long, with a thickness from eight to 12 inches. The leveling of the ground was a massive undertaking in itself. In some instances, seven feet of earth had to be excavated to get to solid ground, all of it done by thousands of workers using shovels, shoulder yokes with buckets strung at both ends, carts, and thousands of squeaky-wheeled wooden wheelbarrows, whose sound they believed would ward off the devil.

Very quickly, the noise got on the nerves of the Americans. As Maj. Gen. Curtis LeMay, one of the commanders of the XX Bomber Command, recalled: "One day a mechanic couldn't stand the racket any longer. One of the Chinese had dropped a wheelbarrow nearby and was looking at the airplanes and resting a little bit, and the mechanic climbed over the fence with an oilcan and oiled the axle on the wheelbarrow. When the fellow started up again, it didn't screech and scare any dragons away, and so he left the whole damned thing right there. He wouldn't have anything to do with it." A degreasing job followed, and the laborer resumed work, quite noisily.

Just as it was impractical to fly heavy equipment over the "Hump," it was also impractical to fly cement, cement mixers, or asphalt. Consequently, the runways had to be built of rock, gravel, and sand. The base course consisted of stones brought from nearby streams set with gravel and sand. The wearing course was made of a native "slurry" of crushed rock, sand, clay, and water. Tung oil, extracted from local trees and used as a varnish, served as the sealant. Ultimately, 100,000 tons of material were used in building the airfields.

The rocks were crushed by hand with little hammers. Huge stone rollers drawn by hundreds of men, and sometimes women, compacted the slurry, which had been puddled in pits by barefoot men and boys. The rollers, carved out of nearby sandstone hills, weighed 10 tons. Gaining momentum as they were pulled, the rollers could not be stopped easily. If a rope puller fell and was unable to scramble away quickly, he likely would be crushed to death by the roller. Twenty-five Chinese workers were killed in this manner.

Day after day, seven days a week, hundreds of thousands of Chinese men, women, and children worked on the airfields, almost oblivious to what was going on around them. Stewart

National Archives

National Archives

National Archives

ABOVE: Pulling a heavy roller across a runway, Chinese laborers complete work on an airstrip to be used by Operation Matterhorn. On this project alone, more than 70,000 Chinese were supervised by two American officers. LEFT TOP: Major Lyman B. Lockwood supervises the tedious work of crushing stone for the construction of an airfield in a remote region of China. LEFT BOTTOM: Ground crewmen tune up one of the B-29's four engines prior to reinstallation. The huge bomber was the first to have a pressurized cabin for its flight crew.

later wrote: "While we watched these thousands toiling as their ancestors had toiled, giant U.S. Army transports from India swooped down over their heads to land cargos [sic] of gasoline, bombs, and all the freight of modern war. The Chinese didn't even look up."

Transporting men and supplies from the United States to India for Matterhorn was a perplexing challenge. Matterhorn had the highest priority of any undertaking in the CBI in the last half of 1944. But the movement of men and supplies was handicapped by the long distance from the United States to India; the low priority accorded to the CBI in the allotment of Allied shipping; the high command's insistence on an early commitment of the B-29s, which left little time for readjusting the existing transportation schedules; and the requirement that Matterhorn not interfere materially with other projects in the CBI.

Most of the highest priority passengers and freight were to go to India by Air Transport Command (ATC) planes via Natal in Brazil, Khartoum in the Sudan, and Karachi in India, a trip that took six days with luck. Otherwise, most units and supplies were to be shipped by sea. For this purpose, the CCS assigned 20,000 troop spaces and 200,000 tons of cargo space to Matterhorn in the first six months of 1944, and at least 20,000 tons of tanker capacity per month beginning in April.

By Christmas 1943 shipping had been earmarked for all troops and supplies projected for Matterhorn through July 1944, although it was necessary to juggle shipping schedules at some expense to the movement of men and supplies for other CBI projects. Most of the troop transports sailed before the end of February 1944.

Some units went eastward across the Atlantic Ocean in convoys to North Africa, then were transported in British vessels across the Mediterranean Sea and through the Suez Canal to Bombay, India, and finally carried to Bengal by train. Other troops and most of the supplies went westward across the Pacific Ocean and around Australia, with the cargo ships going to Calcutta and the troop transports to Bombay because Calcutta was already overburdened and inefficiently operated. It took most units eight to 10 weeks to get from their American embarkation ports to their Bengal stations. Despite the lengthy trip, almost 22,000 men were on hand in the CBI for Matterhorn by May.

In the meantime, the AAF had been moving the high-priority personnel and freight to India. The first important movement occurred in January 1944 when Wolfe led 20 C-87 transports from the United States to India carrying key command personnel and some equipment. The initial plans for Matterhorn called for the B-29s to ferry all combat crews to India as well as some passengers. This provision had to be scrapped, however, when it was decided it would be necessary to have more than the usual number of the B-29's unproven R-3350 engines on hand in India and that each B-29 would haul one engine in lieu of passengers.

As a result, a number of ATC passenger allotments for other CBI projects were assigned to the headquarters units of the XX Bomber Command. These allotments only slightly eased the crunch in getting men to India, causing some Matterhorn personnel to take as long as a month to arrive in Bengal. The use of ATC transports to ferry personnel to India demonstrated the fallacy of the expectation that Matterhorn could be self-supporting, and increasingly it was making other demands on the ATC.

Once it was obvious that AAF planners had underestimated the airlift needed for personnel and the spare engines, they committed additional transport resources to Matterhorn. Thus, from April to June 1944, a special surface-air transport service, called "Mission 10," was established. Passengers and freight went by sea to Casablanca, Morocco, and then to Calcutta by means of 25 C-54 transport planes assigned to the ATC's North African wing.

Altogether "Mission 10" hauled 250 engines and 1,225 passengers to Bengal in a trip lasting from three to four weeks. In June, Arnold replaced "Mission 10" with "Crescent Blend" service, which used two squadrons of C-46 transport planes to shuttle personnel and supplies from Casablanca to Calcutta. Although the C-46 lacked the range and capacity of the C-54, Crescent Blend brought about 350 tons of supplies to Calcutta each month during the summer of 1944, mostly spare engines that were essential to Matterhorn operations.

The overseas movement of the B-29s was to begin on March 10, 1944. Under the plan, 150

National Archives

ABOVE: Boeing B-29 Superfortresses drop their bomb loads above a target on the Japanese home islands. Logistical problems caused the effort to be abandoned, particularly after U.S. bases on the Marianas became operational. OPPOSITE: Flying above Singapore on March 2, 1945, B-29 bombers head for a target in Southeast Asia.

B-29s of the 58th Bomb Wing would leave the United States in daily increments of nine or 10 planes. A five-day trip covering 11,530 miles was scheduled by way of Salina, Kansas, to Gander Lake, Newfoundland (2,580 miles); Gander Lake to Marrakesh, Morocco (2,700 miles); Marrakesh to Cairo (2,350 miles); Cairo to Karachi (2,400 miles); and Karachi to Calcutta (1,500 miles). If everything went well, all of the bombers would be at their stations in India by March 31.

The schedule was too optimistic. The problems involved in getting a new type of aircraft prepared for combat in a theater halfway around the world, especially since many of the maintenance groups had already started their own trip to India, were too great for the planes to be ready on time. As a result, when Arnold arrived at Salina on March 9 and asked how many B-29s would leave the next day, he was told none. Immediately, he issued a flurry of orders to ensure that all 150 B-29s would be on their way by April 15, and during the next month the so-called "Battle of Kansas" went into overdrive as the crews and civilian workers battled time, fatigue, confusion, and cold weather to meet Arnold's deadline.

On March 26, the first contingent of B-29s left Salina; it reached India on April 2. Others soon followed, and by April 15 a total of 32 B-29s had arrived at their stations. A week later, the loss of several planes to accidents along the way prompted the AAF to ground all B-29s that were en route until the accidents could be investigated. After it was determined that most of them occurred due to engine failure, some of which could be attributed to the penchant of the R-3350 to overheat in hot weather, flights resumed on April 29 and thereafter proceeded more rapidly. Over the next months modifications were made to the R-3350 to correct the overheating problem, but they were only partially successful. Meanwhile, by the second week of May, all but nine of the original 150 B-29s were either on hand in India or momentarily expected. Through the rest of 1944 and early 1945, 255 additional B-29s were dispatched to India, so that by the end of March 1945, when Matterhorn was closed down, 405 B-29s had been committed to the operation.

The defense of the airfields in India was a minor concern. They were situated at the extreme range of Japanese bombers, and the U.S. Tenth Air Force and the Royal Air Force had sufficient fighter strength to provide adequate protection. The Chengtu airfields were more vulnerable to Japanese air attack, and the Matterhorn plan called for 150 fighters to be assigned to their defense. Because the Fourteenth Air Force was already short of fighters, the CCS transferred two Curtiss P-40 Tomahawk fighter groups from Italy to China and reequipped them with Republic P-47 Thunderbolt fighters that had to come from the United States. By ordinary surface shipment, the P-47s would not reach India until May, so at the AAF's request, the U.S. Navy diverted two escort carriers from the Atlantic-Mediterranean run to transport 100 P-47s from the Mediterranean to India, tying up the carriers for two and a half months. Another 50 went by regular transport.

The delayed departure of the fighter groups from Italy because of the exigencies of the Anzio operation, the time to transport the P-47s to India, and the need for several weeks of transitional training for the pilots slowed the final deployment of the fighter groups until the middle of July. Their late arrival did not create any significant difficulty, however, for Japanese air attacks against Chengtu were less intensive than expected.

No logistical aspect of Matterhorn was more exasperating than the transport of gasoline and supplies from India to Chengtu. Everything that was sent to China had to be flown over the "Hump." Because the ATC was already straining to ferry its monthly quota of 10,000 tons to China for other CBI projects, Matterhorn had been planned to be self-supporting. Using its own transports flying from Assam and its B-29s flying from Calcutta, the XX Bomber Command would carry all of its own cargo to China. For this purpose, 20 of the precious B-29s were stripped of their armament except for the tail guns and converted into tankers to fly in the dearly needed fuel. The remaining B-29s were used to haul other supplies.

In flying the "Hump" route, AAF crews had to deal with some of the most difficult flying conditions that any airmen confronted during World War II. To get over the "Hump" the planes had to climb to an altitude of 25,000 feet, the highest air transport route in the world, and then contend with the fierce weather conditions of the Himalayan region, including below-zero tem-

peratures that would often ice their wings, violent updrafts and downdrafts that could cause a sudden loss of control, snowstorms, and dense cloud formations.

The "Hump" flights exacted a heavy toll in crashed planes and men killed. During the early months of 1944, the XX Bomber Command lost 12 B-29s and six C-46s that had been assigned to it by the ATC. Despite the dangers, the combat planes and transports continued to carry the XX Bomber Command's fuel and supplies to China. In May, they airlifted 1,950 tons, two-thirds carried by C-46s. As the weeks passed, the total improved, and in July the XX Bomber Command set a record for monthly deliveries with a lift of 3,000 tons. By the end of 1944, the B-29s had flown more than 1,400 transport trips over the Himalayas, and because of the hazards, their crews were given mission credit for each sortie.

The transport of fuel and supplies to Chengtu was a costly and time-consuming operation. Depending on weather, at its worst the B-29 burned 12 gallons of gasoline to transport one gallon to Chengtu; at its best, the ratio was two to one. Moreover, it took seven trips back and forth across the "Hump" for a B-29 to move enough fuel to the Chinese staging bases for one B-29 to participate in one mission against Japan.

Each B-29 required 7,000 gallons of gasoline to fly from Chengtu to Japan, and by June 1944 the XX Bomber Command had ferried enough gasoline and supplies across the "Hump" to carry out a combat mission against Japan. Following a practice run mounted from India on June 5 against railway shops at Bangkok, Thailand, the B-29s struck the steel works at Yawata on the northern coast of Kyushu Island on June 15. The mission consumed so much fuel, however, that during the next six weeks the XX Bomber Command could fly only one relatively insignificant mission out of Chengtu.

Even though a record total of 3,000 tons of fuel was airlifted to China during July, a severe shortage of fuel continued to plague the Chengtu-based missions. As a result, in July the XX Bomber Command was able to launch only 115 combat sorties, less than half of the effort it was expected to make.

The Matterhorn raids continued into the first three months of 1945. Altogether 49 missions were flown against targets in Japan, China, Formosa, and Southeast Asia. The missions staged out of Chengtu, however, represented only a minimum effort. Even with the aid of the ATC, the XX Bomber Command could not bring enough fuel and supplies to China to enable the Superfortresses to be effective. A typical long-range mission against Japan took four days—one day to fly from India to China, one day in China to get organized, one day to fly the mission, one day to return to India. Counting the days required to get fuel and supplies to China, this meant that the XX Bomber Command could fly at most only one combat mission a week. At this rate Matterhorn was unprofitable.

Disappointed by these results, Arnold relieved Wolfe in July 1944, leaving Brig. Gen. LaVerne Saunders in temporary command of the XX Bomber Command until LeMay arrived in late August as Wolfe's replacement. LeMay had orders to produce results, but his hard-driving leadership made little difference.

National Archives

"Up to October 1," he recalled, "35 percent of our total B-29 flying time was consumed in cargo operations to the Chengtu area," wearing down the B-29s and restricting the flight time that could be devoted to combat and training missions.

At the same time, Matterhorn was proving to be a tremendous logistical drain on other operations in the CBI. From February to October 1944, the ATC had to fly 17,931 tons over the "Hump" for the XX Bomber Command, seriously cutting into the operations of the Fourteenth Air Force and Chinese forces. Both had their hands full attempting to contain Ichigo, a major Japanese offensive in eastern China, and there was not enough fuel and supplies arriving in China to support to contain Ichigo and support the B-29s.

"It was always a battle over gasoline," LeMay remembered. "We hauled gas and we chiseled gas [from the ATC]. And Chennault was always trying to get us to help him out."

The XX Bomber Command's transport operations absorbed too much of its energy and left too few B-29s for combat missions. Consequently, in the fall of 1944 the AAF assigned more transports and tankers to the ATC for the "Hump" route, and in return for a guaranteed monthly allocation from the ATC, the XX Bomber Command got out of the cargo business. Thereafter, all fuel and supplies for Matterhorn missions staged out of China were flown in by the ATC's C-109s and C-46s.

"The theory of the self-supporting bomber unit," in the words of an AAF historian, "had been broken by the harsh realities of China-Burma-India."

While the XX Bomber Command was struggling with its logistics, American forces captured the Marianas chain in the summer of 1944 and quickly transformed it into a major base for a massive B-29 assault against Japan. There no longer seemed any reason to continue Matterhorn in light of its logistical problems. Matterhorn raids against targets in Southeast Asia were carried out until the end of March 1945, but beginning in February, the XX Bomber Command's units were gradually withdrawn from the CBI and sent to the Marianas. By May 1945, the last of the B-29s were out of the CBI.

Matterhorn had no significant impact on the defeat of Japan. Only 10 of its 49 missions were actually carried out against targets that fit into its original conception, and their meager results did little to justify the cost. Matterhorn may have contributed to the Chinese will to resist the Japanese, although at best this result was fleeting.

Besides failing to meet its objectives, Matterhorn created severe logistical complications for the CBI that were more than the theater could handle. Matterhorn competed with the Fourteenth Air Force and Chinese forces for the limited capacity of the "Hump" airlift; absorbed a goodly portion of the shipping space allotted to the theater; increased congestion at the port of Calcutta; diverted service troops and supplies from other CBI projects; and, through the expenditure of large sums of money to build the airfields at Chengtu, accelerated the destructive inflationary spiral of the Chinese currency that was already sapping the support Chiang could command from the Chinese people.

Despite a tremendous investment of transport, men, equipment, and supplies, Matterhorn, as LeMay later put it, was doomed by its "utterly absurd" logistical foundation. □

John Kennedy Ohl teaches history at Mesa Community College in Mesa, Arizona. He has contributed to numerous journals and magazines and published three books.

To Deal With Darlan

General Mark W. Clark played a pivotal role in Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of North Africa.

By Jon Mikolashek

Rain battered the shore and the seas were rough on the night of October 21, 1942. Under the surface of the water, a submarine carried the Allies' best hope for turning the tide of war in 1942.

The submarine's secret mission was to surface and launch its cargo of troops, who were to make contact with a turncoat enemy. The group that was to leave the relative safety of the submarine and make landfall with uncertainty on the coast of French North Africa was led by an American, Maj. Gen. Mark Wayne Clark. Wayne, as he was called by friends, stood nearly six-foot-four, too tall for a submariner, but the right man for this mission. Clark was ordered to meet the French and forge an agreement with them that would eventually save the lives of thousands of Americans and Frenchmen as well as the city of Casablanca.

By the summer of 1942, Allied hopes for prevailing over Nazi Germany were at their nadir. After surrendering to Hitler, the French now governed, in name only, the southern portion of their country from Vichy. On the Eastern Front, deep in the Soviet Union, the German Army was poised for its final push toward Stalingrad. The Americans, who had just entered the war, were busy mobilizing and fighting the Japanese in the Pacific. The British had suffered setback after setback: first Dunkirk, and then Erwin Rommel, the Desert Fox, had advanced to the Egyptian frontier across the barren sands of North Africa.

Allied war planners were hotly debating a cross-Channel invasion of France. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt were themselves discussing other Allied offensive moves. Soviet Premier Josef Stalin had been demanding a second front for a year, and the Western Allies had yet to deliver. Eventually, they settled on a North African landing—code-named Operation Torch—to ease the pressure on the Soviets and to address strategic concerns in the western Mediterranean.

North Africa was a logical starting point for direct American ground involvement in the war against Nazi Germany. The untried American forces were not yet strong enough to invade France, and attacking North Africa would give the troops much-needed experience.

Pointing his finger at the chest of Admiral Jean Francois Darlan, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, overall commander for Operation Torch, stresses a concern with the Vichy diplomat. General Mark Clark listens intently in this photo, which was taken on November 13, 1942, five days after the Torch landings. OPPOSITE: General Mark Clark's party boarded the British submarine HMS *Seraph* at Gibraltar and sailed to a position off the coast of Algiers.

On the strategic front, Allied leaders and military planners feared a possible alliance between Germany and Francisco Franco's fascist Spain, however hypothetical. Hitler and his Nazi hordes could have crossed the Pyrenees Mountains into Spain, taken possession of the Azores, the Canary Islands, and, in the North African French colony of Senegal, Dakar, which could have been used as a base for U-boats in the Atlantic. With the Axis in Spain, the eight-mile-wide Strait of Gibraltar would be untenable, and Rommel's chances of seizing Egypt and eventually all of the Middle East would have increased dramatically.

The planning of Torch was a complicated but rapid affair. The coastal areas of North Africa where the landings were to take place were governed by Vichy France, which, after surrendering to Germany, was allowed to keep 120,000 troops in the region. A successful landing would force Rommel to fight a desert war on two fronts. However, the reception the Allied soldiers would receive from the Vichy troops was open to question.

The landings were to take place at Oran, Algiers, and Casablanca, but the Vichy French Army guarded the coast with a significant force of 55,000 men in Morocco, 50,000 in Algeria, and 15,000 in Tunisia. However, the French had no medium or heavy artillery, only about 260 tanks, and 300 aircraft. The French forces could be defeated, but that was not exactly what the Allies wanted.

The American forces already in England were led by Dwight D. Eisenhower and his deputy, Mark Clark. Both these men, along with U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, vehemently opposed Torch. True to American military thinking, they believed any action away from the strategic center was a waste of time. For his part, Clark maintained that Torch would be a "great calamity." Churchill, on the other hand, believed Torch "offered the greatest opportunity in the history of England." While Churchill was prone to overstatement, Torch would prove very beneficial to the Allied cause.

Planning for Torch began on July 31, 1942. The complexity of the mission was

readily apparent when Clark opened the sessions by saying, "Some of you men are less confused than others about Torch." Clark, perhaps more than any figure, would make Torch succeed. As deputy to Eisenhower, Clark established and directed the new Allied headquarters in England, headed planning for Torch, and determined equipment to be used by soldiers on the ground. Over the next few months he would finalize the operation, reach out to the French, and sign an agreement bringing the conflict in North Africa to an end.

If Germany's Afrika Korps could be driven from North Africa, Allied bases in Tunisia would threaten the Axis from the air and provide a staging area for potential operations in southern Europe. Control of the famed Moroccan city of Casablanca, a major railroad terminus in North Africa, could facilitate the movement of troops and supplies throughout the region.

Planning was complete by the middle of September. Operation Torch called for three landings. The Eastern Assault Force, commanded by Maj. Gen. Doc Ryder, would land at Algiers with approximately 20,000 troops. It was to capture the port of Bougie and then advance toward Tunisia. The Central Assault Force, under Maj. Gen. Lloyd Fredendall, would land at Oran with 18,500 troops, capturing the city and the airfields at Tafaraoui and La Senia. The final group, the Western Assault Force, commanded by Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., would land in Morocco with 24,500 troops and counter possible German or Spanish action.

The invasion of North Africa was nearly compromised when a secret letter detailing the entire operation fell into Spanish hands. The courier had been onboard a ship that was torpedoed by the Germans and his body, along with the letter, was recovered by the Spanish. Luckily, the plan was never leaked to the Germans.

Clark traveled back to the United States for final consultation with political and military leaders. Enthusiasm for Torch was not very strong at home, as expressed by Dwight Eisenhower: "Without going into the details of the various plans proposed, it is sufficient to say that, measured purely from a military standpoint, the risks of the projected operation were so great as to condemn it if military factors alone were considered."

With D-Day approaching, the Allies decided to gamble on an operation that could give them control of North Africa without firing a shot. Robert Murphy, the American counselor to Vichy and an expert on North Africa, was in touch with five prominent French civilians who had access to important Vichy military officers in North Africa, particularly General Alphonse Juin, commander of French forces in North Africa, who was known to be sympathetic to the Allied cause, and General Henri Giraud, who the Allies believed could rally the French military to their cause.

Giraud, in his sixties, was a hero of both world wars. Called "Papa Snooks" by the Allies, Giraud believed himself to be a genius of war. He was, however, not a genius of war, but

"We musn't allow them to forget for a moment that we are Americans and that there are millions more Americans behind us."

of escape. Captured in World War I, he escaped from prison and returned to France by disguising himself as a butcher, a stable boy, a coal merchant, and finally a magician in a traveling circus. Captured by the Nazis in World War II, Giraud proved his genius again as he escaped from Koenigstein, a German prison camp for officers of high rank.

In October, Murphy returned from North Africa and reported that Maj. Gen. Charles Mast, chief of staff of the French Nineteenth Corps, was willing to talk to military representatives about cooperation with the Allies. The primary Allied contact in these discussions would be Mark Clark, who, according to Murphy, "is one of those romantic generals destined to move always in an atmosphere of high drama."

Clark was an odd choice for this mission. While some believe that he was the highest ranking officer whose absence would not interfere with the operation, he knew more about Torch than anyone. If Clark were captured, the consequences to the operation would be incalculable. Regardless, Clark, along with Brig. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, head of the Allied Force Plans Section; Colonel A.L. Hamblem, a shipping and supply expert; Captain Jerauld Wright, a Navy liaison officer; and Colonel Julius C. Holmes, who headed the civil affairs branch of Torch, all went on this risky mission.

Before leaving on the mission, Clark wrote his wife a short message. "I am leaving in twenty minutes on a mission which is extremely hazardous.... If I succeed and return, I will have done great things for my country and the Allied cause."

Clark, dressed in a lieutenant colonel's uniform, and the other officers left England aboard a plane named *Red Gremlin*, piloted by Paul Tibbetts, who later gained fame for piloting the *Enola Gay,* the plane that dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima in 1945. The group flew to Gibraltar and boarded the submarine HMS *Seraph,* commanded by Lieutenant Norman Limbury Auchinleck Jewell. Along with Jewell, three British commandos—Captain C.P. Courtney, Captain R.T. Livingstone, and Lieutenant J.P. Foote—would land with Clark. After introductions, Clark told Jewell they were looking for a house "with white walls and a red-tiled roof," 12 miles west of Cherchell on the Algerian coast.

The submarine arrived at the rendezvous point at 4 AM on October 21 and kept the house under observation. A pair of Algerian fishing boats got within 200 feet of the submarine and began to fish. Jewell had no choice but to dive deeper and attempt to land at a later hour.

Clark and his fellow Americans spent much of their time ducking the low ceilings of the sub, playing bridge and adapting to the foul air.

By nightfall on October 22, as he prepared for departure, Clark discussed various scenarios with Jewell. If Clark and his team did not return, the submarine was to crawl across the bottom of the sea near the shore and wait until October 25 before leaving for safe waters. Prior to departure, Clark's party expressed their desire to land in civilian clothes. Clark knew this was a terrible idea, not only because they would be executed as spies if they were caught, but it would send the French the wrong message.

"Hell no! We'll go ashore as American officers and nothing else," roared Clark. "It will help the people we are dealing with to remember who we are and whom we represent. We mustn't allow them to forget for a moment that we are American and that there are millions more Americans behind us."

With the final arrangements made, Clark, armed with $2,000 in gold for use in an emergency, and his party paddled to shore, where they were met by Robert Murphy, who welcomed Clark to North Africa.

Around 6 AM, Clark and his men met with General Mast and his aide, Emile Jousse, and immediately began negotiations. Clark was impressed with Mast and remarked later that he was "a man who can be relied on." Mast asked if the planned invasion could be expanded to southern France. Aware that he was being tested, Clark told Mast that was it was logistically impossible. Disappointed, Mast wanted more specifics on the invasion of North Africa. This put Clark in a precarious situation. He was trying to gain the trust of the French, but he could not tell them exact details.

"I tried to keep a poker face while saying that half a million Allied troops could come in," Clark recalled, "and I said that we could put 2,000 planes in the air as well as plenty of U.S. Navy." In reality, only 112,000 troops would land in North Africa on November 8.

Once Mast was satisfied with what he was being told, Clark asked him what he could do for the Allies. Mast was happy to oblige, but requested 2,000 rifles, ammunition, and grenades to use in the seizure of key areas. With this assistance, the French were to take control of communications centers, take over troop barracks, arrest pro-Vichy commanders, seize public buildings, and try to prevent the French Navy from firing on the Allied landing force. This last task, of course, was the most important.

Mast and his followers were taking an extreme risk. Few Frenchmen in North Africa supported Free French leader Charles de Gaulle, and if found out, Mast and the others would most certainly be executed for treason. More importantly, if the French refused to fight the Americans, German forces would most likely occupy the rest of France and seize the French fleet at Toulon. Clark, as ordered by Roosevelt and Churchill, gave Mast an official assurance that in exchange for cooperation the Allies would restore France to her prewar boundaries, allow the French to lead themselves, and would view France as an equal ally in the war.

The last order of business Clark and Mast discussed was who would command the French forces. Roosevelt had designated General Henri Giraud as the overall commander of the French in North Africa, and Mast agreed. This conversation would come back to haunt both Clark and Eisenhower. When Giraud arrived in North Africa, he demanded to be supreme Allied commander of the entire operation.

With the initial contact made and key information exchanged, a tired Clark changed into a French officer's uniform and went out to stretch his legs along the North African coast. During this break, Clark's assistants finalized smaller but important details with Mast and Jousse. After Clark returned and changed back into his uniform, the French reported that police were on their way to the house.

ABOVE: General Mark Clark and Navy Captain Jerauld Wright leave HMS *Seraph* in folding boats. This drawing and the one at right were done in 1943 by Algerian artist H. Kleiss for Captain Wright. RIGHT: Clark and his party hide in a wine cellar during an unexpected visit from the local police. After evading capture, they returned to the *Seraph*. OPPOSITE: Clark, pictured here with a group of British soldiers, met for a final discussion with Eisenhower on October 4, 1942, a month before the landings in North Africa.

Clark and his landing party fled to the wine cellar underneath the house. While they hid, Robert Murphy and Jousse gave Oscar-winning performances, as Murphy boldly told the police who he was and asked them not to embarrass him, as he and Jousse were having a party and women were upstairs sleeping. In the wine cellar, Clark, armed with a pistol, tried to listen to what was going on.

During the silence, Captain Courtney was fighting back a cough and told Clark, "General, I'm afraid I'll choke." Clark quietly responded, "I'm afraid you won't." He handed the struggling commando some gum. Later, Courtney asked why American chewing gum was so tasteless. Clark laughed. The gum had come right out of his mouth and had been chewed on for hours.

After a few tense minutes, the police left and Clark returned to the upper level of the house. It seemed that the police were not looking for American officers, but black market merchants and illegal trading. Arab servants in the house had been ushered out before Clark's arrival and had contacted the police after discovering footprints in the sand near the beach. With the police gone for now, Clark decided the mission had been completed. Unfortunately, the rough seas prevented the group from reaching the *Seraph*. Clark considered alternatives if they could not reach the submarine, but by 4 AM on October 23, decided to try one more time.

Before they reached the surf, a bizarre exchange took place. Wet and fearful that the gold he was carrying would weigh him down, Clark ordered General Lemnitizer to drop his pants and give them to him. Lemnitizer, now pantless, ordered a colonel to do the same. Eventually, the epic of the pants reached lowly Lieutenant Foote, who outranked no one and was forced to paddle to the sub pantless. Finally, after paddling for what seemed like

hours and losing a boat that contained numerous secret papers and Clark's pants, the group reached the *Seraph*. Immediately, Clark deemed the meeting "a great success."

Once on the submarine, a relieved Clark radioed Murphy to search the beach for his trousers, which contained the gold and the secret papers. Eventually the papers and the trousers were found, but the gold was never recovered.

On October 24, when the *Seraph* emerged from the depths of the ocean, Clark wired Eisenhower of the success of the mission and jokingly told the Supreme Allied Commander that they had hidden in an "empty, repeat empty, wine cellar." Later, Clark and the others involved created the "Panoe Club," an exclusive group that met periodically to remember their mission.

Back in London, Clark met with King George VI, who told the American, "I know all about you. You're the one who took that fabulous trip. Didn't you, by the way, get stranded on the beach without pants?"

In addition to gaining celebrity and a meeting with the king of England, Clark was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, but, more importantly, he had greatly aided Torch. Although downplayed by historians, Clark's submarine mission was a success. While no exact agreements were reached, the meeting started discussions with the French to end Vichy resistance in North Africa. Without this meeting, Allied casualties would have been greater and the success of Torch would certainly have been more doubtful.

A few days before the invasion, all of Clark's hard work was nearly wiped out by the arrival of Admiral Jean Francis Xavier Darlan, who was making an emergency visit to North Africa to see his son, who was dying of polio. Darlan was a high-ranking official in the Vichy government. Not only was he deputy prime minister to Marshal Henri Pétain, but he outranked Mast and Giraud. He also had the respect of the Vichy troops in North Africa. His arrival would have a profound effect on the plans Clark had made with Mast.

While serving as counselor to the Vichy government, Murphy had believed that Darlan would work with the United States. The admiral had secretly told the American diplomat, "When you have 3,000 tanks, 6,000 planes and 500,000 men to bring to Marseilles, let me know. Then we shall welcome you."

Eisenhower, who was busy with the upcoming invasion, delegated the problem of Darlan to Clark. The Supreme Allied Commander gave Clark the best compliment one could receive when he told him, "I must have someone who can act for me without having to confer with me or get my opinions." With the order given, Clark had to complete an even more dangerous mission: dealing with a Nazi collaborator.

The so-called Darlan Deal would become one of the most controversial events of the war, but Eisenhower knew of the importance of dealing with Darlan. "The military advantages of an immediate cease fire are so overwhelming that I'll go promptly to join Clark in Algiers and if the proposals of the French are as definite as I understand, I shall immediately recognize Darlan as the highest French authority in the region. He can act as the interim head of such civil government as exists, on condition that he carries out any orders I may issue," said Eisenhower.

On November 8, 1942, the Torch landings took place. The Allied invasion force safely reached the coast of North Africa, and American troops stormed the beaches. As for Clark and Eisenhower, they had to deal with Giraud,

On November 10, 1942, American troops occupy a machine-gun position in North Africa. The troops met sporadic resistance from Vichy French forces.

who believed he was to be named supreme Allied commander in North Africa. According to Clark, when Giraud demanded command, he believed Eisenhower "had probably never been so shocked and showed it so little." After a few hours, Giraud relented and accepted command of all French forces once the invasion was over. With the issue of Giraud settled, Clark went to meet Darlan.

The early landings were progressing well for the Allies. Still, in some areas the French were firing on Americans troops and putting up stiff resistance. The French battleship *Jean Bart* fired on American ships at Casablanca before being put out of action.

On November 9, Clark met Admiral Darlan and his small staff in the St. Georges Hotel in Algiers. Immediately Clark demanded that Darlan issue a cease-fire order. Darlan coolly responded that he did not have that authority and that he would only "obey the orders of Pétain." Angry, Clark exploded, "Then I will end these negotiations and deal with someone who can act." Darlan again told Clark that he was powerless and said he had "asked Vichy to give me an answer to your terms as soon as possible." Knowing that Darlan was just wasting time, Clark told the admiral, "What you propose is not possible. I will end this conference in thirty minutes."

Clark stormed out of the room and Darlan discussed the situation with his staff. When Clark was ushered back into the room, Darlan told the American commander that he would issue a cease-fire. According to the agreement, Darlan would become head of the government and Giraud would remain head of the French forces in North Africa. Clark was relieved to learn later that the French troops were obeying the order. He had achieved remarkable success.

During a second meeting on November 11, Clark asked Darlan to order the French fleet at Toulon to sail to North Africa and link up with the Allies. Darlan refused, believing he would be dismissed by Pétain and that the fleet commander in Toulon would ignore the order. Darlan eventually did request that the French fleet move out of Toulon to North Africa.

Things appeared to be working out, but by 5 AM on November 12, Clark awoke to his worst fear. Pétain *had* dismissed Darlan and replaced him with General Auguste Paul Nogues, resident general of Morocco. Clark, on the verge of madness, asked Darlan, "Why, in the name of all that is decent, honorable, and intelligent, have you revoked your order to oppose Axis movement into Tunisia?"

Darlan said he could do nothing but wait for Nogues to arrive, but Clark and the Allies could not afford the time. When Clark left the room after having his say, one of Darlan's aides advised him to calm down, telling him, "Don't spoil everything." After wasting more time, Darlan reinstated the order, but 15,000 German troops and 9,000 Italian troops were moving to reinforce North Africa.

Robert Murphy, American minister to French North Africa, recruited French Army officers to aid the Allied cause. He is pictured with General Alphonse Juin, appointed commander of French forces in North Africa by the Vichy government. He changed sides after the Allied invasion.

After the agreement was reached, Eisenhower immediately cabled Clark about the controversy that was to come and stated succinctly, "We must do nothing to embarrass our governments in the future.... Therefore, we must have no needless publicity about any dealings with Darlan."

As expected, public opinion in the Allied nations was generally negative. Many asked how the Allies could deal with a known Nazi sympathizer and collaborationist. The answer was simple. The deal was a military and political necessity. The agreement undoubtedly saved many lives in Morocco and spared the city of Casablanca, which had been scheduled to be bombed from the air and shelled by warships at the order of General Patton.

The deal left Clark tainted, while Eisenhower remained above the fray. Regardless, Clark never regretted his involvement in the deal. Soon, he received his most coveted prize, a field command. Overall, he was relieved, worn out, and ultimately frustrated by the whole affair. He wrote in his diary about the deal: "What a mess.... Why soldiers have to get into things like this when there are wars to be fought—God, it's awful."

Later Clark even cabled Eisenhower and expressed his feelings about the deal. "I know the hell you have been taking, sitting in that damn tunnel, but don't think I haven't had my share of it here. I have never gone through ten days like this before in my life."

Internationally, the Darlan Deal was treated much the same. Free French leader Charles de Gaulle was incredulous, saying, "The United States can pay traitors but not with the honor of France." Winston Churchill, although an accomplice in the whole affair, told the press that Darlan "ought to be shot." Little did Churchill know, but such would be the collaborationist admiral's fate.

On Christmas Eve, Admiral Darlan was assassinated by Bonnier de la Chappelle, a young de Gaulle supporter, who believed he would go unpunished. Chappelle was quickly arrested, sent to trial, and executed. Giraud took Darlan's place, and the outcry over the agreement died with Darlan.

For the Allies, the assassination was a blessing. Clark later wrote, "[His] death was, to me, an act of Providence. It is too bad that he went that way, but, strategically speaking, his removal from the scene was like the lancing of a troublesome boil. He had served his purpose, and his death solved what could have been the very difficult problem of what to do with him in the future. Darlan was a political investment forced upon us by the circumstances, but we made a sensational profit in lives and time through using him."

On December 1, 1942, Eisenhower put Clark in command of the Fifth Army. Now a lieutenant general, Clark readied himself and his army for the invasion of Italy. Clark's Fifth Army would capture Rome on June 4, 1944, and fight the rest of the war in the tough terrain of northern Italy.

Winston Churchill praised Clark's "daring, sagacity, and power of decision." From his work as deputy to Eisenhower, to the submarine mission, to dealing with Darlan, Clark was the key figure of Operation Torch. Without him, Allied casualties would have been higher, and the whole operation could have become a stalemate, or worse an Allied defeat.

The general's exploits during Torch are, for the most part, only footnotes to history. However, his courageous behavior, clear judgment, and determination in the face of uncertainty and danger were pivotal factors in the success of the first major offensive operation against Nazi Germany by the Western Allies. □

Jon Mikolashek is a graduate student at Florida State University. He is currently researching a book on General Mark Clark.

Fiery End *for* Chicago

The U.S. Navy cruiser was sunk during the Battle of Rennell Island off Guadalcanal in January 1943.

BY JOHN DOMAGALSKI

With bond clerk Marge Henning standing by as a witness, Colonel Frank Eldridge removed the first piece of the puzzle. For every war bond purchased, one piece was to be removed from the huge jigsaw puzzle that had been erected on the wall of the Chicago Signal Depot. Hidden below the mosaic was a painting of the warship that bore the city's name.

The festivities on March 3, 1943, were part of "Avenge the *Chicago* Day," organized in memory of the heavy cruiser that had been sunk near Guadalcanal two months earlier. It marked day 15 of a 40-day drive to sell $40 million in war bonds to be used for building a new war ship to be named after the city.

U.S. Navy

National Archives

ABOVE: In a photograph taken from the deck of the USS *Chicago,* the Australian cruiser *Canberra* lists to starboard and belches smoke as a destroyer pulls alongside to rescue crewmen.
RIGHT TOP: The USS *Chicago* is shown at sea on February 19, 1938. The sleek vessel fell victim to Japanese torpedoes in the Solomon Islands five years later.
RIGHT BOTTOM: A Japanese Mitsubishi "Betty" bomber is photographed from the *Chicago* on July 7, 1942. The versatile Betty could carry torpedoes or bombs.

The man-o-war depicted on the Signal Depot Wall and her valiant crew left behind a record of courageous service that would long be remembered. She was launched at the Mare Island Navy Yard on April 10, 1930. The fourth ship of the *Northampton* class, the Chicago bore hull number CA-29. A typical inter-war American heavy cruiser, the ship displaced 9,300 tons as launched and had a peacetime crew of about 750. As built, the main armament consisted of nine 8-inch guns in three turrets and four single-mounted 5-inch guns. An assortment of 40mm and 20mm antiaircraft guns were later added as secondary armament.

THE MORNING OF December 7, 1941, found the *Chicago* about 420 miles southeast of Midway Island escorting the aircraft carrier USS *Lexington* on a mission to deliver planes to the island's airfield. After hearing of the Pearl Harbor strike, the task force immediately began a fruitless search for the Japanese attack force.

In May 1942, the *Chicago* engaged Japanese aircraft during the Battle of the Coral Sea and was involved in an antisubmarine operation near Sydney, Australia. The cruiser again battled Japanese planes while covering the American invasion of Guadalcanal on August 7-8, 1942. On August 9, the *Chicago* was badly damaged during the Battle of Savo Island. Hit by a torpedo in the bow, the cruiser returned to the West Coast for permanent repairs. In early January 1943, the *Chicago* sailed out of San Francisco bound once again for the South Pacific.

January 1943 marked the fifth month of bitter island fighting on Guadalcanal. The first major American offensive in the Pacific was still not over. Although U.S. forces were in firm control of much of the island, the Japanese showed no signs of leaving. Admiral Ernest King, the Chief of Naval Operations, was getting impatient. "I am still unhappy about the lack of progress," he lamented. "At present, as for some months past, it seems to me that we merely continue to 'swap punches' with the enemy—to our advantage for sure—but without working to any plan that is apparent here." King wanted to secure the lower Solomons and continue on the offensive.

In late January, aerial reconnaissance reported major Japanese fleet units in the vicinity of Ontong Java Atoll to the north of Guadalcanal. Other reports indicated increased activity near the major air-sea base of Rabaul on the island of New Britain to the northwest. It appeared that a big Japanese naval operation was in the works.

In charge of the South Pacific area since October, Admiral William F. "Bull" Halsey decided to act. To cover a convoy of four troop transports loaded with Marines and supplies bound for Guadalcanal, Halsey decided to deploy a vast array of sea power. A total of six task forces were deployed northeast of Australia in hopes of luring the Japanese into a major engagement. The new battleships *North Carolina, Washington,* and *Indiana* would participate in the move north, as would the carriers *Saratoga* and *Enterprise*. The carriers were the lead ships in Task Forces 11 and 16, respectively.

Traveling well behind the two forward task forces, these groups would be ready to tangle with any heavy Japanese fleet units that might venture south. All of the task force commanders were charged with the general mission of destroying any Japanese forces encountered on the move north. Leading the sortie were two task groups that started their journey on January 27. The troop convoy, built around the transports *President Adams*, *President Hayes*, *President Jackson,* and *Crescent City*, left from New Caledonia.

Designated as a close support group, Task Force 18 consisted of three heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, eight destroyers, and two escort

National Archives

National Archives

carriers. The force, which departed from Efate in the New Hebrides, was under the command of Rear Adm. Robert C. Giffen, who had just arrived from the Atlantic on his flagship, the cruiser *Wichita*. A 1907 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Giffen had commanded a destroyer in World War I and served in the Atlantic during the early days of World War II. Most recently, he had commanded Task Group 34.1 during the Allied invasion of North Africa.

Giffen was ordered to rendezvous with Destroyer Squadron 21, which had been oper-

On August 8, 1942, a photographer aboard the *Chicago* captured this image of Japanese torpedo planes attacking American ships off of Tulagi in the Solomons. One plane streaks toward its target while two others are ablaze and antiaircraft fire dots the sky.

National Archives

ating near Guadalcanal, and sweep to the northwest of the island while the transports unloaded. The meeting was to take place off the southwest coast of Guadalcanal at 9 PM on January 30. On January 29, Giffen received warnings of possible Japanese intentions. Specifically mentioned were several submarines thought to be operating in the area and a large number of enemy aircraft sighted around Guadalcanal. The communications also warned of a possible night air attack.

To move his task force northward at an increased speed, Giffen detached the escort carriers *Chenango* and *Suwannee* along with two destroyers at 3 PM on January 29. The carriers continued to provide fighter cover for Task Force 18 during daylight hours as they moved southeast. Freed up from the slower speed of the carriers, the remaining ships moved north at 24 knots to keep the appointed rendezvous. Task Force 18 now consisted of the heavy cruisers *Wichita, Chicago,* and *Louisville*, the light cruisers *Montpelier*, *Cleveland,* and *Columbia*, and six destroyers.

In accordance with his experiences in the Atlantic, Giffen was concerned about possible submarine attacks. He divided his cruisers into two columns, light cruisers on the left, and heavy cruisers on the right. The six destroyers formed a half circle in front of the two columns. This formation provided good antisubmarine screening and quick movement into surface battle positions, but it was less than ideal for protection against air attacks due to the less protected rear areas. Giffen provided no specific orders to the ships of his task force as to how to respond to an air attack.

On the evening of January 29, Task Force 18 was zigzagging on a base course of 305 degrees traveling northwest toward the rendezvous point at 24 knots. With darkness approaching, the fighter cover had put down for the night. The force had passed north of Rennell Island and was about 35 miles from Guadalcanal. The *Chicago* was second behind the *Wichita* in the right column of heavy cruisers. Its sister ship *Louisville* was immediately behind.

IN COMMAND OF THE *Chicago* was 52-year-old Captain Ralph Davis. The ship was darkened and conducting radar searches with all antiaircraft batteries manned. The sun had set and the task force was now moving into twilight.

At 7:10 PM, the *Chicago*'s CXAM radar contacted unidentified planes 25 miles to the west. The planes were making a wide circle and approaching the rear of the task force. Reports on the TBS (talk between ships) from the *Wichita* confirmed that they were enemy planes. Aboard his flagship, Admiral Giffen thought the radar plot looked like "a disturbed hornets' nest."

By 7:20 PM, the enemy planes had divided into two groups and were approaching the task force from behind the starboard beam. Such positioning silhouetted the ships against the twilight glow. The groups were closing at ranges of 10,000 yards and 17,000 yards. Captain Davis ordered his ship to general quarters. The ringing alarm sent the crew racing to battle stations.

The approaching planes were Mitsubishi G4M Type 97 bombers. Known to the Allies as a "Betty," the twin-engine land-based bomber was capable of a remarkable range of almost 3,700 miles. Harold Beckman, a cook aboard the *Chicago*, saw the Japanese planes coming in for the attack from his station on the ship's well deck. "Enemy Zero [fighter] planes came on machine gunning the decks in an endeavor to get the men from their stations. Then the torpedo planes dived at us. It was really a suicide attack. The way they came on gave them no means to turn back and some of them fell in flames on the *Chicago*'s port side."

The fast moving Bettys started their torpedo runs low and fast, approaching the heavy cruiser column from the unprotected starboard stern quarter. At about 7:25 PM, the destroyer *Waller*, positioned immediately to the starboard of the *Chicago*, opened fire on the first group of approaching planes. *Chicago*'s starboard 5-inch and 40mm batteries soon joined in the barrage, the former under full radar control. It had been approximately 12 minutes since the initial radar contact.

The *Chicago* was equipped with the secret new proximity fused antiaircraft shells. Used with fragmentation shells, the fuse contained a radio transceiver that caused the shell to explode when near a target. As a result of the new weapon, a near miss was almost as good as a hit when firing at enemy planes.

Two bombers approached the *Chicago* from

the after section of the starboard beam. At least one torpedo hit the water 500 or 600 yards out, but no wake was seen. Both planes passed ahead of the *Chicago*, apparently undamaged by the heavy barrage of antiaircraft fire. Another plane launched a torpedo in the direction of the *Louisville,* which avoided being hit only by making a sharp turn to port. Tracers lit up the darkening sky as all ships of the task force fired away at the attacking planes. Exploding in flames, one Betty hit the sea close behind the *Chicago*.

THE JAPANESE PLANES moved past the cruisers and retired off the port bow of the task force. The first attack ended with no ships reporting damage. Focused on making the appointed rendezvous, Giffen continued at the same speed on the same base course and discontinued zigzagging to make up for lost time. Suddenly, flares began to appear on both sides of the task force. White parachute flares were seen dangling in the sky, while red flares glowed on the ocean surface below. Dropped by Japanese scout planes, both types served to illuminate the ships against the now dark sky. Japanese aircraft now had a beacon that would lead them directly to the American ships.

Shortly after 7:30 PM, more bombers appeared out of the eastern sky. One Betty launched a torpedo ahead of the *Chicago*. It passed harmlessly through the cruiser's wake. At least one torpedo was thought to have passed near the *Wichita*. A second torpedo hit the *Louisville* but failed to detonate.

Appearing tall against the background of the flares, the right column of heavy cruisers continued to be the focus of the air attack, with more planes closing at about 7:38 PM. One bomber went down in flames directly behind the destroyer *Waller*. A second was hit and caught fire. It burned brightly as it passed near the *Chicago*, lighting up the deck with burning fuel before crashing into the sea off the port bow.

Lieutenant Edward Jarman was the *Chicago*'s air defense officer. He recalled the near miss. "We filled one torpedo plane so full of steel that it almost exploded on the *Chicago*. It missed our boat by 10 feet. It burned three or four minutes, silhouetting us for the second wave." Fed by aviation fuel, the wreckage burned brightly, illuminating the cruiser and making it an easy target for other approaching planes. "They all concentrated on the *Chicago,*" Jarman said, "apparently mistaking her for a battleship."

At 7:40 PM, a torpedo hit the after engine room on the starboard side of the *Chicago* with a thunderous explosion. Radio technician John Erby was near where the torpedo hit. "I was in the starboard passageway when the first torpedo struck not 30 feet away from me. Not long after the torpedo hit, the communications failed and we had to leave the passageway," he recalled. "We joined a gang trying to put out fires and we fought desperately to save the ship." Two minutes later, a torpedo wake was sighted closing in fast. Almost immediately, a second torpedo exploded against the starboard side hitting near the No. 3 fire room and forward engine room.

As a result of the first hit, propeller shafts 1, 2, and 3 stopped immediately. Control of the ship was lost as the rudder locked at 10 degrees to the left and no longer responded to commands from the bridge. Four compartments, including the after engine room and the No. 4 fire room, were flooded. Water began to slowly enter the crew's mess. The *Chicago*, now listing to starboard, began to settle by the stern. Emergency diesel generators were started to provide power for lighting, electrical fire pumps, submersible pumps, and radios.

> "We were taking on more water than the books said we could and keep afloat, but we kept her up."

The second torpedo hit flooded the No. 3 fire room and forward engine room. The machine shop was demolished. Several small fires broke out. The starboard list gradually increased to 11 degrees. Soon afterward, the No. 4 propeller shaft stopped, leaving the *Chicago* dead in the water. The *Louisville* turned sharply to avoid hitting her stalled sister ship before taking up position behind the *Wichita*.

Admiral Giffen was notified by TBS that the *Chicago* had been torpedoed and was disabled. Now under the cover of darkness, he took steps to help protect the remaining ships from further air attacks. Giffen changed course to 120 degrees and slowed the task force. The reduced speed made it difficult for the Japanese pilots to spot the white wakes behind the ships. Antiaircraft fire was prohibited unless directed at a definite target. Unable to get a good fix on the American ships, the remaining Japanese planes headed home.

On the *Chicago,* damage control parties sprang into action immediately in a determined effort to save the ship. The crew was not only well trained but also had firsthand experience after dealing with torpedo damage at the Battle of Savo Island. As at Savo, all hands were determined to save the ship.

Fires and flooding were of immediate concern. Small fires in the galley and radio room II were quickly extinguished by damage control parties. Bulkheads were shored up to prevent further flooding. Albert Bartholomew, the ship's carpenter, led a damage control party deep into the ship to close critical hatches. The party "worked like dogs to keep us afloat," he said. "They swam 30 feet in water chin deep, dodging heavy tables and chairs as the ship rolled, to dog down hatches."

Leaks in the laundry and ice machine rooms were quickly plugged. Flooding boundaries were established, allowing bucket brigades to begin their work. Engineers began to work on the jammed rudder, which was straightened out shortly after midnight.

The key to saving the crippled *Chicago* was getting her out of range of land-based Japanese bombers. Accordingly, shortly after midnight preparations were made for the *Chicago* to be taken under tow by the *Louisville*. Under the command of Captain Charles Joy, the *Louisville* maneuvered into position with its stern about 1,000 yards off the bow of the *Chicago*. After resolving some initial problems that occurred while trying to position the cruisers close together in the darkness, sailors began the arduous task of connecting the two ships with a thick steel chain.

Captain Joy later commented, "The passing of the tow was accomplished without a hitch and exactly as planned, with no injury to personnel, or damage to material." Once attached, the *Louisville* moved ahead slowly at four knots, bound for Espiritu Santo. Three destroyers accompanied the connected cruisers on their slow journey south. The remaining ships of Task Force 18 headed west to screen against any possible Japanese ship movements.

Help was also on the way from other sources. Admiral Halsey ordered Task Force 16 to move toward the stricken cruiser. Under the command of Rear Admiral Frederick Sherman, the task force was about 350 miles south of the *Chicago*. Built around the carrier *Enterprise*, the force headed north at 28 knots.

Sherman was directed to provide fighter air cover over the *Chicago* during daylight hours.

To accomplish this, he had to put the *Enterprise* in a precarious position. The carrier had to be close enough to the cruiser to allow for a short flight time for his fighters, yet far enough away that Japanese planes sent to attack the *Chicago* would not be in a position to sight the *Enterprise*. Additional fighter protection would be provided by the escort carriers if needed. The fleet tug *Navajo* and the destroyer *Sands* were also dispatched to assist in the rescue mission.

Meanwhile, frantic work continued aboard the *Chicago*. The No. 2 mess hall, after engine room, forward engine room, and machine shop were open to the sea as a result of the twisted metal from the torpedo hits. However, most of the leaks in other compartments were plugged, and great progress was being made to remove water in flooded areas.

Attention now turned to correcting the starboard list. Shortly after midnight, boiler No. 4 was restarted to provide additional power to the ship. Booster pumps were now able to correct the list by shifting fuel oil. As a precautionary move, the captain ordered that most of the life rafts and floater nets be cut loose and placed on the deck.

The prognosis for the *Chicago* now seemed to be improving. "We were settling fast and it looked touch and go whether we would sink. The next morning we were taking on more water than the books said we could and keep afloat," recalled Lieutenant Jarman, "but we kept her up." Maybe the cruiser would live to fight another day.

It was just before 6 AM on January 30, when four Douglas SBD Dauntless dive-bombers lifted off the flight deck of the *Enterprise*. Disappearing into the predawn sky, their mission was to visually locate the *Chicago*. At 7:15 AM, the damaged cruiser was sighted about 35 miles east of Rennell Island. By 8 AM six Grumman F4F Wildcat fighters of Fighter Squadron 10 were on station overhead. Four other fighters circled above the *Enterprise*.

The tug *Navajo* arrived shortly after 8 AM to relieve the *Louisville* of towing duties. In the early afternoon, Admiral Giffen signaled the *Chicago* to call a destroyer alongside to transfer off any unnecessary personnel at Captain Davis's discretion. Davis signaled the *Wichita* back, asking if the destroyer could also transfer his wounded men to a land hospital.

Giffen replied that no destroyer could leave the task force due to the continued submarine threat. Davis decided to keep the crew aboard and prepared to defend the ship against another air attack, which seemed all but certain. Later in the day, Halsey ordered the remaining undamaged cruisers of Task Force 18 to head for port.

At 3 PM, Admiral Giffen wished the *Chicago* good luck and headed south toward Efate.

Leaving with the cruisers was the task force's fighter direction officer aboard the *Wichita*. As a result, there would be no on-site command and control for the fighters assigned to protect the *Chicago*. Screened by six destroyers, the cruiser continued south at four knots, under tow by the *Navajo*. As each hour passed, the *Chicago* slowly limped farther away from the danger of Japanese bombers.

The Japanese seemed determined not to let the crippled cruiser get away. At about 8:30 AM, Wildcat fighters above the *Enterprise* chased off a Japanese spotter plane that was sighted about 20 miles west of the carrier. The plane likely reported the positions of both the carrier and the crippled cruiser.

By mid-afternoon, coastwatchers had spotted a flight of Japanese aircraft south of New Georgia heading for Rennell Island. Shortly afterward, a warning message from Guadalcanal was picked up by the *Enterprise*. The fighter direction team aboard the carrier quickly estimated that the bombers would be in the area at about 4 PM. The *Enterprise* was now about 43 miles southeast of the *Chicago*. Ten Wildcat fighters led by Lt. Cmdr. William Kane were on patrol above the cruiser.

At 3:40 PM, fighters over the *Chicago* sighted a single Japanese plane north of Rennell Island approaching at high altitude. The plane was likely a spotter, sent in advance to guide the main attack formation to the target. Kane dispatched four Wildcats to give chase. The Japanese plane turned south and headed around the eastern end of Rennell Island, putting it in a position to see both the *Enterprise* and the *Chicago*.

THE WILDCATS GAVE chase, speeding at full throttle toward the twin-engine Betty. A well-placed burst of machine-gun fire knocked out the starboard engine on the Japanese plane, which began to slow and trail smoke. Ensign Hank Ledar pulled his Wildcat in for the kill. Soon, the enemy aircraft caught fire, turned into a ball of flames, and spiraled toward the sea. The chase had carried the four fighters nearly 40 miles away from the *Chicago* and out of position to deal with the main enemy formation that was now approaching.

At 3:54 PM, radar aboard the *Enterprise* picked up an incoming flight of 12 Japanese

National Archives

ABOVE: Damage to the bow of the *Chicago* is clearly visible following the Japanese air attack of August 10, 1942. After undergoing repairs, the warship went back into harm's way.
OPPOSITE: The USS *Chicago* is shown down by the stern following a night engagement with the Japanese off Rennell Island. Her radar apparatus has been blotted out by censors in this final photograph before the vessel was lost on January 30, 1943.

bombers 67 miles away and bearing 300 degrees. The course had the bombers heading directly toward the *Enterprise*. The carrier increased speed as nearby ships closed to form a protective shield. Antiaircraft guns were aimed skyward as the radar plot showed the enemy planes moving closer at 8,000 feet with their noses low, readying for torpedo runs. Ten additional fighters prepared to take off to meet the attackers. Kane had landed to refuel, and the six fighters still over the *Chicago* were now under the command of Lieutenant MacGregor Kilpatrick.

The fighter direction team aboard the *Enterprise* directed Kilpatrick's six fighters away from the *Chicago* into a position to intercept the bombers heading for the carrier. Kilpatrick and his wingman separated from the remaining four fighters as the Wildcats moved into position to meet the oncoming attackers. The Japanese bombers, then 17 miles from the carrier, suddenly made a sharp turn away from the *Enterprise* and headed directly for the *Chicago*.

"We dropped down to the attack. The Jap commander saw our Wildcat fighter planes and realized he could not get across the miles separating him from the task force, so he took what seemed to be the easy way out," recalled Kilpatrick in a later interview. "The torpedo planes turned sharply and headed west toward the *Chicago*."

Kilpatrick's four Wildcats, which a moment earlier stood ready to intercept the incoming bombers before they reached the *Enterprise*, were now behind the enemy planes and giving chase. The 10 fighters that had lifted off the carrier were too far away to play a role in the impending air battle, as were fighters from the escort carriers that had separated from Task Force 18 a day earlier.

Only Kilpatrick and his wingman, Bob Porter, were in position to intercept the bombers before they reached the *Chicago*. Both Wildcats turned sharply and dove in for the attack, riddling two Bettys with machine-gun fire on the first pass. Kilpatrick recalled the action: "[B]efore the Japs had come completely around, two of their number were spinning down with dead pilots at the controls." The remaining torpedo bombers pressed home the attack.

The battle that followed was a short but frenzied event that took place at high speed in close proximity to the stricken cruiser. With the CXAM radar out of commission (it had been damaged in the first torpedo attack), the incoming bombers were sighted by a lookout on the *Chicago* at a distance of seven miles. Eleven bombers were counted speeding in low and fast from the starboard side.

Directly between the *Chicago* and the approaching planes stood the destroyer *La Vallette*, which trained all available guns skyward and opened fire. Two minutes after the initial contact, the starboard 5-inch battery of the *Chicago* joined in at an initial range of 8,000 yards, firing the first of what would be 49 rounds of ammunition expended in the battle. The smaller 40mm and 20mm guns opened fire as range allowed.

THE CREWS OF BOTH ships fought desperately to shoot down the enemy planes before they could launch their deadly torpedoes. Marine Sergeant Anthony Anderson aboard the *Chicago* recalled how his men kept fighting in the face of both wounds and great danger. "[Private William] Stander continued firing despite two bullets in his back until I took him out of his harness and got in myself and kept his gun firing. [Private Harold] Dixon stayed at his post until he collapsed. [Private Verona] Brown had shrapnel wound in his right leg, but he got down on one knee and kept loading." Sustaining a bullet wound to the thigh, Brown survived and was later evacuated from the ship on a stretcher.

At least two Japanese planes fell into the water off the starboard side of the *Chicago*. A third Betty approached as if to crash into the cruiser. With one engine on fire, the plane sped toward the cruiser as antiaircraft gunners tried to shoot it down. The flaming plane missed the stern of the ship and hit the water off the port quarter.

By this time the four diverted fighters initially from the *Enterprise* caught up to the Japanese bombers. They joined Kilpatrick and Porter, following the Japanese bombers into the field of antiaircraft fire being put up by the *Chicago* and the *La Vallette*. Incredibly, not one of the Wildcats was damaged as they followed the bombers right over the *Chicago*, sending two more Japanese planes down in flames. The antiaircraft fire subsided as the remaining enemy aircraft passed with the Wildcat fighters in hot pursuit.

Moments after the bombers had passed, five torpedo wakes were sighted approaching the *Chicago* from the starboard beam. Under a tow that was making only three knots, the cruiser was in no position to take evasive action. The first torpedo hit well forward at 4:24 PM, show-

ering the forecastle and bridge with water and debris. Only seconds later, three more torpedoes exploded in rapid succession, some hitting near the already damaged engineering and engine rooms. The fifth torpedo passed off to the stern.

Standing between the attacking bombers and the *Chicago*, the *La Vallette* was hit by a single torpedo on the port side. Twenty-two crewmen, including damage control and engineering officer Lieutenant Eli Roth, were killed in the blast. The explosion flooded the forward engine and boiler rooms almost immediately, with the water soon spreading to the after boiler room. Quick action by damage control parties managed to contain the flooding. The *La Vallette* survived the ordeal and was eventually towed to port. The *Chicago* would not be so fortunate.

It soon became apparent that the *Chicago* was in serious trouble. After the torpedoes hit, the list to starboard increased at a rapid pace as water poured in. With the situation hopeless, Captain Davis gave the order to abandon ship. Life rafts were thrown overboard, with some difficulty on the port side due to the increasing list. Crewmen aboard the *Navajo* worked to cut the tow line.

As the crew began to leave the ship, another battle was being waged below. Crewmen in the sick bay, many wounded in the first attack, were now becoming trapped in the flooding compartment. Lieutenant Jarman commented on the bravery of the ship's doctor, Lieutenant Everett Jones: "Dr. Jones carried out a spinal meningitis case and then tried to rescue another patient, but he couldn't go back down because of the inrushing water."

Jarman recalled an orderly evacuation. "We got off every survivor on rafts. We had nearly 300 recruits, but all were orderly and waited orders. There was no panic." The *Chicago* rolled over to starboard and began to sink stern first with colors flying. "She laid over on her starboard side and went down fast but smooth," Said Jarman. "She fired a five-inch salute to herself as she went down—shells exploding from the heat of the torpedo set [sic] fires."

Erby watched the ship go down while floating in the water. "It was like watching someone I have known and loved go down under the waves. All the men floating in the water cheered." At 4:43 PM, 19 minutes after the first torpedo hit, the bow disappeared below the surface. The proud cruiser *Chicago* was now only a memory.

The destroyers *Waller*, *Edwards,* and *Sands* joined the *Navajo* in rescuing the crew of the *Chicago*. Planes and ships continued to search the area until all survivors were believed to be recovered. Of the 1,130 officers and men aboard ship at the time of the attacks, 1,069 were rescued. In his official action report, Captain Davis praised his crew for "their excellent and fearless work in keeping the ship afloat after the first action and for their courageous and orderly conduct in abandoning ship when the ship was sinking."

The Battle of Rennell Island was over. For their part, the Japanese claimed to have won a decisive victory. On February 1, Radio Tokyo reported that Japanese naval air forces had sunk three battleships and two cruisers in two days of air attacks south of Guadalcanal. The report seemed to specifically reference the attack on the *Chicago*, the only accurate part of the communiqué.

"A cruiser which had escaped unscathed on the previous night was also subjected to intensive torpedo attacks. After several hits had been scored on her, she sank with a loud explosion," said the propaganda report. The U.S. Navy reported downing a total of 17 Japanese torpedo planes during the same timeframe.

National Archives

WITH THE JAPANESE focused on attacking and sinking the *Chicago*, the four American transports arrived and departed Guadalcanal without incident. As it was later learned, the Japanese fleet was preparing to cover the evacuation of Imperial troops from Guadalcanal. Japanese destroyers began to remove troops from the island during the night of February 1, a process that continued for the next seven days. On the morning of February 9, American ground forces completed their push to the western tip of the island. On the same day, their commander reported by radio, "Total and complete defeat of Japanese forces effected 1625 today." The long and bloody struggle for Guadalcanal was over.

The loss of the *Chicago* can be traced to a variety of contributing factors. Chief among them is Admiral Giffen's complete focus on making the appointed rendezvous time with the destroyers near Guadalcanal at the expense of other considerations. His inexperience with battle conditions in the Pacific led him to arrange Task Force 18 in a formation that was not suitable for air defense. A variety of problems, poor judgments, and just plain bad luck allowed Japanese bombers to press home an attack against the crippled *Chicago* while she was under the fighter protection of aircraft carriers. For the Japanese, sinking the *Chicago* was an endorsement of the new tactic of night torpedo attacks.

The new *Chicago*—another heavy cruiser—was launched on August 20, 1944. Sunny skies and a cool breeze greeted the crowd that had assembled along the Delaware River at the Philadelphia Navy Yard for the event. The day also marked the launching of two other navy warships—the carrier *Antietam* and the heavy cruiser *Los Angeles*. Mrs. E.J. Kelly, wife of Chicago's mayor, followed protocol as she broke the customary bottle of champagne against the new cruiser's hull. "In the name of the United States, I christen thee *Chicago*."

In the day's keynote address, Undersecretary of the Navy Ralph A. Bard told the crowd, "The ships we launch today have a dual mission. They are instruments of war and peace alike." Speaking specifically about the new *Chicago*, he told the crowd, "But it was the second *Chicago* that captures our imagination." Although seeming distant at the moment, the last battle of the previous *Chicago* would not soon be forgotten.□

John Domagalski is a resident of the Chicago area who has devoted hours of exhaustive research to the preparation of this article.

HEROIC DEFENSE AT ST. VITH



BY CHARLES GUTIERREZ

THE TROOPS OF THE U.S. 9TH ARMORED DIVISION CONTESTED THE GERMAN ADVANCE DURING THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE AND WON PRECIOUS TIME IN THE PROCESS.

The U.S. 9th Armored Division arrived in the European Theater of Operations in late October 1944 as a reserve for Maj. Gen. Troy Middleton's VIII Corps. On December 9, 1944, Brig. Gen. William Hoge's Combat Command B (CCB) of the 9th was attached to V Corps to support the 2nd Infantry Division in its planned attack through the Monschau Forest as part of the U.S. Army's strategy to capture or destroy the Roer River dams.

For this mission, CCB consisted of the 14th Tank Battalion, the 27th Armored Infantry Battalion, the 16th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, and miscellaneous smaller units vital to any major command. General Hoge set up his command post in the Belgian village of Faymonville, approximately 12 miles north of the town of St. Vith, unaware of the pivotal role his command was to play in a very different battle.

The German plan for the attack through the Ardennes, an offensive that would forever be known as the Battle of the Bulge, was to be accomplished in the conventional manner. Infantry divisions would begin the attack along the entire length of a 50-mile front, forcing a rupture along the Allied line and giving the German panzer divisions freedom of movement in the unoccupied ground beyond the front.

Since speed was the key to success of the German plan, two panzer armies would spearhead the offensive. One, the Sixth Panzer Army, was commanded by SS Obergruppenführer (brigadier general) Josef "Sepp" Dietrich, and the other, the Fifth Panzer Army, was commanded by General Hasso von Manteuffel. The Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies were to advance abreast, cross the Meuse River, and then drive for the Belgian port city of Antwerp, a major staging and supply center for the Allied armies in western Europe. Overall operational command for the offensive fell to Field Marshal Walther Model.

The Sixth Panzer Army, with the 15th Army on its right, was to launch the main attack between Monschau in the north and Prum in the south. It was to cross the Meuse on both sides of Liege before advancing on to Antwerp. South of Sixth Panzer Army was General Manteuffel's Fifth Panzer Army, with the Seventh Army on its left. Fifth Panzer was to attack from Prum in the north down to Bitburg and Bastogne in the south. The village of St. Vith lay approximately 12 miles behind the front lines on

National Archives

December 16, 1944, the day the offensive code-named Operation Watch on the Rhine began. The town was also in Fifth Panzer Army's area of advance.

St. Vith is built on a low hill surrounded on all sides by slightly higher rises. Its population in 1944 was about 2,000, and its citizens were very much pro-German. Six paved or macadam roads converged at St. Vith, but none of these was considered by the Germans to be a major military trunk line. The closest of the northern German armored thrust routes ran through Recht, about five miles northwest of St. Vith. The closest primary German armored thrust route to the south ran through Burg Reuland, also about five miles from St. Vith.

The capture of St. Vith was, however, important for three other reasons: to ensure the complete isolation of Allied troops that might be trapped on a nearby ridge called the Schnee Eifel; to cover the German supply lines unraveling behind the armored corps to the north and south; and to feed reinforcements laterally into the main thrusts by using the St. Vith road net. Thus, the Fifth Panzer Army commander ordered that St. Vith be taken no later than the second day of the offensive.

The job of capturing St. Vith went to the Fifth Panzer Army's 66th Corps, commanded by General Walther Lucht. The corps consisted of two infantry divisions. One, the 18th Volksgrenadier Division, was holding the northern reaches of the Schnee Eifel. The other, the 62nd Volksgrenadier Division, bore the number of an infantry division destroyed on the Eastern Front, which had been reconstituted. It was at full strength and supplied with the latest equipment. The 62nd, like the 18th, included three regiments of two battalions each. Its mission was to break through to the

south of the 18th Volksgrenadier in the Grosslangenfeld-Heckhuschied sector, advance northwest on a broad front, and seize the Our River crossing at Steinebruck, five miles southeast of St. Vith.

Once the bridge at Steinebruck was seized, the 62nd was to support the 18th Volksgrenadier Division's drive on St. Vith by blocking the western and southern routes in and out of the town.

At approximately 0530 on December 16, eight German armored divisions and 13 infantry divisions launched their all-out attack on five divisions of the U.S. First Army. The German armored and infantry attacks were preceded by the shelling of the American positions with at least 657 light, medium, and heavy guns and howitzers and 340 multiple rocket launchers. On this day, CCB of the 9th Armored Division was still in its assembly area in the vicinity of Faymonville. Its supporting field artillery battalion was at Kalterherberg, two miles south of Monschau, engaged in firing missions for the 2nd and 99th Infantry Divisions. The American plan was that once the 2nd Infantry Division reduced the German defenses at the Wahlerscheid crossroads, CCB was to spearhead a drive to the reservoirs north of Gemund and Schleiden.

To this end, General Hoge was in the town of Monschau to check on the possibility of getting his command across in that area. While making his reconnaissance at Monschau he received an urgent message to call V Corps headquarters. The message was that his command was now back with VIII Corps and that he was to go to St. Vith and report to Maj. Gen. Alan W. Jones, commander of the newly arrived 106th Infantry Division.

On his way to St. Vith, General Hoge stopped in Faymonville to alert his command to be prepared to move immediately. Hoge departed Faymonville at approximately 1800, arriving at General Jones's headquarters in the St. Josephs Kloster about a half hour later. Within the Kloster, General Hoge found a division headquarters staff in a state of disarray and confusion. No one knew what was happening. Clerks were running everywhere and junior staff officers were arguing among themselves; upstairs, however, Hoge found General Jones remarkably composed.

Jones explained to Hoge that his division was being attacked along its entire front and that two of his three regiments, the 422nd and the 423rd, had been partly surrounded in the Schnee Eifel area just east of Schoenberg. What Jones did not tell Hoge was that in one of those regiments his own son was serving at regimental headquarters.

National Archives

Shown conferring with Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower (far right) are (left to right) Maj. Gen. John Leonard, commander of the 9th Armored Division, Maj. Gen. Troy Middleton, commander of the VIII Corps, and Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley, commander of the 12th Army Group.

Initially, General Jones wanted Hoge to move his command into the Losheim Gap at Maderfeld and arrive there at dawn on December 17 to counterattack and erase the enemy penetrations that were threatening 106th Division positions on the Schnee Eifel. Soon after General Hoge left 106th Division headquarters for the drive back to Faymonville, Jones received a call from Middleton informing him that a combat command of Brig. Gen. Robert Hasbrouck's 7th Armored Division would be arriving at St. Vith at 0700 on the 17th. The entire division was to follow shortly thereafter.

Although General Jones was deeply worried about his two regiments on the Schnee Eifel, he was also highly concerned about the German advances in the Winterspelt area where his 424th Infantry Regiment was defending. Situation reports suggested that the Germans were intent on crossing the Our River at Steinebruck. Now with a new armored combat command due to arrive at 0700 hours the next day, and with the rest of the division to follow, Jones believed he would soon have the potential to deal with both the Schnee Eifel and Winterspelt emergencies. Therefore, he decided to use the 9th Armored at Winterspelt, since capture of that area by the Germans would open to the enemy a direct route to St. Vith, a route even shorter than that leading from the Schnee Eifel.

Thus, the job of rescuing the two trapped infantry regiments on the Schnee Eifel passed from the 9th to the 7th Armored Division.

At St. Vith, Lt. Col. William H. Slayden was with Jones when Jones received the call from Middleton concerning 7th Armored Division support. Slayden had been sent to Jones by Middleton as an adviser until the 106th Division could become acclimated. Slayden, knowing that the nearest units of the 7th Armored Division were at least 60 miles away in the Netherlands, had serious doubts that a whole combat command could reach St. Vith on the 17th, much less by 0700 hours. However, he kept these misgivings to himself.

At CCB, 9th Armored Division's headquarters in Faymonville, General Hoge was just finishing up his briefing for his command's move to the Losheim Gap and Manderfeld when the call came through from General Jones informing him of 9th Armored's new Winterspelt mission. Since the move from Faymonville to Winterspelt involved a greater distance, Hoge decided to get his command on the road imme-

German soldiers move past an abandoned U.S. armored vehicle during the early hours of the Battle of the Bulge. The stand of the 9th Armored Division at St. Vith, Belgium, slowed the momentum of the Germans.

National Archives



A Sherman tank of the 9th Armored Division heads into action against the advancing Germans during the Battle of the Bulge. The fighting in the Ardennes was some of fiercest of the war on the Western Front.

National Archives

diately. The time was approximately 1800 on Saturday, December 16, when Combat Command B of the 9th Armored Division began its move to St. Vith.

At about noon that day, the 62nd Volksgrenadier Division's 190th Regiment had broken through north of the 424th Infantry's Cannon Company. The Germans were now on the high ground north of Eigelscheid overlooking the road to Winterspelt. General Frederich Kittel, the division commander, ordered his mobile battalion up from his 164th Regiment reserve at Pronsfeld and into the attack along the Winterspelt road. This battalion hit the 424th's Cannon Company at the Weissenhof crossroads. Outnumbered and in danger of encirclement, the cannoneers and their rifle support from C Company made a platoon-by-platoon withdrawal toward Winterspelt. By dark, just as General Hoge's command was getting underway from Faymonville, Kittel's mobile battalion and infantry from the 190th Regiment were closing in on Winterspelt.

At the close of the first day of battle, General Lucht could look with some satisfaction at the day's events, although his 62nd Volksgrenadier Division had yet to break through the American line. Lucht anticipated that the Americans would counterattack the next day, but that their reaction would be too late to avoid complete encirclement.

At about 0115 on December 17, a platoon from 9th Armored's D Troop, 89th Recon was detailed to proceed through St. Vith in a southeasterly direction and seize the high ground along Highway N27 south of Steinebruck. The troop was to hold until relieved by the 27th Armored Infantry Battalion (AIB) and then reconnoiter farther down the road toward Winterspelt. However, this platoon never completed its mission. While on its way, the platoon was commandeered by a colonel from the 106th Division. The colonel ordered the troop east along the road to Schoenberg to delay a German tank and infantry team approaching St. Vith from that direction. The platoon lost four men missing and two wounded in the ensuing engagement.

The Command's main body was led by the 27th AIB with B Company in front, followed by Headquarters and C Company. Company A of the 27th AIB had been assigned to the 99th Infantry Division and was in the process of being retrieved when the march to St. Vith began. Next came B Company, 9th Armored Engineers; the 16th Armored Field Artillery; B Company, 482nd Antiaircraft Artillery; and the 14th Tank Battalion. Elements of D Company, 89th Recon screened the flanks.

General Lucht's plan for December 17 was simple. A mobile battalion of the 18th Volksgrenadier Division was already moving on Andler to seize the Schoenberg bridge and the road to St. Vith. The southernmost battle group of the 18th Volksgrenadier would also undertake a mobile thrust and, finally, the 62nd Volksgrenadier would break loose at Heckhuscheid and drive for the Our River Valley.

The leading vehicles of General Hoge's command entered St. Vith on Sunday morning just as dawn was breaking and halted close to the 106th Division's command post at the St. Joseph Kloster. Inside the command post, General Hoge learned that the Germans had launched a heavy assault on Winterspelt against the men of the 424th Infantry. General Jones wanted Hoge to use the infantry of his 27th AIB to seize the series of hills near Winterspelt while the 14th Tank Battalion was to remain west of the Our River for use as the situation developed. The ultimate objective was to open an escape route for the soldiers of the 424th. An attack to the east by the 7th Armored Division could then relieve the two surrounded regiments of the 106th.

Colonel Alexander D. Reid, commander of the 424th Infantry Regiment, had reason to fear

RATHER THAN SPILL BLOOD NEEDLESSLY TO TAKE MEANINGLESS GROUND, HOGE CALLED OFF THE ATTACK ON WINTERSPELT.

National Archives

encirclement. During the early hours of December 17, the Germans laid heavy mortar and artillery fire on the front-line positions of his regiment. The situation on Reid's left flank was unclear, and the Germans were attacking in considerable force against his right flank. Elements of the 62nd Volksgrenadier had taken the eastern half of Winterspelt during the night, and at daybreak reinforcements finally drove Colonel Reid's 1st Battalion from the village.

The 424th Infantry had its back to the Our River, and if the Germans seized the bridge at Steinebruck and spread along the far bank his regiment would be hard pressed to effectively withdraw. Communications with division headquarters in St. Vith were limited to liaison officers running along a road now being shelled by the Germans.

Although the 62nd Volksgrenadier Division drove the American defenders from Winterspelt, all was not going well for the Germans. The 424th Infantry still blocked the road to the Our River and Steinebruck. General Lucht hurried to Winterspelt to get the 62nd Volksgrenadier moving to the Our. Although the 62nd Volksgrenadier captured Winterspelt, its losses were high and its left regiment had made little headway in the Heckhuschied sector.

On the road to Winterspelt, General Hoge soon learned that the situation there was worse than General Jones had described. The column came upon stragglers from the 424th Infantry retreating in disarray toward St. Vith. Hoge managed to stop the stragglers, and soon a provisional company of men from the 424th was formed to reinforce the 27th AIB on its march toward the Our.

With the unexplained disappearance of D Troop from the 89th Reconnaissance Platoon, Company B, 27th AIB became the leading element. At approximately 0930 on December 17, B Company was the first 9th Armored Division unit to cross the Our River. Soon after its crossing, B Company ran into German infantry dug in along the high ground overlooking the village of Elcherath.

Staff Sergeant Frank Mykalo knocked out a German machine-gun position, enabling the men in the lead half-tracks to dismount and deploy along the side of the road. In the 27th AIB's move to take the high ground, B Company advanced along the center of the road. A Company moved south under the protection of the high river bank, while C Company deployed along the left side of the road as the enveloping company. During the assault, B Company suffered about 40 casualties including its commanding officer, Captain Henry D. Wirsig.

During the 27th AIB's assault, a call went out for the 14th Tank Battalion to join the action. In minutes, a platoon of medium tanks from A Company of the 14th rolled across the bridge at Steinebruck and placed high explosive and heavy machine-gun fire on the enemy's position in the woods and along the draw. By noon, the 27th AIB, with the help of Company A, 14th Tank Battalion, had retaken that first stretch of high ground. By mid-afternoon, General Hoge ordered his infantry to halt and dig in. Counter to the plan laid out earlier by General Jones, Hoge had decided to launch his attack on Winterspelt with the entire 14th Tank Battalion as the lead element rather than with the more vulnerable infantry of the 27th AIB.

The 14th Tank Battalion was on its way to the Steinebruck bridge when Brig. Gen. Herbert T. Perrin, assistant commander of the 106th Infantry Division, drove up carrying a message from General Jones. Perrin told General Hoge, "You can continue this attack on towards this back country, but you must be back on this side of the river by nightfall."

Hoge could not see much sense in making an attack, taking ground, and then turning right around and coming back, especially if the attack was successful. So, rather than spill blood needlessly to take meaningless ground, Hoge called off the attack on Winterspelt. His troops remained in place, and the pullout to the west side of the Our River began at dusk. Fortunately for Colonel Reid, word came at about 1730 that his 424th Infantry Regiment was to withdraw immediately.

By the end of the day, the 27th AIB had withdrawn through Steinebruck without casualties despite enemy shelling of the village. Both B and C Companies pulled back to the vicinity of Neidingen, near the battalion command post, while the 14th Tank Battalion established a perimeter defense around its assembly area near Breitfeld about halfway between the Our and St. Vith. Troop D, 89th Recon held the sector from Steinebruck to Weppeler while A Company, 27th AIB put up a defensive line anchored on the high ground east of Maspelt. Between these units, a place was found for the provisional company composed of the 424th Infantry stragglers.

While 9th Armored was thus engaged in the Winterspelt area during the morning hours of December 17, Brig. Gen. Bruce C. Clarke, commander of CCB, 7th Armored Division, arrived at General Jones's command post in St. Vith at approximately 1030. By this time the Germans had essentially closed the trap on the two infantry regiments on the Schnee Eifel. Jones wanted Clarke to counterattack immediately with his combat command "and break that ring that these people have closed around the Schnee Eifel."

It was a clear disappointment to Jones when Clarke told him that he, his operations officer, his aide, and his driver were the only representatives of the 7th Armored Division to have reached St. Vith at that time. Furthermore, General Clarke had no idea when his command would arrive.

During the rest of the day and on into the

evening of December 17, CCB, 7th Armored moved into St. Vith and began a buildup that resembled a large horseshoe on the high ground to the east of the village. Although the 7th Armored Division was finally arriving, General Jones had been led to believe that the whole division would arrive in St. Vith starting at 0700. Jones had been counting on this when he sent Hoge's 9th Armored Command to Winterspelt rather than Schoenberg. It appeared now that the fate of his two northern regiments was sealed.

Late on December 17, General Manteuffel was concerned with the lack of progress in his attack beyond the Schnee Eifel toward St. Vith. Since St. Vith should have been taken on December 16 or the 17th at the latest, he decided to leave his command post at Waxweiler and spend the night with the 18th Volksgrenadier Division at Schoenberg. While walking to avoid the traffic congestion, Manteuffel encountered his superior, Field Harshal Model.

Model informed Manteuffel that he would be given the Führer Escort Brigade, which was nearly equal in strength to an American light armored division, for the upcoming assault on St. Vith. The brigade had 9,000 men, Mark IV tanks, assault guns, 104mm and 105mm artillery, 88mm antiaircraft guns, and a number of heavy automatic weapons batteries.

Troop D, 89th Recon had positioned its troop headquarters and first platoon to cover the bridge over the Our. During the night, the troopers experienced harassing fire from light and medium artillery and could observe enemy infantry and at least four tanks moving along high ground to the south of the river. At approximately 0100 on December 18, a German force of about 30 men tried to cross the Our at Steinebruck after a brief artillery barrage. They were repulsed by machine-gun fire. A second attempt on the bridge, made by about 40 men four hours later, was also thrown back by machine-gun fire. Both assault groups suffered heavy casualties. Fire from the 16th Field Artillery broke up other enemy formations trying to assemble on the high ground to the south. One German tank was seen going up in flames.

The provisional company of 424th stragglers disappeared during the night. To cover this dangerous gap in the line C Company, 27th AIB was ordered to the Our between Troop D, 89th Recon and Company A, 27th AIB. On its way to the new position, C Company came under a sudden artillery and rocket barrage in the village of Lommersweiler. Unable to advance, it pulled back to the nearest high ground and dug in.

Sometime later that Monday morning, General Hoge sent his liaison officer to St. Vith to learn the dispositions of CCB, 7th Armored Division. En route, the officer was approached by a member of General Clarke's staff who told him that German tanks were approaching St. Vith along the road from the north. He was also told that all that stood in their way were two troops of the 87th Recon Squadron, 7th Armored's 87th, and a few antiaircraft half-tracks. The staff officer wanted to know if 9th Armored could spare some desperately needed help.

After listening to the information provided by General Clarke's staff officer, General Hoge decided to go to St. Vith himself to assess the situation. Before departing, however, Hoge gave orders to Lt. Col. Leonard E. Engeman, commander of the 14th Tank Battalion, to get a strong force ready to move out to assist 7th Armored should it become necessary. Once in St. Vith, Jones explained that only the leading elements of the 7th Armored Division had arrived thus far and that St. Vith's northern approach was under attack. Hoge immediately got on the phone and ordered Engeman to move out.

Engeman set out with two task forces to meet the enemy. One task force was made up of A and B Companies of the 14th Tank Battalion, B Company of the 482nd Antiaircraft Artillery, and another platoon of the 14th. The second task force consisted of B Company of the 811th Tank Destroyers. Both task forces reached St. Vith shortly before noon on the 18th to find not one, but two German attacks moving against the town.

One task force encountered reconnaissance probes on N27 conducted by units of the 1st SS Panzer Division approximately 1,000 yards north of St. Vith. The Sherman tanks of B Company repulsed the enemy with fire from their 76mm guns. When B Company pulled back to refuel and rearm, A Company passed through to take up the fight. The second task force hit another probe by the 1st SS Panzer and pushed it out of Hunningen.

Both American units were able to drive forward, and the Shermans knocked out six German armored vehicles. The two task forces held onto their respective positions on N23 and N27, deflecting all German armored attempts to penetrate St. Vith, until they were relieved late in the afternoon by CCB, 7th Armored Division. By dark, Lt. Col. Engeman and his two task forces were back in their assembly area in the vicinity of Breitfeld.

During ceremonies observing the 20th anniversary of the Battle of the Bulge, General Clarke was able to talk to General Manteuffel and discuss German operations against St. Vith. Clarke asked, "Why in the world when I had only 2,500 men available to my command on December 17, did you not just execute a powerful frontal assault and overrun me?"

Manteuffel answered, "We estimated that we were up against a division, and perhaps against an entire corps. We made several probing

National Archives

ABOVE: Tanks of the 9th Armored Division roll through an abandoned French village. During the defense of St. Vith, the 9th Armored and several other American units suffered heavy casualties.
OPPOSITE: Near the border with Luxembourg, the crew of a 105mm artillery piece belonging to the 9th Armored Division load and fire on enemy positions during a concentrated barrage on December 21, 1944.

attacks, and every time we went into your position, we encountered armor. Our preliminary briefings had told us that there would be no armor in our path. When you get surprised like this, you become cautious."

Undoubtedly much, if not most, of the armor encountered by Manteuffel's probing actions during the early days of the German offensive belonged to CCB, 9th Armored Division.

South of St. Vith, even as Lt. Col. Engeman's task forces were responding to the 7th Armored's cry for help, Germans of the 62nd Volksgrenadier Division were trying to get across the Our River at Steinebruck and hit St. Vith from that direction. The bridge at Steinebruck was intentionally left intact by General Hoge on the outside chance that some of the American troops trapped in the vicinity of the Schnee Eifel might be able to maneuver their way there.

However, by noon on December 18 it was quite apparent to Hoge that the Germans infiltrating across the river were converging on the bridge in such numbers that it had to be blown. Under cover of automatic weapons fire from a platoon of light tanks, Sergeant Eugene Dorland and two other men from the engineers went into the cold, bullet-splattered water carrying three cases of TNT and placed their charges on the south abutment of the bridge. The resulting blast damaged the bridge to such an extent that the Germans would not be able to bring vehicles across for at least 24 hours.

Although the bridge over the Our was blown, the German presence kept growing. At about 1330, three German self-propelled guns and 19 or 20 horse-drawn artillery pieces went into position on the high ground 800 yards to the southeast of Steinebruck. After putting down a heavy concentration of artillery fire, the Germans moved their infantry across the river east of the position held by the 2nd platoon of D Troop, 89th Recon. The troop's request for armored support was denied by General Hoge because his tank companies sent north to help the 7th Armored had not yet returned and no reserve was on hand.

However, Company B, 27th AIB was sent to help ease the situation, covering the cavalry's left flank. With the enemy inside Steinebruck and excellent direct fire by the German artillery, what was left of 2nd Platoon, 89th Recon withdrew along the St. Vith road. All but five troopers of 2nd Platoon were lost to enemy action.

The 9th Armored Division's position at the Our was no longer tenable. Because the Our had ceased to be a barrier anywhere else, General Hoge felt that there was little to gain in continuing to overextend his command to hold the low ground along the river. Having first conferred with General Jones, Hoge ordered a withdrawal from the river to begin after nightfall. CCB's new position blocked the main Winterspelt-St. Vith highway and the valley of the Braunlauf Creek, a second natural corridor leading to St. Vith. CCB, 9th Armored was linked on its left with CCB, 7th Armored and what was left of the 424th Infantry Regiment on its right.

Although the Germans were quick to build up beyond the Our River after the American withdrawal, they made no immediate moves against the new American line. Rebuilding the blown bridge to get their assault guns across was their first priority.

The defense of St. Vith was now achieving some kind of order in contrast to the chaos that had reigned during the previous three days. The area being defended was beginning to take the form of a large horseshoe, its axis running approximately northeast to southeast. The northern prong of the horseshoe was composed of CCB, 7th Armored Division from Poteau and Vielsalm. The rounded portion of the horseshoe was composed of Colonel Dwight Rosebaum's CCA, 7th Armored between Poteau and Rodt and General Clarke's CCB, 7th Armored in the very center protecting St. Vith.

The southern prong was defended by General Hoge's CCB, 9th Armored with the weakened 424th Infantry Regiment tied in and bent back protecting Burg Reuland. The greatest danger existed in the 424th's position because the regiment's flank lay vulnerable to attacks by the 116th Panzer Division to the south. The distance from Burg Reuland on the southeast to Poteau on the northwest was about 10 miles with only a single secondary road as a line of retreat for thousands of men defending the horseshoe against attack from three directions.

Early on the 19th, the Germans made reconnaissance probes. At about 0930, the enemy attacked St. Vith from Hunningen to the north, apparently in an effort to envelop Clarke's left flank. The fight lasted for more than three hours

National Archives

A disabled German tank lies abandoned along the edge of a slushy road as an American tank destroyer rumbles past. The wintry conditions during the Battle of the Bulge temporarily hindered the employment of U.S. air power.

before the Germans withdrew, leaving one burning tank and approximately 150 dead. Having failed to find a soft spot to the north, the Germans then moved against Hoge's 9th Armored command in the south; however, even before this attack got going three German tanks were knocked out and the rest of the probing force withdrew.

Manteuffel had hoped for considerably more on the 19th. The reason for this comparative respite was due to the fact that the roads to the German rear were completely jammed. Adding to the slowdown of operations against St. Vith, the 18th Volksgrenadier Division was still using two of its three regiments and all but one of its artillery battalions against the two trapped 106th Infantry Division regiments on the Schnee Eifel. It would be unable to turn its full strength on St. Vith until the American surrender in that area.

Manteuffel met near Wallerode with Model and Lucht that day. There was little they could do other than vow to get the attack moving early on the 20th. By that time the 62nd Volksgrenadier Division should have the bridge at Steinebruck rebuilt, at least two regiments of the 18th Volksgrenadier Division should be forward, and the Führer Escort Brigade should be ready to make the principal thrust down the Ambleve highway into St. Vith. Moreover, at least a regiment from the 1st SS Panzer Division was in sporadic conflict with the American defenders in the Recht-Poteau area and, in the south, elements of the 560th Volksgrenadier Division, part of General Walter Krueger's 58th Panzer Corps, were also identified as pushing against American forces in the St. Vith salient.

General Jones and his staff had pulled out of St. Vith on the morning of the 18th for Vielsalm. Since General Hoge was supposed to be under Jones's command and did not understand the overall situation around St. Vith, he decided to find out exactly what was going on.

During the afternoon of December 19, Hoge visited Clarke's command post in St. Vith and expressed his frustration with the current chain of command. After Clarke and Hoge settled upon a mutually supportive command structure, Clarke noted that Hoge's command was, for the most part, forward of a railroad track built on a high embankment. Should 7th Armored lose St. Vith, 9th Armored would be unable to withdraw on its own axis. Hoge and Clarke agreed that Hoge's entire command should be withdrawn west of the railroad tracks. To execute this maneuver, Hoge's entire command would have to move all the way up to St. Vith and back down again. The move would also have to be done under the cover of darkness in severe wintry conditions.

Orders for CCB, 9th Armored to move to a new defensive position were issued at 1600. The supply trains led the way north on N27 to St. Vith. They were followed in order by the half-tracks and other vehicles of the 27th AIB, the tank companies, the antiaircraft company, and the engineers. The foot elements of the 27th AIB were then to move out with Company B, 482nd Antiaircraft Artillery and some light tanks from Company D, 14th Tank Battalion following behind Company B, 27th AIB.

THE FAILURE TO CAPTURE ST. VITH WAS PREVENTING THE LINKUP OF THE FIFTH AND SIXTH PANZER ARMIES.

The move had scarcely begun when an enemy attack hit the junction between Company B, 27th AIB and Company D, 14th Tank Battalion. The guns from a platoon of Shermans, the antiaircraft company, and a mortar platoon supplied a covering barrage, which broke up the German assault and inflicted heavy casualties. The circuitous march up one road and down another led to a new line just a few hundred yards to the west of the old one and was miraculously carried out while under attack without the loss of any men or equipment.

By midnight on the 19th, the horseshoe-shaped defense of St. Vith had taken form. The sector now defended by CCB, 9th Armored extended across five miles of rugged terrain that was primarily held by the three infantry companies making up the 27th AIB. Company B was stationed east of Galhausen and maintained contact with the nearest elements of the 7th Armored Division on 9th Armored's left flank. Situated next to B Company were Company A, 27th AIB and Company D, 14th Tank Battalion. Company B of the 9th Engineers and D Company of the 89th Recon joined the line to supplement the armored infantry. The CCB command post was moved to Neubruck, a small group of farmhouses on Braunlauf Creek about two miles southwest of St. Vith. No reinforcements were expected. The next move was up to General Lucht and his corps. Manteuffel's operation in the St. Vith area was already three days behind schedule.

On the morning of the December 20, three tank destroyers were placed in support of Company C, 27th AIB. Approximately three hours later a German company marched out of Neidingen and along the road leading straight into C Company's position, apparently totally unaware of 9th Armored's recent change of position. The armored infantrymen kept themselves well hidden until the column was directly in front of them and then opened fire. The surviving Volksgrenadiers fled in disarray. That night, infantry patrols found German medics removing their wounded.

Late on the 20th, patrols of the 82nd Airborne Division, on the other side of the Salm River, established contact with patrols of the 7th Armored Division. With this contact, all units in the vicinity of St. Vith, including 9th Armored Division forces, passed to the command of Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway's XVIII Airborne Corps.

December 20 was a day of disappointment for the Germans around St. Vith. Generals Manteuffel and Lucht had planned an all-out attack to take St. Vith starting at daylight with a three-pronged envelopment by the 62nd Volksgrenadier Division against 9th Armored positions in the south. The 18th Volksgrenadier Division was to attack along the two roads from Schoenberg, with the Führer Escort Brigade assaulting from the north. In addition, elements of the 116th Panzer Division and the 560th Volksgrenadier Division were moving against the weakly held southern flank of St. Vith defended by remnants of the 424th Infantry Regiment of the 106th Infantry Division and the 112th Infantry Regiment of the 28th Infantry Division.

However, the monumental traffic jams in the Losheim Gap and at Schoenberg continued to delay both the 18th Volksgrenadier Division and the Führer Escort Brigade, and not until after daylight on the 20th would a bridge be ready at Steinebruck for the 62nd Volksgrenadier Division. Those factors dictated that at least another 24 hours would be needed before a major assault on St. Vith could begin.

When Model released the Führer Escort Brigade to General Manteuffel, he thought that he would be able to gain quick access to the St. Vith road network. Once St. Vith was taken, Model intended to drive the brigade swiftly for the Meuse River or cut behind the opposition on the Elsenborn Ridge that was bottling up the Sixth Panzer Army. Moreover, it was expected that General Lucht's two infantry divisions would be forwarded to the Salm River sector as right-wing cover for two panzer corps.

Such was not the case, however, and by the

evening of the December 20, the Germans were feeling the growing negative effects of the St. Vith salient. The failure to capture St. Vith was preventing the linkup of the Fifth and the Sixth Panzer Armies. In addition, the massive road jam caused by the inability to pass through St. Vith was creating acute shortages of gasoline and ammunition well to the west of St. Vith. Accordingly, that evening Sixth Panzer Army commander Dietrich issued orders to the 2nd SS Panzer Corps to move to the south so that parts of that corps could assist Manteuffel in taking St. Vith. The men of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps had expected to be on the Meuse by December 19, but on the night of December 20 the Americans still denied them access to St. Vith.

At daybreak on December 21, the Germans launched their first assault of the day on CCB, 9th Armored. The Germans attacked the center of the 27th AIB. This initial thrust carried the enemy approximately 400 yards into the battalion's sector. The guns of two platoons of Company A, 811th Tank Destroyers were overrun. A scratch force made up of one platoon of riflemen from Company A, 27th AIB and a platoon from Company B, 9th Engineers were sent to contain the Germans. A platoon of medium tanks counterattacked, and the enemy retreated. By 1245, the original line was restored, and the antitank guns of Company A, 811th Tank Destroyers were recovered.

Farther to the north, in the 7th Armored sector, the pressure exerted by the enemy was also intense. By 1300 on the 21st, the entire line was ablaze with German artillery, rockets, tanks, and infantry. When a particularly heavy onslaught was launched against 7th Armored, near 9th Armored's left flank, Company A, 14th Tank Battalion shifted its mediums to fire directly on Breitfield in support of its armored neighbor to the north. The 16th Field Artillery also pitched in, as did a battalion of 155mm howitzers sited around Commanster. Together they broke up the attack.

Although the Germans were facing stiff resistance all along the American defensive line, they were determined to take St. Vith. Late in the day, the Germans launched three major attacks, each directed along a main road leading into the town. At about 1700, the enemy attacked along the Schoenberg road from the east; at 1830, they came down the Malmedy road from the north, and at 2000, an attack started from the southeast along the Prum road. Each attack was preceded by an intense artillery barrage lasting from 15 to 35 minutes.

At about 2130, General Clarke phoned General Hoge to tell him that the enemy was entering St. Vith from the north and that his forces were withdrawing to form a new line northwest of the city. Since 7th Armored's withdrawal meant that 9th Armored's left flank would be in danger, the two generals agreed that Hoge would have to readjust part of his line to maintain contact with Clarke's new rearward position. The village of Bauvenn was designated the linkage point for the two combat commands. In blinding snow and on slippery roads the tanks and infantry of CCB, 9th Armored headed for Bauvenn. Confusion, darkness, and mud slowed the move, but by morning a medium tank company and a platoon of riflemen had reached the village.

National Archives

For heroism in action at St. Vith, Technical Sergeant Michael Chincher of the 9th Armored Division receives the Distinguished Service Cross from Maj. Gen. John W. Leonard, the division commander, on April 11, 1945.

The 7th Armored had taken a beating in defending St. Vith. At least 900 soldiers who had stood in front of the town were either dead or captured. The division had lost four companies of armored infantry. This left General Clarke with only one full company of armored infantrymen.

Despite the loss of St. Vith, General Ridgway believed that the American armored and infantry forces defending St. Vith since December 16 could still hold. Ridgway's 82nd Airborne was building a fairly firm line west of the St. Vith defenders that should prevent the Germans from cutting off the salient from the rear. He also hoped the 3rd Armored Division soon might attack to remove all threat of encirclement. Based upon this fairly optimistic view, Ridgway, shortly after midnight, ordered the entire St. Vith force to withdraw from its current positions and form a defensive ring west of St. Vith and east of the Salm River.

Ridgway's plan was premised on the assumption that that the American forces in this goose egg-shaped defense could be supplied by air; however, whoever drew up the plan was thinking in terms of supply requirements for the lighter airborne divisions, not for fuel-hungry and shell-reliant armored forces. The troops were exhausted and spread out. The fortified goose egg ran nearly 10 miles in diameter, containing a mass of forest and only one decent road running northwest to southwest. This was no place to conduct a mobile defense with armor-heavy forces.

At 0200 on December 22, the Führer Escort Brigade launched its attack against the town of Rodt, a small village west of St. Vith. As a result of 7th Armored's earlier regrouping, Rodt was the junction point between CCA of the 7th Armored under the command of Colonel Rosebaum and General Clarke's CCB. Rodt was garrisoned by the service company of the 48th AIB and some drivers belonging to the battalion whose vehicles were parked there. Resistance by service company personnel in Rodt was fierce with every possible man—drivers, cooks, radio operators—employed in the defense; however, after nine hours of battle against the much superior German force, Rodt fell.

The fall of Rodt effectively split 7th Armored's CCA from General Clarke's CCB. Clarke pulled back his left flank to protect Hinderhausen, a key position on the emergency exit route to Commanster and Vielsalm.

Not long after Rodt fell to the Führer Escort Brigade, an attack came against the 7th Armored from the direction of Recht. Although it was beaten off, the attacking Germans were identified as new to the area, soldiers of the 9th SS Panzer Division, a cause for considerable concern at this point in the battle.

After learning of the attack by the Führer Escort Brigade, Brig. Gen. Hasbrouck, commander of the 7th Armored Division, sent a message to General Ridgway urging withdrawal, which in part read, "P.S. A strong attack has just developed against Clarke again. He is being outflanked and is retiring west another 2,000 yards refusing both flanks.... Hoge has just reported an attack...." Two regiments of the 62nd Volksgrenadier Division attacked 9th Armored positions early that morning, their goal to gain the Salm River at Salmchateau.

After that morning's enemy assaults, the line of the 27th AIB was reestablished west of Neubruck. Companies A and B held a line from Grufflingen to Hohenbusch with Company A, 14th Tank Battalion to their north. Troop D, 89th Recon and Company D, 14th Tank Battalion formed a line from Grufflingen to Thommen, and Companies B and C of the 14th Tank

St. Vith lies a desolate ruin on February 7, 1945, days after the desperate fight for control of the key Belgian village was over. After several weeks of fighting, the Germans were forced to abandon their winter offensive and relinquish all the territory they had gained during the Battle of the Bulge.

National Archives

Battalion took up positions between Thommen and Maldange. General Hoge moved his command post to Commanster. That evening General Clarke also put his command into Commanster. The commanders were at the center of the Foret Domaniale du Grand Bois. This forest was criss-crossed only by trails.

The American armor of the 7th and 9th Armored Divisions plus supporting units were being pressed into an area in which motorized forces—tanks, half-tracks, self-propelled artillery, tank destroyers—operated with great difficulty. Despite nearly a foot of snow, the ground underneath was still soft, and with the passage of only a few heavy vehicles it was soon churned into a morass of mud. The mud had made the roads and open areas impassable for armored vehicles.

Although the American forces in the St. Vith area came under command of General Ridgway's XVIII Airborne Corps, the Airborne Corps itself was under the command of Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, overall commander of the northern sector of the Bulge. Field Marshal Montgomery, believing that Ridgway's Corps could not attack successfully toward Vielsalm and that the American forces within the goose egg could better be used in support of other forces committed to the northern shoulder defense, decided upon a general withdrawal.

Therefore, Montgomery ordered Ridgway to attack to the southeast until Vielsalm could be reached, ensuring an escape corridor for those trapped within the defense. At about midday, the field marshal sent a message to General Hasbrouck: "You have accomplished your mission—a mission well done. It is time to withdraw."

Under the chain of the northern sector com-mand, only General Ridgway was unsure of Field Marshal Montgomery's decision to withdraw from the defense. In the early afternoon of the 22nd, he arrived at General Hasbrouck's headquarters in Vielsalm to plan the withdrawal. Because Ridgway was not in total agreement with the withdrawal and to get a feel for the real situation on the ground, he and Hasbrouck made their way to General Clarke at Commanster.

After conferring with Clarke, Ridgway wanted to talk to one more man in whom he had supreme confidence—Brigadier General Hoge. Hoge and Ridgway had been on the West Point football team together when Ridgway had been the team's manager. Ridgway knew Hoge to be calm, courageous, and imperturbable. If Hoge told him that the situation was bad, then without a doubt the situation was worse than he thought. Double-talking his identification over the radio with allusions to West Point football days, Ridgway gave Hoge a location at which to meet him.

During his meeting with Hoge, General Ridgway became convinced that defending this area any further would be futile. Although both men agreed that a withdrawal at this stage was the wiser decision, Hoge was skeptical that, given the weather and ground conditions, the defenders would be able to get out. Hoge pointedly asked Ridgway how it could be done. Ridgway answered, "Bill, we can and we will." The withdrawal plan called for a general pullback west of the Salm River to an assembly area in the zone controlled by the 82nd Airborne Division in the vicinity of Lierneux.

Aside from the cold and mud, there was also the enemy to contend with. Before the day ended, renewed fighting broke out along the entire front. There was a bitter struggle to the south of Grufflingen, and the Germans were again active in the Neubruck area. General Clarke again called on the 9th Armored for assistance to help stiffen his line, and Hoge responded by sending the 3rd Battalion, 424th Regimental Combat Team. The two commanders agreed

Continued on page 73

Joe Dimaggio, the famed Yankee Clipper, steals home during a game against the Chicago White Sox in May 1942. Dimaggio set a record the previous season for his 56-game hitting streak. **BELOW:** Baseball, America's national pastime, is prominently featured in a propaganda poster from 1942.

MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL ADAPTED TO THE CHALLENGES OF WARTIME AND CONTRIBUTED TO THE FINAL VICTORY IN WORLD WAR II.



BASEBALL GOES TO WAR

BY ROY MORRIS JR.

IN DECEMBER 1941, AFTER FOUR decades of play in the same sixteen eastern and midwestern cities, major league baseball was finally coming to the west coast. Saint Louis Browns owner Donald Barnes had a surefire plan: he would relocate his financially struggling team to Los Angeles and take over the local franchise rights and ballpark currently held by Chicago Cubs owner Phil Wrigley for a one-time fee of $1 million. The move would help everyone—Barnes, Wrigley, the St. Louis Cardinals (who would no longer have to share a stadium with the Browns), and major league baseball itself, which in one fell swoop would extend its reach from the Atlantic to the Pacific. At long last, baseball would truly be a transcontinental business.

Barnes intended to present his plan, complete with an intricate new schedule designed to limit cross-country train trips for opposing teams to two apiece during the season, at the annual meeting of the sixteen major league owners in Chicago on December 8. While waiting, Barnes decided to attend a professional football game between the Chicago Bears and the Chicago Cardinals at Comiskey Park. He was sitting in the stands with club general manager William DeWitt on Sunday, December 7, when the first news flash came across the radio that Japanese warplanes had bombed Pearl Harbor. In that instant, everything changed. There would be no baseball on the West Coast in 1942, and Barnes, DeWitt, and the rest of the major league owners, executives and players instead would find themselves struggling to adapt their sport—and their lives—to the unprecedented needs of a country that suddenly found itself at war.

In the massive confusion following the attack at Pearl Harbor, there was good reason to believe that the upcoming baseball season would be cancelled altogether. Many big-league players, like the rest of their outraged fellow-countrymen, were already flocking to enlistment offices across the nation. One of the first to go was 23-year-old Bob Feller, the fireballing pitcher for the Cleveland Indians. Feller, who had won 25 games for the Indians in 1941, had been en route to Chicago from his father's farm in Iowa to attend the winter meeting when he heard the terrible news come over the radio. Although he had previously been classified 2-C (farmer) by his local draft board, Feller did not feel that it was right to retain his off-season exemption. Instead, he drove directly to the federal courthouse in Chicago, where he was sworn into the Navy by former heavyweight boxing champion Gene Tunney, who was serving as a lieutenant commander in charge of the Navy's physical fitness program. The swearing-in ceremony was carried live on the radio throughout the country and filmed for use in motion picture newsreels. Feller shrugged off any praise for his quick enlistment. "We needed heroes," he remembered later. "I thought I could help."

Another American League superstar also acted quickly to enter the service. Detroit Tigers slugger Hank Greenberg had already been drafted in a special peacetime draft the previous May. Exchanging his $55,000-a-year salary for the $21-a-month stipend of an Army private, Greenberg was discharged two days before Pearl Harbor (all draftees over the age of 28—Greenberg was 30—only had to serve 180-day tours of duty).

Not waiting to hear again from his draft board, the home run-hitting outfielder immediately reenlisted at his last rank of sergeant. "We are in trouble and there is only one thing for me to do—return to the service," Greenberg said at the time. "All of us are confronted with a terrible task—the defense of our country and the fight of our lives." Being Jewish, the war would have particular significance for Greenberg, although no one yet knew how heinous Nazi atrocities against Greenberg's fellow Jews in Europe would prove to be.

PERHAPS FITTINGLY, the first major league player drafted after President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Selective Service Act of 1940 was Philadelphia Phillies pitcher Hugh Mulcahy. Nicknamed "Losing Pitcher" Mulcahy for the abbreviated way he was usually listed in the morning box scores, Mulcahy would eventually spend five years in the Army—unlike Greenberg, he was too young to receive an early discharge. The lowly Phillies put a photo of Mulcahy, wreathed by a "V for Victory" arrangement of bats, on the cover of their 1942 team yearbook. They had already shown how much they missed his pitching prowess by finishing 57 games out of first place in 1941, after finishing a mere 50 games out of first the year before. Mulcahy, too, downplayed his sacrifice. "I might have got hit with a line drive if I spent six more months with the Phillies," he joked. Given the Phillies' congenital ineptitude, that might have been more of a danger than it seemed at the time.

Baseball officials were unsure, at first, how to proceed with the season. National League president Ford Frick sent President Roosevelt a telegram pledging that "individually and collectively, we are yours to command." And baseball's unofficial Bible, the *Sporting News*, editorialized in its first post-Pearl Harbor edition that the sport was ready to close down, if need be, for the duration of the war. But FDR, heeding the hardly disinterested advice of his close friend Clark Griffith, owner of the Washington Senators, sent a letter to baseball commissioner Kenesaw Mountain Landis in January 1942, clarifying the government's position on the immediate future of the game. "I honestly feel that it would be best for the country to keep baseball going," the president wrote. "There will be fewer people unemployed and everybody will work longer hours and harder than ever before. And that means that they ought to have a chance for recreation and for taking their minds off their work even more than before." American League president Will Harridge eagerly accepted the morale-boosting mission. "Baseball," he said, "may be approaching the finest opportunity for service to our country that the game has ever had, providing a recreational outlet for millions of fans who will working harder than ever to help achieve our common cause of victory."

Roosevelt's so-called "green light" letter did not exempt players from fulfilling their military obligations, and during spring training in 1942 there were a few ostentatious hints of things to come. In Miami Beach, the luckless Phillies were put through a series of short-order drills by visiting Army officers, and the players dutifully shouldered their bats like rifles to march in step prior to an exhibition game with the Boston Braves. The drills were the brainchild of Philadelphia manager Hans Lobert, who recalled a similar stunt during his playing days in World War I. Farther west, in Pasadena, Calif., Chicago White Sox pitchers warmed up for games by chucking fastballs through a cardboard caricature of a leering, bucktoothed Japanese soldier. Meanwhile, the *Sporting News* urged that major league baseball somehow "withdraw from Japan the gift of baseball which we made to that misguided and ill-begotten country." While acknowledging that the sport was wildly popular in Japan, the magazine conjectured that the true meaning of baseball had never really caught on in the island nation. "They may have acquired a little skill at the game, but the soul of our National Game never touched them," publisher J.G. Taylor Spink wrote dismissively. "No nation which has had as intimate contact with baseball as the Japanese could have commit-



Fans crowd the stadium for a game between the Detroit Tigers and the Cleveland Indians in 1942. President Franklin D. Roosevelt asserted that continuing to play major league baseball was essential to the national morale.
OPPOSITE PAGE: Major General Alexander D. Surles (left) confers with National League President Ford Fick in May 1942.

ted the infamous deed of the early morning of December 7, 1941, if the spirit of the game ever had penetrated their yellow hides." Japan, for its part, outlawed baseball as an insidious American influence on its time-honored culture.

Despite such outward trappings as a newly stitched flag insignia on all players' uniforms and the required playing of "The Star-Spangled Banner" before all home games, the 1942 baseball season was not greatly affected by the onset of the war. Few major league players were called up that first year, and the overall quality of play did not suffer noticeably. While the United States Navy was decisively defeating the Japanese at the naval battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, and American marines were landing on the island stronghold of Guadalcanal, baseball went about its morale-boosting business. The New York Yankees, as expected, repeated as American League champions, while the St. Louis Cardinals, with the help a well-stocked minor league farm system directed by general manager Branch Rickey, surprised the defending champion Brooklyn Dodgers to win the National League pennant by two games. In the ensuing World Series, which the British Broadcasting System beamed to American servicemen stationed in Ireland and England, the upstart Cardinals spotted the Yankees the first game of the Series, then swept the next four games in a row, including two complete-game victories by rookie righthander Johnny Beazley from Nashville, Tennessee. Another prized rookie, Stan Musial, batted .315 for the Cardinals in 1942, the start of a storied Hall of Fame career for the Donora, Pennsylvania, native.

MUSIAL WAS A NOTABLY healthy 23-year-old, but he was also married, with a son, and was the primary financial support for his parents (his father was a retired coal miner who suffered from black lung disease). In the off-season, Musial worked in a war-related assembly plant. As the 1943 season began, he remained undrafted, but the same could not be said for dozens of other talented major league players. Musial's own Cardinals lost starting outfielders Terry Moore and Enos Slaughter and ace pitcher Johnny Beazley. Their World Series opponents the year before, the New York Yankees, lost superstar Joe DiMaggio, outfielder Tommy Henrich, shortstop Phil Rizzuto, first baseman Buddy Hassett, and pitcher Red Ruffing, who was taken by the Army despite being 38 years old, missing four toes from one foot, and supporting a wife, several children, and a mother-in-law at home.



Other star players entering the armed services prior to the 1943 season included Ted Williams and Johnny Pesky, both of the Boston Red Sox, Johnny Mize of the New York Giants, Johnny Sain of the Boston Braves, Bob Lemon of the Cleveland Indians, and Charlie Gehringer of the Detroit Tigers.

The two biggest names on that list, of course, were Joe DiMaggio and Ted Williams. Both men had been widely criticized for accepting exemptions the previous season. *New York Times* sports editor M.M. Caretti complained in a scathing column: "It seems to me that men well known in sport should take the lead in volunteering for their country in time of need and not wait to be drafted, much less accept exemption." Williams, who won the Triple Crown in 1942 after hitting .406 in 1941, rejected the criticism. "I have as much right to be exempted as anybody else," he said. "I have my mother to support. Before my status was changed to 1-A, I made commitments which I must go through with. I can do so by playing ball this year [1942]. When the season is over, I'll get into the Navy as fast as I can."

Williams made good on his promise, entering the Navy and training as a pilot. DiMaggio, likewise, enlisted in the service in early 1943—in his case, the Army. Miffed at being offered a pay cut by the Yankees, the star centerfielder did not even bother to notify the club of his enlistment.

In all, some 219 major league players were members of the armed services in 1943, along with hundreds of topnotch minor league players, necessitating a frantic search by teams for adequate frontline replacements. Old-time stars such as former Pittsburgh Pirate outfielder Paul Waner, now a glasses-wearing 40-year-old, were brought back to the big leagues for another tour of duty, and journeymen players like Oris Hockett of the Indians and Nick Etten of the Yankees suddenly found themselves stars for the first time in their careers.

The manpower shortage was so severe that Chicago Cubs general manager James T. Gallagher proposed that the clubs pool their remaining players to create more parity among teams, a suggestion that St. Louis Cardinals owner Sam Breadon called "unthinkable, unworkable … an offspring of socialism that has no business in baseball." Instead, Breadon, a committed capitalist, ran a two-column want ad in the *Sporting News* under the headline: "Cardinal Organization Needs Players."

For his part, Yankees' general manager Ed Barrow made public a letter he had received recently from a fan. "I am ready to play left field for the Yankees," the note read. "I am a fine fielder and a good hitter and could easily make good. I also am free from draft or war work call. I have a recent discharge from the state hospital for the insane at West Haven, Connecticut." Barrow turned down the offer, but allowed that if the man had still been confined to the insane asylum in West Haven, "I would write him to move over. The situation in baseball is enough to drive anybody daffy."

ADDING TO THE DAFFINESS was a decision by baseball commissioner Landis to require the major league teams to forego their annual spring training sessions in Florida and California. Instead, as part of a nationwide move to curtail train travel for all non-essential individuals, Landis ordered 14 of the 16 big- league teams to hold spring training in an area east of the Mississippi River and north of the Ohio and Potomac rivers. The two St. Louis clubs, the Cardinals and the Browns, were allowed to continue training near their homes. The decision led to a number of ridiculous sights. Dodger players arrived on skis for spring training at the Catskills resort of Bear Mountain, New York, where they found the local groundskeeper hard at work building a fire at first base. The Boston Braves made camp at the exclusive Choate School in Wallingford, Conn., where they bedded down in vacant dormitories—the students were away on spring break—and manager Casey Stengel, nicknamed "the Ol' Professor," obligingly conducted drills in a site-appropriate cap and gown.

The New York Giants set up camp on the former estate of tycoon John D. Rockefeller in Lakewood, New Jersey, playing their games on a ballfield carved out of the oil baron's private nine-hole golf course. Other teams trained indoors at school gymnasiums or local Army bases, and Chicago White Sox pitchers sometimes warmed up inside their hotel ballroom at French Lick, Indiana, propping mattresses against the walls as backstops.

The cold weather outside and the limited space indoors induced some teams to hire special physical fitness instructors to help their players get ready for the upcoming season. The Cincinnati Reds' instructor, Bill Miller, raised eyebrows when he had players at the Indiana University spring training camp warm up to rhumba music provided by Tommy de la Cruz, a Cuban-born pitcher whose brother sang with Xavier Cugat's Latin band. Passing soldiers en route to their own physical fitness programs at the university gave the gyrating players a long, loud horselaugh as they passed. The training session was not completely wasted for the Reds, however, as they signed a hulking IU student named Ted Kluszewski to a minor league contract. After the war, "Big Klu" would become a fixture at first base for the Reds for the next decade and a half.

Baseball executives worried that the unconventional training conditions would leave players unprepared for the rigors of the regular season. Yankees manager Joe McCarthy complained, "the sport is essentially an outdoor one and indoor training is of little help." McCarthy added patriotically that the team was willing to "do all in our power to cooperate with the war effort," and asked reporters not to construe his remarks as "any sort of beef."

Chicago Cubs manager Jimmy Wilson was less diplomatic. "Calisthenics stink as a baseball conditioner," he said. "A player goes through all those monotonous drills and when he gets through he's sore all over. He has exercised muscles he never knew he had, muscles that won't help him one bit when he's out there in a game." The chilly conditions also contributed to several players getting severe colds before the season got underway. "An awful lot of us got sick there," St. Louis Cardinals outfielder Danny Litwhiler recalled of the team's makeshift camp on eastern bank of the Mississippi River at Cairo, Illinois.

"IT WAS JUST SO damp and so cold there," Detroit Tigers pitcher Virgil Trucks, describing the Tigers' camp at Evansville, Indiana, summing up the unique spring training experience for all big league players. "It was quite cool, it was always wet, it wasn't anywhere near like Florida weather, but you could train, you could do running," Trucks said. "It wasn't an ideal area for spring training, but since the circumstances called for that, nobody complained about it. We all went about our jobs."

Once the regular season got under way in 1943, the players faced an additional challenge, one that made Trucks' and other pitchers' jobs much easier—a newly designed baseball, the much-derided "balata ball." The new ball was made necessary by the Japanese seizure of key rubber producing plantations in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, which forced the government to ration existing rubber supplies for use in the construction of tanks and airplanes. The A.G. Spalding Company, which had made every major league baseball since 1877, went through 16 different variations before coming up with a new design that replaced the traditional cork-and-rubber center of the ball with a center composed of two layers of balata, a hard rubbery substance made from tropical trees and ordinarily used in golf ball covers and telephone cable insulation. The new ball was noticeably less lively than regular baseballs—tests conducted by the Cooper Union Institute of Technology found the balata ball to be 25.9 percent less resilient than a regulation 1942 baseball. Players did not need scientific tests to tell them what they could see with their own eyes.



Pete Gray reached the majors despite losing his right arm in a childhood accident.

"The ball wouldn't ride," said Cincinnati Reds first baseman Frank McCormick. "If you hit it on the end of the bat, or even if you got good wood on it, it felt like you had a handful of bees. It was like hitting a piece of concrete." Stan Musial, watching his best drives fall several feet short of the fences, said the experience made him understand what it must have been like to play during the deadball era, before Babe Ruth ushered in the dawn of the tape-measure home run.

With the help of the new balata ball, big league pitchers threw 11 shutouts in the first 29 games of the season, and no home runs at all were hit in the first 11 games. Detroit Tigers manager Steve O'Neill, who had played as a catcher with the Cleveland Indians during the first two decades of the century, observed sourly, "any ball club would be lucky to get two runs in a game with this new ball. It's deader than the one in use when I was playing." And Cincinnati Reds owner Warren Giles, watching the Reds and the Indians get a grand total of one extra-base hit in 21 innings of spring training play, grumbled that the baseballs made by Spalding had used "ground-up bologna instead of balata and cork."

Making a suitably martial analogy, Giles complained that "asking big leaguers to play with the sort of ball with which we are opening the season would be like asking our soldiers, sailors, and marines to win the war with blanks instead of real ammunition."

National League President Ford Frick was so alarmed by the lack of offense that he ordered Senior Circuit teams to play with leftover 1942 baseballs until they were used up. "Baseball faces a tough enough year as it is, without continuing play with a dead ball and thus alienating the spectators," Frick said. "You can imagine the fans' reaction to going to a game and watching well-hit balls plop feebly into fielders' hands." Stung by the protests, Spalding hastily redesigned the balata ball, replacing the center with unhardened rubber cement. The first day the new ball was used, six homer runs were hit as opposed to only nine home runs in the first 72 games of the season.

Along with the new ball and bats made from inferior quality wood, major league players had to contend with such familiar homefront viscidities as stadium dim-outs during air-raid drills, food rationing, room shortages, and severely overcrowded passenger trains. Players accustomed to traveling in Pullman car luxury and dining nightly on T-bone steaks had to make do with sleeping on train benches and choking down a spartan menu of fish and macaroni. Soldiers traveling by train to their military bases had first dibs on sleeping accommodations and dining cars.

Many players' wives went on voluntary diets to save their ration cards for their husbands. "They kept fit and we ate good," Philadelphia Phillies outfielder Danny Litwhiler remembered somewhat unchivalrously. The crosstown Philadelphia Athletics had it slightly better. Third-string catcher Tony Parisse's father owned a meat market three blocks from Shibe Park, and players' wives could shop there more freely than they could at other tightly rationed stores.

Owing in part to their vast farm systems,

and in part to the number of superb players they still retained—for one more year, at least—the Yankees and Cardinals repeated as league champions in 1943. Travel limitations mandated that the first three games of the World Series would be played in New York, the remaining games in St. Louis. As it was, there were only two games played in St. Louis, with the Yankees closing out the series, four games to one, to avenge their 1942 defeat.

IN WINNING THE TITLE, the Yankees took full advantage of draft-exemption loopholes. Only two Yankee players were bachelors in 1943, pitcher Atley Donald, who was 4-F due to a variety of eye and back problems, and infielder George "Snuffy" Stirnweiss, who was the sole support of his mother and sister and also suffered from a stomach ulcer. Midway through the season, the Yankees sold second baseman Gerry Priddy to the Washington Senators primarily because, although he was married, he had no children and thus was prime draft material.



Bob Feller, a star pitcher with the Cleveland Indians, strides toward the plate and prepares to release the ball. Feller became a physical training instructor in the military in the spring of 1944.

Such considerations entered into the thinking of all the major league clubs, with 4-F players who could actually play being more highly coveted than draftable players. Three of the best of the 4-Fs were Cleveland shortstop Lou Boudreau, who suffered from heel spurs; St. Louis Browns shortstop Vern Stephens, who had allergies; and Detroit pitcher Hal Newhouser, who had a congenital heart murmur. All performed at a high level despite their handicaps—much to the displeasure of opposing fans whose own less athletically gifted sons were serving overseas in North Africa, Sicily, New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands.

By the spring of 1944, there were 12 million Americans under arms, including 340 major leaguers and over 3,000 minor leaguers. The defending champion Yankees were hit hardest of all. Before the regular season started, they lost regulars Billy Johnson, Charlie Keller, Joe Gordon, and Bill Dickey, plus pitcher Marius Russo and outfielder Roy Weatherly. In addition, ace relief pitcher Johnny Murphy had taken a job in a war plant, and general manager Ed Barrow would not allow him to pitch part-time.

"A man is either a major league player, or a war worker or bricklayer," Barrow said. "I think that using part-timers would demean big league ball. It would give it a semi-pro tone." Manager Joe McCarthy refused to name a starting lineup in the press, lamenting, "How could I possibly do that? I couldn't tell you who will be here next Tuesday." Chicago White Sox manager Jimmy Dykes had scant sympathy for his New York counterpart. "I feel sorry for that McCarthy," he said sarcastically. "Now the poor guy will have to have a thought now and then instead of pressing a push-button every time he wants a DiMaggio or a Keller or a Gordon to hit a home run."

With the war hitting a peak in Europe and the Pacific, the major league teams continued to lose players in 1944. Yet again, the two St. Louis contingents lost fewer than the rest. Stan Musial, the 1943 batting champion, retained his cushy deferment. He was joined by third baseman Whitey Kurowski, who was 4-F after a bout of childhood polio; pitcher Mort Cooper and shortstop Marty Marion, deferred with bad knees; and catcher Walker Cooper, who suffered from a variety of non-debilitating ailments.

The Cardinals' longtime rival, the Brooklyn Dodgers, were not so lucky. They lost their last two starting infielders, second baseman Billy Herman and third baseman Arky Vaughn, and were reduced to using 16-year-old Tommy Brown and 17-year-old Eddie Miksis as a teenaged double play combination during the season. Even so, Brown and Miksis were older than Cincinnati Reds pitcher Joe Nuxhall, who was only 15 when he made his major league debut on June 10, 1944. Nuxhall pitched two-thirds of an inning against the Cardinals in a 19-0 blowout, giving up five runs on five walks, two singles and a wild pitch. It would be the lefthander's last appearance in the major leagues until he was recalled from the minors in 1952, the true start to a solid professional career in which he would win 135 games and post a lifetime earned run average of 3.90.

Even luckier than the Cardinals were their longtime Sportsman's Park roommates, the Browns, who entered the 1944 season with the oldest and most 4-F laden team in the American League—13 players in all, not counting catcher Frank Mancuso, who had already been honorably discharged. Capitalizing on their experience, the downtrodden Browns snared their first and only pennant by one game over the Hal Newhouser-led Detroit Tigers. Unlike his counterpart on the New York Yankees, Browns general manager William DeWitt had no qualms about using part-time players. Pitcher Denny Galehouse won nine games for St. Louis in 1944 while working at a Goodyear aircraft plant in Akron, Ohio.

Typically, Galehouse would work all week building planes, then take an overnight train to whatever city the Browns were playing in that weekend. After pitching the first game of the traditional Sunday doubleheader, Galehouse would rush back to Akron to rejoin the assembly line on Monday. Another Browns player, outfielder Chet Laabs, worked at a Dodge factory in Detroit, making jeeps for the Army. With the help of his father-in-law, Browns' manager William DeWitt, Laabs obtained a transfer to a St. Louis pipe plant, where he helped make pipes that were later used in the Oak Ridge, Tennessee, plant where the first atomic bombs were constructed. Laabs was available for home games and weekend trips to other midwestern cities. Although he never fully developed his batting eye in 1944, Laabs hit two home runs against the Yankees to clinch the pennant for St. Louis on the final day of the season. Reverting to form, the Browns lost the ensuing "Streetcar Series" to the Cardinals, four games to two, and soon receded into com-

fortable mediocrity before moving to Baltimore and becoming the Orioles in 1953.

That autumn Franklin Roosevelt was reelected to an unprecedented fourth term as president, and Allied forces drove eastward toward Germany and prepared to breach the Nazis' supposedly impregnable Siegfried Line. Meanwhile, in the Far East, General Douglas MacArthur fulfilled his pledge to return to the Philippines, trudging through the surf at Leyte Gulf. With casualties rising, James F. Byrnes, head of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, sent a letter to General Lewis B. Hershey, director of the Selective Service, urging that professional athletes with medical discharges be recalled to military service and that players holding 4-F exemptions be carefully reexamined.

"It is difficult for the public to understand, and certainly it is difficult for me to understand, how these men can be physically unfit for military service and yet be able to compete with the greatest athletes of the nation in games demanding physical fitness," Byrnes wrote. "They prove to thousands by their great physical feats upon the football or baseball field that they are physically fit and as able to perform military service as are the 11 million men in uniform."

HERSHEY AGREED, DIRECTING local draft boards to take another look at the professional athletes under their authority. Roosevelt, too, got into the act, reiterating his call from the previous year for a national service act aimed at utilizing the country's five million 4-Fs "in whatever capacity is best for the war effort." Kentucky Congressman Andrew J. May, charged with drafting new "work or fight" legislation, was equally resolute. "Any man who is able to play baseball is able to fight or work in a war plant," May said. "If baseball has a morale value, it can be just as great played in the Army. Let those fellows play their baseball with the Japs and the Germans." No one had the nerve to point out that the sports-loving Nazis had never played baseball.

With more and more major leaguers being drafted into the service, the quality of play suffered noticeably during the 1945 season. A full 60 percent of the players on the last pre-war rosters four years earlier were now in the military, and sportswriters joked with some accuracy that the rosters of such service teams as the Great Lakes and Norfolk Naval Training Stations constituted a third major league. But while Joe DiMaggio, Ted Williams, Stan Musial, Bob Feller, Phil Rizzuto, Pee Wee Reese, and dozens of other big league stars played for the military, the civilian leagues prepared to mount their last wartime season.

Teams took players wherever they could find them. Forty-six-year-old pitcher Hod Lisenbee, who had given up Babe Ruth's 58th home run in 1927, toiled on the mound for the Cincinnati Reds alongside teammates Guy Bush, 43, and Boom-Boom Beck, 40. Eddie Basinski, a concert violinist with the Buffalo Philharmonic, traded his bow for a fielder's glove as a shortstop for the Brooklyn Dodgers. Old-time stars such as Jimmy Foxx, Red Ruffing, and Babe Herman were pressed back into service, and Foxx, in particular, amazed fans by taking his turn on the mound as well as at the plate, appearing in nine games, winning one and losing none, with a sparkling earned run average of 1.59.

No one better symbolized baseball in 1945—and indeed all the war years—than St. Louis Browns outfielder Pete Gray. It is his photo that adorns the covers of various books devoted to World War II baseball, and he has a secure place in baseball history in general. Gray's fame has nothing to do with his lifetime batting average of .218, his 13 career-total runs batted in, his six doubles and two triples. His notoriety is based, instead, on the simple fact that he played in 61 major league games with only one arm (he had lost the other in a childhood farming accident).

Gray's brief stint in the big leagues was more a publicity stunt than a true indication of his abilities, and his teammates on the Browns bitterly resented his presence on the team. Former starting centerfielder Mike Kreevich abruptly quit midway through the season, declaring, "If I'm not playing well enough so that a one-armed man can take my job, I quit." Teammates estimated, perhaps unfairly, that Gray personally cost them eight to 10 games in 1945, enough to give the pennant to the Detroit Tigers by a six-game margin. The Tigers, in turn, were sparked by star Hank Greenberg's unexpected return to the team in July, after more than four years in the Army. Greenberg homered in his first game against the Philadelphia Athletics and won the pennant with a dramatic grand slam home run against the Washington Senators on the last day of the season. The Tigers went on to defeat the Chicago Cubs in the 1945 World Series, the last time the Cubs have appeared in the Series.





LEFT: Joe Dimaggio played baseball while in the military. ABOVE: Pitcher Denny Galehouse pulled double-duty on the mound and in a factory.

GRAY'S BRIEF DUTY with the Browns and Greenberg's 11th-hour return to the Tigers highlighted baseball's final wartime season. By the time the season was over, President Roosevelt had died, the Germans and the Japanese had surrendered—the latter only after forcing the United States to drop two devastating atomic bombs on their homeland—and the Allies had persevered to a gallant if exhausting triumph. Baseball had done its part, sending thousands of players into the armed forces, while carrying on as best it could with rosters dotted with ancient mariners, service rejects, beardless teenagers and a one-armed man.

In the end, only two major league players were killed in World War II, Washington Senators outfielder Elmer Gedeon, who died in France on April 14, 1944, and Philadelphia A's catcher Harry O'Neill, was was killed at Iwo Jima on March 6, 1945.

Fifty-seven minor leaguers also gave their lives.

Dozens of major leaguers, including such reigning superstars as Joe DiMaggio, Ted Williams, Hank Greenberg and Bob Feller, lost at least three years of playing time in the prime of their careers. If they ever regretted their military service, none of them said so publicly. World War II, after all, had been "the good war," and baseball and its players, at home and abroad, had helped to fight and win the good fight. Some victories never show up in the box scores. □

Roy Morris Jr. is the editor of Military Heritage *magazine and the author of several well-received books. He resides in Chattanooga, Tennessee.*

Continued from page 65

that even without the mud to contend with the withdrawal would have to be delayed simply because of heavy enemy pressure.

At 0100 the 23rd, D Troop, 89th Recon lost an armored car and a jeep to antitank guns. At 0130 the 27th AIB was hit hard and the sector held by Company B, 9th Engineers was deeply penetrated, causing the armored infantry to fall back under the protective guns of Company A, 14th Tank Battalion. An assault on Thommen forced out the troops holding the town, and efforts to retake it failed. Another attack hit the left flank of 7th Armored.

Farther to the west, the 82nd Airborne, trying to keep a corridor open for the St. Vith defenders, was coming under intense pressure from the 2nd SS Panzer Division. In light of these circumstances, General Hasbrouck felt compelled to write to Clarke that unless the withdrawal began soon "the opportunity will be gone."

During the night of December 22, a cold wind had begun to blow out of the east bringing what weathermen call a "Russian high." Although both Clarke and Hoge noted it, they saw little hope that the ground might freeze in time to aid their withdrawal, but after receiving Hasbrouck's message Clarke stepped out and tested the ground. He could not believe it. The ground was frozen solid. Shortly thereafter, Hasbrouck called and asked, "Bruce, do you think you can get out?" Clarke answered, "A miracle has happened, General! That cold snap that hit us has frozen the roads. I think we can make it now. At 0600 I'm going to start to move."

General Hoge received his order to pull CCB, 9th Armored out at 0605 on December 23. The formations started to peel backward in succession from opposite Neubruck to Maldingen. As each unit joined the rear of the column, it took its turn being the rear guard. Company A of the 14th Tank Battalion had some trouble disengaging. Two of its tanks were mired in mud that had not frozen and had to be retrieved by a tank dozer. Then, four German antitank guns covering the Grufflingen-Maldange road were encountered. One gun, firing from the house that had been the 14th Tank's command post an hour earlier, disabled two of the Shermans, but the other tanks managed to knock out the four antitank guns plus three German command vehicles.

Ninth Armored and its attachments traveled southwest on N26 to the junction with N33 west of Beho, then turned north on N33 to Salmchateau, and finally west on N183 through Lierneux to Malempre-Jevigne, southeast of Manhay. The tanks of the 14th Tank Battalion and the half-tracks of the 27th AIB paused to pick up the foot elements of the 424th RCT, 106th Infantry Division. Company C, 27th AIB withdrew under heavy artillery and sniper fire but managed to destroy a number of German vehicles.

The last of the St. Vith defenders to come out were Task Force Jones and the 112th Infantry Regiment. These troops were hit by the Führer Escort Brigade and driven from Rogery to Cierreux in some disarray. Fortunately, a tank destroyer from Vielsalm turned up and hit the leading two German panzers, which drove the rest for cover. Task Force Jones and the 112th Infantry eventually found their way into 82nd Airborne Division lines during the night of the 24th, but not before the units suffered heavy losses.

The losses in men and equipment for CCB, 9th Armored, as with the rest of the American units defending St. Vith, had been severe. The line companies were down to one officer apiece. Staff officers were casualties. A platoon of tank destroyers had vanished. The hardest hit, though, were the armored infantrymen of the 27th AIB with nearly 300 battle casualties. Ten tanks, numerous supply vehicles, armored cars, and jeeps were lost to enemy action.

Ninth Armored sent out billeting parties as it reached its new area. A two-day rest was planned for everyone. This break appeared to be only a dream, however, as it seemed every outfit wanted a piece of CCB, 9th Armored to help shore up its positions. The new sector assigned to CCB was on the fringe of territory the Sixth Panzer Army had mapped out for its further maneuvers. General Lucht's 66th Corps was shifted from General Manteuffel's Fifth Panzer Army to the Sixth Panzer. The 27th AIB was ordered to establish a defensive position south, east, west, and southeast of Malempre. Roadblocks were set up and manned. Mines were laid. By 2300 enemy patrols tested 27th AIB's new position and a night attack was thrown back with the help of D Troop, 89th Recon.

The heroic defense of St. Vith, though costly in men and materiél, disrupted the German timetable extensively. Rather than reaching the Meuse and driving on to Antwerp, the offensive stalled and eventually was turned back. The stubborn defenders of St. Vith played a major role in defeating the final German offensive of World War II in Western Europe. □

First-time contributor Charles Gutierrez is the son of a 9th Armored Division veteran. The Pontiac, Michigan, resident also served 10 years in the U.S. Army.

Of all the battles of World War II, none was harder, covered more territory, or lasted longer than the Battle of the Atlantic.

BY MASON B. WEBB

Between 1939 and 1945, over 72,000 Allied sailors, Navy airmen, and merchant seamen lost their lives in the Atlantic Ocean while attempting to deliver the food, weapons, and other supplies desperately needed by Britain and the Soviet Union in their titanic struggle against Nazi Germany.

As bad as it was for the Allies, the Germans fared even worse. Fully 80 percent of the U-boat crewmen did not survive the war, the highest casualty rate of any branch of the military on either side.

Bitterly contested and nearly lost, the Allies' monumental battle for control of the Atlantic shipping lanes has been largely overlooked—until now. David Fairbank White's masterfully researched and exquisitely written ***Bitter Ocean: The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939-1945*** (Simon & Schuster, New York, 2006, 350 pp., photographs, maps, bibliography, index, $26.00, hardcover) shines a very bright spotlight on this essential struggle in the North Atlantic, bringing into sharp focus the enormity of the battle and the sacrifices made by both friend and foe.

White perfectly captures the grim years of 1940-1942 when Admiral Karl Dönitz's U-boat wolfpacks decimated the floating lifeline, sinking ships faster than Allied shipyards could replace them. White also describes the Allies' technological breakthroughs, such as improved radar, machines that cracked the German naval code, and long-range bombers—breakthroughs that turned the hunters into the hunted, victims into victors, and began to turn the tide of battle in the Allies' favor in 1943.

Drawing on a vast treasury of memoirs and official records, as well as compelling interviews with German, British, and American veterans of this campaign, White takes the reader aboard ship and beneath the waves as he reconstructs this epic clash. One can almost smell the fear, the sweat, and the diesel fuel as he presents one heart-pounding clash after another.

White, a maritime journalist and former *New York Times* reporter, writes with a clear and fluid style. A passage describing the loss of the crippled submarine *U-99* will suffice: "One by one, holding on to each other, the crewmen of *U-99* jumped into the icy waters and began swimming for HMS *Walker* ... With [Midshipman Volkmar] König and the others swimming across the distance between *U-99* and *Walker*, [Otto] Kretschmer [*U-99*'s skipper] suddenly realized that the submarine was still afloat and could be captured. At once, he told the chief engineer to go back and open valves so the sub would fill with water and sink. The chief engineer swam back, got into the sub, opened the valves, and *U-99* began to slowly settle by the stern, then plunged below. The chief engineer was never seen again. 'This must have haunted Kretschmer all his life,'" says König.

It is well to remember that, without victory on the high seas, the Allied invasion of the European continent in 1944 might never have happened. This book will help everyone understand the courage and sacrifices behind the eventual Allied victory.

Bitter Ocean is White's first nonfiction book. If future works are half as good as this one, he definitely will be a writer worth watching.

Canadian War Museum

After their ship was torpedoed in the North Atlantic, the crew of a Canadian merchantmen was able to launch a boat and make their escape into the rough waters.

Hitler's Shadow War: The Holocaust and World War II, by Donald M. McCale, Taylor Trade Publishing, New York, 2006, 557 pp., photographs, maps, bibliography, index, $26.00, softcover (reprint).

When *Hitler's Shadow War* first appeared in hardcover in 2002, it created a storm of controversy because its thesis was that Hitler did not start his war of conquest for his oft-stated desire to acquire *lebensraum*, or living space,

for a growing German population, but rather as a smokescreen for his bloodlust against Europe's Jews.

In page after page, McCale, a professor of history at Clemson University, carefully deconstructs the popular myths of Hitler's motives and reconstructs history in light of his theory—a theory that makes absolute sense.

The Holocaust is often examined apart from, or considered one aspect of, World War II. In reality, according to McCale, what seems on the face to be Hitler's quest to expand Germany and a simultaneous mission to "ethnically cleanse" Europe was actually a well-planned and systematic expansion that was a cover for the evil strategy of eliminating the non-Aryans.

As McCale writes, "Hitler and his Nazi associates used the war in Europe, with its massive violence, as a cover or camouflage for the real war they meant to fight. This was a 'shadow war' in which they would eliminate millions of Jews—a people whom the Nazis hated more than anyone or anything else—in Eurasia and eventually elsewhere in the world…. Indeed, once they implemented the Holocaust, the Germans utilized huge resources—human, physical, and technological—to carry out the 'war against the Jews' that could have been channeled to fighting the military war against the Western Allies and the Soviet Union."

After reading McKale's logical and compelling work, one will never be able to view World War II in quite the same way again. This is a hugely important book, one that should be required reading everywhere.

NEW AND NOTEWORTHY

Leatherneck Legends: Conversations with the Marine Corps' Old Breed by Dick Camp, Zenith Press, St. Paul, Minn., 2006, 320 pp., photographs, bibliography, index, $24.95, hardcover.

Imagine sitting down in a bar or a room somewhere with a bunch of crusty old Marine combat veterans and spending a few hours listening to them spin their war stories, answering every question that might pop into your head.

That is what reading *Leatherneck Legends* is like. Author and retired Marine Corps colonel Dick Camp has done a masterful job of weaving historical narration with a large number of oral histories and memoirs from former Corps commandants, division commanders, Medal of Honor recipients, and four-star generals.

Camp takes the reader along on a tour of duty that spans Marine Corps history from the Great War through Vietnam, presenting eyewitness accounts of what it was like to be on the front lines in some of the 20th century's

SIMULATION GAMING BY ERIC BAKER

This month starts with a "What if?" board game. ***Island of Death: the Invasion of Malta, 1942*** from Avalanche Press is only $20.00 and takes four hours at most to model one of the great "never happened" battles of World War II. Malta was perfectly positioned to disrupt the Axis's supply lines to their troops in Africa. Both the Italian and German commands designed a series of different assaults to capture the island, but neither the Italian Operation C.3 or the German Operation Hercules ever actually launched. *IoD* takes those plans, plus the Allied defense orders, and puts them together for board game done on the scale of companies and battalions on a map where each hex equal a mile.



The mechanics of *IoD* are the same as those used in Avalanche's *Red Steel* but this game plays much faster because the conflict is contained on the rather small space of Malta. The rules include two scenarios and several variants. There are units for infantry, artillery, and tanks, plus air and naval support. Tanks are mostly an after thought in the strategy simply because there were so few of them. Infantry tells the tale of the battle, although the player who keeps their artillery well supplied and out of harm's way will fight at a big advantage. The British player defends with regular troops and the King's Own Maltese Regiment. The Axis player attacks with German and Italian paratroops and commandos as well as Italian air landing troops.

Groove Games has issued a PC title about an island assault that really did happen. ***World War II Combat: Iwo Jima*** is the next game in their series of first person shooter titles that attempts to put the player in the action of the war. As in the other games, the setting and situation are drawn from the actual events of what was the Marines' largest amphibious assault of the war. The ten levels combine not only the desolate terrain and the dug in enemy of the real Iwo Jima, but also the "flavor" of the battle with explosions, sirens, and aircraft adding to the closer in noises of the combat. The included weapons the player will handle over the course of the game are the KA-BAR Fighting Utility Knife, M1911 .45 Colt, M1 Garand, M1903A4 Springfield, Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR), M1 Thompson Submachine gun ("Tommy" Gun), Mk2 Pineapple Grenade and the M2-2 Flamethrower.

A game we're anticipating, but haven't yet been able to play is ***First Battalion*** from Dreamcatcher Interactive. This PC game will put the player in charge of either a US, Russian, or German battalion. The game will combine elements of first person shooters, strategy games, and roleplaying games, apparently allowing players to level their characters between battles, construct orders of engagement, and actually fight in the battles either on foot or driving a vehicle. There will also be a 32 player online mode that presumably will have more of the tactical elements and fewer of the strategic ones. □











most harrowing battles and glorious triumphs. Page after page is filled with stories of bravery, honor, and sacrifice.

During a lull in the fighting, Craig said, "Vehicle traffic had churned through the mud and unearthed several Japanese dead. I will always remember one huge-looking Jap who was sitting right up in the mud with his face turned our way. Early the next morning, my orderly brought me a helmet with water in [it] to wash by. I splashed the water on my face and immediately smelled the terrific odor of dead Jap. He had dipped the water from a pool full of dead Japanese without knowing it."

Camp is the author of *Lima-6,* his memoir as a Marine infantry company commander at the brutal battle of Khe Sanh. He is currently the Deputy Director of History for the Marine Corps Association.

The Few and the Proud: Marine Corps Drill Instructors in Their Own Words by Larry Smith, W.W. Norton, New York, 2006, 324 pp., photographs, $24.95, hardcover.

The Marines are often regarded as America's toughest fighting force, but who made them that way? The Marine Corps drill instructors, that's who.

Larry Smith has done an exemplary job of showing exactly what makes the men (and women, too) who make the Marines—their mental and physical toughness, their uncompromising standards, their self-discipline, and their unflinching devotion to duty, honor, country, and Corps.

From the sands of Iwo Jima to the deserts of Iraq, Smith introduces the reader to a fine and fearsome sampling of D.I.s, including the legendary R. Lee Ermey (he of the History Channel's "Mail Call" program and star of Stanley Kubrick's *Full Metal Jacket*), as they talk about the D.I.s who stuck in their minds when they were boots and taught them lessons that helped them survive the crucible of combat—lessons that stayed with them all their lives.

While only a portion of the book touches upon World War II, Smith shows how the traditions of the Corps and boot camp have been passed down from one generation of Marines to another.

Old leathernecks may be dismayed to learn that in some ways the Marine Corps has changed with the times. Platoon runs are usually conducted wearing sneakers instead of boondockers, and Skin So Soft is recommended for keeping Parris Island's notorious sand fleas away. Most everything else, however, is pure, by-the-book, old-fashioned Marine Corps.

As one of the former D.I.s says, "When I was a D.I., we really relied on stress. The idea was that if they're going to break under stress, break

WWII THROUGH PATTON'S LENS

Kevin Hymel, this magazine's research director and the associate editor of *ARMY* magazine, made an amazing discovery a decade ago. In 1996, while doing research on General George S. Patton, Jr., at the Library of Congress, he came across an amazing find: a huge collection—15 albums—of never-before-published photographs taken by the general himself!

Not only were there hundreds of photos taken *by* Patton during World War II, there were also scores of pictures taken *of* Patton by Signal Corps photographers and others, plus a trove of captions, notes, and letters written by the general that had not been seen for decades.

After each roll of film was developed, the general wrote a caption on the back of almost every print and mailed the sets, along with his voluminous letters, to his wife Beatrice, who dutifully pasted them into the albums. As Hymel notes, this endeavor was almost a full-time job for Mrs. Patton. Thanks to a grant by Carl Gnam, publisher of *WWII History,* copies of the precious photos were made and assembled for Hymel's book, ***Patton's Photograph's: War As He Saw It.*** (foreword by Martin Blumenson, Potomac Books, Dulles, Va., 2006, 137 pp., photographs, maps, bibliography, index, $21.95, softcover). The result is a startlingly fresh look at one of America's greatest (albeit most controversial) military leaders. Even the eminent historian and Patton biographer Martin Blumenson who, before his death in 2005, contributed the foreword and worked with Hymel on the text, said he learned things about Patton that he had not known before.

Nothing escaped the sharp eye of the shutter-bug Patton, whether it was the faces and native costumes of North Africans, battlefield detritus, German POWs, the buildings that served as his headquarters, his dog Willie, or a wild boar he had shot and killed and had strapped to the front of a half-track.

Hymel writes, "For Patton, history was everything. Be it a Roman ruin or the history he was making, he wanted a record kept, both for personal use and for historians.

Diaries and letters were not enough. Only by carrying his camera (which, by the way, is preserved at the Patton Museum, Ft. Knox, KY) into battle could he ensure an accurate depiction of events, free from interpretation.... He claimed his [photographic] hobby saved his life. Touring the front, he stopped to take a picture. A salvo of German shells exploded up the road ahead. The photograph, he wrote, 'saved my life.'"

Patton's Photographs is a revealing, unique treasure, and a book every Patton buff will want to own.

'em in boot camp instead of in a combat situation. Boot camp today I think is physically tougher than it used to be. Everything's PT, PT, PT, but it's not as mentally tough, and I personally like the old school a little better, with the emphasis on mental stress, harassment, little stupid things that made no sense."

Anyone who has ever gone through Marine boot camp will remember the terror and awe their D.I. instilled in them. This book will be enough to bring those moments rushing back. A definite must read.

Death at a Distance: The Loss of the Legendary USS Harder by Michael Sturma, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Md., 2006, 246 pp., photographs, bibliography, index, $29.95, hardcover.

The commander and crew of the USS *Harder* receive their due in this outstanding new book about the sub and the war in the Pacific by Australian history professor Michael Sturma.

During her five war patrols, *Harder* sank 16 Japanese ships with a tonnage in excess of 54,000, making the boat's skipper, Lt. Cmdr. Sam Dealey, one of the U.S. Navy's top five submarine commanders. On one patrol, Dealey and *Harder*'s crew were credited with sinking five Japanese destroyers—dangerous, depth-charge-laden targets that many commanders avoided. No other American sub sank so many destroyers.

Drawing on previously untapped sources, Sturma details several daring missions and places one boat's deeds in the wider context of the Pacific conflict, such as *Harder*'s rescue of a group of Australian coastwatchers—an invaluable source of intelligence—before they could be captured by the ruthless enemy.

The ending of the story is a heroic tragedy. Sam Dealey and the entire 78-man crew were lost when *Harder* was depth-charged into oblivion on August 24, 1944. The sub received the Presidential Unit Citation and Dealey was awarded the Medal of Honor, posthumously—one of only seven Medals of Honor awarded to members of the Silent Service.

Death at a Distance is a loving tribute to a gallant submarine and her heroic skipper and crew.

The All Americans in World War II: A Photographic History of the 82nd Airborne Division at War by Phil Nordyke, Zenith Press, St. Paul, Minn., 2006, 196 pp., photographs, maps, index, $34.95, hardcover.

Following on the heels of his superb first book, *All American All the Way: The Combat History of the 82nd Airborne Division in World War II*, Nordyke has compiled what must be close to every photograph ever taken of the 82nd and assembled them into this handsome, oversized volume.



If it is true that a picture is worth a thousand words, then *The All Americans in World War II* is one of the wordiest volumes yet. The author gives us only a concise page of narrative text per chapter (there are 36 chapters), leaving the 365 photographs and 30 detailed maps and their instructive captions to carry the rest of the story.

And what a story it is! Nordyke takes the reader from the 82nd's early training at Ft. Benning, Georgia, to its deployment to Morocco, then Tunisia, in preparation for its first combat jump—Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily. Chapter 4 covers the 82nd's disastrous jump over Sicily, where nervous American gunners mistook the troopers for Germans and blasted the sky with antiaircraft fire, downing 23 planes and causing heavy casualties.

Recovering from the friendly fire incident, the 82nd managed to regroup and carry out its assigned mission. Nordyke also details, through words and pictures, the division's less than successful role in the Allied invasion of Italy at Salerno. In the winter of 1943, the 82nd, with the exception of the 504th RCT, which remained in Italy and took part in the Anzio landings, headed to Northern Ireland to begin preparations for the Normandy invasion.

Several chapters deal with the Normandy operation, especially the jump into Ste. Mere-Eglise. The book goes on to document the 82nd's operations in France, the courageous parachute drop and fight to capture the bridge at Nijmegen during Operation Market Garden, and the tough struggle against the Germans and the elements during the Battle of the Bulge.

Anyone with the slightest interest in the airborne will want to own this handsome volume.

Skorzeny's Special Missions: The Memoirs of "The Most Dangerous Man in Europe" by Otto Skorzeny, Greenhill Books, London, 1957 (reprint 2006), 224 pp., $14.95, softcover.

A gifted and dedicated student of special operations, Otto Skorzeny, Germany's top commando, carved out an extraordinary wartime

legacy by doing the impossible.

When Benito Mussolini was imprisoned in Italy in 1943, it was Skorzeny who successfully planned and executed the daring glider rescue, winning the Knight's Cross and promotion as his reward. Hitler again relied upon Skorzeny's talents in 1944 when he was sent into Budapest to prevent the Hungarian regent from signing a separate peace treaty with Stalin, an action for which he was awarded the German Cross in Gold.

It was also his idea to dress German troops in American uniforms and have them drive U.S. vehicles through Allied lines during the Battle of the Bulge. His captured colleagues also spread false rumors that Skorzeny was planning to kill General Dwight D. Eisenhower—rumors that kept the supreme commander confined to his headquarters for weeks. As the Third Reich crumbled, Skorzeny was also rumored to have smuggled Hitler out of Berlin.

At the end of the war, Skorzeny was captured by the Americans, interrogated, and stood trial as a war criminal.

Skorzeny's amazing wartime career was one of high risk and adventure, and he tells it all in this compelling reprint of his 1957 autobiography. Was Otto Skorzeny an audacious military hero or a war criminal? The answer is left for the reader to decide. □

SHORT BURSTS

109 East Palace: Robert Oppenheimer and the Secret City of Los Alamos by Jennet Conant, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2006, photographs, bibliography, index, 425 pp., $14.00, softcover.

Several books provide behind-the-scenes accounts of the development of the atomic bomb, but few touch on the personal aspects of the 5,000-person secret community in New Mexico the way *109 East Palace* does.

Jennet Conant's prodigious writing skills transport us back to the Los Alamos compound of the 1940s where the super-secret weapon was being developed. The central figure of the book is the brilliant but flawed physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer, an inspiring leader who motivated all those involved in developing a bomb of unspeakable destructive power.

Conant tells her tale through the eyes of a young Santa Fe widow, Dorothy McKibbin, one of Oppenheimer's first recruits, who acted as the "gatekeeper" for the project, working out of a nondescript office at 109 East Palace Avenue. She was the head of the Santa Fe office, the only reliable link between Los Alamos and the outside world. In her position, McKibbin knew everyone involved in the project and virtually everything about it except what the scientists were working on—a secret she eventually guessed.

Conant brings a personal aspect to her book: her grandfather was one of the scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project.

Overall, this is a terrific book about a diverse group of people who put their petty concerns aside for the achievement of their mission: to create a weapon so powerful and horrible that it might make future wars unthinkable.

B-17 at War by Bill Yenne, Zenith Press, St. Paul, Minn., photographs, index, 128 pp., $19.95, softcover.

Regarded by many as one of the finest airplanes ever built, the Boeing B-17 and its many variants were the scourge of the skies over enemy territory. This new book pays homage to the sleek Flying Fortress.

Illustrated with over 100 photographs (many in color) and diagrams, *B-17 at War* takes readers from the cockpit to the tail-gun in one of the most formidable flying weapons ever devised. Known for its ability to absorb punishment and dish it out, the B-17 became a legend that few other warplanes have matched. Yenne takes a critical look at the bomber, its development, its strengths and weaknesses, the deployment of the different models, the combat missions, and the brave men who flew and serviced them.

B-17 at War is a source of unending pleasure to the Flying Fortress fan.

Just Americans: How Japanese Americans Won a War at Home and Abroad: The Story of the 100th Battalion/442nd Regimental Combat Team in World War II by Robert Asahina, Gotham/Penguin, New York, 2006, photographs, maps, bibliography, index, 340 pp., $27.50, hardcover.





Suspected of being disloyal after Pearl Harbor, over 100,000 Japanese Americans had their very existence uprooted, losing their homes, businesses, and other property and being forcibly evacuated to relocation camps throughout the West, South, and Southwest. Incredibly, thousands of young men, eager to prove their fealty to the Stars and Stripes, enlisted in the armed services and went on to defend the country that had stripped them of their rights.

It has often been said that the 442nd Regimental Combat Team was the most decorated unit in the U.S. Army, and Robert Asahina's new book uncovers the reasons why.

Of special focus are the battalion's actions in October-November 1944, when it came to the rescue of the "lost battalion" of the 36th "Texas" Infantry Division in the Vosges Mountains along the border of France and Germany.

Through extensive archival research and interviews with veterans, Asahina paints a full portrait of the heroism that infused the 100th Battalion of the 442nd RCT and earned for them the deepest respect and admiration of their fellow soldiers.

The combat story is as compelling as the battle the soldiers were waging on the home front—a struggle that continues for minority groups today—over what it means to be an American.

Up Close and Personal: The Reality of Close-Quarter Fighting in World War II by David Lee, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Md., 2006, photographs, maps, bibliography, index, $34.95, hardcover.

Comparable to John Ellis's 1980 classic *The Sharp End: The Fighting Man in World War II*, British author David Lee uses first-person accounts to provide a gripping picture of what life on the front lines was really all about.

Using American, British, and German veterans' accounts of battles in several theaters of war—North Africa, Italy, the Far East, Normandy—Lee weaves a fascinating tale of what it is to kill, or be killed, in close-quarter combat.

More than just a collection of war stories, however, *Up Close and Personal* also explores and analyzes the myriad psychological factors that go into the conditioning and training that turn a young man from gentle civilian into deadly adversary.

Up Close and Personal is a very personal look at the craft of the modern soldier and well worth exploring.