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WWII HISTORY ■ EARLY FALL 2012 Volume 11, No. 7

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

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

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Christopher S. Donner
Edited by Jack H.McCall Jr.

"The three month battle for Okinawa became a slaughterhouse. . . . Lieutenant Donner's personal memoir—written a year after the battle—recounts the searing experiences of this Marine artillery officer serving as a forward observer with front-line infantry units of the U.S. Tenth Army. . . . Tautly written, painstakingly honest, and exacting in detail, Donner's memoir chronicles his frustrations in striving to deliver precise fire support in chaotic amphibious assaults, from the Solomons to Okinawa, the climactic battle of the Pacific War."—*Colonel Joseph H. Alexander, ISMC (ret.)*



Guerrilla Daughter

Virginia Hansen Holmes

This is a powerful memoir of the Hansen family's extraordinary struggle to survive the Japanese occupation of Mindanao from the spring of 1942 until the end of the war in 1945. The men in the family fought as guerrilla soldiers in the island's resistance movement, while the women, facing disease, hunger, harsh living conditions, and possible capture and death, were left on their own to evade the Japanese.

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

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Early Fall 2012

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Cover: An American M4 Sherman tank races down a desert road during combat in Tunisia in December 1943.

Photo: Eliot Elisofon, Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images

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Editorial

Times change for Japan and Korea, but bitter memories linger.

FOR CENTURIES THE JAPANESE AND KOREAN PEOPLES HAVE REMAINED WARY OF one another, warring and occupying, threatening and maintaining an uneasy peace at various times. Early in the 20th century, following the comments made by one Japanese diplomat that the Korean peninsula was a dagger pointed at the throat of Japan, the defeat of Imperial Russia during the controversial Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, and the burgeoning expansionist sentiment within the Japanese government, Japan formally annexed Korea and initiated 35 years of harsh rule.

From 1910 until the end of World War II in 1945, Japan exploited Korea for its own purposes, conducting horrendous biological and chemical warfare experiments on Korean prisoners and impressing Korean laborers into construction projects to build fortifications on the islands of the Pacific that were later stormed at tremendous costs by American forces during World War II. Most noticeably today, a strong resentment lingers among the Korean people for the Japanese practice of forcing Korean women into sexual slavery during the war as "comfort women" subservient to Japanese soldiers away from the home islands.

During the last quarter century, documentation of widespread atrocities committed by the Japanese in Korea has come to light and exacerbated the distrust and bitterness of the Korean people against their former colonial rulers. While significant ill will remains and some survivors of the occupation era continue to seek justice, South Korea and Japan have yet to settle the issues of compensation for "comfort women" or their surviving family members as well as the actual ownership of a group of small islands lying off the coastlines of the two nations.

Nevertheless, in something of a surprise last June, the governments of Japan and South Korea abruptly announced their intent to sign an agreement to share intelligence information. In itself, the intelligence agreement is a pragmatic move that would enhance the security of both nations in an unstable region. Regardless, the day after the announcement, the two governments were compelled to postpone the signing ceremony due to an outcry of disapproval from thousands of South Korean citizens.

An opposition leader scored the government of South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, asserting that the administration has become more pro-Japanese in recent months than pro-American while the United States maintains a standing presence of more than 30,000 troops in South Korea. These troops and their South Korean allies patrol a restless border along the 38th parallel between the North and South that has been maintained since the agreement that ended the shooting in the Korean War in 1953.

The proposed intelligence-sharing agreement would represent the first military pact between the two countries since the end of World War II, and the reasons for it are obvious. The continuing threat from North Korea imperils the security of both nations. The unprovoked communist shelling of a South Korean village and the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel apparently by a North Korean submarine last year combined with North Korean efforts to develop an operational nuclear missile capable of striking cities as distant as the United States loom large, particularly with the change in leadership following the death of Kim Jong-il and the rise of his son Kim Jong-un to power in the repressive communist country. Further, both Japan and South Korea remain concerned with the conduct of North Korea's closest supporter, China.

The agreement would provide for the sharing of data and intelligence information on missile defenses and development, the North Korean nuclear program, and the activities of the Chinese military, particularly deployments and exercises. Both North Korea and China maintain mammoth military forces.

For what it is worth, when the agreement was made public the North Korean government accused the Lee administration of "selling the nation out."

The Japanese foreign ministry hailed the pact as a "historic event," but agreed to postpone the formal signing of documents at the request of the Seoul government.

Modern geopolitical cooperation is imperative among nations; however, old wounds that may never heal continue to impede progress.

Michael E. Haskew

WWII HISTORY

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Rifle Company Casualties

Dear Sir,

As a World War II veteran of C Company, 134th Infantry, 35th Division, I certainly enjoyed Don Haines's article on the Bedford Boys in the May 2012 issue of *WWII History*. I have done a lot of research on my own outfit, which was a National Guard unit out of Nebraska. C Company was first committed at St. Lo at which time they suffered heavily, losing over 30 men killed in the month of July 1944. I joined them January 8, 1944, near Bastogne and in January 1945 they lost over 30 men KIA. My research shows that in the rifle companies sooner or later something happens to everyone. At war's end the only original men present were in the company supply and kitchen, and maybe two or three who had been wounded and sent back up to the front. My experience was an example. On January 8, 1945, 42 of us joined C Company and by the end of the month something had happened to 28 of the 42.

James G. Graff
Middletown, Ilinois

Oradour-sur-Glane

Dear Editor,

In regard to the article on Oradour-sur-Glane in the July 2012 issue of *WWII History*, while not exonerating the Germans for what they did, don't you think that, in the interest of fairness, the individuals who triggered the whole thing by taking it upon themselves to play hero and snipe at a mechanized column that was on its way out, never to return, with full knowledge of what the Germans' reaction was likely to be —after four years of occupation there was no way they could not have known—deserve just a bit of the blame?

B.J. Figueredo
Gonic, New Hampshire

Dear Mr. Figueredo,

Frankly, I am taken aback by your letter. There is never—repeat—never an excuse for executing innocent civilians. To even attempt to place blame with anyone other than the German troops and their officers who perpetrated the heinous atrocity at Oradour-sur-Glane defies logic.

Michael E. Haskew
Editor

Pacific Merchant Tanker

Dear Editor:

Thank you for Dr. Carl Marcoux's Pacific Merchant Marine story and the fine pictures of the tankers in your July 2012 issue. That's the first picture I've seen of a full tanker (five feet of freeboard). I am going to cut the pages, glue them together, and frame them.

G.F. Gomez
WWII Pacific Tanker Sailor
Albuquerque, New Mexico

The Magnificent Jeep

Dear Editor,

I read with interest the article "The Magnificent Jeep" by Michael D. Hull in the July 2012 issue of your magazine. It brought back a lot of memories. I would like to add a few things that I saw about the jeep.

The jeeps we received in England were partially disassembled in strong wood boxes. When assembled, the instructions were: "Fill the battery with water, start the engine and run it for 15 minutes." Incredible! At that time batteries were shipped dry and then filled with sulfuric acid solution of the correct specific gravity. Evidently when the batteries were assembled at the factory they were first filled with sulfuric acid crystals to make the proper electrolyte.

The jeep ignition switch did not require a key to start the engine. It was a simple on/off switch. To prevent the theft of his jeep, the dri-

ver raised the hood, unsnapped the distributor cap, then removed the distributor rotor, snapped the distributor cap back on, shut the hood, put the rotor in his pocket and walked away. He felt certain that his jeep was safe and could not be stolen.

The problem was everybody knew about this procedure, and jeep distributor rotors could be purchased on the black market in Paris for $25!

When the 87th Infantry Division reached Metz, France, an order came from headquarters: "A length of angle iron must be bolted to the center of the front bumper on all jeeps, extending up above the driver and ending in a hook forward…" When the jeep drivers drove at night they often laid the windshield down flat on the hood in order to see better in the dark. If the Germans stretched a wire across the road between two trees it could cut the driver's head off! The angle iron with the hook on the top end was supposed to break the wire.

At Junkerath, Germany, we "liberated" a large DC arc welding generator. We fastened the generator in the back end of a salvaged jeep and connected it with a third drive shaft to the transmission transfer case. Now we had a portable arc welder that was mobile and self-propelled.

The medics brought over several jeeps to modify. Staff Sergeant Cecil Cantrell welded litter racks across the hood and across the back of the jeep behind the front seats. They were then used to haul wounded men back to the field hospitals.

The only way you could tell which jeeps were made by Ford and which were made by Willys was by the front crossmember in the jeep frame. One was made of square tubing and the other was round tubing. After 69 years, I can't remember which was which!

Paul Donald Winkler
Denton, Nebraska

USS *Corregidor*

Dear Editor:

While reading "Pearl Harbor Heroism" about Seaman Doris "Dorie" Miller in the May 2012 issue, I was surprised to read about the escort carrier USS *Corregidor* being part of Task Force (Taffy) 52.3.

My late father, Donald Eugene Birkett, served aboard the *Corregidor* as a Torpedoman's Mate First Class. She, like the USS *Liscome Bay,* was of the Casablanca class.

Tim Birkett
Bartonville, Illinois

Maritime Academies

Dear Editor,

I enjoyed reading the article on the Pacific Merchant Marine (July 2012 issue), but your author missed one of the maritime academies. Florida had its own maritime academy in St. Petersburg. My father, Captain James E. Dillon, was captain on the training ship from 1944 until 1946. It was originally named the SS *Edgemont*. When it became the training ship at the academy, it was renamed the USS *American Sailor.* As a child, I made a few cruises aboard her, and I slept in my father's stateroom. In any event, thanks for a well-written article.

Harry J. Dillon
Captain, U.S. Navy (ret.)
Cathedral City, California

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By Blaine Taylor

Imperial War Museum



The crew of a Canadian Sherman tank rests in the village of Vaucelles, France, during the Normandy campaign in the summer of 1944. The American-designed Sherman was also built under license in Canada.

"Blunder" or "Wonder" Weapon?

> The American-built Sherman medium tank was admittedly inferior to its German opponents. Yet, it won the war in northwestern Europe by numbers, not quality.

FOR THE ALLIED TANKERS AND INFANTRYMEN OF THE AMERICAN, BRITISH, Canadian, and Free French armies battling German Panther and Tiger tanks in Normandy in the summer of 1944, the Sherman tank's failures were glaringly evident as their own shells bounced off the hulls of the Nazi armor and they were themselves destroyed at a far greater range by the powerful German tanks.

It was, therefore, somewhat ironic that the outgunned and lighter armored Shermans nevertheless defeated the retreating Nazis by their sheer weight of numbers. Today, more than seven decades after the end of the greatest war in military history, the debate continues. Was the American-designed and -built Sherman M4 medium tank a colossal blunder, a wonder weapon, or both?

Author Philip Trewhitt wrote, "The Medium Tank M4 Sherman used the same basic hull and suspension as the M3, but mounted the main armament on the gun turret rather than the hull. Easy to build and an excellent fighting platform, it proved to be a war-winner for the Allies. By the time production ceased in 1945, more than 40,000 had been built. There were many variants, including engineers tanks, assault tanks, rocket launchers, recovery vehicles, and mine-clearers. The British employed the Sherman extensively, notably at the Battle of El Alamein in 1942. Though outgunned by German tanks and with insufficient armor to compete in the later stages of the war, the sheer numbers produced overwhelmed enemy armored forces. Its hardiness kept it in service with some South American countries until very recently."

With a crew of five, the Sherman weighed 6,000 pounds, was 19 feet, four inches long, eight feet, seven inches wide, and nine feet high. It had a range of 100 miles, armor of .59-2.99 inches thick, and a single 75mm turret gun, plus one coaxial 7.52mm machine gun and a .50 caliber machine gun on the turret. The power plant consisted of twin General Motors 6-71 diesel engines that developed 500 horsepower. Its maximum road speed was 30 miles per hour, and it could ford a stream three feet deep, mount a vertical obstacle two feet high, or cross a trench seven feet, five inches wide.

The M4 series entered service in 1941, and was built by American automobile manufacturers Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors. Both hulls and turrets were either welded or cast. The five-speed transmission was a synchromesh with front sprocket drive and a controlled differential, while the vertical volute suspension was changed to horizontal on later models, and its fuel capacity was between 140-175 gallons.

The most refined Sherman model was the M4A3. It differed from the M4A2 primarily in turret and suspension, utilizing the horizontal volute spring system, while its armament was the more effective high-velocity 76mm gun and its armor was thicker in vulnerable areas.

Ford built the M4A3 between June 1942 and September 1943, and later Grand Blanc produced the variant. Other improvements were a vision cupola for the commander, wet ammu-

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All: National Archives

LEFT: An abandoned American Sherman tank, destroyed by a direct hit from a German Faustpatrone, hollow-charge projectile, sits on a street in Leipzig, Germany. BELOW: Some M4 tanks were equipped with 4.5-inch rocket launchers and dubbed Calliopes. Although the rockets were inaccurate, they could saturate a significant area with high-explosive ordnance.

nition storage, and a loader's hatch.

The M4A3 Sherman medium tank also had a five-man crew, a weight of 71,024 pounds, and a range of 100 miles. Its length with gun was 24 feet, eight inches, and the hull length was 20 feet, seven inches. Its width was eight feet, nine inches, and its height was 11 feet, 2.85 inches. Its armor plating was up to 3.94 inches, and a single 7.62mm coaxial machine gun complemented the 76mm main weapon. The powerplant consisted of a Ford GAA V8 gasoline engine developing 400-500 horsepower. Its maximum road speed was 30 miles per hour, and its fording ability was three feet. It could surmount a vertical obstacle two feet high and a trench 7 feet, five inches wide.

Against those 40,000 Allied Shermans, the Nazis fielded but 1,835 Tiger and King Tiger tanks and 4,800 Panther tanks, for a grand total of 6,635. Some estimates of Sherman wartime production reach an astounding 50,000.

Ironically, the United States entered World War II without an armored fighting vehicle such as the Sherman available. Thus, its new design was developed too quickly and the normal, slow-moving series of developmental stages was cast aside in favor of getting the M4 into immediate mass production. The Allies paid for this hasty decision later on in the summer of 1944 in the fields and hedgerow country of embattled Normandy against far superior German armor.

The enormous production numbers also resulted from this initial strategic decision to produce Shermans in large quantities rather than wait for a heavier armored vehicle, such as the M26 Pershing heavy tank, which finally arrived just before war's end in 1945.

On the pro side of the ledger, the M4 Sherman was technically uncomplicated, reliable, and mechanically well constructed. It also

helped that the Allied air forces enjoyed a huge aerial superiority over the virtually beaten German Luftwaffe. Working in tandem with well-coordinated Allied infantry, artillery, and air forces, the plentiful and trusty Shermans were able to vanquish most German armored formations simply by ganging up on them in overwhelming numbers when all else failed.

On the con side, however, the Sherman's 75mm and 76mm guns just could not pierce the mighty Tiger tank's frontal armor even at short range while the latter could vanquish the Shermans with impunity from greater distances. Another drawback was that, unlike the German tanks and the Soviet-built T-34 medium tank, the Sherman made a far more visible target in combat because of its height.

In addition, noted one source, "In fact, to destroy a German Tiger, the Shermans had to hit it from the side or from behind, and obviously if the Tiger saw them approaching, it could destroy some Shermans before the others could eventually destroy it." That was, alas, too often the case.

Powerplants for U.S. tank production were always a major problem, and eventually this led to the development of the 8-cylinder Ford-produced engine. Although originally designed for aircraft, the Ford 8 cylinder was gasoline fueled and had 500 gross horsepower. Following testing, the engine was authorized by January 1942 for Sherman usage by the U.S. Army Ordnance Committee, and with the new engine, the first M4A3 was completed by May 1942.

Testing was completed at the General Motors Proving Ground, with minor changes being made. By September 1943, fully 1,600 tanks had been constructed when Ford ceased production. This was taken over by the Detroit Tank Arsenal and also the Fisher Tank Arsenal, and by mid-1943 there were already numerous other changes.

Stated one account, "Distinguishing turret features included an all around vision cupola for the commander—except in early production, which retained the earlier circular split ring hatch—and an oval shaped loader's hatch. Those vehicles produced with the circular split ring commander's hatch had it replaced by the all around vision cupola in the field as supplies became available."

The Canadian Army replaced its Ram tank with the versatile Sherman model for the invasion of Italy in July 1943. Sherman tanks were also produced in Canada under license agreement.

Named after the American Union Army General William Tecumseh Sherman, the M4 medium tank was used not only in World War II, but also in the Greek Civil War, the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, the Korean War, the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

The original M4 was debuted on August 31, 1940, with final characteristics completed on April 18, 1941 at the Aberdeen Proving Ground. The first pilot M4 was finished on September 2, 1941, and then put into mass production during February 1942. Altogether, there were seven models: M4, M4A1, M4A2, M4A3, M4A4, M4A5, and M4A6.

Stated one account, "The sub types differed mainly in terms of engine, although the M4A1 differed from the M4 by its fully cast hull rather than by engine; the M4A4 had a longer engine system that also required a longer hull, longer suspension system, and more track blocks. The M4A5 was an administrative placeholder for Canadian production, and the M4A6 also elongated the chassis but totaled fewer than 100 tanks. Only the M4A2 and M4A6 were diesel; most Shermans were gasoline fueled."

Author David Irving has noted the shortcomings of the Sherman in combat along with

A Sherman tank modified to carry a flamethrower demonstrates its usefulness against enemy fixed fortifications in September 1944.

the painful awareness of Allied commanders and tankers in the field. "The superiority of the Nazi tanks was nothing new to the Allied commanders," he wrote. "It had been reported by tank crews on the Anzio beachheads ... C.L. Sulzberger of the *New York Times* had tried to expose the scandal: that the Sherman tank's armor was inferior to the Tiger tank's, that its gun was outranged by the guns of the Mark IV special and the Tiger, and that the new German anti-tank gun had twice the velocity of the best American weapon.... There was no doubt that, in Normandy—as at Anzio—the Americans were finding that their weapons were inferior.... For the Americans, too, however, the most serious headache was the superiority of the Panther."

Pilot production on the Sherman tank began in November 1941, just before the U.S. entered World War II, and the very next month the official design was approved. The Medium Tank M4 was the welded-hull version with the Medium Tank M4A1 the cast-hull model. Both models entered quantity mass production by the early summer of 1942.

At the Battle of El Alamein against German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's famed Afrika Korps, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's British Eighth Army deployed 400 Shermans and 650 other tanks versus the enemy's 200 Mark IVs and 200 Mark III tanks.

Noted one source, "The Sherman proved far superior to both of these types and—although the enemy was aware of the Sherman before Alamein, and knew the British had some—they completely underestimated the Sherman's potential, and the results of their poor judgment proved disastrous."

Following their victory over the Germans at El Alamein, the ecstatic British claimed that the Sherman was "the best in the world." It was they who named it the General Sherman but

soon shortened it to Sherman alone.

It was also following El Alamein that the vaunted combat vehicle received its first close reexamination. The British observed, "Overall, armor was rated as good, and front armor especially good. One improvement in its armor that was recommended was the welding of one-inch-thick reinforcing plates on the outside of the hull, where they would protect drivers and the ammunition supply. The applied plates became a very distinctive feature of the Sherman from then on."

This same post-combat examination revealed but one serious weak point overall—that it caught on fire too easily when hit. In addition, if the floor escape hatch was open, it created a chimney effect, thus making the fire itself far worse. Thus, even before the end of the North African campaign most tankers welded the escape hatch shut, and the U.S. Army gave the Sherman, too soon as it later developed, its seal of approval.

In late June 1944, the U.S. Army Ordnance Corps accepted a limited run of 254 M4A3E2 Jumbo Shermans with extremely thick armor and the new high-velocity 75mm or 76mm gun in the new and heavier T23-type turret to be used in attacking fortifications. It was also the first to be factory produced with the new HVSS suspension with extra wide tracks for lower ground pressure.

Stated one account, "The smooth ride of the HVSS with its experimental E8 designation led to the nickname 'Easy Eight' for Shermans so equipped. Among the later developed Sherman special attachments were the bulldozer blade, the Duplex Drive for 'swimming' tanks, the R3 flamethrower for Zippo flame tanks, and the T34 60-tube 4.5-inch Calliope rocket launcher for Sherman turrets."

The Sherman chassis also undertook many other roles, including acting as minesweepers and self-propelled guns.

M93 Hypervelocity Armor Piercing HVAP ammunition, a new projectile that could pierce the turret of the Panther tank at longer ranges than the more standard Sherman ammunition, was standardized for the 76mm gun by July 1944, but its distribution was limited to U.S. tank destroyer units only.

Noted one source, "In the relatively few Pacific tank battles, even the 75mm gun Shermans outclassed the Japanese in every engagement. The use of High Explosive (HE) ammunition was preferred because antitank rounds punched cleanly through the thin armor of the Japanese tanks (light tanks of 1930s era design) without necessarily stopping them. Although the high-velocity guns of the tank destroyers were useful for penetrating fortifications, Shermans armed with flamethrowers also destroyed Japanese fortifications. There was a variety of types of flamethrowers, differing primarily in the type and location of launcher, and the U.S. used similar devices on other tanks and LVTs, and also used flamethrowing Shermans in Europe."

Because of its propensity to catch fire, the Sherman soon gained several nicknames. "Tommycooker" (which was a World War I trench cooker), "Ronsons" (a la the cigarette lighter that were guaranteed in their ads to "Light up the first time, every time!"), and also what the Free Poles called "The Burning Grave."

As for the cause of the fires, U.S. Army research proved that the major reason was the use of unprotected ammunition stowage in sponsons above the tracks. The common myth that that the use of gasoline engines was a cul-

Imperial War Museum

Photographed in July 1944, this camouflaged Canadian Sherman is known as the Firefly. These Shermans were upgunned with the British 17-pounder to help even the odds against German armor.

National Archives

Still tethered to its recovery vehicle, an M4 Sherman tank nicknamed *Hurricane* has its engine overhauled in the field. One of the virtues of the lightly armored Sherman was its reliability and the fact that such maintenance could be accomplished in less than ideal conditions near the front.

prit is unsupported. Gasoline was unlikely to ignite when hit with armor piercing shells.

At first, a partial remedy to ammunition fires was found by welding one-inch-thick applied armor plates to the vertical sponson sides over the ammunition stowage bins. Later models moved ammunition stowage to the hull floor, with additional water jackets surrounding the main gun ammunition stowage. This decreased the likelihood of brewing up. In time, thicker armor was added to both the turret and the hull front, and the troops themselves placed sandbags, spare track links, helmets, wire mesh, and even wood, for better protection against shaped-charge rounds.

General George S. Patton Jr. forbade the usage of sandbags and instead ordered that the Shermans have extra armor welded to the front hulls taken from destroyed American and German vehicles. He had been advised by his technical experts that the sandbags actually increased the Shermans' vulnerability and also that their chasses suffered from the added weight.

Accordingly, about 36 of these Shermans with thicker armor were supplied to each of the armored divisions of the Third Army in early 1945. The rare M4A3E2 Sherman Jumbo variant had even thicker frontal armor than the German Tiger I.

The Sherman had good speed both on the road and traveling cross-country. In the desert, the Sherman's rubber tracks performed well, while in Italy, it could cross hilly terrain that German armor could not. Tankers found that on soft ground, such as snow or mud, the narrow tracks provided poor ground pressure compared to those of German tanks.

Ironically, the majority of the losses of Sherman tanks were not from tank versus tank battles, but, rather, from mines, aircraft, infantry antitank weapons, and even friendly fire.

The controversy over the Sherman continues, however. Author Belton Y. Cooper even referred to them as "death traps," with a loss rate in his own 3rd Armored Division of over 580 percent, while, conversely, noted one source, "Patton argued that the Sherman tank was overall a superior tool of war."

Among the many Sherman variants were Lend-Lease tanks, postwar vehicles, British Sherman Firefly tanks mounting the reliable 17-pounder gun, and others. Indeed, vehicles that used the Medium Tank M4 chassis or hull included the 3-inch Gun Motor Carriage M10 Tank Destroyer, also known as the Wolverine,; the M32 and M74 TRV recovery tanks; the M34 and M35 artillery tractor prime movers; the M4A3R3 Zippo and M4 Crocodile flamethrower tanks; the T34 Calliope, T40 Whizbang, and other Sherman rocket launching tanks; and the Duplex Drive swimming vehicles and other deep-wading Shermans.

There were also the D-8, M1 and M1A1 dozers, M4 Doozit, Mobile Assault Bridge, and Aunt Jemina engineer tank mine clearers, the Jackson 90mm Gun Motor Carriage M36 tank destroyer, the Priest 105mm Howitzer Motor Carriage M7 self-propelled artillery, the 155mm GMC M12 with Cargo Carrier M30, the 155/203/150mm Motor Carriages, 155mm GMC M40, 8-inch HMC M43, 250mm MMC T4, and Cargo Carrier T30. □

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By Steven Trent Smith

National Archives

Standby for Special Mission

U.S. Navy submarines assisted in the conduct of numerous covert raids during the Pacific War.

SUNSETS OVER MANILA BAY ARE NOTHING LESS THAN SPECTACULAR. ONCE THE sun dips below the horizon there is a lingering illumination known as "blue hour" as the sky gradually shifts from pale azure to deep indigo before fading completely into the black tropical night. But for the men of USS *Seawolf* there was no blue hour that warm January evening in 1942. Their submarine rested on the inky bottom of the bay awaiting nightfall, when it would be safe to surface.

At 7:30 PM, Lt. Cmdr. Frederick "Fearless Freddie" Warder, gave the command. The submarine broke the calm waters off the besieged island of Corregidor, sailing cautiously toward South Dock. When *Seawolf* was securely moored, the crew began transferring her cargo: 36 tons of antiaircraft shells destined for the island's desperate garrison.

Though Pearl Harbor was barely a month past, this was already *Seawolf*'s third war patrol. And it was to become a landmark, for it was the first of nearly 300 "special missions" undertaken by American submarines during World War II.

After unloading her cargo, *Seawolf* embarked 25 passengers for transport to Surabaya on Java's eastern coast. It must have galled Freddie Warder that his warship had been used as a truck and was about to become a bus. But most of his refugees were VIPs—Very Important Pilots—men who had lost their planes in the first days of the war. It was *Seawolf*'s mission to deliver those flyers to new aircraft to rejoin the fight.

In those first, dispiriting months of the war, Asiatic Fleet submarines were kept busy on similar missions—so many that the chief, Admiral Thomas Hart, complained bitterly in a report to Washington: "This Command has been continuously attempting to satisfy numerous demands for use of submarines for various evacuation and ferrying trips." Those trips included transporting high-ranking officials, more pilots, members of a top-secret radio intelligence unit, and 20 tons of gold and silver from the Philippine treasury. They also carried in as much ammunition and foodstuffs as the boats could fit. Hart noted that these special missions detracted from offensive operations, but Washington seemed to pay no heed.

The last trip to Corregidor was made on May 3 by USS *Spearfish*, redirected from a war patrol off the Lingayen Gulf to pick up 27 passengers. Twelve were Army nurses; two were unauthorized stowaways. The island fortress fell to the Japanese just three days later.

The typical modern diesel-electric "fleet submarine" of the time was 311 feet long and displaced 1,525 tons. The Navy had three boats greatly exceeding that size: the minelayer *Argonaut* and the cruiser subs *Narwhal* and *Nautilus*. Each was more than 370 feet in length, displaced over 4,000 tons, and was armed with pairs of six-inch guns. Built between 1927 and 1930, the boats were big, slow, and ill-suited for the underwater attack role. It was said that *Argonaut*'s diving time was four or five minutes.

However unsuitable the trio may have been for deployment offensively, their sheer size proved attractive to Navy planners for special missions.

One of the first was deployment of *Nautilus* and *Argonaut* for landing a Marine Corps raiding party on Makin Atoll in the sum-

Lieutenant (j.g.) George W. Bush is pulled from the Pacific Ocean by crewmen of the submarine USS *Finback* after the young aviator was forced to ditch on September 2, 1944. Submarines performed such rescue duties routinely across the expanse of the Pacific.

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

ABOVE: The submarine USS *Narwhal* participated in clandestine supply missions, the evacuation of refugees and military personnel, and the delivery of covert agents to the Philippines as part of the U.S. Navy's Spyron effort. BELOW: The submarine USS *Gudgeon* carried U.S. agents to the island of Negros in the Philippines. Guerrillas in the Philippines came to depend on resupply from submarines as well.

mer of 1942. The assault was meant to divert enemy attention from Guadalcanal, where a full-scale invasion had begun a week before. In all, 252 Marines were crammed into the boats' torpedo rooms, where the "fish" had been replaced by tiers of bunks.

In the predawn darkness of August 16, the men of Colonel Evans Carlson's 2nd Raider Battalion launched their rubber boats and paddled ashore to destroy Japanese facilities. While the Marines were on the island, *Nautilus* had an opportunity to unlimber her six-inch guns. Firing blind, over the island and into the lagoon, the ship managed to sink an enemy patrol vessel and a 3,500-ton freighter.

Nautilus and twin *Narwhal* were used in a similar capacity 10 months later, when they supported the American assault in the Aleutians, landing 214 Army Scouts on Attu Island. As they had at Makin, the big subs amply demonstrated their versatility as transports.

At the beginning of 1943, a whole new phase of special operations began. In January, six agents were landed on Negros in the central Philippines by USS *Gudgeon*. Code-named Planet Party, the group was led by Captain Jesus Villamor, a much decorated Filipino pilot and war hero. The unit's task was to set up a communications network that could radio intelligence back to General Douglas MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area headquarters (SWPA GHQ) in Brisbane, Australia.

Villamor discovered a flourishing guerrilla organization in desperate need of arms, ammunition, and more. That news excited GHQ, which made arrangements in February for USS *Tambor* to deliver 70,000 rounds and $10,000 in cash to the rebels on the southern island of Mindanao while en route to her patrol area. Even as she was sailing north, commanders in Brisbane were discussing the feasibility of establishing a regular submarine transport service to the Philippines. "It is suggested that every effort be made to provide [the Philippine] sub-section with undersea boats," wrote Lt. Col. Allison W. Ind, deputy controller of the Allied Intelligence Bureau on February 25, 1943.

Like *Gudgeon, Tambor* was also carrying a group of agents, led by an unassuming naval reserve officer, Lt. Cmdr. Charles "Chick" Parsons. He was an old Philippine hand, arriving there in 1921. Before the war he had been an executive at Luzon Stevedoring Company in Manila and seemed to have knowledge of every channel and bay and inlet throughout the islands. He was widely connected and widely respected. After disembarking from the sub, he began an island-by-island investigation of the situation, talking to rebel leaders, observing daily life, forming opinions on the state of the country. He would become, in a very real way, MacArthur's eyes and ears in the Philippines.

SWPA continued to send men and supplies north—but in ad hoc dribs and drabs. In April, *Gudgeon* went back with four men and three tons of supplies for Panay Island. And that July, *Trout* put ashore another reconnaissance party on Mindanao, evacuated four escaped POWs and, after four months in country, Chick Parsons.

On August 20, 1943, Parsons submitted a lengthy report to MacArthur on the state of the Philippines. There were sections on political and economic conditions, on military and civilian internees, and on the morale of the nation under Japanese occupation. Parsons then offered up some thoughts on how the United States might aid the resistance movement. Among them he recommended submarines be employed to supply the guerrilla districts. This idea had been kicking around GHQ for months, but it took another old Philippine hand, Colonel Courtney Whitney, a close friend of MacArthur's, and before the war a very sharp Manila lawyer, to get the ball rolling.

Until then the Navy had been reluctant to commit a boat full time to the Philippine guerrilla campaign. Whitney, frustrated by the lack of cooperation, persuaded the general to threaten to take the issue to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. It still took six more weeks to convince the Commander Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral Arthur S. Carpender, that the Navy's assistance in inserting intelligence teams would produce "information of direct benefit to [the Navy's] operations against the enemy," through the establishment of a network of coastwatchers reporting Japanese ship movements, valuable information that would be of paramount interest to patrolling submarines. Carpender went to his boss, Admiral Ernest J. King, commander in chief, United States Fleet, with a recommendation that a Nautilus-class submarine be made available to SWPA to make two trips into the islands toward the end of the year. The plan was approved.

Because of his experience and expertise, Commander Parsons was handed the job of organizing the sub supply system under the aegis of both Whitney and the Seventh Fleet's director of Naval Intelligence, Captain Arthur H. McCollum. In time the unit came to be called the Spy Squadron, or "Spyron." From an office in Brisbane, Chick coordinated the materiel requisitions from rebel commanders. Once the freight was assembled, it was forwarded to Darwin on Australia's north coast

for loading aboard the submarines.

Narwhal was made available to Spyron late that autumn after receiving a complete refit, including removal of her torpedo-handling gear to clear space in the torpedo rooms for cargo, though 10 fish were left in her tubes just in case.

And so it was, on October 23, 1943, USS *Narwhal,* Lt. Cmdr. Frank D. Latta commanding, departed Australia bound for Mindoro and Mindanao. For this inaugural Spyron trip she was transporting two Army radio intelligence teams, 92 tons of cargo, and Chick Parsons. The supplies ran the gamut from rifles, pistols, machine guns, ammunition, grenades, radio sets, medicines, cigarettes, lubricating oil, uniforms, and typewriter ribbons and carbon paper (the rebels had a well-organized bureaucracy of their own), to communion wafers, propaganda, and chocolate bars wrapped in labels emblazoned with "I Shall Return, MacArthur."

The voyage was routine, at least until November 10, when, at 10:35 PM, lookouts spotted a Japanese tanker escorted by three warships, range 12,000 yards. Latta decided to attack, waiting until the range dropped to 3,100 yards before firing four torpedoes at the target. All missed.

Less than three hours later two of those escorts spotted the old girl and took off in pursuit, one of them opening fire. Latta screamed for more power. The engine men gave him enough to push the boat through the Bohol Sea at an astonishing 19 knots (she was built to top out at 17). In time, *Narwhal* pulled ahead. When the ordeal was over, Latta christened the diesels that had saved his boat, "Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John."

Two days later the sub reached Paluan Bay on the northwest coast of Mindoro, where half the cargo was unloaded along with one of the Army teams.

Narwhal then sailed down to Nasipit in northern Mindanao. While maneuvering into the tiny port, the sub ran aground on a shoal. Though it took less than an hour to back her free, those were tense moments for the crew in waters alive with Japanese patrols. When the boat finally reached the dock an enthusiastic Filipino band, resplendent in neatly pressed uniforms, struck up a warm welcome with a rousing rendition of "Anchors Aweigh."

It took just a few hours to get the remaining supplies ashore. That accomplished, 32 evacuees boarded the boat for the trip back to Australia. Chick Parsons stayed behind with the guerrillas.

Narwhal arrived at Darwin on November 22, 1943, did a three-day turnaround, and headed back to the Philippines with another 90

tons of materiel and 11 men. The trip up was uneventful. The supplies were quickly unloaded, seven evacuees and Commander Parsons embarked, and the boat was steaming back toward Australia by December 2. The voyage was not without some excitement. Latta attacked and sank a Japanese freighter.

Spyron was off to a promising start. Thereafter, resupply missions were run every four or five weeks. The addition of *Nautilus* in July 1944 doubled the unit's carrying capacity. It seems President Roosevelt had urged her reassignment after being nudged by Philippine President Manuel L. Quezon, who sought ever greater support for his country's guerrillas. In August, two smaller boats, Freddie Warder's old *Seawolf* and *Stingray,* were added to the Spyron fleet.

Even while Spyron operated, other boats continued to run special missions into the Philippines, usually diverted from a regular war patrol to effect an emergency evacuation. In March 1944, USS *Angler* was sent to Panay to pick up 58 civilians who had been stranded there since the beginning of the war. There was some urgency to her assignment. The Japanese had brutally murdered 17 missionaries and their children just before Christmas, and MacArthur wanted to remove the remaining Americans on the island as quickly as possible.

In May, USS *Crevalle* was diverted to nearby Negros to bring out 40 people, a mixture of missionaries, civilian contractors, and more escaped POWs. But that was not why she was sent there. A month before, the guerrillas had come into possession of a briefcase full of top-secret Japanese Navy papers following the crash of a flying boat carrying a high-ranking officer. When rebels radioed MacArthur that they had these mysterious documents, GHQ hastened to send a submarine to pick them up. *Crevalle* just happened to be the closest.

Embarking the 40 provided a neat cover story for the real mission In fact, they would have been evacuated by *Narwhal* or *Nautilus* within a few weeks. When the papers got back to MacArthur, they were quickly translated and analyzed. The cache turned out to be the Z Operations Order, a strategic battle plan for the defense of the Western Pacific. American forces used the intelligence to their advantage that June in the invasion of Saipan and the Battle of the Philippine Sea.

In early 1945, when most of the Philippines was back under American control, Spyron was dissolved, and any special missions required were once again assigned to operational subs.

When the great offensive across the Central Pacific opened in late 1943, another phase of special missions began. During air strikes against enemy-held islands and atolls, subs were stationed offshore to rescue any pilots that went down. Over the next 18 months, more than half the boats in the submarine force participated in what came to be known as the Lifeguard League. Perhaps the best known incident was USS *Finback*'s September 1944 rescue of a young Grumman Avenger torpedo bomber pilot, Lieutenant (j.g.) George H.W. Bush. Perhaps the hairiest was USS *Harder*'s April 1944 extraction of a pilot at remote Woleai Atoll in the eastern Carolines.

The sub, commanded by Lt. Cmdr. Samuel D. Dealey, was assigned lifeguard duty there to cover a bombing raid by carrier-based planes. On April 1, Dealey received a radio message telling him that a fighter pilot was down on the beach. *Harder* sped to the scene, easy to find because other aircraft were circling overhead.

The skipper conned his boat as close to the reef as he dared. "White water was breaking over the shoals only 20 yds in front of the ship and the fathometer had ceased to record," he wrote in his patrol report. *Harder* was literally between a rock and a hard place, so the flyers suggested backing off and trying a different approach. No sooner had the sub begun to maneuver away than the stranded pilot, Ensign John R. Galvin, fell to the ground in profound despair, thinking his saviors were abandoning him. "My heart stood still," he said.

The new spot did not pan out, so Dealey returned to the first and began in earnest to execute a rescue. He put over a rubber boat that had no paddles and three volunteers. Word came up from the forward torpedo room that the sub's bottom was scraping the coral. Dealey, worried that *Harder* might get pushed broadside by the surf, "worked both screws to keep the bow against the reef." If that was not enough, enemy snipers hiding in the palms along the beach kept up a continuous fire. "Bullets whined over the bridge, uncomfortably close," the skipper noted.

The volunteers had a 1,200-yard swim to the beach. It took them half an hour to reach Galvin, who had by then climbed into his own raft and was being pushed by the currents away from his rescuers. Finally, they got the pilot into their boat. Sailors on the sub began to haul in the line to the raft, but an over-exuberant, would-be rescuer in a Curtiss floatplane managed to sever it while taxiing toward Galvin. Another *Harder* crewman had to swim out with a second line, and slowly the raft was pulled alongside the sub.

Despite the mishaps, the entire rescue took just an hour and 19 minutes. But to all

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The submarine USS *Harder* rescues Navy pilot John R. Galvin near Woleani Atoll. The seaplane pictured attempted to assist in the rescue but accidentally severed a line from the submarine to the downed airman, prolonging the rescue effort.

involved, it must have seemed an eternity.

Throughout the final months of the war, fleet submarines continued to conduct special operations. Many involved landing intelligence teams throughout Southeast Asia. But in April 1945, *Tigrone* and *Rock* teamed for an unusual mission to use their five-inch guns to knock out an enemy radio station on Batan Island in the Luzon Strait.

Also that spring a group of boats conducted a series of special missions as guinea pigs for a new kind of Frequency Modulated (FM) sonar designed to detect underwater mines. It was not a particularly popular assignment. In June 1945, a group of nine FM-equipped submarines dubbed the Hellcats successfully penetrated the minefields guarding the southern entrance to the Sea of Japan. In 15 days they managed to sink 28 enemy ships at the cost of one of their own, USS *Bonefish*.

The final official submarine special mission was run by USS *Catfish*. On August 15, 1945, the boat began an FM sonar sweep for mines off the coast of Kyushu. None were detected, but after surfacing at the end of the day, the ship's radioman picked up a flash. "Received War News and heard war was over," the skipper wrote in his report. "News was received in 'proper' manner by all hands. Now the topic is 'When can I go home?'"

When the record of the submarine force was compiled after the war, the results were impressive. The boats had accounted for 55 percent of all Japanese maritime losses. And the record for special missions was equally impressive. In fact, 15 percent of all patrols were either wholly special operations or had a special operations component.

Chick Parsons's Spyron unit delivered 1,325 tons of supplies and 331 personnel and evacuated 472, most of them civilians, many of these women and children. Parsons himself made eight round trips to the Philippines. A 1948 SWPA assessment of Spyron said, "The practical importance of this efficient supply service by cargo submarine can scarcely be overestimated. It became the 'life-line' of the guerrilla resistance movement." *Narwhal* was withdrawn from service in January 1945, having made nine cargo runs. *Nautilus* was sent home in April with six under her belt. Spyron had one tragic loss. *Seawolf* went down with all hands during an October 1944 mission, very likely sunk by an American warship.

The Lifeguard League delivered 504 flyers from certain death or capture by the enemy. The record rescuer was *Tigrone,* which plucked 31 airmen from the Pacific. The valiant *Harder,* heroine to Ensign John Galvin, did not survive the war. She was lost with all hands on August 24, 1944, after a brutal depth charging in the South China Sea.

On hundreds of special missions throughout World War II, American submarines performed myriad tasks, always at enormous risk to the crews and their boats. In the process they played a manifest role in winning the war in the Pacific. □

Steven Trent Smith is the author of two books, The Rescue: A True Story of Courage and Survival in World War II *and* Wolf Pack: The American Submarine Strategy That Helped Defeat Japan. *As a freelance news and documentary cameraman for more than 30 years, he earned five Emmy Awards.*

By Sheldon Winkler

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

Elaborate Literary Hoax

The fabricated diary of a young Dutch boy was intended to gain American sympathy for the British struggle against Nazi Germany.

DURING WORLD WAR II, QUEEN WILHELMINA OF THE NETHERLANDS, FROM HER exile in London, urged her staff to find a 12-year-old Dutch boy, Dirk van der Heide. Young Dirk, who had emigrated to the United States with his nine-year-old sister Keetje, had written a short book titled *My Sister and I,* which was published by Harcourt, Brace and Company in New York in January 1941. A few months later the book was published in London by Faber and Faber.

Dirk, who was from the southern suburbs of Rotterdam, lived through the five-day blitzkrieg in Holland and kept a detailed diary of those troubled times. Unfortunately, Queen Wilhelmina was unsuccessful in her efforts to locate Dirk and present him with an award of some kind during her visits to the United States in 1942 when she addressed a joint session of Congress and 1943 when she visited President Franklin D. Roosevelt at Hyde Park. The reason was simple. The book was a fabrication and Dirk van der Heide did not exist.

The translator of the diary, Mrs. Antoon Deventer, writes that all of the names in the diary, including the author's, were changed to protect the author's family remaining in Holland from the risk of German retaliation. In the book's introduction prepared by the translator, we are told that Dirk has augmented his diary since he left his homeland. Mrs. Deventer goes on to reveal that the English captain of the ship that brought Dirk and his sister to the United States, who conveniently could read Dutch, persuaded him to revise and enhance his diary. Speaking of Dirk, Mrs. Deventer admits, "Sometimes his writing seems abnormally mature," and the "bewildered child in wartime is revealed with a direct force and clarity."

The diary begins on May 7, 1940, when Dirk observes a number of soldiers on his way to school, some surrounding public buildings. Later that evening the radio announces that all leaves are canceled and soldiers are instructed to return to their units.

On May 10, 1940, Dirk writes, "Something terrible happened last night. War began!!!" Dirk tells about a series of German air raids that day on Rotterdam attacking unarmed civilians, beginning in the early morning. He speaks of antiaircraft fire, ambulance sirens, searchlights, fires, and the consistent loud noises of the guns and falling bombs. Radio reports call for reservists to report to their posts and his father, a veterinarian, dutifully obeys. Radio reports also tell of German parachutists, some of whom he thinks he observes as "white specks floating down" toward Waalhaven Airport, and fighting throughout the country.

The situation in Holland continued to deteriorate on May 11, 1940. Dutch citizens were asked to pile sandbags around their homes, dig trenches, and store food. Telephone service and mail delivery were terminated. German planes dropped leaflets claiming they came as friends to protect the Dutch from the British and French. Dutch radio constantly provided updates and admitted that the war was going badly.

Later that day a bomb landed on one side of the air raid shelter Dirk and his family used, did considerable damage, and caused a few

The Dutch city of Rotterdam was devastated by Luftwaffe Stuka dive bombers, and 30,000 people were killed. The book *My Sister and I,* purported to be the diary of a Dutch refugee boy, proved to be a British propaganda hoax.

We found our most important watch in a soldier's pocket

It's the summer of 1944 and a weathered U.S. sergeant is walking in Rome only days after the Allied Liberation. There is a joyous mood in the streets and this tough soldier wants to remember this day. He's only weeks away from returning home. He finds an interesting timepiece in a store just off the Via Veneto and he decides to splurge a little on this memento. He loved the way it felt in his hand, and the complex movement inside the case intrigued him. He really liked the hunter's back that opened to a secret compartment. He thought that he could squeeze a picture of his wife and new daughter in the case back. He wrote home that now he could count the hours until he returned to the States. This watch went on to survive some harrowing flights in a B-24 bomber and somehow made it back to the U.S. Besides the Purple Heart and the Bronze Star, my father cherished this watch because it was a reminder of the best part of the war for any soldier—the homecoming.

He nicknamed the watch *Ritorno* for homecoming, and the rare heirloom is now valued at $42,000 according to *The Complete Guide to Watches*. But to our family, it is just a reminder that nothing is more beautiful than the smile of a healthy returning GI.

The hunter's back

The Ritorno watch back opens to reveal a special compartment for a keepsake picture or can be engraved.

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casualties. Dirk reported seeing dead people being removed from bombed houses and ambulances coming and going. Late that night, Dirk's Uncle Pieter told him his mother was killed earlier in the day when the hospital where she volunteered her services was bombed.

On May 12, rumors of the Germans using gas, exceptionally powerful bombs, and flamethrowers that emitted a long line of fire abounded. Uncle Pieter decided to try to get Dirk and his sister to England and began a perilous journey in his American Buick that day. They miraculously reached the riverside town of Dordrecht by driving south over roads filled with refugees from all walks of life trying to leave Rotterdam. The refugees walked, rode bicycles, carried children and their belongings, and pushed babies in carriages. Dutch soldiers were also traveling over the same crowded roads on their way to fight the Germans. The car passed meadows with Dutch soldiers manning antiaircraft guns. The defenders shared these meadows with spring flowers.

At 3 in the afternoon German planes attacked the road with machine guns, causing many casualties. Dirk, his sister, and Uncle Pieter got under the car along with other refugees. Many people were killed or wounded. Uncle Pieter continued the trip after the attack, driving slowly and carefully. At one time he had to get out of the car and move three dead bodies so they could get by. In Dordrecht, they finally were able to board a small boat to bring them to Vlissingen on May 13. Eventually, they left for England in an overcrowded boat on May 14. Their boat docked in Harwich the following day, and they learned that Holland had surrendered to the Germans.

Dirk and Keetje enjoyed London for several weeks. Uncle Pieter took them sightseeing, and they were impressed by the sand bags banked around the British Museum and St. Paul's Cathedral and the trenches in the gardens at Kensington. Dirk notes that English roads are "fixed to stop Germans, with barricades, trenches, and tank traps."

Comments about the kindness and hospitality of the British and England's precarious wartime situation abound during Dirk and Keetje's stay in London. On arriving at the London train station, Dirk writes, "There were many English people there to give us breakfast and to help us. They were all very cheerful and smiling." Dirk later comments, "It is fine to be in this country where it is so quiet and peaceful the way home was." Uncle Pieter remarks, "The fall of Holland threatens England." A point is made about the English physician who refused to accept money when he treated Keetje when she was ill. When he is about to depart from London, Dirk writes, "I hate to leave England. I have had a good time here and I hope the Germans never do to England what they did to Holland."

Library of Congress

Dressed in white, exiled Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands visits New York in July 1942. During her visit the queen tried in vain to locate the author of *My Sister and I,* whom she believed to be a real boy.

Dirk and Keetje left Liverpool for the United States on July 2, 1940, and arrived safely after a fearful voyage, with the ship successfully avoiding German submarines and mines. They were met by an aunt and uncle who lived in New York and soon were enjoying their new home.

The next diary entry is dated September 28, 1940, when Dirk writes about his happy experiences in America. Uncle Pieter's letters tell the children that he is not able to return to Holland and is now working for the British. The children's father writes that he is back in Rotterdam and tells of the deteriorating conditions and suffering his country is experiencing.

On reading the book today, the question of its authenticity is obvious. The exceptional writing, moving descriptions of events, and remarkable insights introduce doubts whether it is the work of a 12-year-old. Dirk appears to have experienced or observed every type of horrific German military action, and what he did not see he mentions and attributes to hearsay and rumor. It seems improbable that a little Dutch boy could be at the right place at the right time to go through so much misery and terror in such a short time period and record everything in a masterful way.

The propaganda aspect of the book is also obvious, with its continuing comments about Britain's hopeless situation, the kindness and determination of the British in the midst of adversity, and the need for Britain to avoid the same fate that befell Holland. The appeal for the United States to enter the war and come to the aid of Britain is clear and continuous. The book was published too late to assist Holland, but it had the potential to help England and hasten U.S. involvement in the war.

Sales of *My Sister and I* were far beyond Harcourt, Brace's expectations. During 1941 approximately 46,000 copies were sold. By July 1948, when the book went out of print, more than 52,000 copies had been produced.

Reviews of the book from around the world were outstanding. The *New York Times, Boston Transcript, Chicago Tribune, Manchester Evening News,* and *Irish Times,* among others, had nothing but praise for the slim volume. Although a few critics expressed some doubts about the authorship of the book, these

patriotic skeptics did not want to create any potential problems during wartime and basically kept their thoughts to themselves.

The music world was not to be left behind. "My Sister and I," a tribute to the refugee children of Europe inspired by the best-selling book, was put to music. Recorded by Jimmy Dorsey and his Orchestra with a vocal by Bob Eberly, Nat Brandwynne and his Orchestra, the Dick Jurgens Orchestra in the United States, and Oscar Rabin and his Band with a vocal by Bob Dale in England, among others, the song was very popular during the summer of 1941. The title page of the sheet music states, "As inspired by the current best-seller *My Sister and I, by* Dirk van der Heide."

The words and music of "My Sister and I" were written by Hy Zaret, Joan Whitney, and Alex Kramer and published by Gower Music, Inc., of New York. Hy Zaret, the senior author, would continue to write lyrics, the most popular of which were those to "Unchained Melody." It is interesting to note that despite its popularity, "My Sister and I" is not mentioned in many of the standard music encyclopedias and indexes of the war years and not included in most collections of World War II sheet music. Based on the *Billboard* charts, "My Sister and I" was listed in the number seven position for the top songs of 1941.

The first four lines of the song's lyrics are, "My sister and I remember still, a tulip garden by an old Dutch mill, and the home that was all our own until.., but we don't talk about that."

Dr. Paul Fussell, Donald T. Regan Professor of English Literature at the University of Pennsylvania and noted lecturer, critic, and historian, had doubts about the book's authenticity. He questioned why a 12-year-old Dutch boy portrayed the British as noble, kind, and sympathetic people. Dr. Fussell noted the book's "subtle job of black [covert] propaganda." He hypothesized that it was a "shrewd British propaganda maneuver" beyond the capability of a 12-year-old and tried to find out as much as possible about *My Sister and I*. Dr. Fussell's subsequent research was discussed in great detail in the Munro Beattie Lecture titled "Writing in Wartime—The Uses of Innocence," which he presented at Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, in 1987.

In a visit to Faber and Faber, the British publisher of *My Sister and I,* Dr. Fussell found that the file on the book "had been thoroughly sanitized," with all evidence of authorship removed and presumably destroyed. Back in New York, he visited Harcourt, Brace (at that time known as Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich),

Author's Collection

The book *My Sister and I* inspired a popular song of the day. The sheet music sold briskly.

where the entire file had been removed. Dr. Fussell's astonished company guide claimed this was a unique incident as it had never occurred previously.

Not to be discouraged, Dr. Fussell inserted author's queries in a number of standard literary outlets requesting information about the authorship and publication of *My Sister and I*. One of the many respondents suggested writing to a Mrs. Stanley Young, who lived in New York State. Another response was from a woman who worked in the advertising department of Harcourt, Brace in 1941. She wrote, "Most of the actors in that comedy of errors are dead, but there are, I believe, relatives still alive and capable of kicking who might prefer to have the little hoax left buried."

Mrs. Stanley Young (the novelist Nancy Wilson Ross) was most cooperative and revealed to Dr. Fussell that *My Sister and I* was written by her late husband while he was working as an editor at Harcourt, Brace. Stanley Preston Young, the true author of *My Sister and I,* was a noted writer and editor who at one time taught English at Williams College. He settled into publishing and held a number of positions at major publishing houses before his death in 1975.

Another participant in the story of *My Sister and I* was Frank Morley, the brother of novelist and essayist Christopher Morley. In 1939, he moved from London to New York to accept the position of editor in chief at Harcourt, Brace.

Fussell believes Morley returned to the United States at that time "specifically to assist the covert work of British propaganda in wearing down American neutrality." Fussell also

Continued on page 74

By Michael D. Hull

Both: National Archives

Japan's Naval War Leader

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto led the Imperial Japanese Navy into war but warned that the United States was a formidable foe.

BRAVE, URBANE, AND COMPLEX, ADMIRAL ISOROKU YAMAMOTO WAS JAPAN'S greatest naval strategist and the architect of one of the most stunning achievements in the history of modern warfare.

Fluent in English, he studied in the United States and claimed many American friends before he became one of their deadly enemies. A solid and widely respected man, he argued passionately for peace in the 1930s while fascism spread in Europe and a fanatical militarist faction in Tokyo was calling for aggressive expansion in the Far East. Yet Yamamoto was a patriot to the bone, and when ordered to fight, he waged war with a vengeance.

As war approached, he was initially uneasy and warned his countrymen of the likely consequences of provoking the West. Having studied briefly at Harvard University and spent two years in Washington as a naval attaché, he admired America and was aware of its industrial strength and potential military power.

"Japan cannot beat America," Yamamoto told a group of school children in 1940. "Therefore, Japan should not fight America." He played no part in the militarists' decision for war, but, when the decision was made, he quickly summoned his strategic wisdom and was adamant on one point: the only course open to Japan in gaining control of the Pacific area was to destroy the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

When the Navy General Staff unanimously opposed his plan, Yamamoto declared, "The U.S. Fleet ... is a dagger pointed at our throat. Should war be declared, the length and breadth of our southern operations would be exposed to serious threat on its flank." Only when the commander in chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet threatened to resign and retire if his plan was not approved did the General Staff concede. "If he has that much confidence, it is better to let Yamamoto go ahead," said the naval chief of staff.

A Japanese Nakajima B5N Kate torpedo bomber speeds away from Hickam Field on the island of Oahu on the morning of December 7, 1941. Despite the obvious risks involved, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto was the foremost proponent of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Believing that a preemptive strike to cripple the U.S. Navy at the outset was Japan's only hope against such a powerful opponent, Admiral Yamamoto started planning the Pearl Harbor assault in early 1940. But he was not

optimistic. "If you tell me that it is necessary that we fight," he told the bellicose Tokyo high command in September 1940, "then in the first six months to a year of war against the United States and England, I will run wild, and I will show you an uninterrupted succession of victories; but I must tell you that, should the war be prolonged for two or three years, I have no confidence in our ultimate victory."

Yamamoto's Pearl Harbor blueprint was influenced by the spectacular destruction of the Italian Fleet at Taranto on November 11, 1940, by Fairey Swordfish biplane torpedo bombers of the British Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm. An earlier inspiration, according to many experts, was a 1925 book, *The Great Pacific War,* by Hector C. Bywater, the naval correspondent for the *London Daily Telegraph*. With uncanny foresight, the novel described a Japanese surprise attack on the U.S. Asiatic Fleet at Pearl Harbor and simultaneous assaults on Guam and landings in the Philippines.

Yamamoto realized that the Hawaii operation was dangerous but that the odds were too good not to take. "If we fail, we had better give up the war," he said fatalistically. As it turned out, the carrier-plane attack early on the morning of Sunday, December 7, 1941, executed by heavy-set, gray-haired Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's strike force, achieved strategic and tactical surprise. It caught Admiral Husband E. Kimmel's anchored Pacific Fleet napping and thrust America rudely into World War II.

Admiral Yamamoto's final message to his carrier crews and pilots had echoed the rallying cry of the commander of the victorious Japanese fleet at the decisive Battle of Tsushima in 1905: "The rise or fall of our empire now hinges on this battle."

On the fateful morning, two waves of torpedo bombers, dive bombers, high-altitude bombers, and fighters from the carriers *Akagi, Hiryu, Kaga, Shokaku, Soryu,* and *Zuikaku* swept in over the Hawaiian island of Oahu and devastated the American battleships around Ford Island in Pearl Harbor. Virtually unopposed, the enemy planes sank the USS *Arizona* and *West Virginia*, capsized the *Oklahoma*, and damaged the *California, Maryland, Nevada, Pennsylvania,* and *Tennessee*. A total of 2,403 American servicemen were killed and 1,178 wounded in the attack.

The masterful Japanese operation dealt the U.S. Pacific Fleet a staggering blow, though it was less than complete. The American fleet's three precious carriers—*Lexington, Saratoga,* and *Enterprise*—were fortunately out to sea on

maneuvers, and the enemy raiders overlooked such strategically vital targets as the Pearl Harbor oil tank farm, repair workshops, and submarine pens.

News of the attack electrified the Japanese people, and Yamamoto's reputation soared. Viewed as the Horatio Nelson of Japan, he was then, indeed, free to "run wild" for several months as powerful Japanese naval formations supported thrusts against unready British and American bases in the Far East: Hong Kong, Singapore, Guam, Wake Island, Midway, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, the Solomon Islands, the Philippines, and New Guinea. But Admiral Yamamoto's misgivings persisted about the wisdom of the Japanese Empire's expansionist strategy.

Born on April 4, 1884, Isoroku Yamamoto (the name means "base of the mountain") was the seventh child of Sadayoshi Takano, a cultured but impoverished primary schoolmaster of the samurai class in the city of Nagaoka on the bleak, isolated western coast of Japan's main island, Honshu. His first name meant "fifty-six," the age of his father at the time he was born. The boy grew up in a little wooden house, and his childhood was hard. Rice was scarce and life rigorous with gardening in the summer, the clearing of deep snows during the harsh winters, and fishing all year long. Isoroku secured part of his early education from Christian missionaries, although he never became a believer.

A short, slender lad with a protruding lower lip and thoughtful, easygoing demeanor, Isoroku was often ill and regularly suffered from influenza. He read the Bible, wrote poetry, was exposed to the English language, and became interested in the British and American cultures. His father had told him that America was peopled by hairy, odorous barbarians who ate flesh, but the intelligent boy was soon able to discount such fables. Isoroku and his family and friends enjoyed taking box lunches to the playing fields around his school, where they watched baseball games. The American national pastime was then becoming a favorite sport in Japan.

But Isoroku's great love was gymnastics, in which he excelled and gained physical strength. In later years, then broad shouldered and barrel chested, he could not resist showing off by doing headstands on the rail of a ship or boat. He referred to himself as a "country boy" who became "just a common sailor," but he was actually far from common.

While in middle school during the 1890s, Isoroku, like thousands of other Japanese boys from several prefectures, took part in annual maneuvers led by Army officers. The youngsters carried real weapons but not live ammunition. This was an adventure Isoroku looked forward to each year.

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

Serving as a naval attaché in Washington, D.C., Captain Isoroku Yamamoto is seated far left. Also shown in this photo taken during the Washington Naval Conference of 1926 are, left to right, Secretary of the Navy Curtis Wilburn, Captain Kiyoshi Hasegawa, and Admiral E.W. Eberle, chief of Naval Operations.

He decided on a career in the Navy "so I could return Admiral [Matthew] Perry's visit." Therefore, as the new century dawned, the youth applied for admission to the Naval Academy at Etajima on the Inland Sea. Out of 300 applicants, he scored second highest in the entrance examination. He was 16 years old. The academy regimen was rigid and spartan, with the cadets forbidden to drink, smoke, eat sweets, or associate with girls. The fourth year of the course was spent aboard naval vessels. Isoroku ranked seventh in the class of 1904.

He was just in time to take part in the Russo-Japanese War, which had broken out that February. The young ensign went to sea with the Imperial Fleet and did not have to wait long for his baptism of fire. As a gunnery officer aboard the cruiser *Nisshin* covering the flagship of Admiral Heihachiro Togo, Yamamoto saw action in the destruction of the Russian battle fleet in the Strait of Tsushima between Japan and Korea on May 26-28, 1905.

In the first and last great fleet encounter of ironclads in the predreadnought era, superior Japanese seamanship and gunnery annihilated the Russian force. The Russians lost all 12 of their major ships. Never in history had a naval battle between apparently closely matched fleets ended with so complete a victory. The British-educated, unassuming, and ruthless Admiral Togo became a national hero.

At Tsushima on May 27, Ensign Yamamoto was knocked unconscious and wounded when a shell hit the *Nisshin*. His body was peppered by shell fragments, and he lost an orange-sized chunk of his thigh and two fingers from his left hand. After spending two months in a hospital, he returned home to Nagaoka for a hero's welcome and sick leave. Soon after his recovery, he went back to gunnery school, was promoted to commander, and served at the Imperial Naval Headquarters in Tokyo. In the meantime, he went on training cruises to China and Korea, and in March 1909 his squadron paid brief visits to ports on the American West Coast.

Isoroku's career moved into high gear when he was appointed to the Naval Staff College in 1913. There, his intelligence and energy gave him an advantage over his carousing fellow officers. Though he had a strong sexual appetite, Isoroku had learned early that he could not tolerate alcohol in large quantities, so he practiced temperance. But he was a ferocious gambler, often staying up half the night to play shogi (the Japanese version of chess).

In 1913, Isoroku's father and mother died, and, according to Japanese custom, the young man was adopted by the Yamamoto family. Advancement in the Navy came rapidly for him. He was promoted to lieutenant in 1914, lieutenant commander in 1915, and attended the Navy Staff College in 1916.

After several love affairs with geishas and a brief courtship, Yamamoto married a sturdy but pretty housemaid named Reiko in August

1918. They would have two sons and two daughters. The couple had no sooner set up housekeeping than they were separated. Yamamoto was posted to the United States as a "special student in English" at Harvard University, and he sailed in April 1919. Occupying rented rooms in the Boston suburb of Brookline, he studied economics and petroleum sources at Harvard along with 70 of his fellow countrymen.

Yamamoto adapted smoothly to life in America and learned to play bridge and poker, which appealed to his temperament with its mixture of bluff, luck, and anticipation. Poker became one of his life's passions. When a friend asked him how he had learned bridge so quickly, Yamamoto explained, "If I can keep 5,000 ideographs in my mind, it is not hard to keep in mind 52 cards." He amused his American hosts with impromptu acrobatics and juggling plates.

But he was a diligent student. He read omnivorously, became proficient at English, and slept only three hours a night. He learned all he could about oil, knowing that it was the life blood of a modern navy, and several oil companies offered him jobs. While at Harvard, Yamamoto also developed a lively interest in naval aviation, which had been pioneered by the Royal Navy in 1912. Completed in September 1918, HMS *Argus* was the world's first operational flush-deck aircraft carrier. Yamamoto's focus on naval aviation would stand him in good stead in the years ahead.

The up-and-coming young officer returned to Japan in 1921 and was promoted to commander. In 1924, he was given his first major assignment as executive officer of a new naval air station at Lake Kasumigaura, 40 miles northeast of Tokyo. Built at the suggestion of a British advisory mission, the station was the training ground for most of Japan's naval aviators.

Yamamoto soon became one of his country's leading experts in military aviation. Promoted to captain, he commanded the light cruiser *Isuzu* and the carrier *Akagi* in 1926 and returned to the United States that year as a naval attaché in Washington. During his two-year stint there, he learned much about American power as a whole but formed a lower opinion of the U.S. Navy, which he described as a club for golfers and bridge players.

By now promoted to rear admiral, Yamamoto served as a delegate to the London Naval Conference in 1929-1930, took command of the fledgling First Air Fleet in 1930, and was assigned to the Naval Air Corps headquarters in charge of the Imperial Navy's technical service. Having learned to fly while a captain and receiving his wings at the age of 40, he vigorously championed naval aviation, convinced that aircraft carriers would one day relegate battleships to a secondary fleet role. Yamamoto strove to improve the quality of naval aircraft and demanded the development of a fast carrier-borne fighter that eventually resulted in the highly effective Mitsubishi Zero.

He took command of the 1st Carrier Division in October 1933, and by 1935 was a vice admiral and vice minister of the Imperial Navy. Yamamoto's emphasis on naval aviation intensified, and he clashed with traditionalist colleagues who argued for more battleships. Yamamoto had little faith in such venerable behemoths. "They are like elaborate religious scrolls which old people hang in their homes," he said, "as a matter of faith, not reality.... In modern warfare, battleships will be as useful to Japan as a samurai sword." When fellow admirals called for a program to build two gigantic battleships, saying that only a battleship could sink a battleship, Yamamoto resisted. He quoted an Oriental proverb: "The fiercest serpent may be overcome by a swarm of ants."

Nevertheless, as the chief Japanese delegate to the London Naval Conference in 1934-36, Yamamoto stepped into the international limelight by forcing the termination of a treaty that had kept Japan's battleship fleet inferior to those of Great Britain and America by a ratio of 5:5:3. He returned home a national hero and continued to lobby for the construction of carriers. The flattops *Akagi* and *Kaga,* already in service, were joined by faster and more sophisticated models, long-range flying boats entered service, and the formidable Zero was developed.

As Navy minister and commander of the 1st Fleet, Yamamoto oversaw an extensive buildup and modernization of the Imperial Navy and its air services in the late 1930s. Unorthodox in his training methods, he sometimes placed tacks on the chairs of staff officers to teach them vigilance and made them play poker in order to master the arts of bluff and surprise. Yamamoto often told Commander Yasuji Watanabe, one of his favorite staff officers, that gambling—half calculation and half luck—was a major factor in his thinking.

Yet, while he fought for increased naval power he continued to oppose the militarists and denounced the Tripartite Pact. Negotiated in Tokyo and signed in Berlin on September 27, 1940, by Japan, Nazi Germany, and Italy, it was intended primarily to assure mutual aid and to forestall American intervention in World War II. Yamamoto had been so outspoken against war in the late 1930s that he was in danger of being assassinated by extremists. When a plot to kill him was uncovered in July

ullstein bild / The Granger Collection, New York

Resplendent in his dress white uniform, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto addresses a group of pilots on Rabaul. The photo was taken just a few hours before his death on April 18, 1943.

1939, he was saved by being promoted to admiral and sent to sea as commander in chief of the Combined Fleet.

Yamamoto had vigorously warned against war with America and Britain, but East-West tensions heightened and diplomatic efforts began to fall apart. In the spring of 1940, Admiral Yamamoto paced the deck of his flagship, the battleship *Nagato,* with his chief of staff, Rear Admiral Shigeru Fukodome, and watched impressive maneuvers by carrier-based fighters. The fleet commander said, "I think an attack on Hawaii may be possible now that our air training has turned out so successfully." In one crushing samurai blow, he reasoned, the American fleet at Pearl Harbor would be crippled, and before it could be rebuilt Japan would have seized Southeast Asia with all of its resources.

Yet the misgivings continued to torment Yamamoto as the Far East situation worsened and the prospect of hostilities loomed. "It's out of the question," he remarked in October 1940. "To fight the United States is like fighting the whole world. But it has been decided, so I will fight my best. Doubtless I will die on board the *Nagato*." Almost a year later, addressing a Tokyo meeting of his old Nagaoka schoolmates on September 18, 1941, Yamamoto warned, "It is a mistake to regard Americans as luxury loving and weak. I can tell you that they are full of spirit, adventure, fight, and justice. Their thinking is scientific and well advanced.... Remember that American industry is much more developed than ours, and, unlike us, they have all the oil they want. Japan cannot vanquish the United States. Therefore we should not fight the United States."

But the warnings were now of no avail as Japan rushed toward war. An imperial conference had agreed that a confrontation with America was inevitable, and the Japanese militarists triumphed when scrawny, bespectacled General Hideki Tojo, a longtime admirer of Nazi dictator Adolf Hitler, was appointed prime minister in October 1941. So, Admiral Yamamoto resigned himself to his country's fate and directed his considerable skills toward war-making. He pushed the plan—drawn up by his eccentric operations officer Captain Kameto Kuroshima—for a preemptive strike against the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor as Japan's only course. Yamamoto's colleagues demurred, saying it was too risky and that the probable loss of two or three carriers was too high a price to pay. But Yamamoto argued, cajoled, and threatened, and eventually the "Operation Kuroshima" plan was adopted.

The December 7 attack was a brilliant tactical success, making Yamamoto a national hero overnight in the mold of Admiral Togo. Japanese victories in the Pacific War that followed added to his prestige, but, as he had predicted, the euphoria was to be short lived. In April 1942, American B-25 Mitchell medium bombers led by Lt. Col. James H. Doolittle left the carrier USS *Hornet* and bombed Japan. The daring raid inflicted only slight damage, but Japan's confidence was shaken and its military establishment humiliated. This was followed by the Battle of the Coral Sea on May 4-8, 1942. Both the U.S. and Japanese fleets suffered heavy losses, but the Americans thwarted Japan's advances in the South Pacific.

Then, only six months after his master stroke at Pearl Harbor, Admiral Yamamoto suffered the first major Japanese naval defeat since the 16th century.

After the Doolittle Raid, Yamamoto made a fateful decision to seek a decisive battle with the "remnants" of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz's Pacific Fleet by attacking the American base on tiny Midway atoll, 1,110 miles northwest of Pearl Harbor. The Japanese admiral chose this action rather than a more circumspect course of remaining on the strategic defensive and taking advantage of his numerical superiority in carriers, supported by the extensive ring of island air bases lying across the Americans' expected line of attack in the Central Pacific. The scheme called for the deployment of several task forces ranging from the Central Pacific to the Aleutian Islands.

The plan was complex, risky, and involved too much dispersal of his forces, and the Navy General Staff initially rejected it. Yamamoto justified it as necessary to close a gap in the Japanese defenses, and the General Staff acceded after the Doolittle Raid. Yamamoto sought to lure the American fleet to fight at a place and time of his own choosing. The capture of Midway would have been followed by a landing in the Hawaiian Islands. But, although Yamamoto's fleet enjoyed a numerical superiority in ships and aircraft, the Americans held a trump card. American codebreakers at Pearl Harbor were reading major portions of Japanese naval communications and advised Nimitz that the Japanese would strike Midway.

The result was that at Midway on June 4-6, 1942, the overconfident Japanese fleet was outmaneuvered and forced to withdraw by a much smaller American force that had the advantage of surprise, better planning, and luck. In the hard-fought, four-day battle, Nimitz lost the valuable carrier USS *Yorktown,* the destroyer USS *Hammann,* 150 planes, and 307 men. But Yamamoto lost his four carriers, *Akagi, Kaga, Soryu,* and *Hiryu,* plus 275 planes and more than 4,000 men. These included 100 experienced pilots who could not be replaced.

The Combined Fleet commander had conceived a sound strategy, but a flawed one. He failed to muster all available force for his main effort, was not positioned so that he could control the action, and was careless about deploying reconnaissance and screening units.

Midway, America's revenge for Pearl Harbor, was the turning point in the Pacific War and the most decisive naval encounter since Nelson's defeat of the French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar on October 21, 1805. It assured the

National Archives

Wreckage from the Mitsubishi G4M1 Betty bomber that carried Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto to his death in 1943 lies strewn on the floor of the jungle on the island of Bougainville.

final Allied victory in the Pacific. Midway was the finest hour for Admiral Nimitz and his heroic carrier crews. For Admiral Yamamoto, Midway was the tragic climax of his long career and an indescribable blow. Too stunned to speak, he could only groan as he read the battle reports.

Together with the Battle of the Coral Sea, the American triumph at Midway prevented an inevitable and disastrous invasion of Hawaii, ended six months of Japanese ascendancy in the Pacific, and made possible a U.S. counteroffensive—the invasion of Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands by the 1st Marine Division on August 7, 1942. Japan was now forced onto the defensive, unable to mount major offensives and obliged instead to consolidate its gains. The Americans, meanwhile, began their great island-hopping campaign that took them to the shores of Japan itself.

After Midway, Admiral Yamamoto retained his high reputation and fought on. But he was drawn into a war of attrition as he struggled to prevent the Allied forces from seizing the Solomons and eroding Japan's position in the South Pacific. Directing operations from the super battleships *Yamato* and *Musashi,* Yamamoto scored some successes against U.S. naval units around Guadalcanal, but his forces were unable to prevent the Americans from prevailing at sea and eventually winning the big island.

From August 1942 until his death the following spring, this struggle on the periphery of the empire rapidly consumed Japanese fleet and air strength. It was a losing battle, and Yamamoto knew it. While putting in at the big Combined Fleet base at Truk in the Caroline Islands on August 28, 1942, he wrote to a friend, "I sense that my life must be completed in the next 100 days."

On April 3, 1943, he shifted his headquarters from Truk to Rabaul in New Britain, and two weeks later flew out to inspect Japanese bases in the northern Solomons. Characteristically, he was not hesitant to venture into a combat zone, but once again he fell victim to U.S. intelligence. Admiral Nimitz was given decoded information on Yamamoto's movements, and he asked Washington if it would be in America's best interests for him to be eliminated. The answer was "Yes."

The end came for Yamamoto on Saturday, April 18, 1943, exactly a year after the famous Doolittle Raid. On that day, a flight of 16 Army Air Forces Lockheed P-38 Lightning fighters from Henderson Field at Guadalcanal, led by Colonel Thomas G. Lanphier Jr., ambushed Yamamoto's green-striped Mitsubishi G4M Betty bomber as it approached an airfield on the island of Bougainville and shot it down. The burning plane crashed in dense jungle, and there were no survivors. The admiral's remains were recovered and sent to Japan aboard the destroyer *Yugumo.*

In Tokyo, Emperor Hirohito awarded Yamamoto the Grand Order of the Chrysanthemum, First Class, and promoted him posthumously to admiral of the fleet. German dictator Adolf Hitler made Yamamoto the only foreign recipient of the Knight's Cross with Swords.

The death of their greatest admiral since Togo was recorded as "an insupportable blow" to the Japanese people. He was guilty of some costly strategic mistakes, but he had few modern peers in naval leadership. As Goro Takase, one of his Combined Fleet staff officers, said, "His concern for subordinates struck the heart of every sailor, and each was ready to die for him. His leadership pervaded the lowest reaches of the Navy and inspired every man. There was never any wavering in his command." Yamamoto's successor, Admiral Mineichi Koga, said, "There was only one Yamamoto, and no one can replace him."

Admiral Yamamoto's state funeral in Tokyo on June 5, 1943, featured one of Japan's last great wartime parades. A million people lined the streets. The hero's ashes were placed in two urns. One was deposited in Tokyo's Tamabuchi Cemetery alongside Admiral Togo's ashes, and the other was buried beside the ashes of his father in Nagaoka. As requested, Yamamoto's modest grave marker was cut an inch shorter than that of his father. □

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The Most Beautiful

In this painting by artist Robert Bailey, rocket-firing Hawker Typhoon fighter bombers of Royal Canadian Air Force No. 440 Squadron attack German Tiger II tanks during the pivotal phase of the Battle of the Bulge. Allied air power devastated German armor that moved across open ground during daylight hours; however, bad weather with the onset of the German offensive had grounded Allied planes for several days.

BY DAVID H. LIPPMAN

Sunrise

AS THE WEATHER CLEARED, ALLIED AIRCRAFT HIT THE GERMANS HARD DURING THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE.

© Robert Bailey

"THIS IS THE SHORTEST DAY," General Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme commander of Allied forces in Western Europe, wrote in his diary for December 21, 1944. "How I pray that it may, by some miracle, mark the beginning of improved weather!"

His fervent prayer was a reflection of the desperate situation in which the Allies found themselves as winter began in 1944. On December 16, Adolf Hitler had hurled two mighty panzer armies against the thinly held Ardennes sector, advancing against determined but thin opposition. By the 21st, the key Belgian crossroads town of Bastogne was surrounded in the south, St. Vith in the north nearly so, and General Hasso von Manteuffel's 5th Panzer Army was closing in on the Meuse River at Dinant.

Two things were needed to stop the last-ditch Nazi attack: hard counterattacks and clear weather to enable the overwhelming Anglo-American air forces to operate against the German supply and communication lines.

So far, neither was forthcoming. The Germans had the Allies off balance. Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., was set to attack on December 22, but the entire Ardennes sector was covered with thickly overcast skies, hanging mists, ground fog, and snowstorms, preventing the vast Allied air arm from operating.

The Allies had plenty of planes. The Ninth U.S. Army Air Force boasted 1,111 medium bombers, 1,502 fighters, and 217 reconnaissance planes. The British 2nd Tactical Air Force was somewhat smaller, with 293 medium bombers, 999 fighters, and 194 reconnaissance planes. Behind that, the Allies could call on the heavyweights of the U.S. Eighth Army Air Force, with its 2,170 heavy bombers and 1,234 fighters, and the Royal Air Force Bomber Command's 1,871 heavy bombers. It all added up to 9,720 aircraft, and all were socked in by heavy weather.

The Allied aircraft and their pilots were an elite force by now, many of the pilots veterans of bitter fighting over France and Germany. Their aircraft were the most up-to-date technology British and American factories could provide—Supermarine Spitfire and North American P-51 Mustang fighters for top cover, powered by Packard-built Merlin engines; twin-boomed Lockheed P-38 Lightnings and the rugged Republic P-47 Thunderbolt for fighter and ground attack missions; and Hawker Typhoons armed with antitank rockets. It was a highly formidable, mobile, well-trained force, probably the world's most powerful air force at the time.

But it was only good if it could fly, and on December 21, 1944, it could not. And never was it more desperately needed. Patton was about to counterattack—he had ordered his chief chaplain, Father James O'Neill, to pray for good weather—and so was Lt. Gen. J. Lawton Collins and his powerful VII Corps on the northern flank. But Bastogne was short on ammunition and medical supplies, and the situation at St. Vith was so desperate the Americans were preparing to pull out.

"This is our big chance," wrote Brig. Gen. Dick Nugent, who commanded the 29th Tactical Air Command. "Several days of good weather for air action followed by a heavy, well-placed counteroffensive should end the war."

Nugent did not get what he wanted. The morning of December 22 began with a snowstorm over the Ardennes. At Ninth Air Force's daily weather briefing, Major S.S. Tomlin, the Air G-3, gave a gloomy report on the situation to General Hoyt Vandenberg, who commanded the Ninth Air Force. Without air cover, the German offensive would continue. Colonel George F. McGuire followed, listing the planned air strikes for the next two days—assuming the weather broke. Finally, Major Stuart J. Fuller gave the weather report. Fog, mist, and snow. Outside the Luxembourg headquarters, the airmen could hear the sounds of infantry trudging through the snow toward the front. Vandenberg tried to relieve the tension with humor, saying, "Do

you think that Hitler makes this stuff?"

It broke the tension, if not the fog, but Vandenberg called in Fuller for a one-on-one. "How much longer is this going to last?" Vandenberg asked his weatherman.

Fuller said that stagnant high pressure systems existed to both the east and west of the Ardennes—nothing was going to start them moving. Maybe on the 26th. Four days away.

"Suppose it's clear tomorrow," Vandenberg asked rhetorically. "What are you going to do?"

Fuller turned away and muttered, "Shoot myself," under his breath.

That day was a tough one for the Allied defenders in the Ardennes. A team of German emissaries approached a position held by the 101st Airborne Division, demanding that the besieged Americans in Bastogne surrender. Brig. Gen. Anthony McCauliffe gave the Germans a legendary one-word response—"Nuts"—but the siege continued. At Ninth Air Force headquarters, the planners worked on ideas for attacks that hinged on good flying weather.

The aviators and their ground crews may not have been flying, but they felt the pressure. The 430th Squadron of the 47th Fighter Group, a unit of P-38s, was less than 30 miles from advancing German armor. At 8 PM on the 22nd, the squadron was warned that they would defend their airfield at all costs. Guards were posted, and "everyone went around armed to the teeth," wrote a night fighter pilot. "It was a wonder no one was shot."

Pilots were told to be ready to evacuate, and enlisted men were briefed on standard infantry tactics. Then came the word that the Germans were not that close—but everyone was still scared and frustrated. Unable to fly, pilots wondered if the airfields would be overrun by the Germans before the weather cleared.

Some aviators worried about personal fears. Lieutenant John C. Calhoun wrote his mother and let her know that he had made out his full allotment of his GI insurance to the family. "I have done my best to provide for you in case I do not come home, a possibility we must all face together the way fighting is going over here for us airmen," he wrote.

At the Ninth Air Force weather center, Major Fuller was back on duty amid external and internal gloom. But, a little after midnight, in came a report that boosted morale. It showed that in the east the barometric pressure was rising.

General Sam Anderson, who commanded the 9th Bombardment Division of Ninth Air Force, was asleep in his quarters in Rheims, France, when his phone rang just after midnight. It was Anderson's weather officer.

"General, you won't believe this, but it is going to be clear tomorrow," said the weatherman. Anderson thought he was dreaming. He rose from his bed and peered out the window into the fog. "I can't see across the street," Anderson told the weatherman.

The lieutenant explained the sudden rise in barometric pressure moving in from the east. Anderson was convinced and rang up Vandenberg's headquarters in Luxembourg.

Their weather team was on the ball, though. Fuller and his crew studied the fresh data coming from remote stations near the front line.

National Archives

The heavy overcast and fog were breaking. What was coming was a "Russian high" from the east, which would push aside the fog and low clouds, replacing them with colder air and clear skies.

"Notify the general," said a senior officer. "Tell everybody that it's almost certain we'll fly tomorrow."

Vandenberg wasted no time. He woke up his staff officers, and they began cutting orders over teleprinters to air bases in England, Holland, Belgium, and France to be ready to attack.

The weather was breaking. Even the Germans noticed it. A Russian high was indeed pushing through westward across the Ardennes. It cleared over the Luftwaffe's bases first, of course, and the Germans reacted immediately. The 2nd Jagdkorps warned its scattered fighters, bombers, and antiaircraft gunners: "The weather in the morning will probably bring relief to us and difficulties to the enemy. In the afternoon the enemy will be able to fly. All forces are to be made ready, so as to be able to successfully engage in an air battle on a grand scale. Four-engined bombers are the Army's greatest danger. All formations will therefore direct their ruthless attacks on them."

As the sun rose over the Ardennes on Monday, December 23, it burned through the fog and mist, replacing the gray with clear blue. A GI on the ground called it "the war's most beautiful sunrise." Patton remarked wryly, "What a glorious day for killing Germans!"

Shortly after dawn, the Eighth Air Force's massive Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses and Consolidated B-24 Liberators began thundering down airfields in England's Lincolnshire to attack German communication targets east of the battlefield. The RAF's Bomber Command began planning a massive night raid on Cologne and its rail centers.

At daybreak, the Ninth Air Force and 2nd Tactical Air Force took to the skies of Europe. Everywhere weary GIs and British Tommies looked to the sky to see flocks of metallic starlings headed east—American P-47s and Martin B-26 Marauder medium bombers, British Hawker Tempest ground attack planes and De Havilland Mosquito fighter bombers—roaring along in loose four-plane formations, top cover fighters weaving between them.

The Ninth Air Force made 696 fighter-bomber sorties, but the 19th Tactical Air Command had all seven groups active in 451 sorties, bombers loaded with fragmentation weapons and a new device, napalm, a deadly chemical jelly created by DuPont, that set targets aflame.

Soon the American airmen were in action. The 36th and 373rd Fighter Groups hit the Luftwaffe's air bases at Bonn-Hangelar and Wahn, where the Germans were revving up their Focke-Wulf FW-190 fighter bombers for their own missions. The Americans bombed and strafed the hangars and buildings, blasting nine planes on the ground. The Luftwaffe hit back immediately, with 60 German planes attacking. The 36th and 373rd Fighter Group's P-47s clawed back, shooting down three fighters.

At Bonn-Hangelar, 30 FW-190s and Me-109s charged the Americans during the bombing and strafing, making accurate damage counts on the ground impossible. The Germans lost 14 fighters and the Americans seven in the pitched battle. The German defenders in the air, seeing that their two bases were out of action, had to find alternative landing grounds—at least one was heard to crash.

The 9th Tactical Air Command flew 211 sorties in 19 missions and dropped 64 tons of ordnance, claiming 42 German aircraft for the loss of five Americans. Tactical reconnaissance planes spotted heavy German motor traffic in the German rear, bringing up supplies to the frontline troops.

The British were active, too. Rocket-firing Typhoons of 83 Group attacked the 1st SS Panzer Division, whose Panther tanks were struggling toward the Meuse. An intercepted radio message on January 1 noted an observation by a 1st SS Panzer Division officer that a single direct rocket hit on a Panther tank meant a total loss.

American medium bombers pounded rail bridges over the Rhine River, seeking to cut supply traffic in the rear. But the Luftwaffe was up in the clear skies, too. Southeast of the city of Euskirchen and its train yards, two dozen Me-109s bounced into the B-26 Marauders. Covering P-38s swooped down on the Me-109s, shooting down 11 of the enemy for the loss of one.

That afternoon, another fighter group missed its rendezvous with bombers but did find four FW-190s, shooting down three of them for no loss.

And so it went all day over the Ardennes, one-sided air battles. The 368th Fighter Group claimed 13 enemy fighters. Another group of P-47s shot down 15 German planes for the loss of one pilot.

There were good reasons for the overwhelming victories. Most of the Luftwaffe's best pilots were dead or in prison camps after six long years of war. The Germans did not rotate their pilots in and out of tours of duty as the British and Americans did. New pilots were not as well trained as the veterans who had covered the invasions of France and Russia. And the British and Americans practiced well-coordinated tactics.

While the fighters were engaging in dogfights over the Rhineland, the critical air battles were raging over the Ardennes. Nothing was more important than slowing down the relentless panzer tide, and the two P-38 groups at Florennes were sent after Manteuffel's lead outfit, the 2nd Panzer Division, streaking for Dinant, the Meuse River, and the fighter pilots' own base. All night long ground crew at Florennes could hear and see the distant boom and flashes of heavy artillery to the east. At dawn, it was cold but clear. Mechanics got the P-38s ready. The 474th was one of the last groups to operate the massive twin-engined fighter, and despite their effectiveness as tank killers they were maintenance headaches.

In the cold, pilots walked out to their waiting aircraft. Ground crews pulled out chocks, and the P-38s rumbled down the runway and into action.

Once airborne, the 474th flew nine separate missions against the enemy. One flight hit a column belonging to the German 89th Infantry Division just west of Rocherath. The ragtag group of a depleted company was marching along in dispersed order when six P-38s hit them at 5 PM. Eight of the 50 Germans were killed and another 12 wounded.

U.S. Air Force

ABOVE: Ground crewmen use an external heater to warm up one of the twin engines aboard a Lockheed P-38 Lightning fighter of the Ninth Tactical Air Force. An armorer loads the guns in the nose of the fighter plane. BELOW: Rugged Republic P-47 Thunderbolt fighter bombers of the 365th Group take off on a tactical support mission during the Battle of the Bulge. OPPOSITE: A rain of ordnance from Allied Eighth Air Force heavy bombers demolishes the rail yard at Euskirchen, Germany, on December 23, 1944.

National Archives

Not every attack went well. Another flight of four P-38s spotted a concentration of German vehicles from the 9th SS Panzer Division near Vielsalm. Major Ernest Nuckols reported a "juicy convoy of possibly 200 vehicles" and swooped in. Then his bomb refused to drop. The rest of the flight returned with little better result. A second strike on the 9th SS Panzer Division met with heavy flak, which damaged planes. Lieutenant Adrian Knox was hit by flak fire and parachuted out of his plane. Only after the war did his pals learn that he was killed.

But the big story for the 474th was the German spearhead near Dinant. The attacks were all-out, and even a P-61 night fighter was committed on a rare day mission. The objectives were the roads between St. Hubert and Marche, and 2nd Panzer Division's vehicles were all over them.

At noon the supply column of the 3rd Battalion, 766th Volks Artillery Corps, moved into the village of Foy Notre Dame, less than five miles from the Meuse. Soon after the Germans arrived, so did the 474th and its P-38s. The dreaded "Jabos" swooped down on the column and immediately burned six trucks and three half-tracks, exploding the battalion's only fuel truck, wiping out 3,400 liters of gasoline. The 2nd Panzer Division was soon out of gas.

The P-47s of the 406th Fighter Group had a busy day, too, based at Mourmelon-le-Grand some 80 miles from the Bastogne battlefield. The

406th had enjoyed friendship with the base's other tenants, the famed 101st Airborne Division, now besieged in Bastogne. The 406th regularly traded its ample supplies of whisky to the paratroopers in return for souvenir Nazi Luger pistols. Now the 406th learned that their pals were surrounded at Bastogne and needed help.

Private Henry Mark Connell lashed fragmentation bombs and napalm under the wings of the Thunderbolts out on the freezing runways in slush, wind, and snow. Armed guards covered the approaches to the field, watching for German paratroopers. Conditions were rugged. The miserable wood huts were heated by coal stoves that were hard to start. Someone discovered that the fast way to start a coal stove was to add a little napalm to the ash pans—that brought out a quick fire.

At dawn on the 23rd, the 406th's immense P-47s thundered down the runways. In less than half an hour, the P-47s were over the battlefield. Among their pilots was Lieutenant Howard W. Park, a veteran tank buster from Normandy, in his red-nosed Thunderbolt named *Big Ass Bird II*.

From 12,000 feet, he flew into a high-speed dive against a convoy of tanks, troops, and guns and immediately came under fire from mobile German 20mm flak guns deployed around Bastogne. "I remember so vividly my slipping and skidding as streams of flak fire reached for me, sometimes within three feet of my wing surfaces. Despite skill, a lot of luck was needed to escape unscathed. The flak took a toll. It seemed as if the 513th was always first out and it seemed we lost one in four in lead flight every time. Actually we lost five of the 513th in three days, and seven in a week during which the group lost a total of 10 pilots. Most of those who didn't return were recently transferred to us from the States and had no feel for the flak as those of us who dealt with it regularly," Park wrote.

The P-47s ranged over the Bastogne area, spotting tanks disguised as haystacks. To the north, American P-47s hammered Germans gathering at the Baraque de Fraiture crossroads for an attack, forcing the 2nd SS Panzer Division to postpone its attack until the American aircraft had gone home, giving the defenders time to prepare.

East of Trier, more P-47s of 514th Squadron under Captain Bedford R. Underwood met up with 20 Me-109s and claimed six of those for the loss of two of their own.

Captain Bernard J. Sledzick gave this account: "Ten of the enemy fighters went down on the four that were attacking the target, leaving two Me-109s to attack Lt. Fuller and me. I

National Archives

Caught in gun camera footage, a German Messerschmitt Me-109 fighter is chewed to pieces by the guns of an Allied fighter plane, and flames erupt along the left wing.

maneuvered my plane onto the tail of one of them, fired and saw strikes on him which caused a fire, but the fire went out although the plane was smoking badly. I gave him another burst and the pilot bailed out. In the meantime, the second Me-109 had gotten on my tail and Lt. Fuller promptly disposed of it. I saw two tracers hit the Me-109 and it exploded in the air ... below us the aerial battle was raging. Every time we saw an Me-109 on the tail of a P-47 we dove down on it causing it to break away. Lt. Jones received a hit in the cockpit and three of his toes were blown off by a 20mm burst. Lt. McLane and Lt. Price were shot down and both bailed out. Lt. Sickling shot down three Me-109s before the aerial battle. Lt. Jones made it back to Mourmelon and crashed on landing due to his injuries…. Lt. McLane bailed out over enemy territory and became a prisoner of war…. It seemed like the battle only lasted a few minutes and parachutes of downed pilots filled the sky."

The accurate shooting was aided by Captain James Parker—an air control officer in Bastogne who was finally demonstrating his value after days of cloud cover and uselessness— who radioed instructions to the attacking planes. He sent some of the P-47s west where German troops were reportedly congregating for a major attack. As the P-47s swooped in, they saw tank tracks leading into the woods. Napalm set the trees on fire, and the planes moved in to strafe the exposed enemy. By day's end, almost every German-occupied village around Bastogne was smoking. The 406th claimed 97 vehicles, 11 tanks, 20 horse-drawn vehicles, and 24 gun positions. The count was probably exaggerated, but the damage was not—the Germans postponed their attacks until night.

Inside Bastogne, Colonel William L. Roberts, who commanded Combat Command B of the 10th Armored Division, McAuliffe's tank force, said the American fighter bombers were worth "two or three infantry divisions." Parker, who had been all but ignored during the bad flying weather, earned a Bronze Star.

Bombers and fighters were not the only planes sortied that day. The 363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Group flew into action in the Ansbach-Koblenz area, hunting for German trains and road convoys. Enemy fire was intense. Two P-38s were attacked by a German FW-190. The plane made two firing passes, and one P-38 pilot managed to turn inside to fire quick bursts into the enemy aircraft. The bullets killed the pilot, and the plane went into a lazy spiral before smashing into the ground.

The casualties were not all caused by Germans. Seven red-tailed P-47s bounced two P-51s of the 10th Photographic Reconnaissance Group, and only the superior aerobatics of the pilots saved the P-51s. Misidentification of Mustangs was common since the P-51 had a silhouette similar to the German Messerschmitt Me-109.

After a lot of radio complaining, the snafu was resolved, but one plane's glycol tank was holed. The engine seized, and the pilot had to bail out. After hitting the frozen ground and stowing his chute, he saw soldiers heading toward him, blazing away with M-1 rifles. He quickly hid behind some rocks and screamed that he was American. The bullets flew on. The GIs, from the 4th Infantry Division, had heard about English-speaking German infiltrators and were taking no chances. So the pilot unleashed a blistering stream of obscenities. "No German could have known some of those colloquialisms," he said later.

The biggest mission of the day was Operation Repulse, the resupply of the defenders of Bastogne. As soon as they got the word of clear weather, the 490th Quartermaster Unit began packing parachutes and supply canisters at its base in England. Some 82 P-47s of four fighter groups escorted 241 C-47 transports from the 9th Troop Carrier Command over the garrison, delivering 192 tons of ammunition, 12 tons of gasoline, and 35 tons of provisions and medical supplies to a drop zone marked by red smoke. Seven C-47s were lost to enemy flak guns ringing the town. To the paratroopers below, the drop was well-timed manna from heaven.

The 101st Airborne was not the only outfit that got airborne resupply. Another attempt was made to a group of American tankers of the 3rd Armored Division trapped behind enemy lines north of La Roche along the Ourthe River. This 1,000-man group, Task Force Hogan, named for its boss, Lt. Col. Sam Hogan, was to receive 4,000 gallons of gasoline, rations, and ammo from 30 C-47s, but

into German hands just beyond the American reach. Next evening, the Americans abandoned their equipment to escape German encirclement in the dark.

Back at Bastogne, the last C-47s were pulling out, and the fighter escorts hung around, splattering the Germans around the town with bombs and machine-gun fire. Captain Parker directed the P-47s with great precision. A report of enemy armor from an outpost was followed within minutes by a covey of P-47s to hit the German tanks. "This is better hunting than the Falaise Pocket," one fighter pilot radioed. "And that was the best I ever expected to see."

Other P-47s were hard at work. After their resupply mission, the 362nd Fighter Group, also known as Mogin's Maulers, flew 107 ground attack sorties. The 377th Squadron attacked the German Seventh Army's key bridge at Echternach with rockets and napalm as well as bridges at Bollendorf and Vianden, missing the bridges but setting five German vehicles aflame.

Over Bastogne, the 379th Squadron spotted some 45 troop-laden vehicles heading north on the road between Recogne and St. Hubert. As soon as the P-47s swooped in, the Germans abandoned their vehicles. The same squadron also hit a tank-truck convoy between Houffalize and Bourcy.

The 378th dropped napalm and bombs on Bourcy, claiming 84 motor vehicles and 12 tanks. The air bombardment was so harsh that the 26th Volksgrenadier Division had to cancel a planned attack on the 101st Airborne. The commander of the German 5th Parachute Division had a harsh and telling comment on American air strikes: "At night, one could see from Bastogne back to the Westwall, a single torchlight procession of burning vehicles."

The attacks at Bastogne continued: 354th Fighter Group sent the tough Panzer Lehr Division's tanks scurrying for cover.

Other divisions benefited from the P-47s. The 84th Infantry Division was nearly surrounded, and P-47s of the 354th stormed in, hitting tanks and trucks near Forrieres, the 356th doing the same to 10 tanks and 20 trucks near Nassogne.

The legendary P-51s were up as well. The Yellowjackets of the 361st Fighter Group flew numerous fighter sweeps on the 23rd. So did their buddies in the 375th.

At 2:30 PM, several P-51s of the 375th spotted two "bogeys on the deck and going east" near Bonn. Lieutenant Caleb J. Layton and Lieutenant William H. Street dove on the enemy, and Layton sent one FW-190 crashing into the woods. Layton then attacked a second FW-190 and set it on fire. Then he saw a third plane, an Me-109, and later reported: "I got on the tail of the 109 and followed him around the hills and gullies, firing short bursts at 200 yards and observing some strikes. After turning around one of the hills, the 109 pulled up. I fired a 10-second burst at 100 yards, 0 degrees deflection, and saw strikes all over his fuselage and wings. The 109 caught fire and went into a sharp turn to the right and crashed into the top of one of the hills."

The heavy bombers were in action, too. East of the Ardennes, more than 1,000 medium bombers of the Ninth Air Force and Bomber Command hammered rail centers, roads, bridges, and other choke points. Some 485 Avro Lancaster bombers pounded transportation centers near Trier, while the British 2nd Tactical Air Force ripped road targets between Malmedy and St. Vith and rail targets at Kall and Gemund.

The other big punch was the 423 heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force, heading for the marshaling yards in the German rear. Their job was to smash the rail lines that were feeding Hitler's offensive. The Americans dropped 1,131 tons of explosives on the rail yards at Ehrang, Junkerath, Ahrweiler, Dahlem, Kaiserslautern, and Homburg. Some 632 fighters provided escort, fending off the Germans. The Luftwaffe tried to hit back, but shot down only one bomber and seven fighters for a loss of 69 German fighters. The veteran American 56th Fighter Group alone took care of 32 German aircraft.

The 9th Bombardment Division was also busy, with Hoyt Vandenberg's 624 medium bombers. With so many missions, there was not enough fighter escort for the mediums, but 465 of the bombers punched through the German defenses to drop 899 tons of bombs on railroad bridges at Mayen, Euskirchen, Eller, the Kyllburg railhead, and the Prum marshaling yards. The bombing had impact. A POW captured later told his American interrogators that the damage at Kyllburg was so great that it took two hours on Christmas Day for him and his pals to get through the wreckage.

"In the entire army area, heavy enemy air

National Archives

Surrounded for a time by superior German forces, elements of the 101st Airborne Division held the key crossroads town of Bastogne, Belgium, during the early days of the Battle of the Bulge. As the weather improved, the Bastogne garrison welcomed supplies dropped from the air by Douglas C-47 transport planes.

activity," read the entry in the German 66th Corps diary that day from its positions near St. Vith. "Fighter bomber attacks on German attack spearheads as well as bomb drops from four-engined bombers on roads and traffic in the area."

The battle did not go entirely the Allied way. At Ahrweiler, the 391st Bombardment Group was unable to hook up with its fighter escort and attacked anyway amid weather so poor that the B-26s of the second box had to make two bomb runs, doing so through a wall of flak. Then a red-colored flare burst amid the formation and the flak stopped. It was the signal that the Luftwaffe's fighters had arrived, and 60 FW-190s and Me-109s stormed in at 11:55 AM. They attacked for 23 minutes in waves four deep and 16 abreast. German planes were everywhere—the group's gunners reported 69 separate engagements. Sixteen of the 30 B-26s were shot down. The Americans shot down seven of the enemy.

In one action, Captain Edward M. Jennsen led a box of Marauders behind their pathfinder through heavy flak. The pathfinder was crippled and forced to turn back. Jennsen led his planes to the rendezvous point to meet their fighter escort, but none appeared. He led his group to the Ahrweiler target and ran into heavy flak and fighters. Jennsen's Marauder was hit while dropping its bombs, and five of his other planes careened out of the sky emitting trails of black smoke.

Other bomb groups ran smack into German fighters. The 322nd Bombardment Group was hit by 50 German fighters and lost two bombers. The 387th lost four bombers and a pathfinder to 20 German fighters between Bastogne and their target at Daun.

The bombers and their crews were determined to get through, though. The 397th aimed for a railroad bridge at Eller and met up with heavy flak. Three B-26s were damaged by flak and crumpled to earth. After completing the bomb run, they were attacked by two dozen Me-109s that downed seven more bombers, leaving only five undamaged.

Sergeant Neil McGinnis watched the B-26s in the box ahead of him fly in when a German fighter appeared from nowhere and drilled bullets into a B-26 in the lead box. The B-26's tail gunner fired back at the German, and both were shot down, plunging with their crews to their deaths.

At Euskirchen, a tremendous air battle erupted as the 322nd Bomb Group, Nye's Annihilators, flew in covered by the P-38s of the 392nd Fighter Squadron. In eight minutes, the Americans lost two planes and 22 more were damaged. The lead pathfinder plane was knocked out, another's wing caught fire and it spun out in flames, a third was so damaged by flak that its crew had to bail out near Sedan. The P-38s shot down four German fighters for the loss of one P-38. The bombardment mission had value. Captured German POWs said the city of Euskirchen was "one field of bomb craters."

U.S. Air Force

National Archives

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TOP: Captain Lowell Smith, left, thanks members of a U.S. Army antiaircraft crew for their help. Returning from a mission after exhausting his ammunition, Smith was attacked by a German Messerschmitt Me-109 fighter and found himself virtually defenseless. He flew low over the gun position, and his comrades on the ground shot the German fighter out of the sky. ABOVE LEFT: Fighter Ace Lt. Col. David C. Schilling led the famous U.S. 56th Fighter Group against the Luftwaffe. ABOVE RIGHT: Luftwaffe Colonel Gustav Rodel threatened any German pilots who broke off attacks with court-martial.

The new Douglas A-26 Invader attack planes made an appearance, too, assigned to a highway bridge near Trier, but eight of the flights failed to recognize the bridge. The rest hit the bridge accurately, and the only loss was an A-20K Pathfinder.

The 391st Bombardment Group did better with a concentrated attack on the German road center of Neuerburg, dropping 37 tons of bombs without loss. The 391st's firm discipline earned it a Presidential Unit Citation.

More B-26s attacked Prum, east of St. Vith, trying to jam roads and blast troop concentrations. The 387th lost only one plane to flak damage—hit just before the bomb run and flipping over on its back. The pilot managed to roll over and drop his bombs before the B-26 spun out and crashed.

There were also some terrible mix-ups. Six B-26s of the 322nd mistook the American-held town of Malmedy for the German-held town of Zuplich and set it afire. Worse, the flames attracted more lost American bombers. For three days, the Americans pounded the town with friendly fire, killing 125 civilians and 37 American soldiers of the 30th Infantry Division, which added insult to injury—the Ninth Air Force had hammered the 30th Infantry Division in Normandy also by mistake. Disgusted Old Hickory men named the Ninth the American Luftwaffe.

There were other mistakes as five lost American bombers attacked the U.S. rail marshaling yards at Arlon, exploding five tank cars full of gasoline for Patton's Third Army. Another attack fell by mistake on the town of Verviers east of Spa, in firm American hands. An irate General Anderson issued a stern warning that all secondary targets were to be positively identified before attacking.

The 9th Bombardment Division lost a total of 35 medium bombers, three pathfinders, and one light bomber. Four others crashed, two crash-landed, and 182 of the participating planes were damaged, many total write-offs. The losses were a shocking 8 percent of the American planes. The primary reason was the failure of bombers to hook up with their fighter escort. Anderson was dismayed by the failures, and Colonel Ed Chickering, who commanded the 367th Fighter Group, ordered the creation of a direct phone line between his outfit and the bombers to better coordinate escort missions.

Despite the heavy losses, the 9th Bombardment Division had lived up to its motto: "Smash the Enemy Until He Quits." The bridges had been pounded. Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, the overall commander of the German Western Front, passed judgment on the bridge attacks, saying, "The consequences were disastrous. It meant that we could not get supplies or troops forward. The further we advanced the further the troops had to march ... the deep penetration of heavy bombers east of the Rhine against our communications ... were painful for moving our troops, our supplies and our gas.... On the roads our convoys or single motor transport could not move during the day. We could never count on when a certain division would arrive at its destination."

Anderson was worried about the losses, though. The Luftwaffe was proving troublesome, and it would have to be punched out. That would be the Eighth Air Force's job for the morrow.

But on the 23rd, the Mighty Eighth was send-

ing 417 heavy bombers to the marshaling yards west of the Rhine, which were feeding the German onslaught. The bombers hit railheads southeast of the German salient at Homburg, Kaiserslautern, and Ehrang, along with three road junctions, Junkerath, Dahlem, and Ahrweiler. Some 56 P-47s from the 56th Fighter Group flew in from Boxted in England, looking for enemy fighters. They did not find any on three attempts, but on the fourth Lt. Col. David C. Schilling, the group's boss, personally spotted a big swarm of German planes over Euskirchen airfield. He maneuvered his group behind the enemy and jumped them from the east, coming at them like another squadron of German fighters. Schilling and company were almost on top of the Germans before they were recognized.

The defenders numbered more than 90 fighters from four groups, and a wild 45-minute dogfight raged from 28,000 feet to the deck. Schilling "flew straight ahead, pulled up, applied full power, and made a slow diving turn to the left to position my flight on the outside and allow the other three to cross over inside so that we might bring as many planes into position to fire as possible. In so doing I managed to hit the rear right Me-109 with about a 20-degree deflection shot at a range of 700 yards. There was a large concentration of strikes all over the left side of the fuselage, and he fell off to the left. I then picked out another more or less ahead of the first and fired immediately. By this time the first Me-109 was slightly ahead, below and to the left, at which point he started to smoke and caught fire. I then picked another and fired at about 1,000 yards and missed as he broke right and started to dive for the deck. At about 17,000 feet I had closed to about 500 yards and fired, resulting in a heavy concentration of strikes, and the pilot bailed out."

Separated from the other three flights of his unit, Schilling heard one of his pals in a "hell of a fight and called to get his position. As I was attempting to locate him, I sighted another gaggle of 35-40 FW-190s 1,000 feet below circling to the left. I repeated the same tactics as before and attacked one from 500 yards' range and slightly above and to the left. The plane immediately began to burn, spinning off to the left. I then fired at a second and got two or three strikes. He immediately took violent evasive action, and it took me several minutes of maneuvering until I managed to get into a position to fire. I fired from above and to the left, forcing me to pull through him and fire as he went out of sight over the cowling. I gave about a five-second burst and began getting strikes all over him. The pilot immediately bailed out and the ship spun down to the left, smoking and burning, until it blew up at about 15,000 feet."

Schilling had clobbered five planes in a single action. Some of his wingmates did well, too, with Captain Felix Williamson and his wingman punching out two Me-109s. Lieutenant Robert E. Winters of the 62nd shot up an Me-109 and set it ablaze. As he closed in, the Me-109 pilot cut his throttle and Winters shot ahead, ramming into the wing of the enemy plane. Amazingly, Winters recovered, but he never found out what happened to the German.

While Schilling and his mates tore into enemy fighters below, the 61st Squadron circled overhead. Captain Joseph Perry saw a P-47 with two FW-190s on its tail, so Perry swooped in to help. He found himself amid a beehive of German fighters, but Perry shot one down quickly. Aware he was temporarily outnumbered, Perry and his wingman hit their throttles and flew into the sun, hoping the Germans would not follow. They did not. Another P-47 joined Perry and his squadron mates, and the three saw a loose FW-190 diving into the dogfight. Perry charged down and forced the FW-190 to ground level, making him prey for American light flak at 500 feet.

Other pilots were less lucky. Lieutenant Lewis R. Brown scored hits on two FW-190s, using up most of his ammunition. Then bullets slammed into Brown's instrument panel, shattering his canopy. Brown saw an FW-190 on his tail, firing away. Brown bailed out and landed in enemy hands. The next stop was a POW camp. But when he was liberated, Brown was able to claim three of the FW-190s shot down that day.

The 63rd Squadron did pretty well, slamming into a gaggle of German planes. Major Harold Comstock, who commanded the squadron, found himself face to face with an FW-190 just 1,000 yards away. The FW-190 fired first, but Comstock's bullets tore up the plane's engines. The German pilot bailed out. Comstock then pulled up and clawed at an FW-190 from underneath, at nearly point-blank range. The German plane was shattered, and it disintegrated in front of Comstock.

Lieutenant Randel L. Murphy, in the same squadron, flew a P-47 named *The Brat,* which was unable to catch up with one of the speedy FW-190s. He spotted a P-47 in trouble and swooped down on the aggressor FW-190, scoring hits all along the body of the German plane. It fell straight into the ground. As Murphy pulled up, an FW-190 passed him, firing as he went. Murphy used the P-47's superior diving speed to make a tight diving bank to the right 500 feet off the ground. As the FW-190 flew after him, it shuttered and stalled, falling to the ground.

U.S. Air Force

The railroad yard near Limburg, Germany, was rendered unserviceable after bombing by the Ninth Air Force on December 23, 1944.

Captain Cameron Hart shot down an FW-190 and then saw four on his tail. Hart clawed at the Germans, scoring hits on one and doing a barrel roll to evade the others. "Those Jerries were really aggressive and good, hot pilots," he said later.

The Wolfpack of the 62nd Squadron had a good day, though, losing only Lieutenant Charles E. Carlson for 34 German kills. Among the German dead was a leading ace, Sergeant Heinrich Bartels, a Linz native and Knight's Cross recipient. Bartels had just shot down his 99th kill when a P-47 caught him unaware. The P-47 shredded Bartels's Me-109 named *Marga,* and the plane plunged to earth just outside Bonn. Neither the plane nor the pilot's body were found until 1968, as the Me-109 slammed deeply into the ground near Gudenau Castle.

Other Luftwaffe pilots suffered equally tragic fates. Lieutenant Willi Bach's FW-190 took a stream of bullets, and he made no attempt to escape before his plane hit the ground near Rottingen. Friends of Lieutenant Klaus Gehring watched in horror as he bailed out of his stricken FW-190. But his parachute snagged on the plane's tail, and pilot and plane fell into the ground together.

Around Trier, the Luftwaffe tried its best to thwart American and British heavy bombers with ample bravery but little success. The RAF dispatched 153 Lancasters to hammer the railway yards through cloud cover. It was one of the toughest raids Trier suffered during the war, and the British lost a single Lancaster.

In the evening, 27 Lancasters and three Mosquitos of 8 Group flew to attack the Gremberg railway yards. The force was split into three formations, each led by an Oboe-equipped Lancaster with an Oboe Mosquito as a reserve leader. Oboe was the code name for the British radio signals that enabled pathfinding bombers to locate targets for marking. When the bombers reached the target, the clouds cleared, and the decision was made to bomb visually. That message did not reach the leading Lancaster, a 582 Squadron aircraft piloted by Squadron Leader Robert A. Palmer, a holder of the Distinguished Flying Cross.

Although his plane was damaged by flak, Palmer kept on course and dropped his marker bombs. But the plane went out of control, and only the tail gunner escaped by parachute. Squadron Leader Palmer, on his 110th mission of the war, was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross, the only Oboe VC of the war. "He was determined to complete the run and provide an accurate and easily seen aiming point for the other bombers," read his VC citation. "He displayed conspicuous bravery. His record of prolonged and heroic endeavor is beyond praise." His body is buried in the Rheinberg War Cemetery with the other men who died in the Lancaster.

The Trier air battle attracted planes of both sides. Jagdgeschwader 4 and Jagdgeschwader 11 tried to head off the incoming American bombers but instead ran into P-51 fighters of the 479th Fighter Group, which shot down a dozen FW-190s, three of them falling to Major Arthur E. Jeffrey alone. The Americans lost only a single Mustang.

Despite the overwhelming Allied air might, the Germans tried to take advantage of the weather break to fly their own attack missions. Jagdgeschwader 4 sortied 20 FW-190s to attack ground targets near Bastogne and ran into heavy American flak and fighters. Six FW-190s were shot down. Oberleutnant Markoff was able to nurse his battered fighter back to the Reich, where he bailed out, returning to his airbase by train. But Lieutenants Haug, Nefzger, Dehr, and Walter were listed as missing, while three others, Lieutenant Dietman Bischoff, Lieutenant Edward Schmidt, and Sergeant Hoflich, were taken prisoner.

Photo courtesy Penny Palmer

Squadron Leader Robert A. Plamer kept his Lancaster bomber on course despite flak damage, and dropped his marker bombs on target before the plane went out of control. Palmer was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for this, his 110th mission of the war.

Jagdgeschwader 11 took a pounding trying to stop the bombers, losing 12 pilots killed, four missing, and 11 wounded in wild battles all above the Moselle. Jagdgeschwader 3 lost four pilots killed or missing, along with another four who bailed out while attacking the 322nd Bombardment Group as it parceled out bombs on the Euskirchen rail bridges. Twenty JG 11 Me-109s piled into the Americans, but they lost six of their number. Lieutenant Adolf Tham rammed a B-26 with his Me-109 and was able to parachute away from the falling wreckage. The hail of return fire killed two pilots immediately, and another died later of wounds received.

Down below, ground troops on both sides watched this ferocious air battle. William Breuer, a mortarman with the 87th Mortar Battalion near Sadzot, Belgium, mistook the German fighters for jets and reported: "As the miles-long stream of bombers was nearly overhead, bright and twinkling specks high in the sky, the initial elation the mortar men felt on the ground was quickly replaced by a chilling surge of concern. From out of the bright sun, a swarm of [German] fighters pounced on the American bombers and the ultra-high-speed Luftwaffe planes promptly began knocking Flying Fortresses and Liberators out of the sky. Several bombers, burning brightly, plunged to the earth with their crews.... There were no parachutes. The P-47 Thunderbolt and P-51 Mustang fighters that were accompanying the four-engined craft sought in vain to protect the bombers from their tormentors, but the speedy [German] fighters simply flew faster....The sky was filled with pieces of destroyed American bombers which were tumbling and spinning downward in a crazy-quilt pattern—part of a wing here, a portion of a fuselage there, a tail assembly twisting and turning in grotesque movements ... crisscrossing the winter skies were countless vapor trails…."

P-51s of the 479th Fighter Group slammed into another group of FW-190s and shot down 12 Germans for the loss of one Mustang. Major George Ceuleers had four kills, including one that he blasted from behind the tail of another P-51. Ceuleers pulled behind another German, and the Luftwaffe pilot did not even bother to fight. He leaped from his FW-190, and Ceuleers got a kill without firing a shot.

It was a tough day for the German pilots. Jagdgeschwader 77's 3rd Group, under Captain Armin Kohler, had a typical day waiting out the low clouds in the morning with games of cards until noon, then an urgent scramble to stop a group of enemy medium bombers headed for the Reich. They took off at 1:45 PM and burst upward through the mist into a blue sky above. The Group's 11th and 12th Squadrons ran into a horde of P-47s, which nearly wiped out the 12th Squadron before the 11th could intervene. Two pilots were killed and five wounded before they returned to their base near Dusseldorf. Lieutenant Sepp Unverzagt was able to bail out without injury.

Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-489-3156-30, Photo: Dressler

Messerschmitt Me-410 ground attack aircraft of the Luftwaffe fly in formation toward Allied targets over France. Late in the war, due to crippling losses, German pilots were often ill-trained for aerial combat, with relatively few hours of flying time.

The 12th Squadron, flying in to help its buddies, also suffered heavily. Lieutenant Walter Wildenaur jumped from his plane and was machine-gunned as he fell to earth, but he survived. Lieutenant Hasso Frohlich belly landed his battered Me-109 near Walsum. Other Me-109 pilots, forced to drop their fuel tanks, found themselves short of aviation gas after a few minutes of dogfighting and had to flee for the nearest airfield, using the Cologne Cathedral as a reference point. To make matters worse, many of the airfields around Cologne were damaged by the day's American strafing and bombing. A complete *Schwarm* of four planes was destroyed landing at Koln-Ostheim, but the four pilots survived. Captain Kohler himself had to land at Ostheim. The planes landed at scattered airfields, and it took days to reorganize the battered group. It had lost 20 planes for the probable claim of two American P-47s.

Other Luftwaffe pilots were lost forever. The body of Major Eric Putzka of JG 11 was never found. Sergeant Holland was last seen being chased by 30 P-47s. The 10th and 11th Squadrons of JG 11 lost 16 pilots killed or missing.

The famous Ace of Spades, JG 53, went into action with a dozen Me-109s taking off from Germersheim to intercept P-47s reported to the west. They met up with a pack of P-47s at 10,000 feet. Lieutenant Wilhelm Westhoff, a veteran of North Africa, had to parachute into captivity. The equally renowned JG 26 was also in battle, flying defensive support of panzers advancing on the Meuse. Some 23 FW-190s launched at 11:14 AM and immediately found Americans swarming all over their airfield at Furstenau.

Six of the German fighters were immediately in a dogfight, and the remainder were able to head for the battle zone, attacking a group of B-26 bombers. Two Marauders were shot down before the P-47 escorts showed up and shot down four German fighters at no cost to themselves. Five JG 26 planes crash-landed just east of the Ardennes.

Meanwhile, the Anglo-American air onslaught rolled on. The 394th Bomb Group, Colonel Thomas B. Hall's Bridge Busters, sent 32 B-26 bombers over Prum in the afternoon to punch out the rail marshaling yards. Lieutenant Fred Riegner's Marauder was hit by flak during its bomb run and ended in a flat spin. Two crew members, 2nd Lieutenant Lester Fowell and Sergeant Wilson Voorhis, Jr., escaped the spinning plane to become POWs.

That night, the RAF's No. 2 Tactical Group Mosquitos got airborne. Mosquitos of the 138th and 140th Wings stalked the rear of the German 6th SS Panzer Army, looking for vehicles of all sorts. They fired off 80,000 machine-gun and cannon rounds at ground targets near Blankenheim, Mayen, Bitersborn, and Prum. German night fighters countered with raids by 88 aircraft sent on harassing patrols in the Metz-Sedan area.

Sergeant Albert Johanntges and his Junkers Ju-88 crew had an adventure. Their radio guidance and compass went out, and they got lost. Low on fuel, they spotted a railway station just west of Liege, decided that was a suitable target, and dropped their bombs on it. Just as they pulled out, a night fighter drilled their Ju-88, and pilot, observer, and wireless operator bailed out to captivity. The bombardier died with the plane.

The Americans had two night fighter squadrons in the Ninth Air Force, and they flew only 13 sorties, strafing Germans around St. Vith and bombing towns near Nohfelden, losing one Northrop P-61 Black Widow. The three active night reconnaissance groups were also busy reporting on the heavy bombing of Trier—the RAF had left it in flames—and on German troop movements.

The 23rd was finally ending, and both sides now began to count the gains and losses. The Luftwaffe had put up its greatest effort of the campaign, reporting 800 sorties. But the missions were to little avail. Fewer than half of the German fighter sorties were in the battle area. The Luftwaffe had split its work between attacking Allied fighters and ground support. The big attack planned for Bastogne had to be called off due to overwhelming Allied presence. Some 63 valuable fighter pilots were killed or missing, with another 35 wounded. Their impact on the ground battle was minimal. The boss of JG 27, Colonel Gustav Rodel, was exasperated with his pilots, accusing 20 percent of them of breaking off attacks early and returning to base. Court-martial was threatened for pilots who avoided their duty in the future.

Another problem was the lack of air cover over the German advance. Orders for the 24th insisted, "Fighters must avoid air combat and penetrate without fail into the area above the foremost panzer spearheads." That would not be easily achieved, given the Allied air superiority.

The Ninth Air Force summarized the German effort as follows: "It appears that the enemy during the morning was able to enter the battle area, whereas during the afternoon he was prevented from doing so either by the nature of his mission or by Allied aircraft. His effort for the day is best described as an aggressive defensive effort."

In contrast, the American Ninth Air Force flew 696 sorties, shooting down 91 enemy aircraft for a loss of 19 of their own, with an additional loss of 35 medium bombers.

The Eighth Air Force claimed 75 enemy aircraft destroyed while losing one bomber and seven fighters. Ground claims by the fighter-bombers totaled some 230 vehicles of all types. The first day of good flying weather had been a disaster for the Luftwaffe and the German ground troops. German Army Group B reported to Berlin, "In the entire army area, there was heavy enemy flying activity with fighter-bomber attacks on German spearheads as well as bomb drops from four-engined bombers on roads and traffic targets in the attack zone."

To make matters worse, the Luftwaffe was running out of aviation gasoline, just as the

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Conspicuous **Gallantry** *at*

In this gripping photograph by Corporal Obie Newcomb, Marine Lieutenant Sandy Bonnyman, circled, leads an effort to storm a Japanese strongpoint on the islet of Betio during the fight for control of Tarawa Atoll in November 1943.

National Archives

Tarawa

BY JOSEPH M. HORODYSKI

SANDY BONNYMAN LED THE WAY FOR OTHER MARINES DURING A BLOODY ASSAULT AND EARNED THE MEDAL OF HONOR.

FOUR MEDALS OF HONOR were awarded for acts of conspicuous gallantry during the invasion of Tarawa atoll in the Pacific during World War II. It is perhaps indicative of that four-day ordeal that three of them were awarded posthumously. The citation most covered in the press at the time, which caught the imagination of the American public, was given to the family of U.S. Marine 1st Lieutenant Alexander Bonnyman for his actions on November 22, 1943, the final day of battle.

Perhaps no other individual best represented the average American male of middle America than did Alexander Bonnyman. Born in Atlanta, Georgia, on May 2, 1910, Bonnyman grew up in Knoxville, Tennessee, after his family moved there when he was two years old. Bonnyman's father became president of the Blue Diamond Coal Company of Knoxville, one of the widest distributors of coal for home heating at the time. Bonnyman attended Mrs. J.A. Thackston's School in Knoxville as a youth and graduated from Newman High School in Lakewood, New Jersey, before entering Princeton University in 1928.

U.S. Navy

Lieutenant Alexander "Sandy" Bonnyman received a posthumous Medal of Honor for heroism on the embattled islet of Betio at Tarawa Atoll.

"Sandy was a very handsome guy, a pleasure to be with," said his 99-year-old classmate John Harmon, who until recently still went to work in his investment office in suburban Chicago twice a week. "We ate lunch in the Commons and talked about women."

Bonnyman studied engineering and emerged as a college football star during his sophomore year, playing guard on the 1928 Tigers football team. Ever restless, he dropped out of college in 1930, lacking the grades necessary to advance to his junior year. He finally enlisted in the Army Air Corps as a flying cadet on June 28, 1932.

He attended preflight school at Randolph Field, Texas, but for reasons still unclear washed out of the aviation program and received an honorable discharge on September 19 of that same year. He found employment in his father's company and married a local sweetheart named Josephine Bell, in San Antonio, Texas, on February 15, 1933. Always striving to improve his lot in life, Bonnyman moved to New Mexico in 1938, where he purchased a small copper mine with interest in a second in Santa Rosa, about 60 miles outside Santa Fe, and started his own small mining business at the age of 28. During this period he fathered three daughters, Frances, Josephine, and Alexandra. He seemed to have found his place in life.

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ABOVE: Marines rush forward in support of the initial attack against a Japanese strongpoint at Tarawa. This photo is one of a series that captured the sequence of events and was taken by Marine Corporal Obie Newcomb. RIGHT: The islet of Betio, roughly shaped like a parrot, was heavily fortified by the Japanese in their defense of Tarawa Atoll, where American Marines landed in November 1943. This aerial photo clearly shows the airfield on Betio.

When war broke out in 1941, Bonnyman was exempt from service due to his age (31) and the fact that he was running a company producing strategically vital material necessary for the war effort. Nevertheless, determined to see action, he signed up once again for Army Air Corps flight training and washed out once more, reportedly for buzzing too many control towers. He then turned to the Marine Corps, which accepted him as a private in July 1942. He enlisted in Phoenix, Arizona, and received his basic training at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot in San Diego, California.

"Sandy" Bonnyman, as he was known to his friends, sailed for the South Pacific in October of that year aboard the transport USS *Matsonia* as a member of the 6th Marines, 2nd Marine Division, headed for Guadalcanal. He served with distinction during the Guadalcanal campaign as part of a Marine pioneer unit (similar to a light Army combat engineer group), using his engineering experience during his time there to build a vitally needed bridge across the flooded Poha River. Now a corporal, at the conclusion of the campaign in February 1943, he received a battlefield commission to the rank of second lieutenant in recognition of what his superiors described as exceptional leadership skills.

After a stateside leave, he saw his family for what would be the last time. Then, the Marines began intensive training for the upcoming campaign to seize Tarawa, an atoll in the Gilbert Islands. On September 1, 1943, Bonnyman was promoted yet again to executive officer of the 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines shore party, detailed to handle shore logistics and the landing of men and supplies. Bonnyman's civilian experience, temperament, and skills were deemed ideal for the post and would come to play a vital part in the Marines' ability to come ashore in his sector against heavy Japanese opposition.

The amphibious landing on the islet of Betio at Tarawa atoll on November 20, 1943, turned into one of the grimmest bloodbaths of the entire Pacific War. Some of the landing craft in the first wave were hung up on the island's surrounding coral reefs; many men were drowned or cut down before they had a chance to make it to shore. Those who did found only a narrow strip of beach a few yards wide with little more than a narrow seawall of coconut logs for cover.

The Japanese had had months to prepare defenses on Betio, and every square foot was covered by Japanese weapons. Whole units were held up at the water's edge or cut down trying to secure a foothold. Once the surviving Marines reached the beach, they confronted a network of Japanese pillboxes, snipers, and artillery fire. By nightfall the Marines ashore were hanging onto a tenuous foothold.

Bonnyman's position as executive officer of the 2nd Battalion Shore Party did not give him direct combat responsibility. Nevertheless, he took on a leadership role in the chaos, assembling and leading an ad hoc assault team, as shown in the 1944 documentary *With the Marines at Tarawa*. "He was a good, likable guy, but he took no guff," remembered Leroy Kisling of Modesto, California, then a sergeant

who served with Bonnyman as a demolition man on Tarawa. He recalled Bonnyman as a generous man who would share his officer's liquor ration with the noncommissioned officers. "Wading into Tarawa, we all had our hands full. One of the guys had a mine detector, and he thought it was too heavy, so he dropped it into the ocean. Bonnyman threatened to send the guy back under enemy fire to get it. His attitude was, 'You've got a job to do; you'd better do it.' "

Sandy Bonnyman soon demonstrated the courage and valor on that first day that gained him the gratitude of a thankful nation at the cost of his own life. When the assault troops comprising the first wave were pinned down by heavy enemy artillery fire at the seaward end of the long Betio pier, Bonnyman, acting on his own initiative, gathered a group of five men and led them across the open pier, swept by continuous Japanese machine-gun and mortar fire, to the beach beyond. There he obtained flamethrowers and demolition charges and oversaw the destruction of several enemy installations that were preventing the Marines from moving forward.

On the second day, November 21, the Marine advance was held up by a cement blockhouse and a large, sand-covered redoubt, later known as Bonnyman's Hill. The blockhouse, containing at least 150 Japanese defenders, was impervious to air attack and shelling from the naval vessels assembled offshore. Destruction of this position would open a hole in the entire Japanese defensive line, allowing the Marines to pour through to the interior of the island.

The Japanese position, 40 yards forward of the Marine lines, was inflicting heavy casualties. An ad hoc squad of assorted engineers, including Corporal Harry Niehoff leading a demolitions section and Corporal John Borich in charge of two fully loaded flamethrowers, was assembled. Neither of these men knew Bonnyman before that moment.

"He just showed up," remembered Niehoff. "Until that time we were being held up with no gain to show for it." The unit was nicknamed "Forlorn Hope."

The initial assault carried the men forward almost to the mouth of the Japanese position, and a number of Japanese troops were killed along the way. However, the Marines were eventually beaten back short of ammunition. As the day faded, Bonnyman surveyed the Japanese position with an experienced engineer's eye, carefully studying the approach to the bunker, the various outlying machine-gun positions, and taking special notice of the large air vents that protruded from the top of the bunker. Tomorrow would be different.

Bonnyman's third and last day on Tarawa, November 22, dawned bright and clear to find the Marines still pinned down in the same positions they had occupied on the previous day. Under the sweltering tropical sun the temperature soared to 110 degrees Farenheit later in the day. By this time another individual had attached himself to Bonnyman's squad, a Marine Corps photographer by the name of Corporal Obie Newcomb. Newcomb quickly realized he was in the presence of someone unusual and decided to follow the lieutenant's assault with his camera. The action he was about to record belied the oft-repeated Hollywood myth of Bonnyman strapping on a flamethrower and singlehandedly taking on the Japanese. What happened that day was the result of teamwork, but also the intelligent, selfless, and absolutely fearless leadership of Sandy Bonnyman.

When Bonnyman sensed his team of 21 men was ready, he instructed his fellow Marines to lay down a withering covering fire. Rifles, automatic weapons, and mortars cut loose as Bonnyman vaulted over the seawall, darted for the protection of a nearby wooden fence, and crawled his way to the edge of the bunker. At regular intervals the others made their way over. At a signal the covering Marines shifted their fire higher, and Bonnyman's group prepared for the final assault.

What happened next was witnessed by hundreds of Marines that day, each remembering a little piece of the swirling action from his unique vantage point. Bonnyman's men scrambled up the sandy slope of the 10-foot-high mound covering the bunker, each trying to maintain his foothold. They immediately attracted the fire of Japanese guns, and the small group began taking losses. Corporal Borich made it up the left side of the bunker, cremated the nearest enemy machine gunner with his flamethrower, then unleashed a longer blast of napalm to cover the approach of Corporal Niehoff, who threw a short-fused TNT charge to the top of the bunker. Though doing little physical damage to the emplacement, the resulting explosion and smoke provided enough of a distraction for other engineers to begin tackling the vulnerable air vents.

In the midst of this chaos, Major William Chamberlain, the executive officer of the 8th Marines who was in charge of the Marines providing covering fire, shouted "Go!" and instantly 30 or 40 more Marine began flying up the deadly slope. Corporal Borich exhausted his flamethrower against the remaining machine-gun nests protecting the bunker, while Bonnyman and Niehoff took up prone positions atop the eastern edge of the bunker to provide protective covering fire for

National Archives

Visible in the center of this action photo on Tarawa, a Marine film photographer records the swift assault against a Japanese strongpoint. Although the commander of the Japanese garrison boasted that Betio was impregnable, the Marines captured their objective in 76 hours.

the rapidly advancing infantry.

"As Bonnyman and I were almost elbow to elbow," Niehoff later recalled, "we heard a cry from the men on the south rim. Suddenly Japanese were running all over and our men were yelling that they had breached a log and sand tunnel beneath them, which explained the mysterious appearance and disappearance of the Japanese soldiers in the area over the last few days."

All at once, over 100 Japanese soldiers began swarming out the bunker. The Marines scrambled for clear shots. Pfc. Bill Fratt remembered cursing the slow speed of his bolt-action Springfield rifle. The crew of the M4 Sherman tank named *Colorado* fired a single canister round, instantly cutting down several dozen fleeing Japanese. Other Japanese stopped and raised their muzzles, firing back at the Marines. A vicious, close-range shootout ensued, with Bonnyman yelling for more demolition charges to toss down the mound's southern slope. He personally killed three Japanese soldiers before he was cut down.

"Lieutenant Bonnyman raised himself up on one elbow," Niehoff continued, "and looked back to tell someone behind us to get more charges, when I heard the bullet hit him. He never moved after that and I knew he was dead. I felt like I was next because we were lined up on the top rim like ducks in a shooting gallery."

Corporal Newcomb was the only other Marine in the action who knew Bonnyman on sight from the previous day and was able to track his movements throughout the battle. "He didn't have to go up to take that blockhouse," he wrote in a letter he sent to Bonnyman's family, "but there was no stopping him. It was a perfect hell hole and the boys needed a little urging when things started to break. I can still see him waving the boys up over that blockhouse and hear his southern voice urging them on. He was one of the bravest and most courageous men we had with us." Bonnyman was 33 years old when he died.

The battle continued for what seemed like an eternity but was in reality only a matter of some 10 or 15 minutes, until all the Japanese were flushed out and eliminated and the blockhouse destroyed. A Japanese counterattack was swiftly beaten back. Survivors of the assault ended up utilizing two 54-pound blocks of TNT and an entire case of gelatin dynamite on this blockhouse alone, with engineers applying each of these charges by hand, literally hugging the deadly fortification in the process.

National Archives

Japanese dead lie in heaps after the fighting at Tarawa has subsided. Many Japanese troops committed suicide rather than surrender to the American Marines that stormed Betio in November 1943.

A bitter Niehoff looked for Bonnyman's body after the shooting had died down. "His body was still in the same position on the edge of the shelter, next to a Japanese machine gunner, as when I left him. But no one knew who he was until they read his dog tags. He was already unrecognizable." Of Bonnyman's 21 Marines, only 13 survived the assault. Major Chamberlain, along with Corporals Niehoff and Borich, provided enough eyewitness corroboration for Marine Maj. Gen. Julian Smith to recommend Sandy Bonnyman for the Medal of Honor.

Sometime during the review process the recommendation was downgraded to the Navy Cross. But to its credit, the 2nd Marine Division persisted, and eventually the Navy Department reversed its decision and awarded Alexander Bonnyman the posthumous Medal of Honor three years later. All of the action was captured in a series of remarkable still photographs taken by Obie Newcomb. Never before or since has a Medal of Honor winner been photographed during the action that earned him the award.

Because of the achievements of Bonnyman's "Forlorn Hope" squad, a breach was made in the Japanese lines enabling the leathernecks to proceed to the interior of Betio, rolling up Japanese positions as they went until all resistance ceased and the islet was declared secure later that same day, with the final actions taking place on the 23rd.

The location of Bonnyman's remains along with dozens of others who died on that island was lost to history. Some early accounts have his body being buried at sea, though most likely he was placed in an unmarked common grave with other Marines who died on Tarawa and covered with sand by a bulldozer. The Marines buried their dead quickly in the humid tropics where they fought, hoping to retrieve the bodies later.

For decades, the whereabouts of Bonnyman's remains were unknown. There are no neatly tended military cemeteries on Betio. On this overcrowded, trash-littered Pacific islet, construction projects routinely turn up skeletal remains. The U.S Defense Department's Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office maintains that Bonnyman's body was "non-recovered." Other sources say that his body lies in Oahu's Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific. His Marine casualty card lists both a temporary grave used immediately after the battle and a "memorial" grave with a marker but no body.

In November 2008, researchers from the volunteer organization History Flight reported that they had located on Tarawa the remains of 139 of the 541 U.S. Marines whose bodies were never found, including those of Sandy Bonnyman. Mark Noah, the executive director of History Flight, said that Bonnyman's body most likely lies under a dirt parking lot. Another private researcher, William Niven, overlaying Google Earth maps and photographs on the invasion maps, concluded that the remains of Bonnyman and 39 other Marines are located in a different spot "just southeast and just inland of the old pier the Marines fought so hard to take."

History Flight and WFI Research Group raised $90,000 and used ground-penetrating radar and GPS technologies along with military records to locate the possible remains. A recovery of the remains on the Tarawa atoll could potentially be the largest identification of American war dead in the nation's history.

In September 2010, the Hawaii-based Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command began excavating six possible burial sites on Tarawa with the goal of identifying possible U.S. remains, but no word on any findings has been released. "There is a long process we have to go through before we can positively identify any remains we may find," said Gregory Fox, lead archaeologist for the mission on Tarawa. "And that can take months or even years."

Finding his grandfather's remains is the goal of Clay Bonnyman Evans of Niwot, Colorado, Bonnyman's last living grandson. Evans has made the trip in person to see the remains of the bunker where the grandfather he never knew won the Medal of Honor. Evans is a writer for a local newspaper and is writing a book about his grandfather. "That trip to Tarawa has been the dramatic centerpiece I have been waiting on. This is not only about me, our family putting an end to the war and family heroes, but it is also about the Marines not leaving anyone behind," he commented.

Evans said he was not able to get to a site on the north side of Betio where some JPAC members and others think Bonnyman might be buried. He did, however, walk up to the bunker, which is named for his grandfather. "I got up on top and there was still sand and weeds," he said.

Most of the bunker remains standing to this day. Evans said it did not hit him about his grandfather's gallantry until he walked back down Bonnyman Hill and reached Red Beach 3, the military designation, approximately where his grandfather came ashore nearly 70 years ago. "I looked back toward the bunker, and that sent a shiver up my spine," he said. "It was a Marine's eye view."

Though she was only seven years old when her father left for the war, Frances Bonnyman Evans said she remembers Sandy as "tall and handsome, very outgoing with lots of friends and I gather, somewhat impetuous." She explained that his leadership role and impressive performance at Tarawa were a reflection of his adventurous nature.

"He was a reckless sort of person," said Gordon Bonnyman, one of Alexander's brothers, in an interview for the Veteran's Oral History Project at the University of Tennessee in April 2000. Gordon served with Merrill's Marauders and was stationed in Burma when he got a letter informing him of his brother's death in battle.

National Archives

The Japanese bunker that was assaulted by Marines led by Lieutenant Sandy Bonnyman on Betio stands silent following the attack in a photograph from the island side of the mound it defended. Following the assault, the high ground was renamed Bonnyman's Hill.

In addition to the Medal of Honor, during his 16-month career in the Marines, Bonnyman also earned a Purple Heart, Presidential Unit Citation, the Asiatic-Pacific Campaign medal with three bronze stars, and the World War II Victory Medal. The Medal of Honor was presented to his then 12-year-old daughter, Frances Bonnyman, by Secretary of the Navy James F. Forrestal during ceremonies at the Navy Department in Washington, D.C., on January 22, 1947.

Sandy Bonnyman's legacy lives on not only in the many family members who followed him to Princeton, but also in the two memorials on campus that bear his name. One is inside the Nassau Hall Memorial Room, where Sandy's name is inscribed on the list honoring university casualties in World War II. The second is a bronze star that rests on the window ledge of his former dorm room, Blair Hall 54. His star is one of the many visible in campus dormitories, meant to commemorate those alumni who died in combat in World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam.

Bonnyman's legacy lives on. Thanks to the series of extraordinary photographs by Obie Newcomb, his actions—whether noted by name or not—have appeared in newsreels and documentaries of the battle for Tarawa. He will forever be pictured as a true leatherneck, going over the hill with his fellow Marines, to meet whatever fate lay beyond. □

Author and researcher Joseph M. Horodyski resides in Brook Park, Ohio.

Indian Ocean RAID



In the months following Pearl Harbor, the Imperial Japanese Navy conducted daring operations at sea, threatening British Royal Navy dominance in the area.

BY DAVID H. LIPPMAN

In this painting by artist John Hamilton, Japanese carrier-based aircraft inflict heavy losses on the British Eastern Fleet, sinking the aircraft carrier HMS *Hermes* and the cruisers HMS *Cornwall* and HMS *Dorsetshire.*

John Hamilton

"SO THIS IS THE EASTERN FLEET," RAN VICE ADMIRAL Sir James Fownes Somerville's signal. "Never mind. Many a good tune is played on an old fiddle."

It was March 31, 1942, and good humor was almost Britain's only defense against Japan's seemingly inexorable advances in the Pacific Rim. Since Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, her forces had overrun Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, and Burma. Now the Imperial Japanese Navy and Army were heating up for an assault on India, the jewel in the British imperial crown.

The Japanese had confounded Western observers and experts with their superb aircraft, offensive spirit, and coordinated tactics, which sent Britain's most modern battleship, HMS *Prince of Wales,* to the bottom of the ocean three days into the war and captured Singapore after 70 days of victorious fighting. Now they beat upon the gates of India.

Roaring up from an air raid that had destroyed the north Australian port city of Darwin was Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's First Air Fleet of five tough carriers, all veterans of Pearl Harbor—only the *Kaga* was missing, having suffered the indignity of grounding—with roughly 300 planes, four battleships, three cruisers, and 11 destroyers. The Nagumo task force was to stage a massive raid on the British Indian Ocean convoy routes, disrupt the flow of supplies in the Bay of Bengal, and neutralize the British Eastern Fleet. Nagumo was backed by Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa's separate task force, which consisted of the light carrier *Ryujo,* seven cruisers, and 11 destroyers, assigned to strike convoys in the area.

Nagumo's task force was a veteran outfit, and its pilots had scored victories at Pearl Harbor, Wake, Darwin, and the Dutch East Indies. Against this the British had to send in a second-string team. On paper, the British Eastern Fleet was a tough outfit: three carriers, five battleships, seven cruisers, and 14 destroyers, based out of Ceylon. Closer inspection showed serious flaws in the fleet.

Of the three carriers, two were new—HMS *Formidable* and HMS *Indomitable*. Neither carrier was fully worked up and they were operating obsolete aircraft compared to the Japanese and their nimble Zero fighter. Between them, they had 45 Fairey Albacore torpedo bombers and 33 fighters, the latter consisting of 12 Grumman F4F Martlets (the export version of the American Wildcat), 12 Fairey Fulmars, and nine Hawker Sea Hurricanes.

The third carrier, HMS *Hermes,* was one of Britain's oldest, completed in 1923, and could not keep up with the other two. She carried only 15 obsolete aircraft.

Four of the five battleships were of the R class: *Revenge, Ramillies, Royal Sovereign,* and *Resolution,* all World War I veterans, were slow and weak compared to their Japanese opponents. The only British battleship that could match the Japanese was the modernized HMS *Warspite,* which had fought at Jutland. Not even the British cruisers were the equal of the Japanese—four of them had been laid down during World War I.

Air defense was another problem: the British had three squadrons of Hawker Hurricanes and three more of Fulmars to defend Ceylon. Both types were weaker than the Japanese Zero. The two-seat Fulmar was hopeless and the Hurricane outmaneuvered at low altitudes. The only bombers available were a squadron of Bristol Blenheims, but there were two detachments of long-range Consolidated PBY Catalina flying boats for recon-

naissance work, one of them the Royal Canadian Air Force's 413 Squadron.

The only British advantage was that their torpedo bomber squadrons had been trained in night attacks, but even there the British had problems. Their Fairey Swordfish torpedo bomber was a biplane that looked like a throwback to World War I.

All these weaknesses landed on the desk of Vice Admiral Somerville, a veteran sea dog whose achievements included the pursuit and destruction of the German battleship *Bismarck* in 1941. With Britain unable to send out any ships to reinforce the patchwork and ancient Eastern Fleet, the best they could do was provide solid leadership in the form of Somerville.

Faced with outdated ships and an all-conquering enemy, Somerville chose to split this fleet into a fast division with the two modern carriers and *Warspite* and a slow division with the four old battleships and *Hermes*.

Somerville knew he could not win a "fire-away Flanagan" sea battle against the Japanese, so he hoped to hit the Japanese with his night bombers, crippling their ships, and mopping up the survivors by day. But his primary goal was to preserve his small and incoherent fleet. As long as his ships existed, the Japanese could not risk an amphibious assault on the coast of India.

So to conceal the Eastern Fleet, Somerville created a secret base at Addu Atoll in the Maldive Islands. Here, at the secret Port T—a "Scapa Flow with palm trees"—Somerville concealed his supplies and support vessels.

Next, Somerville's intelligence services let him down. With no Japanese ships spotted by radio intercepts or prowling Catalinas, Somerville ordered his fast division to return to Addu Atoll to refuel and take on fresh water—the big ships were nearly out of water and the small ships nearly out of fuel. When the Japanese did not attack Ceylon on April 1, Somerville made the faulty assessment that no assault on the island was imminent.

He sent his slow ships to Ceylon for their turn at the fueling hoses. The heavy cruisers *Dorsetshire* and *Cornwall* were sent to Colombo, while the carrier *Hermes* and destroyer *Vampire* were sent to Trincomalee.

The dispersion of the ships turned out to be a mistake. The Japanese were coming. On April 4, Royal Canadian Air Force Squadron Leader L.J. Birchall sighted Nagumo's fleet 360 miles southeast of Ceylon at 4 PM. As the radio operator tapped out the report, Birchall flew his Catalina into cloud cover to avoid Japanese Zero fighter patrols. His radio signals were picked up by the Japanese, who shot down Birchall's plane and captured the crew. They were

U.S. Navy

Commander Mitsuo Fuchida led the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and served prominently during the subsequent Japanese naval offensive in the Indian Ocean.

retrieved and beaten, then sent to a prison camp for the duration of the war, surviving it.

For spotting the Japanese fleet, Birchall was given the nickname "Savior of Ceylon."

Somerville was in a bad tactical position. The fast division (Force A) was refueling and the slow division (Force B) was scattered—*Hermes* at Ceylon with two cruisers, the battleships at Addu Atoll.

Worse, the sighting report did not describe the enemy force's strength. But Somerville correctly guessed the intruders were Nagumo's carriers coming up from south of Java and not a full-scale amphibious assault force.

At 7 AM on April 5, the fully fueled Force A set sail from Addu Atoll, joined by Force B's battleships. But being 600 miles from Ceylon, it had no chance of intercepting the Japanese.

At Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), the British alerted their defenses. RAF Catalinas roared out to find the Japanese carriers. The Catalinas made contact with the enemy but were unable to report their strength. One Catalina was shot down, and the others were driven off. It was obvious the Japanese were out there with carriers, but precisely where the attack would come from remained a mystery to the British.

The mystery was solved at 8 AM on Easter Sunday, April 5, when the Japanese struck Colombo, hoping to find the Royal Navy's Eastern Fleet tied up in port like the Americans were at Pearl Harbor. Leading the Japanese attack was Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, who had also led the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese sent in 91 planes: 70 dive bombers and 21 fighters.

However, the Japanese did not find the British fleet at anchor. Somerville had taken the precaution of dispersing the warships and merchant vessels gathered in Ceylon's two main harbors of Colombo and Trincomalee. Apart from a few coasters and cargo carriers, the only ships to remain behind were the destroyer *Tenedos,* the armed merchant cruiser *Hector,* the depot ship *Lucia,* and the submarine *Trusty.* The latter was being floated out of dry dock to avoid presenting enemy dive bombers with a sitting target.

Ceylon's defense lay in the hands of the Royal Artillery's antiaircraft gunners and the small contingent of RAF and Fleet Air Arm Hurricane and Fulmar fighters.

The Japanese swarmed in on Ceylon, their 30 fighters easily defeating the British defenders. The British lost 15 Hurricanes and four Fulmars, while the Japanese lost seven fighters. The Japanese were surprised by the tenacity of the Hurricane, whose wooden frame could absorb armor-piercing bullets.

The Japanese bombers raked Colombo, but with so few ships in harbor little damage was done. The *Tenedos* and *Hector* were both sunk and the *Lucia* was damaged, and six Swordfish attempting to land at the main airbase were bounced and shot down. The explosions and fires were impressive, but the damage was minimal. The British had flown the coop.

On returning to the carrier *Akagi,* Fuchida stomped up to the flag bridge to report to Nagumo and urge that scout planes be launched to find the British ships that had fled the harbor. Nagumo did not need any prompting. He sent out search planes to find the missing ships.

Two of them had left already. The cruisers *Dorsetshire* and *Cornwall,* sisters of the British County class, had sailed from Colombo the previous evening at 10 PM, heading southwest at 23 knots. The senior officer was *Dorsetshire*'s Captain Augustus Agar, who held a Victoria Cross for torpedoing a Russian cruiser during the Royal Navy's short-lived intervention against the Bolsheviks back in 1919. His orders were to rendezvous with Somerville's Force A. After studying his orders and the big map in the chart room, Agar ordered his cruisers to crank up their speed to 26 knots, then to 28 when the Japanese were reported to be 150 miles east of his position.

At 11:30 AM on the 5th, lookouts on *Dorsetshire* spotted a seaplane from the Japanese cruiser *Tone* hovering watchfully on the eastern horizon. Agar maintained radio silence until noon, then reported he was being shadowed. The message never got to Colombo or to Somerville.

The Japanese were less worried about radio

Imperial War Museum

U.S. Navy

LEFT: The World War I-era battleship HMS *Resolution* and the aircraft carrier HMS *Formidable* served with the British Eastern Fleet at various times during World War II. RIGHT: The Japanese battleship *Haruna* is photographed underway at sea. One of the battleship's floatplanes actually spotted the British aircraft carrier *Hermes* in the Indian Ocean, initiating the air attack that led to the carrier's sinking.

silence. The *Tone*'s plane reported its find to Nagumo, and the Japanese admiral acted speedily. He sent 80 dive bombers under Pearl Harbor veteran Lt. Cmdr. Takashige Egusa after the British ships. The bombers were originally scheduled to make a second attack on Colombo, but Nagumo wanted those cruisers sunk.

Egusa's planes were picked up on *Dorsetshire*'s radar at 1 PM, and Agar radioed Somerville the news. Somerville's big ships were only 70 miles away from *Dorsetshire* and *Cornwall,* but Agar's message arrived on Somerville's flagship, the *Warspite,* in mutilated form, and nearly an hour passed before its origin was established.

In the meantime, the Japanese swooped in on the two heavy cruisers. "They came diving at us out of the sun in waves of three," Agar recalled. "The first made straight for *Cornwall,* scoring a hit aft ... within seconds of being sighted. The next three came straight at us. We could see the bombs falling, black and shiny, blunt-nosed 1,000-pounders. I ordered the helm to be put over 25 degrees ... but in spite of this the first one scored a hit near the catapult and started a fire. The next one fell close to the bridge, the blast throwing us to the deck ... [and it] knocked out of action the main wireless office [which] stopped further reports getting through to the C-in-C."

In minutes, *Dorsetshire*'s guns were out of action. A third bomb exploded in the cruiser's magazine, and the warship began to sink by the stern. Within eight minutes of the attack commencing, HMS *Dorsetshire* sank, leaving behind life rafts, whalers, and wreckage. Agar was one of 500 men to escape, and he quickly organized the survivors so that everyone, including himself, took carefully regulated turns in the water so that their shipmates could enjoy rest periods in the boats.

Meanwhile, other bombers slammed down on *Cornwall.* For 20 minutes, the second cruiser fought back, until Captain P.C.W. Manwaring gave the order to abandon ship. *Cornwall*'s stern rose high into the air, and she slid to the bottom with her colors flying.

Fuchida's assessment of the one-sided engagement was harsh: "The surface vessels did not have a chance against our striking force. It was like turning a hand, it was so easy."

When Fuchida reported on the victory to Nagumo, the dour old admiral swelled with pride. But the surrounding surface line officers were discomfited, almost angry. They did not like the idea of the naval air arm being so powerful. The First Air Fleet had just sunk two powerful men-of-war in motion, not trapped and immobile like the ships in Pearl Harbor. The advocates of surface ship supremacy had no alibi left. Fuchida said, "Sea power had changed and a new era had begun. This was the victory of naval air power."

For a day and a half, the survivors of both ships floated in the water until the light cruiser HMS *Enterprise* and the destroyers *Paladin* and *Panther* arrived to start picking them up. Out of 1,546 officers and crew from the two ships, some 1,122 officers and men were saved from the drink.

Somerville knew he could not fight the Japanese in daylight, so he turned south to avoid the enemy. For the next few hours, Somerville played hide-and-seek with the Japanese, struggling to avoid their reconnaissance planes. He worried that the Japanese might learn the location of his secret base at Addu Atoll.

Actually, the Japanese had not. Nagumo was circling to the east of Ceylon, a clear 500 miles away, figuring out his next move.

W*arspite* and the carrier group hooked up with the R-class battleships at dawn on April 6, and Somerville approached Addu Atoll carefully, preparing for a night attack on the Japanese enemy he presumed was near his base. As the tactical situation clarified, it was clear Nagumo was nowhere near the secret base, and Somerville's ships anchored there on April 8.

Meanwhile, the second Japanese sword, Ozawa's raiding force of five heavy cruisers and the light carrier *Ryujo,* struck at British merchant shipping in the Bay of Bengal. Ozawa split his force into three groups at dusk on Easter Sunday and hurled them at merchant ships headed for Calcutta.

In 48 hours, Ozawa's ships sank 20 merchantmen, including the 7,726-ton *Dardanus,* the 5,281-ton *Gandera,* and the 7,621-ton *Autolycus.* In all, Ozawa's cruisers sank 93,000 tons of valuable British shipping between April 5 and 7. The effects of the two days were massive. Calcutta's port was at a standstill for three weeks in the aftermath of the attack.

Somerville was helpless in the face of this awesome display of modern naval power—his ships were too far from the scene, Nagumo's carriers were between him and Ozawa, and his ships were outmatched and outclassed by Nagumo's carriers and battleships.

It was a hopeless situation, and the best Somerville could do was bluff and preserve his dwindling fleet. He decided to send the four R-class battleships to Mombasa in Kenya to protect the vital shipping lanes off East Africa, while *Warspite* and the two fleet carriers would base themselves in Bombay, where they would be out of reach of Nagumo's carriers but still capable of intervening southward. This meant the Royal Navy was abdicating control of the eastern Indian Ocean to the Japanese—a harsh choice for any veteran sailor.

But the Admiralty approved Somerville's

move, signaling that the battle fleet must "get out of danger at the earliest moment."

Within 24 hours of Somerville's decision, Nagumo struck again, having refueled at sea from his tankers. His new target was Ceylon's other port, Trincomalee. Nagumo sent in 91 bombers and 38 fighters, led by Fuchida himself, to attack the port.

Once again the British Catalinas reported the incoming airstrike, and the British had time to scatter shipping in the harbor and prepare for attack. Some 17 RAF Hurricanes and six Fleet Air Arm Fulmars attacked and soon found themselves overwhelmed by the 38 more nimble Zero fighters. Eight of the Hurricanes and one Fulmar were shot down, and the Japanese swooped in efficiently.

In a welter of explosions and screeching dive bombers, the Japanese scored hits on the British harbor buildings and other shore installations. They also hit the monitor *Erebus* and the merchant ship *Sagaing,* 7,958 tons.

U.S. Navy



A Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighter plane takes off from the deck of the Japanese aircraft carrier *Akagi,* part of the Japanese Naval force in the Indian Ocean.

The RAF tried a counterattack. The last nine Blenheim bombers of No. 11 Squadron roared off to hit Nagumo's ships, but they stood no chance against the Japanese Zero fighters and only four returned to base, all damaged.

While Fuchida's planes formed back up over Trincomalee and returned to their carriers, at 7:55 AM a floatplane from the battleship *Haruna* spotted the biggest prize of the raid, the carrier *Hermes* and her escort, the Australian destroyer HMAS *Vampire,* some 65 miles to the south, about five miles offshore, returning to Trincomalee and fighter protection. Along with them was the hospital ship *Vita,* heading south.

Though Fuchida's strike was heading home with all its ordnance expended, Nagumo had a second wave readying on his flight decks for an attack on Trincomalee. Now Nagumo changed the plan. Instead of making a second attack on Ceylon, Commander Egusa's 85 dive bombers and nine fighters would hammer the British carrier. The planes launched at 9:45 AM.

At 10:35 AM, Egusa's bombers arrived over the *Hermes*. They ignored the clearly marked hospital ship and swooped down on the carrier. It had been intended to provide the carrier with fighter cover—she had only Swordfish and Albacore torpedo bombers embarked—but a communications failure meant that the orders did not arrive at RAF Ratmalana in sufficient time to scramble the few fighters available.

The attack was almost a massacre. The first wave of bombers scored hits on *Hermes,* and within minutes she was struck by more than 40 bombs. She sank 20 minutes later, and one of her antiaircraft guns was still firing defiantly as she rolled over and vanished beneath the surface. Her skipper, Captain Richard Onslow, went down with the ship along with 18 officers and 288 men.

Meanwhile, 16 Japanese dive bombers pounded the equally hapless *Vampire*. Two near-misses shook the ship badly, and then she was stopped by a direct hit in the boiler room. Four hits followed in quick succession, and Commander W.T.A. Moran, *Vampire*'s captain, ordered the crew to abandon ship. Floats and rafts were launched when another hit broke the ship's back. The Japanese estimated 13 direct hits on *Vampire* with 16 bombs.

Vampire's bow sank quickly, and the stern, which floated for some time, followed at 11:20 AM after a heavy explosion, most likely from the magazine. Commander Moran, last seen standing on his destroyer's bridge, went down with *Vampire* along with seven ratings: Chief Stoker R.E. Lord, Stoker Petty Officer J.V.A. Carey, Petty Officer R.A.H. McDonald, Stoker Petty Officer L.A. Gyss, Stoker G.H. Williams, Stoker J.H. Hill, and Signalman A.S. Shaw, Royal Navy.

Meanwhile, Fuchida's group was quickly recovered and turned around to join Egusa's group. Maintenance crews loaded Fuchida's level bombers with torpedoes. Leaving his torpedo bombers behind on the carriers, Fuchida led a group of Zeros in pursuit of Egusa in case he needed help coping with any fighters.

When Fuchida arrived, *Hermes* was already sinking. He noticed Lieutenant Shokei Yamada, who led the *Akagi*'s dive bombers, gesticulating urgently, so Fuchida flew alongside his plane. Yamada pointed at his nose, then downward, and smiled. Fuchida followed the finger and found the *Vampire* sinking. Fuchida understood. Yamada had his heart set on bombing the carrier, and rather than waste his bomb, had dropped it on the destroyer instead.

The two warships accounted for four enemy aircraft in the attack, but it was a hopeless situation. Fortunately for all in the water, the hospital ship *Vita* was standing by and she moved in to start picking up survivors. *Vita* herself accounted for 590 survivors, while others were picked up by local craft or, incredibly, swam five miles to shore.

With *Hermes* and *Vampire* sunk quickly, other Japanese planes in the strike package hunted the nearby area for other targets. They found the tanker *British Sergeant* some 15 miles to the north. Six dive bombers left her sinking, and she foundered off Elephant Point, where her crew landed in boats.

Nine other Japanese dive bombers found the corvette *Hollyhock* escorting the merchant ship *Athelstone* 30 miles south of Batticaloa Light. The Japanese jumped both ships and sank them quickly. All of *Athelstone*'s crew survived, but 53 of *Hollyhock*'s, including the commanding officer, did not.

The Japanese had one more small punch to throw at the British. The carrier *Ryujo* launched airstrikes on Vizagatapan and Cocanada in India, which did little physical damage but frightened the Indian command, setting off an invasion scare that took months to die down.

Both: Australian War Memorial





LEFT: Blazing from at least three bombs from Japanese aircraft, the British cruiser *Dorsetshire* heels over and sinks during a one-sided air attack launched from Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's carriers. RIGHT: After sustaining more than 40 direct hits from Japanese bombs, the British aircraft carrier *Hermes* burns furiously. Her forward elevator has been blown out of its well, and smoke billows from deep inside the ship. The carrier sank in 20 minutes with the loss of 18 officers and 288 sailors.

With that, the Indian Ocean raid was over. It had been a massive victory for the Japanese, and Fuchida himself saw it as a great victory for air power. "He who controls the air controls the sea—and the world," he wrote later. "Conventional navy vessels do not have a chance against air power. It is sad to see them sink so helplessly."

At the same time, Fuchida was saddened to see the vaunted Royal Navy collapsing so easily before him. "This is the end of the British Empire and British sea power," he mused. "What a pity—an era of world history lay dying before my eyes."

As soon as Fuchida's planes landed on their carriers' decks, Nagumo turned his vast task force home to Japan to prepare for the next operations—the attacks on the Coral Sea and Midway. Nagumo decided to retire for four reasons: he had exterminated the greater part of the British surface power in the Bay of Bengal; half the British air strength in Ceylon was destroyed; India could not be regarded as a dangerous source of attack in the absence of heavy bombing squadrons there; and the British were showing no inclination to fight.

Back in London, Prime Minister Winston Churchill had no choice but to support his admiral in the face of Parliamentary criticism. On April 13, Churchill told the House of Commons, "Without giving the enemy useful information, I cannot make any statement about the strength of the forces at Admiral Somerville's disposal, or of the reasons which led him to make the dispositions of his fleet for which he was responsible. Nothing in these dispositions, or the consequences which followed upon them, have in any way weakened the confidence of the Admiralty in his judgment."

Privately, Churchill was angry and complained to the Admiralty, "No satisfactory explanation has ever been given by the officer concerned [Somerville] of the imprudent dispersion of his forces in the early days of April."

Somerville, typically, took the responsibility. He blamed the British losses on a "wrong appreciation on my part," namely that he had concluded wrongly that the Colombo raid had been postponed or canceled and that he had underestimated the sheer size of the attack Nagumo was about to launch.

It all looked glorious to the Japanese propaganda machine. For a mere 47 planes the Japanese had sunk two heavy cruisers, a carrier, a destroyer, and a corvette and punched out nearly 93,000 tons of merchant shipping. But the victory was a flawed and pointless one.

Certainly the Japanese had again demonstrated that a navy that lacked air cover was helpless against enemy airpower. But that point had been demonstrated at Pearl Harbor, and at the sinkings of the B*ismarck* in the Atlantic and the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* off Malaya. The British had tried to avoid such a one-sided clash and for the most part had succeeded. Despite Nagumo's best efforts, the British Eastern Fleet was still intact and still in business.

The Eastern Fleet proved it was still capable on May 5, when its ships supported the invasion of Vichy French Madagascar, the first successful Allied invasion of the war.

But the Eastern Fleet still had a long way to go. It needed more modern ships, better coordination with ground-based aviation, and more aircraft.

The Japanese never returned to the Indian Ocean to follow up on their success and never challenged the Eastern Fleet again. Despite the victory, the Japanese could not mount an amphibious end run around the British defenses in Burma, let alone an amphibious assault on India's shores.

Nor were the Japanese raids on the British bases at Trincomalee and Colombo particularly successful. Despite their best efforts, the British continued to use the bases.

Most important, the Japanese Indian Ocean raid took their big carriers and their highly trained pilots away from their primary target, the U.S. Navy. While Nagumo's ships raided the Indian Ocean, the Americans had time to rebuild from Pearl Harbor and buttress their strength for the next rounds. By the time the Japanese returned to the Pacific, they would have only two carriers available for the Coral Sea operation, which ended badly for Japan. The time spent in the Indian Ocean could have been used more profitably in the Pacific.

In the end, Nagumo's raid on the Indian Ocean used a hammer to crack an eggshell. The British losses were embarrassing and humiliating, but minor in the long run—two cruisers and an old aircraft carrier—and the British knew they needed a more powerful, faster, and well-balanced fleet to take on the Japanese.

Once again Nagumo's task force had swatted down the emperor's enemies without suffering a scratch of paint on its warships' hides. The 47 planes lost were a pittance. The easy victory added to Japan's arrogance, which would be brought down in a welter of destruction two months hence, at Coral Sea and Midway. □

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The Strength to Wage War

A CRISIS IN AVAILABLE BRITISH MANPOWER AFFECTED ALLIED STRATEGY IN WESTERN EUROPE.

BY WILLIAM WEIDNER

IN AN AUGUST 14, 1944, cable, General Bernard L. Montgomery wrote to Chief of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshal Alan Brooke, "Regret time has now come when I must break up one infantry division. My infantry divisions are so low in effective rifle strength that they can no—repeat NO—longer fight effectively in major operations. The need for this action has been present for some time but the urgency of the present battle operations forced me to delay decision."

A spirit of intense cooperation characterized the months of pre-invasion planning through the June 6, 1944, Normandy landings and subsequent buildup of Allied forces within the lodgement area in France. But after the German western flank collapsed at the end of July, British officials began voicing strong opposition to future Allied strategy. Led by Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Winston S. Churchill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) Field Marshal Alan Brooke and the Allied Ground Forces Commander in France, General Bernard L. Montgomery, British officials increased their efforts in August 1944 to direct Allied strategy. They much preferred a strategy that favored British political interests. The British were determined not to lose their strategic voice as a result of the ongoing and massive buildup of United States Army forces in Europe. Their success in this endeavor has generally been ignored by historians.

Many accounts of World War II in Europe try to separate the political disagreements between U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill from the battlefield arguments between Allied generals. These arguments had an impact on Allied strategy. U.S. historian Russell F. Weigley put it bluntly, "The Allied armies in Europe simply lacked one of the prerequisites of military success, unity of command."

Most American senior officers serving in General Dwight D. Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters were initially committed to mak-

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ABOVE: Clockwise from left, Canadian II Corps commander General G.G. Symonds, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, British Second Army commander General Miles Dempsey, and British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, commander of the Allied 21st Army Group, examine troop positions on a map in Normandy. As the war progressed, British political and military strategy were shaped by a lack of manpower to replace combat losses.

LEFT: British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery and American General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, discuss the lack of progress during the weeks following D-Day in Normandy. Montgomery was frustrated during attempts to capture the town of Caen.

ing the Anglo-American alliance work. Some senior officers in the British Army displayed a reluctance to cooperate with their American allies almost from the beginning. This was particularly true of CIGS Field Marshal Alan Brooke and his protégé, General Bernard L. Montgomery.

The unspoken assumption had been that after a decision was made by Roosevelt and Churchill or at the Combined Chiefs of Staff level, the generals in France faithfully carried out their bosses' wishes. This simply was not true. British intransigence over Allied strategy in Europe took the Americans completely by surprise.

Allied strategy and its political implications

for postwar Europe were a far greater concern for British leaders than for the Americans. This was understandable. Both before and during the war the British government had been intimately involved in treaty negotiations with many European governments and actively sought a return of the old states of Europe to their prewar boundaries and political status. The Americans had no prewar treaty with any European country. Prior to American entry into the war, isolationist sentiment in the United States had even made it difficult for President Roosevelt to ship war supplies to the Western democracies.

Although the Japanese attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor, the Americans agreed with British planners that they should make their main effort in Europe against Hitler's Germany. A strategic planning conference between senior officers in the British Army and the U.S. Army was held in Washington, D.C., from January through March 1941.

From the very beginning it was obvious that the two sides had different opinions about military strategy. One of the first Allied arguments was over Singapore, which British representatives placed high on their list of strategic priorities. They wanted American help defending it. But the Americans, who had already committed to making their main effort in Europe, questioned the British decision to defend Singapore. It was determined that "British insistence on the defense of Singapore was based 'not only upon purely strategic foundations, but on political, economic and sentimental considerations which, even if not literally vital on a strictly academic view, are of such fundamental importance to the British Commonwealth that they must always be taken into serious account.'"

The Americans declined the British request to help defend Singapore. They told the British representatives at the conference, "The security of the North Atlantic and of the British Isles was the common basis of American-British strategy and that it was up to the British to do the best they could to take care of their [political] interests elsewhere, even as it was up to the United States to defend American interests overseas."

Although it was not always possible, the Americans tried to separate military strategy from political considerations. Strategy was the determining factor in most U.S. military operations; political concerns would be addressed by the president or his advisers at the end of the war.

Since the Americans would be the major contributors to the Allied effort in France, President Roosevelt convinced Prime Minister Churchill that it would be fitting to have an American as

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the supreme Allied commander for the invasion of France. The commander Roosevelt selected with Churchill's approval was General Dwight D. Eisenhower. The Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff based in Washington, D.C., directed General Eisenhower to "enter the continent of Europe, and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces." The wording was very simple and straightforward. Eisenhower's job was to destroy the German Army. Off the record, General George Marshall gave Eisenhower an additional caveat; he was to beat the Germans and get along with his British allies.

The Americans tried to avoid involvement in European politics. U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall "just did not want to get into politics, and he kept warning Eisenhower to stay away from them. Politics was the business of the arbiter in the White House." Marshall would later advise Eisenhower that he was opposed to letting General George Patton's Third Army drive into Prague, the Czech capital, and that he did not favor sacrificing American lives for "purely political reasons." Eisenhower followed Marshall's advice; he made the same decision not to commit Allied forces to occupy either Prague or Berlin and saved thousands of soldiers' lives.

President Roosevelt did not trust the Europeans or their political games. According to historian Robert Dallek, "He [Roosevelt] did not want the United States ... to 'get roped into accepting any European sphere of influence,' which he believed any peacekeeping responsibility for France, Italy, or the Balkans would compel. He expected America's occupation force to be about one million troops, who would remain in Europe for at least a year, possibly two."

Roosevelt saw no long-term role for the United States in Europe after the war ended. In discussions over which country would be given a certain occupation zone in Germany, Churchill proposed that the British occupy Denmark and Northern Germany with major seaports and Germany's major ship-building industries. Roosevelt believed that Churchill was trying to unload France, Italy and all their political problems on the United States. He told Churchill, "Please don't ask me to keep any American forces in France, I just cannot do it. I would have to bring them all back home. As I suggested before, I denounce and protest the paternity of Belgium, France, and Italy. You really ought to bring up and discipline your own children."

Prime Minister Churchill agreed to a second Allied invasion in Southern France, Operation Dragoon, at the Teheran Conference in late 1943. British agreement for Dragoon was secured only under great pressure from Soviet Premier Josef Stalin and President Roosevelt. They were unhappy because Operation Dragoon forced a reduction in the number of divisions and landing craft available for the Allied war effort in Italy and the Mediterranean Theater.

Most of the senior officers in the Mediterranean Theater were British. British Mediterranean strategy had dominated Allied discussions since mid-1942, and they were determined to resist any plans that seemed to compromise the importance of their theater.

The Allied campaign in Italy was a continuation of the Mediterranean strategy that the Americans had joined in November 1942 with the invasion of northwest Africa, Operation Torch. Allied operations in the Mediterranean were an example of British peripheral strategy wherein the weaker Allied armies engaged only the edges of Germany's military power. The Allies hoped to retain strategic flexibility while taking advantage of German weaknesses wherever and whenever they could be exploited without exposing themselves to defeat in a major land battle with superior enemy forces.

An invasion of northwest France in 1943, which George Marshall and his advisers had fought for, would have led to almost certain disaster. By postponing the invasion of France until 1944, the British had saved their American ally from the prospect of a tragic and often unacknowledged defeat. An Allied invasion of France in April, May, or June 1943 would have drawn

new German PzKpfw. V Panther and PkKpfw. VI Tiger Tanks west to the invasion area rather than east to Kursk where they went into action against the Soviets during Operation Citadel on July 5. The Allies would have had to face the new generation of German tanks without the complete air superiority over the battlefield they enjoyed in 1944, a daunting task.

President Roosevelt insisted that his armies must go into action somewhere in 1942 against the Germans to take pressure off the Soviets fighting on the Eastern Front. There was also an election in the United States in November 1942, but Roosevelt's desire to have Torch scheduled just prior to the November elections did not pan out.

Although they had agreed to Operation Dragoon at Teheran, it was not an operation the British were prepared to support. In early August 1944, Churchill raised his opposition to Dragoon in a series of meetings with General Eisenhower. The prime minister blustered and bullied his American guest. He threatened to go the king and "lay down the mantle of my high office." He cried and accused the Americans of becoming bullies, of using their overwhelming military power to force concessions from the British. The meetings lasted for hours. Eisenhower was deeply moved by Churchill's emotional distress, yet he could not oppose an operation that had both President Roosevelt's and George Marshall's firm support. Their final meeting over Dragoon was on August 9, 1944, barely one week before the operation was to begin.

In politics the saying goes, "Follow the money." In military disagreements between Allies, the overriding issue was often command and control of strategy. The British had agreed that Eisenhower would take command of Allied ground forces when Patton's U.S. Third Army and General H.D.G. Crerar's Canadian First Army were activated in France. The British had agreed to it, but they did not like it and they never accepted Eisenhower in that role.

Throughout the war in Europe, the British continually sought to undermine Eisenhower's command authority so they could propose one of their own generals as Allied ground forces commander. As late as February 1945, British delegates at the Yalta Conference sought to compromise Eisenhower's authority to command Allied ground forces in Europe.

The U.S. Third and Canadian First Armies were activated on August 1, 1944, but Eisenhower declined to accept the role of commander at the time citing difficulties in getting communications established for his new headquarters at Granville. This was a ruse intended only to soften the blow to British national self-esteem. British spirits were depressed after Montgomery's Operation Goodwood in mid-July failed to meet expectations during efforts to capture the French town of Caen. The American breakout victory during Operation Cobra a few days later seemed to invite the kind of unfavorable comparison between the British and United States armies that Churchill had hoped to avoid.

Eisenhower knew that any change in the command arrangement that might be interpreted as a demotion for Montgomery would be deeply resented in Britain. He sought to take some of the sting out of Montgomery's demotion to army group command by postponing it for one month.

Eisenhower's aide, Harry Butcher, made this entry in his diary on July 31, 1944: "Just how personally Ike has taken command of the ground forces is not yet clear to me. Each time I have suggested he do it, he has belligerently countered, 'Then they will have to get someone (else) to be the Allied Commander.'" Eisenhower clearly saw a difference in the role of ground force commander and his own role as supreme Allied commander. While he believed that the ground force commanders were free to argue military priorities based on national or political concerns, he considered that his own job of supreme commander should remain politically neutral.

After the war, Eisenhower wrote, "In a theater so vast as ours each army group commander would be the ground commander in chief for his particular area; instead of one there would be three so-called commanders in chief for the ground and each would be supported by his own tactical air force." Eisenhower never envisaged himself as one of those three ground commanders in chief.

After news of the impending change in command had been picked up by correspondent Wes Gallagher, it was carried in the U.S. Army newspaper in Europe, *Stars and Stripes*. Just as Eisenhower predicted, the British howled in protest. The Allies were winning a great victory under General Montgomery in Normandy. Why, the British people asked, did the Americans want to demote him now?

Reacting to British criticism, Supreme Head-

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ABOVE: During Operation Goodwood on July 19, 1944, a British M4 Sherman tank passes the smoking hulk of a destroyed German PzKpfw. IV medium tank. Controversy lingers as to the true purpose of Operation Goodwood, the outright capture of Caen and an attempt to draw German forces away from the Americans, who broke out of the Normandy beachhead during Operation Cobra launched a week later, or a concerted effort by 21st Army Group to achieve its own breakout. OPPOSITE: Australian correspondent Chester Wilmot covered the war in North Africa and Western Europe. Montgomery confided to Wilmot that a manpower shortage was crippling the combat effectiveness of the British Army.

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quarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) truthfully denied that the change in command had actually taken place without explaining that it would occur within a few weeks. This statement produced an angry reaction in the United States where it was pointed out that the British enjoyed all three major operational commands of Allied land, sea, and air forces. They wondered in print what happened to Eisenhower and the other American generals in France.

President Roosevelt saw a potential political crisis developing in the United States just prior to the 1944 presidential elections. He told General Marshall to "tell Ike to get over there…." This was one of the few times Roosevelt intervened in military affairs in the European Theater. On September 1, 1944, doing as he was ordered, Eisenhower took nominal command of Allied ground forces, but it was not a command he was prepared to exercise.

Eisenhower's friends and supporters have gone to extraordinary lengths to show that Ike was really the Allied boss in Europe. Harry Butcher wrote, "General Ike has always been directly responsible for approving major operational policies and all principal features of all plans of every kind.... In any event, no major effort takes place, by ground, sea, or air, in this theater, except with General Ike's approval, and no one here presumes to question his supreme authority and responsibility for the whole campaign."

All of this was perfectly true. Eisenhower's name appears at the top of every organizational chart ever produced that sought to explain the Allied command structure in Europe. Eisenhower certainly enjoyed all the trappings of power. Everyone called him the boss. He looked like the boss. He had the rank, although after September Montgomery, as a British field marshal, nominally outranked him. He had the office and eventually nearly 15,000 people would work for him.

Unfortunately, if one looks at what happened instead of what was written about it later, it quickly becomes apparent that the words "approved" and "command" have very different meanings. Although there can be little doubt that Eisenhower was the boss, he would exercise his command with great discretion and a firm commitment to the Anglo-American alliance. British intransigence would ultimately cripple his ability to command Allied ground forces.

According to author D.K.R. Crosswell, "American policy makers regarded strategy as politically neutral. The conduct of operations served as a purely military mechanism whose sole objective centered on destroying the enemy's armed forces."

Conversely, the British, who had been working with military alliances for nearly 300 years, could not resist inserting politics into strategic discussions. Eisenhower was caught between opposing viewpoints. Crosswell wrote, "His two political bosses resided on opposite poles: whereas Churchill viewed war through political glasses and constantly meddled in operational questions, Roosevelt never interceded in operational matters and deferred the hard political questions until after the war."

Neither Roosevelt nor Marshall put much political pressure on Eisenhower to favor American interests in Europe. General Marshall always gave his subordinates great latitude in the performance of their duties. This allowed Eisenhower to give General Montgomery and Alan Brooke most of what they demanded in the fall of 1944 without facing criticism from Washington.

The problem of discord within the Allied command, like so many of the Allies' historical puzzles, can be traced directly to British Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery. The British had a debilitating manpower crisis in Normandy. Yet Prime Minister Churchill needed the British Army to perform well in France for political reasons. He saw Great Britain's future, indeed, the future of the British Empire as dependent on the British Army winning a great victory in France. It was a matter of maintaining the pretensions of "Empire" with an army its commanding general once called a "wasting asset."

After the invasion, it did not take long for the Germans to demonstrate their fighting abilities. The German soldier was an excellent defensive fighter. A series of British offensives on the eastern Allied flank aimed at Caen failed to take the town. As June became July, British losses in Normandy were mounting. Caen, Montgomery's D-Day objective, remained beyond his grasp. The British War Office was forced to inform its commanders in France that they were running out of men to replace their battlefield casualties.

There were two obvious solutions to the British manpower crisis. One, they could frankly admit their manpower dilemma to Eisenhower, giving up their claim to an equal share in Allied command assignments. This would enable the British to protect their fragile army by limiting offensive operations on the eastern flank and leave the Americans free to develop an Allied strategy preferred by George Marshall and the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

The alternative was that the British could retain their position as equals with the Americans by accepting the casualties and demanding that Montgomery press home his attacks on the eastern flank at Caen. Eisenhower explained the matter clearly in a July 21 letter to Mont-

gomery: "Time is vital.... So we must hit with everything.... But while we have equality in size we must go forward shoulder to shoulder, with honors and sacrifices equally shared."

Neither of the obvious solutions to their manpower crisis appealed to British leaders. So they tried to hide their problem by ignoring it. The prime minister strongly believed that the political future of the British Empire, which he had sworn to protect, was tied directly to the public's perception of the British Army sharing the Allied victory in France. Churchill and his military chiefs would go to great lengths to hide the limitations the manpower crisis imposed on the British Army. He had not become, Churchill once famously said, "The King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire." Churchill and his generals were so successful at obscuring the British manpower dilemma, at least in part, because of the intimate cooperation they received from an American, General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Privately, Churchill was willing to admit his manpower problem to Eisenhower. British intelligence officer Maj. Gen. Kenneth Strong remembered that he was "with Eisenhower in his caravan on one occasion when Churchill telephoned him from London. Churchill's request was that if possible Eisenhower should avoid too many British casualties; British losses had been severe…." This was true. Churchill wanted to obscure the problem in order to maintain the public's belief that the Second British Army remained a viable independent military force capable of sustained offensive operations, just like the Americans. This proved not to be the case, but historical references to it are hard to find.

Montgomery agreed with his superiors in London. For morale reasons he believed the manpower crisis should remain concealed from public scrutiny; but the manpower shortage was also having a negative impact on his offensive operations and therefore on his reputation as a military commander. While he clearly expected the Second British Army to gain more ground at Caen, he was forced to adjust his plans as German defenders inflicted severe casualties on his infantry divisions.

Montgomery explained his thinking in a 1946 interview with author Chester Wilmot: "Of course we would have liked to get Caen on the first day and I was never happy about the left flank until we had got Caen. On this flank [at Caen] ground was of no importance at all. All I asked Dempsey to do was to keep German armor tied down on this flank so that my breakout with the Americans [on the right flank] could go more easily. Ground did not matter so long as the German divisions stayed on this flank. It would have been very easy for me to yield to the public criticism and the American pressure and to have made greater efforts to gain ground on this flank. It might have helped my immediate reputation but it would have crippled the British army."

Royal Air Force officers have strongly disputed Montgomery's claim that the ground at Caen was of no importance at all. This was the ground they had been promised on D-Day or shortly thereafter and which Montgomery still had not taken by July. This was ground Allied air forces desperately needed to move their squadrons from England to France, dramatically increasing their operational range.

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Major General Sir Francis de Guingand, chief of staff to 21st Army Group commander Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, recognized that a critical manpower shortage would inevitably curtail offensive operations of the British Army in Western Europe. OPPOSITE: A camouflaged American M3 Stuart light tank leads a column of vehicles along a dirt road in the town of St. Lo following the successful American breakout of the Normandy beachhead during Operation Cobra.

It is important to note that Montgomery admitted to Chester Wilmot something he would never have shared with the British press or the Americans during the war. The British Army he commanded was simply not capable of conducting sustained offensive operations against the Germans. Such operations, Montgomery admitted to Wilmot, "would have crippled the British army."

Addressing the British manpower shortage in Normandy was going to be difficult no matter what decision was finally made. The government of Winston Churchill decided to keep the manpower crisis a secret for political reasons. Author Carlo D'Este wrote, "Churchill ... was anxious to avoid any reduction in the strength of 21st Army Group during the final victory over Germany." Churchill believed that having fewer British divisions in Europe would lessen the impact of Great Britain's strategic voice in discussions with their Allies.

The British manpower problem directly influenced Montgomery's tactical operations in France. His reputation was under attack both in the press and at Supreme Allied Headquarters. But he was not able to press home his attacks in the Caen sector without inflicting severe damage on the Second British Army. The solution Montgomery finally adopted was to fabricate a logical reason for his failure to gain ground at Caen other than the obvious manpower crisis. As the end of June arrived with Caen still beyond his grasp, Montgomery uncovered an excellent reason for his failures. He phrased it so eloquently and so logically that historians have been wrestling with it since the end of the war.

At some time around the end of June, Montgomery decided to make a British virtue out of the German necessity to deploy the bulk of their armor and artillery on the eastern flank near Caen. The editors of the Eisenhower papers wrote, "By June 30th the British Army had not captured Caen, and now Montgomery issued his first directive that showed an intention of holding on the left and breaking through on the right. He directed the British forces to contain the greatest possible part of the enemy forces. This was a correct evaluation, brought about by the German reaction at Caen."

Montgomery began his disinformation campaign by claiming that it was not important either to take Caen or to gain any more ground in the Caen sector. The important thing on the eastern flank, Montgomery said, was to remain well balanced, to avoid a setback, and to trick the Germans into deploying the bulk of their armor at Caen to make things easier for the Americans on the western flank. This, Montgomery claimed, had always been his plan. While he had not gotten Caen yet, he dismissed that as not very important. He had already accomplished the more important task of attracting the bulk of the German armored divisions and their heavy artillery to his eastern flank.

Chester Wilmot wrote *The Struggle for Europe* in 1952. Wilmot spent the war attached to Montgomery's 21st Army Group headquarters and had grown quite fond of the little British field marshal. He was so happy to discover how Montgomery had tricked the poor Germans into reinforcing the Caen sector that

he repeated it over 30 times in his book.

Other British officers who had served with Montgomery during the war were not convinced of his claim that attracting the German armor to Caen had always been part of his plan. Montgomery's chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Francis De Guingand wrote, "We had, as I have already said, hoped to take Caen and get out into the open country beyond in the first few days, and in that event we should have been able to make the fullest use of our tanks."

P.J. Grigg worked at the War Office in London but made frequent trips to France and was thoroughly familiar with Montgomery's plans. After the war he wrote, "Of course his [Montgomery's] original idea was to break out of the bocage country around Caen into the open in the first few days after landing—it would be idle to deny that…. One of his greatest qualities was his flexibility. If a battle did not go entirely as he planned it then he would adjust his plan and he was capable of doing this with great boldness and swiftness…." The problem was that Montgomery never admitted to anyone that he had changed his plans. One of his aides remarked that Montgomery "tried to make himself look bigger by saying he planned it all beforehand. He didn't."

The Allied officer in charge of pre-invasion planning was the gifted British Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan. After the war, General Morgan wrote, "Above and beyond everything it was evident from the first moment that the objective of supreme importance was the town of Caen with its command of communications.... With Caen, the key, firmly in our grasp the puzzle seemed to resolve itself with a tenable logic." Occupying Caen would also clear the short route to Paris, and northeast of Falaise the ground opened up to the central French plain, excellent tank country.

The Allied western flank occupied by the Americans was dominated by rivers, swamps, small streams, and the worst of the Normandy hedgerow country. British military historian Michael Reynolds described one German attempt to launch an armored attack through the hedgerows (bocage): "The initial part of their route was through bocage with high banks along the narrow roads, there was no chance of deploying cross-country and visibility was restricted, even without the fog, to less than 100m. They would therefore have no chance to use their splendid tanks guns effectively." German vehicles, including tanks, were blocked from moving off the roads by 10- to 15-foot-high hedges. If Allied fighter bombers destroyed the first and last vehicles in a column, the entire column was instantly immobilized and became sitting ducks.

Imperial War Museum

British Air Chief Marshal and Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Arthur Tedder was openly critical of Montgomery and his slowness on the ground in delivering terrain in France suitable for forward Allied air bases.

It was no great surprise to anyone that the Germans committed the bulk of their armor and heavy artillery in the Caen sector. Limiting the magnificent 88mm antitank gun, the PzKpfw. V Panther, and PzKpfw. VI Tiger tanks to operations where their fields of fire would often be 100 meters or less by deploying them in the American sector would have been a gross misuse of these fine weapons. No reasonable person could argue otherwise.

Yet this was precisely the argument Montgomery put forward. The British press and public eagerly consumed any information from their famous general that explained why his army had failed to gain ground in Normandy. Montgomery's questionable explanation was quickly accepted as established fact. His success at fooling the Germans and the British public about Caen has become part of the Montgomery legend. The Americans, however, were leery of any Montgomery scheme that claimed to sacrifice British lives for their benefit.

Montgomery's untruthful boasting may have helped his reputation during the war, but it has created a red flag for military historians. Max Hastings suggests that it was "nonsense such as this [Montgomery's disinformation about Caen] that a great professional soldier caused so much of the controversy about the Normandy campaign to focus upon his own actions."

Hastings also wrote, quite correctly, that Montgomery had good reason for fabricating an untruthful account of the events near Caen. As the senior British officer in France, Montgomery was responsible for the morale and fighting spirit of the British Army in France. The German soldier was good at his craft, better than the Allies expected. His exceptional combat skills were enhanced by the superiority of his weapons and the excellent leadership provided by his NCOs and junior officers. The unpleasant truth was that neither the British nor American soldier was the equal of his German adversary on the battlefield.

As the ranking British officer in France, Montgomery was fully justified in obscuring this painful truth. But Montgomery created a problem for himself when he repeated the same misinformation to his superiors. Hastings wrote, "Montgomery served ... his men very well by maintaining his insistence ... that all was going according to plan. But he did himself a great disservice by making the same assertions in private to Eisenhower, Churchill, (Deputy Allied Supreme Commander Arthur) Tedder and even his unshakeable patron Brooke." What had begun innocently enough as a white lie precipitated by the British manpower crisis and intended to protect the morale of British soldiers would grow into an Allied misunderstanding that would shake the foundations of the Anglo-American alliance.

Eisenhower understood the British problem completely, and he phrased it correctly in letters to Montgomery. As long as the British wished to remain co-equal strategic partners with the Americans, "honors and sacrifices must be equally shared." On July 7 Eisenhower wrote to Montgomery, "I am familiar with your plan for generally holding firmly with your left, attracting thereto all of the enemy armor, while your right pushes down the Peninsula and threatens the rear and flank of the forces facing Second British Army." In the same letter Eisenhower described the horrible ground the Americans would be fighting through and acknowledged Montgomery's manpower problems by offering a U.S. armored division for offensive use on Montgomery's left flank.

Montgomery's suggestion, popular among British historians, that Eisenhower did not understand the finer nuances of his decision to hold with his eastern flank at Caen while he attempted to break out with the Americans on the western flank is simply not borne out by the historical evidence. Eisenhower not only understood Montgomery's plans completely and said so in his letters to the British commander, he often repeated Montgomery's own

words back to him.

The problem, the source of the misunderstanding between the two Allied commanders, resides with Montgomery, not Eisenhower. Eisenhower's intentions, motives, and statements could not have been put forth more clearly to Montgomery at the time nor recorded more faithfully for historians. R.W. Thompson described Montgomery's personal limitations: "His eccentricities ... his deliberate isolation, and his inability to enter into the problems of others rendered him peculiarly unsuitable for any cooperative role."

Eisenhower did his best to help Montgomery see the political requirements of their wartime alliance. His patience with Montgomery's failure to understand their mutual problem (making the Alliance work) was nearly endless, but eventually there were limitations.

General Montgomery's command position within the Allied armies had been compromised by the lack of resources His Majesty's government provided. He was in a difficult position almost as soon as his British troops hit the Normandy beaches. Eisenhower and the senior British officers at SHAEF demanded larger offensives at Caen. Prime Minister Winston Churchill was also concerned by the lack of British progress in France. In late July he wrote to Montgomery, "It certainly seems very important for the British Army to strike hard and win through; otherwise there will grow comparisons between the two armies [British and American] which will lead to dangerous recrimination and affect the fighting value of the Allied organization."

While Churchill and Eisenhower were urging General Montgomery to make greater offensive efforts at Caen, the British War Office was trying to head off a manpower crisis, sending the adjutant general, General Sir Ronald Adam, to France in early July to warn Montgomery and Dempsey [General Miles Dempsey, commander of the British Second Army] about the manpower problem.

Dempsey later recalled, "In a talk in my caravan he [Ronald Adam] warned me that if our infantry casualties continued at the recent rate it would be impossible to replace them, and we should have to 'cannibalize'—to break up some divisions in order to maintain the rest."

Montgomery was forced to limit his offensives at Caen to save the British Army. Max Hastings makes a similar point: "The truth, which he [Montgomery] never avowed even to Brooke, yet which seems self-evident from the course of events, was that in Goodwood, and throughout the rest of the campaign, Montgomery sought major ground gains for Second Army if these could be achieved at acceptable cost. He forsook them whenever casualties rose unacceptably. This occurred painfully often."

Montgomery was torn by Eisenhower and Churchill demanding stronger offensives on the eastern flank while the British War Office warned that his current level of casualties could not be sustained. Montgomery told Chester Wilmot quite frankly, "You must remember that the British Army was a wasting asset."

Montgomery was forced by these unusual circumstances to obscure the truth about his dilemma at Caen. Montgomery's behavior may have compromised the Anglo-American alliance were it not for the generous personal support he received from his American boss.

National Archives

An American convoy including an ambulance moves through the shattered French town of St. Lo following the breakout from the Normandy beachhead. Following heavy losses and a failure to take Caen for weeks, Montgomery asserted that a holding action was part of the plan to draw forces away from the Americans.

Then and later, General Eisenhower kept his American subordinates quiet about Montgomery's untruthful boasting to the press and the very real British manpower crisis.

After he decided to hold down British casualties at Caen by limiting his offensive operations, it became essential for him to admit this to the Americans so they could adjust their plans accordingly. Unfortunately, Montgomery never told the Americans about his change in plans. Instead, his continued deception and boasts to the press that "everything was going according to plan" only made the Americans mad.

Carlo D'Este later wrote: "The outrage and frustration felt by many American officers then remained long after the war had ended. Unable to understand the reasons for Montgomery's action and suspecting that U.S. forces were being used as sacrificial lambs while the British dallied around Caen, American critics began to voice their opinion that the campaign was being badly mismanaged by the British commander who ought to be replaced as Allied ground force commander at once by Eisenhower, as originally planned."

Eisenhower was completely forthright with both Winston Churchill and General Montgomery concerning American distrust of Montgomery's behavior at Caen. But he never allowed Montgomery's behavior to become an issue in the press; he covered it up. Tedder, from the Royal Air Force, thought Eisenhower was going too far in support of Montgomery: "I told Eisenhower that his own people would be thinking that he had sold them to the British if he continued to support Montgomery without protest." Yet this was precisely what Eisenhower did. However, eventually even Eisenhower's patience wore thin.

By the end of July, there was a movement afoot at Supreme Allied Headquarters to fire

Continued on page 74

Taking on Counterinsurgency

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAEL F. TREVETT

AS THE MONTHS OF 1945 passed at an agonizingly slow pace, Allied forces in the Pacific struggled unwaveringly toward Japan. Expectedly, during the summer of 1945, Allied forces led by the United States faced the prospect of invading the Japanese home islands. The overarching plan for the invasion and occupation of Japan was code-named Operation Downfall. Kyushu, the southernmost of the four home islands, would be the first attacked and occupied. Planning for the invasion and occupation of Kyushu, code-named Operation Olympic, began even as the fighting on Okinawa raged in the spring of that year.

After the difficult victory on Okinawa, American-led forces faced the dreadful prospect of continuing the fight on the home islands of Japan in which tens of millions of Japanese would wage conventional then unconventional warfare with no foreseeable end. As they demonstrated on Guam, Saipan, Tinian, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, in the Philippines, and on numerous other islands, the Japanese intended to fight to the death. Not only was surrender by Japanese soldiers forbidden, so too was surrender by Japanese civilians. On Saipan, Japanese civilians held out until there was no hope in their view. Instead of surrendering or being captured, many of these civilians, including mothers holding their infants,



leaped from rock cliffs to their deaths.

Consequently, Allied forces faced brutal fighting in the pending conquest of Japan. Allied planners estimated that an invasion and occupation of Kyushu Island alone would require 766,700 ground forces. Allied casualties were expected to reach 105,000 just to seize the southern part of Kyushu, more than double the casualties sustained fighting on Okinawa.

Even before the issuance of Operation Olympic and before he knew of the existence and intended use of the atomic bombs, General MacArthur directed his staff to begin developing Operation Blacklist in May 1945, to address the possibility of surrender by or complete collapse of the Japanese government. Assumptions for Olympic, including expected casualty ratios, led Allied leaders to seek the unconditional surrender of Japan.

The Potsdam Declaration, requiring unconditional surrender, was issued in July 1945. However, the Japanese did not provide a timely response. Consequently, as late as August 14, Allied military leaders did not know which operation, Olympic or Blacklist, they would execute. Fortunately for all parties, the Japanese surrendered following the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The devastation of these two cities and the fear of future atomic bomb attacks, however, did not generate any substantial attitude for surrender within the Japanese military leadership or among the general population. "The Japanese Army announced that the Nagasaki bomb was not formidable and that the military had 'countermeasures.' The high command ... did not believe the war was lost."

Consequently, the key to Japan's surrender was the position of and statements from Emperor Hirohito in early August 1945. In an unusual speech during the Imperial Conference of Japanese leaders at 2 AM on August 10, 1945—unique that he spoke at all but even more astounding that he took such a strong position rebuking the military leaders present—Hirohito voiced his "divine" decision: "After serious consideration of conditions facing Japan both at home and abroad, I have concluded that to continue this war can mean only destruction for the homeland and more bloodshed and cruelty in the world.... I cannot bear to have my innocent people suffer further. Ending the war is the only way to restore world peace and relieve the nation from the terrible suffering it is undergoing."

Initially, the military leadership opposed the terms of surrender, but after much internal wrangling and confusion, the Japanese government, on August 14, 1945, officially announced its sur-

Operation Blacklist served as the supreme model to combat continuing resistance from the Japanese following formal surrender.



ABOVE: Shortly after his arrival in Japan, General Douglas MacArthur, who led the American occupation forces and ordered Operation Blacklist to deal with either the surrender or the collapse of the Japanese government in late 1945, takes questions from reporters. LEFT: In September 1945, American troops of the 81st Infantry Division come ashore on the Japanese home island of Honshu. These soldiers constituted a portion of the 3rd Amphibious Force that occupied key locations in Japan.

All photos: National Archives

render and acceptance of the terms outlined in the Potsdam Declaration. The most important point for the Japanese was the continuation and protection of Emperor Hirohito. The Japanese conceded everything else required in the Potsdam Declaration. General MacArthur was named Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), and the various parties met on the morning of September 2 for the formal surrender ceremony aboard the battleship USS *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay. Because the Japanese achieved their primary goal of keeping the emperor in his position and continuing the imperial system, albeit with much reduced authority, the Japanese did not unconditionally surrender. Nonetheless, it would be Operation Blacklist.

Insurgencies are not necessarily small wars, as evidenced by the protracted Chinese communist insurgency against the nationalists and the potential for insurrection in Japan. Additionally, insurgencies often develop in response to occupations by foreign powers, such as those in Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Malaya, Palestine, Spain, Vietnam, and numerous others. During World War II, some Allied leaders, particularly MacArthur, understood all of this from education, experience, and events preceding the war, including lessons from such historical conflicts as the American Revolution, Boer War, American Indian Wars, and the Philippine Insurrection. Consequently, the announcement and formal surrender by the Japanese did little to assuage U.S. military concerns regarding the occupation and demilitarization of Japan.

Although military occupations of various countries, regions, or periods may have few similarities, the manner in which occupying forces conduct themselves and the methods they use always influence the nature and outcome of an occupation. Related to this, over 2,200 years ago, Sun Tzu wrote, "To win a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the highest excellence; the highest excellence is to subdue the enemy's army without fighting at all." He also wrote, "He who knows the enemy and himself will never in a hundred battles be at risk."

These were key premises of General MacArthur's plan in successfully occupying Japan in 1945, which was the crowning achievement of the Allied forces in the Pacific Theater of World War II. Unfortunately, to the detriment of many, this model of counterinsurgency and occupation is often overlooked by military and political leaders and historians because there were no armed battles to discuss or analyze. It was simply not sensational in terms of armed conflict, maneuvering, and military tactics. Yet, when viewed in terms of countering the largest potential insurgency ever faced by an occupying power, incontrovertible actions and principles become apparent.

General Douglas MacArthur stands with Japanese Emperor Hirohito during a historic meeting on September 27, 1945, in Tokyo. A key element of the peaceful occupation of Japan was the retention of Hirohito.

In immediate postwar Japan significant concern existed over questions of whether the entire Japanese military would accept surrender and whether the general population would comply with the terms of surrender. Should occupation forces face the prospect of the entire population of Japan fighting against them, they would need millions of troops to defeat and pacify the Japanese people. MacArthur knew too well as he explained, "History clearly showed that no modern military occupation of a conquered nation had been a success."

In 1945, the population of Japan was approximately 80 million. The Japanese National Volunteer Force consisted of 25 million nonmilitary men, women, and children, ready to support their military, defend their homeland, and fight with whatever means they could muster. Before the occupation in 1945, SCAP headquarters estimated that more than 1,700,000 former members of the Japanese military would have to be disarmed along with 3,200,000 civilian defense volunteers.

Even the Japanese leadership worried over its ability to get the surrender order disseminated with authority and credibility to not only the military but the entire population. When informed that the first occupation troops would arrive on August 23, historian Samuel Eliot Morison writes, "the Japanese asked for more time, stating the problem of controlling their own armed forces and pleading that delay would enable them to prevent regrettable incidents." The Japanese military was so strongly opposed to surrender that "hotheads in the Japanese Army Air Force threatened to shoot down any surrender mission that took off" from Japan to meet with the Allies.

With deep concern over the enormous magnitude of tasks regarding the occupation of the Japanese home islands, American forces executed Operation Blacklist. Under Blacklist, Morison wrote, "the initial, primary missions of the Occupation forces were set out as being the disarmament of the Japanese armed forces and the establishment of control of communications. MacArthur fully intended to use the Emperor and other Japanese leaders in executing every aspect of the occupation [being] thoroughly familiar with Japanese administration." He outlined and prioritized the following goals of the occupation:

(1) Destroy the military power. (2) Punish war criminals. (3) Build the structure of representative government. (4) Modernize the constitution. (5) Hold free elections. (6) Enfranchise the women. (7) Release the political prisoners. (8) Liberate the farmers. (9) Establish a free labor movement. (10) Encourage a free economy. (11) Abolish police oppression. (12) Develop a free and responsible press. (13) Liberalize education. (14) Decentralize the political power. (15) Separate church and state.

Delegation of authority from SCAP to tactical-level units was an essential aspect of the occupation contributing to its success. Specifically related to disarmament, countering opposition, rebellions, and potential insurgencies, MacArthur through Blacklist delegated the following "Special Tasks" to Army commanders, all of which they accomplished in an exceptionally professional manner under extraordinary circumstances:

a. Destruction of hostile elements which might oppose by military action the imposition of surrender terms upon the Japanese.

b. Disarmament and demobilization of Japanese armed forces and their auxiliaries as rapidly as the situation would permit. Establishment of control of military resources insofar as would be practicable with the means available.

c. Control of the principal routes of coastwide communication, in coordination with naval elements as arranged with the appropriate naval commander.

d. Institution of military government, if required, and the insurance that law and order

would be maintained among the civilian population. Facilitation of peaceful commerce, particularly that which would contribute to the subsistence, clothing and shelter of the population....

f. The securing and safeguarding of intelligence information of value to the United States and Allied Nations. Arrangement with the U.S. Navy for mutual interchange and unrestricted access by each Service to matters of interest thereto.

g. Suppression of activities of individuals and organizations inimical to the operations of the Occupation forces. Apprehension of war criminals, as directed....

i. Preparation for the imposition of terms of surrender beyond immediate military requirements.

j. Preparation for the extension of control over the Japanese as required to implement policies for postwar occupation and government, when prescribed.

k. Preparation for the transfer of responsibilities to agencies of the post-war governments and armies of occupation, when established.

The key method in which U.S. occupation forces carried out these "Special Tasks" was by employing the Japanese themselves to do the majority of the work. MacArthur and his staff never intended for American troops to actually conduct all of the specific work necessary for accomplishing the numerous goals of the occupation.

It was emphasized that in view of the limited forces that would have to occupy a country of roughly 80 million, Army commanders would make all possible use of Japanese demobilized forces ... and would take all steps to insure that public servants, such as the civil police, railway workers, communication workers, utilities operators and public health officials, not only remained at their tasks but intensified their efforts to ensure a continuation of all functions under what was certain to be a period of great stress.

MacArthur later wrote that he cautioned his "troops from the start that by their conduct our own country would be judged in world opinion, that success or failure of the occupation could well rest upon their poise and self-restraint." These methods were and remain fundamental to any successful counterinsurgency or occupation. He added that the Japanese would "shoulder the chief administrative and operational burden of disarmament and demobilization." Unlike most other counterinsurgencies, this aspect of Operation Blacklist was "designed to avoid possible incidents which might result in a renewed conflict; no seizures or disarmaments were to be made by Allied personnel."

ABOVE: Japanese police officers cooperate with two U.S. Navy Shore Patrol sailors near Yokohama in September 1945. BELOW: On August 30, 1945, U.S. Marines destroy Japanese weapons that were surrendered by their former owners. The disarming of the Japanese military was a necessary step in diminishing the possibility of counterinsurgency in Japan following World War II.

Addressing the wartime political, military, and police leadership of Japan, SCAP issued Directive No. 1, on September 2, 1945, the day of the formal surrender. Directive No. 1 ordered "the Imperial General Headquarters to begin to demobilize all Japanese armed forces, and eleven days later the Imperial General Headquarters itself was abolished. The arrest of war criminal suspects [was to] begin

Just two and a half years following the surrender, approximately 5,700 war criminals were tried by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, which found 920 of them guilty. Many of the guilty were hanged. Around 200,000 ultranationalists were purged out of public offices. Shinto was discontinued as the state religion. Large companies were broken up. Land reform was initiated, and the civil service was reconstituted.

Following SCAP instructions and priorities, primarily Japanese forces under U.S. military supervision destroyed over 11,000 aircraft, more than 1.2 million rifles and carbines, almost 190,000 artillery pieces, and approximately 1.2 million tons of ammunition. Additionally, hundreds of naval vessels and other equipment and weapons were destroyed. At least 135 naval vessels were delivered to the Allies for their use. The most common method of destroying or disposing of explosives and ammunition was dumping at sea. Amazingly, in less than three years SCAP implemented and oversaw all of these actions and those outlined earlier, affecting a population of 80 million with just over 200,000 troops.

The single most significant issue that would certainly have initiated a massive insurgency against the occupation forces if mishandled was the treatment of Emperor Hirohito. In the aftermath of the war against Japan, some Allies, principally the British and Soviets, wanted to prosecute Emperor Hirohito as a war criminal. MacArthur wisely and successfully fought against such imprudent and selfish ideas, angering many in the process. He knew that prosecuting Hirohito, the divine authority for all Japanese, would turn the entire population against the occupying forces, resulting in the largest insurgency against an occupying force in history. In addressing the issue of prosecuting the emperor for war crimes, author Edward Drea asserted, MacArthur "warned Washington in 1946 that if the emperor were tried as a war criminal, he'd need at least a million [additional] troops to garrison Japan to ensure law and order, and public security."

MacArthur later said that he "believed that if the emperor were indicted, and perhaps hanged, as a war criminal, military government would have to be instituted throughout all Japan, and guerrilla warfare would probably break out."

Law and order and public security, some of the most essential issues of counterinsurgency, were well understood by MacArthur and his staff. Accordingly, MacArthur's decisions regarding Emperor Hirohito were twofold. First, he decided not to prosecute Hirohito, which for the most part alleviated the certainty of a massive insurgency. Second, he left Hirohito in his imperial position with somewhat more than just symbolic power. In the long term, this second action ensured tremendously important continuity of control and authority over the Japanese population.

Another important benefit of MacArthur's actions regarding Hirohito was legitimacy, an

indispensable aspect of successful counterinsurgency. In addition to leaving the emperor in place and successfully opposing his war crimes trial, MacArthur attained and increased the respect of the Japanese people and cemented his own legitimacy as supreme commander for the Allied powers, in effect, the legitimate ruler over Japan. This legitimacy was also conferred upon MacArthur by the emperor through public appearances, broadcasts, and speeches, all of which further suppressed any insipient insurgency within the Japanese population. All of these aspects of the occupation permitted the Japanese population to respect MacArthur and the occupation troops and to accept the postwar rules, regulations, and laws imposed by the Allies.

The peaceful and tranquil transition of postwar Japan, especially when compared to occupations of other postwar nations, was the ultimate success of the occupation and was in large part due to the work of intelligence organizations. However, in addition to the possibilities of a general insurrection among the greater Japanese population, several factions or organizations posed problems for the governing forces. In preparation for and response to these groups, MacArthur wrote that the various intelligence organizations early on and consistently developed "intelligence information on every shade of public unrest—in the field of labor, in communist infiltration, and in movements of disillusioned, repatriated military personnel," of whom there were millions.

To function effectively, military intelligence units had to change the methods in which they conducted activities, reorganizing and sharing information with all services, including Japanese police agencies. Intelligence on a conventional military foe no longer applied. Consequently, the SCAP G2 focused on "civil intelligence" and was divided, as MacArthur noted, into "four major components: Operations Branch, the 441st Counter Intelligence Corps, the Civil Censorship Detachment, and the Public Safety Division." The most important adaptations took place within the realm of counterintelligence. "As the Occupation progressed, the duties of combating and controlling diverse elements, subversive or inimical to the objectives of the Occupation ... were expanded immeasurably to cover every facet of the intelligence problem."

MacArthur added, "The greatest single political group as a medium of potential trouble for the Occupation was the Japan Communist Party (JCP) with its varied and persistent attempts to discredit and nullify the program of democratization.... [The JCP was] less a political party and more a fifth column introducing alien ideologies into Japan."

Organized along geographic lines, the counterintelligence organization effectively monitored and mitigated the JCP by working with and through the Japanese police, preventing any significant opposition to the successful occupation of Japan and the peaceful transition into a democratic form of government. In 1950, due to stern measures ordered by MacArthur in relation to the outbreak of war in Korea, the JCP was practically eliminated as a national entity of any influence. Although it would reemerge much later, the JCP never presented a significant threat to the occupation and democratization of Japan.

Fortunately, during and immediately after World War II, the American and Allied forces were led by intelligent, experienced, and educated men. Their primary motivation in avoiding a massive, long-term invasion of Japan was to save lives and resources. Their experiences in amphibious landings, kamikaze attacks, land warfare, and naval warfare provided ample information and statistics to use in analyzing the exceedingly difficult mission of militarily seizing and occupying the Japanese home islands.

Although the government of Japan agreed to surrender, it did not mean that the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and civilians would honor the terms of surrender, nor did it prevent the Japanese from changing their minds at some later date, only to resume fighting against the occupying forces. The formal signing of the surrender documents did not preclude those in the field from continuing the fight. Additionally, many combatants, especially in 1945, simply did not or could not receive word of the surrender.

Because of the Japanese stated intent to surrender, instead of landing in force as he did on Leyte Island in the Philippines, General MacArthur on August 30, 1945, took a tremendous risk and bravely flew into Atsugi Airfield in Tokyo aboard a simple cargo plane with just a small staff element before any substantial number of occupation forces were in place. He eventually met with and broadcast respect for Emperor Hirohito. His plan involved having the emperor order the Japanese people to lay down their arms and discontinue fighting, alleviating the need for American troops to forcefully invade and physically implement postwar policies under martial law.

By leaving the emperor in place and using him to order the Japanese military and general population to cooperate, MacArthur prevented that potential, enormous insurgency. His face-saving plan for the emperor ensured the greatest possible peaceful transition and reconstruction of Japan. In fact, MacArthur's approach was so successful, the first completely free election ever held in Japan was on April 10, 1946, only seven months after the formal surrender, and it included 75 percent of eligible voters.

Conversely, had MacArthur yielded to the British and Soviet ideas by rebuking and publicly shaming Emperor Hirohito or trying him for war crimes, the entire Japanese population would have fought boldly to oppose the Allied occupying forces, which the Japanese would

have perceived as attacking, blaspheming, and discrediting their deity, the emperor. Viewed in another way, had MacArthur stripped Emperor Hirohito of all his formal authority and titles and publicly shamed him by showing a humiliated, unkempt emperor—bedraggled, broken, and handcuffed or imprisoned—the Japanese would most certainly have fought against the occupying forces for years, likely decades. Hundreds of thousands of casualties would have resulted in the attempt to pacify the Japanese, and the rebuilding of the nation would have been set back many years.

SCAP's actions in no measure dismissed Hirohito's knowledge and tacit approval of many of the cruelties, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed by Japanese forces and leaders. Yet, MacArthur wisely permitted Hirohito to remain in power and position as the emperor and necessarily included him in the restructuring and rebuilding of postwar Japan, at the same time ensuring their own legitimacy in the eyes of the Japanese. By December 1948, just over three years after the surrender,

ABOVE: Japanese laborers stripped to their waists set to work rebuilding structures demolished by the atomic bomb dropped on the city of Nagasaki on August 9, 1945. LEFT: One discharged Japanese soldier assists another with a light for his cigarette. These two are among a group of discharged Japanese troops that is headed home from the war in September 1945. OPPOSITE: Handing out candy to children in the town of Karuizawa, an American soldier is greeted by an enthusiastic crowd.

MacArthur declared amnesty for 17 men awaiting trial for Class A war crimes, specifically those who had led Japan during the war.

Later, he commuted death and life imprisonment sentences of many found guilty of war crimes. He also lifted the order for apprehending fugitive war criminals. He also granted amnesty to Class B and C defendants accused of abuse or atrocities. Such reconciliation was hard for many among the Allied nations to accept, but MacArthur clearly understood the benefits of forgiveness and the need to move on to rebuilding Japan. Ultimately, these policies effectively eliminated any incipient or potential insurgencies and ensured the successful restructuring of Japan along with the security and stability of 80 million people within only three years.

Unfortunately, the remarkable lessons in leadership and command in countering insurgencies and conducting occupations have been lost among many who have led efforts in subsequent and similar operations. For example, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and Coalition forces in the early years of occupied Iraq could have used a situation for a period of time in which Saddam Hussein, or certainly some of his key ministers and military and police leaders, worked with the Coalition forces to suppress nascent insurgencies. There were several distinct insurgent organizations in Iraq. With these known leaders ordering police and military units back to duty to restore law and order, the insurgencies could have been contained and might not have developed at all, preventing years of conflict and thousands of casualties. After all, Iraqi leaders were no guiltier of atrocities than many of the Japanese leaders with whom the Allied forces worked in postwar Japan.

In other respects, the analogy between postwar Japan and Iraq or occupations of other nations diverges and is not meant to be an absolutely pure analogy with exact correlations throughout but instead a contrast. However, the general parallel and the specific actions taken by occupying forces are important and relevant, particularly for future conflicts and occupations, of which history warns there will be many.

History provides ample political and military lessons, such as those exemplified by MacArthur and validated in Japan, that permit experienced and learned, well-intentioned leaders to successfully execute counterinsurgencies, occupations, and other forms of political-military conflict.

For President Harry Truman and the Allied powers in postwar Asia, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur epitomized such a leader. Fittingly, MacArthur's Operation Blacklist, often forgotten precisely because of its unequaled success in preventing an enormous, long-term insurrection, stands supreme above all other modern counterinsurgency and occupation operations. □

Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Trevett is a U.S. military officer with 29 years of service. He has trained or operated with the civilian, military, or police forces of over 40 nations and territories on antiterrorism, counterdrug, counterinsurgency, law enforcement, and search and rescue issues, operations, and tactics. In 2011, he published Isolating the Guerrilla, *a book on counterinsurgency.*

By Al Hemingway

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

Treasury Spy for Stalin

Could an apparently steadfast Treasury Department worker have steered the United States into war with Japan?

HARRY DEXTER WHITE WAS AN UNASSUMING MAN. HIS METAL-FRAMED GLASSES, child-like appearance, and mild demeanor endeared him to people. He was also a crackerjack economist and Treasury Department Secretary Henry Morgenthau's righthand man when it came to financial matters and policymaking within the organization. But beneath that scholarly exterior lay a dark secret. White was a Soviet sympathizer. Although never a card-carrying member of the Communist Party, he channeled information to Russian spies.

Eager to see hostilities between Japan and the United States erupt to keep the Japanese Army occupied so as not to pose a threat to the Soviet Union, Russian agents initiated Operation Snow to provoke a war between the two nations. By writing memoranda that irritated the Japanese during negotiations and forcing them to "lose face," White single-handedly shaped the events that eventually led to the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor, plunging the United States into World War II.

In *Operation Snow: How a Soviet Mole in FDR's White House Triggered Pearl Harbor* (Regnery Publishing, Inc. Washington, D.C., 2012, 256 pp., photographs, bibliography, notes, index, $27.95, hardcover), journalist John Koster has written a provocative book that is sure to ignite debate from historians and World War II buffs alike. He pulls no punches when discussing White's nefarious activities and how government officials allowed White to continue in his role despite warnings from Kilsoo Haan, a Korean active in the Korean Underground movement, who loved both Korea and the United States and despised Japan. His letters, warning of an impending attack on the U.S. naval base in Hawaii were dismissed or ignored.

Soviet dictator Josef Stalin was extremely nervous with Japanese troops near his borders. Although Russia had signed the infamous nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany in August 1939 and had fought the Japanese prior to that at Nomonhan in Manchuria, resulting in thousands of casualties, he still was uneasy about having his nemesis so close. If the United States could be prodded into a war with Japan, it would resolve the problem.

Enter Harry Dexter White. His memoranda written in May and November 1941, signed by Morgenthau and given to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, were highly influential in thwarting the peace process and leading to the eventual breakdown of the talks between American and Japanese diplomats just prior to Pearl Harbor in December 1941.

In his May note, White wrote that Japan should lease 50 percent of her naval and air forces to America. Koster writes, "If [it were] made public, [the notion] would have sparked riots in Tokyo and rebellion in Korea." But it was the November memo that sealed a war between the two nations. In it, White wrote 10 "aggressive demands" that he realized would lead to armed conflict—withdraw all military forces from China, replace all military scrip, loan the Chinese two billion yen so they could rebuild their country, and withdraw all Japanese troops from Manchuria. These are just a few of the concessions that White knew Japan would never accept.

After the war, White also attempted to disrupt the German economy by giving the Soviets the plates for printing money to be used in Germany. White and Morgenthau, both of the Jewish faith, wanted to punish Germany after the war by creating an agricultural state with little or no industry. Secretary of War Henry Stimson was angered and wrote that the Treasury Department had a "Carthaginian attitude" and "had virtually taken control of the Roosevelt administration." Ultimately, their plan would be rejected. Morgenthau was no communist, he simply wanted Germany to pay for what the Nazis had done to the Jews during the war. White, however, had

Harry Dexter White, an economist with the Treasury Department and Communist sympathizer, may have helped push Japan to attack the United States at Pearl Harbor.

You deserve a factual look at . . .

Arabian Fables (I)

How the Arabs soften up world opinion with fanciful myths.

Josef Goebbels, the infamous propaganda minister of the Nazis, had it right. Just tell people big lies often enough and they will believe them. The Arabs have learned that lesson well. They have swayed world opinion by endlessly repeating myths and lies that have no basis in fact.

What are the facts?

The "Palestinians." That is the fundamental myth. The reality is that the concept of "Palestinians" is one that did not exist until about 1948, when the Arab inhabitants of what until then was Palestine, wished to differentiate themselves from the Jews. Until then, the Jews were the Palestinians. There was the Palestinian Brigade of Jewish volunteers in the British World War II Army (at a time when the Palestinian Arabs were in Berlin hatching plans with Adolf Hitler for world conquest and how to kill all the Jews); there was the Palestinian Symphony Orchestra (all Jews, of course); there was *The Palestine Post*, and so much more.

The Arabs, who now call themselves "Palestinians," do so in order to persuade a misinformed world that they are a distinct nationality and that "Palestine" is their ancestral homeland. But, of course, they are no distinct nationality at all. They are entirely the same — in language, customs, and tribal ties — as the Arabs of Syria, Jordan, and beyond. There is no more difference between the "Palestinians" and the other Arabs of those countries than there is between, say, the citizens of Minnesota and of Wisconsin.

What's more, many of the "Palestinians," or their immediate ancestors, came to the area attracted by the prosperity created by the Jews, in what previously had been pretty much of a wasteland.

The nationhood of the "Palestinians" is a myth.

The "West Bank." Again, this is a concept that did not exist until 1948, when the army of the Kingdom of Transjordan, together with five other Arab armies, invaded the Jewish state of Israel, on the very day of its creation.

In what can almost be described as a Biblical miracle, the ragtag Jewish forces defeated the combined Arab might. But Transjordan stayed in possession of the territories of Judea and Samaria and part of the city of Jerusalem. The Jordanians promptly expelled all Jews from the area that they occupied, destroyed all Jewish institutions and houses of worship, used Jewish cemetery headstones to build military latrines, and renamed as "West Bank" what had been Judea and Samaria since time immemorial.

The attempt, quite successful, was to persuade an uninformed world that these territories were ancestral parts of the Jordanian Arab Kingdom (itself a very recent creation of British power diplomacy). Even after the total rout of the Arabs in the 1967 Six-Day War, in which the Jordanians were driven out of Judea/Samaria and of Jerusalem, they and the world continued to call this territory the "West Bank", a geographical concept that cannot be found on any except the most recent maps.

> "The web of lies and myths that the Arab propaganda machine has created plays an important role in the unrelenting quest to destroy the State of Israel. What a shame that the world has accepted most of it!"

The concept of the "West Bank" is a myth.

The "Occupied Territories." After the victorious Six-Day War, during which the Israeli army defeated the same cabal of Arabs that had invaded the country in 1948, Israel remained in possession of Judea/Samaria (now renamed "West Bank"), which the Jordanians had illegally occupied for 19 years; of the Gaza strip, which had been occupied by the Egyptians but which (hundreds of miles from Egypt proper) had never been part of their country; and of the Golan Heights, a plateau of about 400 square miles, which, though originally part of Palestine, had been ceded to Syria by British-French agreement.

The last sovereign in Judea/Samaria and in Gaza was the British mandatory power — and before it was the Ottoman Empire. All of Palestine, including what is now the Kingdom of Jordan, was, by the Balfour Declaration, destined to be the Jewish National Home. How then could the Israelis be "occupiers" in their own territory? Who would be the sovereign and who the rightful inhabitants?

The concept of "occupied territories" in reference to Judea/Samaria and Gaza is a myth created by Arab propaganda.

Unable so far to destroy Israel on the battlefield — though they are feverishly preparing for their next assault — the Arabs are now trying to overcome and destroy Israel by their acknowledged "policy of stages". That policy is to get as much land as possible carved out of Israel "by peaceful and diplomatic" means, so as to make Israel indefensible and softened up for the final assault. The web of lies and myths that the Arab propaganda machine has created plays an important role in the unrelenting quest to destroy the State of Israel. What a shame that the world has accepted most of it!

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Facts and Logic About the Middle East
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Gerardo Joffe, President

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an ulterior motive. If his scheme had been put into practice, Germany would have remained weak and under the thumb of communism.

White's communist leanings and clandestine activities were eventually revealed. In a hearing in 1948 before the House Un-American Activities Committee, the egotistical White was one-upped by the committee members who included a young representative from California named Richard Nixon. White died three days after the hearing. His death, Koster believes, was a suicide when he took an overdose of digitalis, heart medication he was taking, to save his family any embarrassment. Unaware of his spying activity, White's family professed his innocence for years. White's remains were cremated, and any evidence that he did take his own life was lost forever.

Koster has delivered a real spellbinder. It is a must-read for those who want to learn more about the days before Pearl Harbor. His book traces Harry Dexter White's subversive activities and how he manipulated top U.S. government officials as pawns in his plan to start a war between Japan and America.

The Admirals: Nimitz, Halsey, Leahy, and King—The Five-Star Admirals Who Won the War at Sea by Walter R. Borneman, Little, Brown, New York, New York, 2012, 559 pp., maps, photographs, bibliography, notes, index, $29.99, hardcover.



Chester Nimitz, William "Bull" Halsey, William Leahy, and Ernest King all attained the coveted rank of five-star admiral during their tenure in the U.S. Navy. Although they all differed greatly in personality, temperament, and management style each individual had one common denominator: great leadership ability. During the early days of World War II, when it appeared the fate of the free world was in the balance, each man displayed courage and determination to see the conflict through to final victory.

Historian Walter R. Borneman has written a detailed biography of each officer from childhood to their days at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, their respective careers, and their retirement years. All four saw the U.S. Navy grow to become a powerful force to reckon with on the world scene, and each of them had a vital role in that growth which eventually led to victory in 1945.

Borneman does great justice to one of the least known—and the least understood and most overlooked member of the foursome—William Leahy. He states that Leahy was the "most influential" among the group. At one point he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, chief of staff, and de facto national security adviser to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. He also served as a trusted adviser under President Harry S. Truman for several years. Although he was no sycophant and always spoke his mind, both presidents came to trust his opinion on a number of diplomatic, as well as military, issues.

The Admirals is a unique look at four of the most prominent men in U.S. naval history. Their vision and fortitude helped the American Navy transform itself into a sea power that is still very much in evidence today.

Hell in the Pacific: A Marine Rifleman's Journey from Guadalcanal to Peleliu by Jim McEnery with Bill Sloan, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2012, 305 pp., maps, photographs, index, $27.00, hardcover.



Brooklyn-born Jim McEnery was a tough kid of Irish descent who made it through the Great Depression of the 1930s, enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps in 1940, and miraculously survived three of the bloodiest battles of World War II—Guadalcanal, Cape Gloucester, and Peleliu. Attaining the rank of sergeant, McEnery, together with historian Bill Sloan, has penned a riveting account of his harrowing experiences as a member of Company K, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines. McEnery's insight into what transpired, from a grunt's point of view, will have readers on the edges of their seats. His story is graphic as he describes the day-to-day fighting he and his fellow leath-

Short Bursts

One Marine's War: A Combat Interpreter's Quest for Humanity in the Pacific by Gerald A. Meehl, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2012, 288 pgs., maps, photographs, notes, index, $34.95, hardcover.

A moving story of one Marine's ability to shed his hatred for the Japanese in World War II and ultimately learn to show compassion for captured enemy soldiers during the terrible battles of Tarawa, Saipan, and Tinian where he served as a language officer and interpreter during these three bloody campaigns.

Robert Sheeks grew up in Shanghai, China, during the 1930s. His father, a businessman, relocated his family to the safety of the International concession area where the younger Sheeks could hear the distant roar of artillery as the Japanese fought the Chinese. His intense loathing for the Japanese crystallized when he saw the remains of two Chinese house servants roasted alive over a pit.

After language school in Boulder, Colorado, 1st Lt. Sheeks was assigned to the 2nd Marine Division. He soon realized that by coaxing the enemy into surrender, it would ultimately save the lives of the Marines. Sheeks had undergone a metamorphosis while in combat. As the author writes, "He was an eyewitness to that great range of human behavior and had, in the end, found life-affirming humanity in the midst of the brutality of war."

Missing Believed Killed: Casualty Policy and the Missing Research and Enquiry Service, 1939-1952 by Stuart Hadaway, Pen & Sword Books, South Yorkshire, England, 2012, 207 pp., diagrams, photographs, notes, index, $29.95, softcover.



This in-depth account illustrates the Herculean efforts of the Missing Research and Enquiry Service (MRES) first established in 1941 to determine the status of downed British pilots believed killed in action and to identify their remains. Realizing that the arduous job required additional personnel, the organization was expanded in late 1944. Groups were sent to France and other European countries after the war to search for information on the whereabouts of more than 40,000 RAF pilots and crewmen.

At times the assignment could be exhausting and in some cases grisly when graves had to be exhumed and bones returned to Great Britain to be identified, a daunting task in itself in the days before DNA was used. This thoroughly captivating book focuses on the unique mission of a relatively unknown but important unit during World War II.

Waffen-SS Armour in Normandy: The Combat History of SS-Panzer Regiment 12 and SS-Panzerjager Abteilung 12, Normandy 1944, Based on Their Original War Dairies by Norbert Szamveber, Helion and Company, West Midlands, England, 2012, 304 pp., maps, photographs, index, $69.95, hardcover.

The author made a great find when uncovering the original war dairies of these two elite German

ernecks had to endure, including an incredible bayonet charge on Guadalcanal that broke the enemy's resistance.



At 90-plus years old, McEnery is still a Marine at heart with an incredible memory for detail in events that occurred 70 years ago. He and Sloan have done a remarkable job in getting his memoirs on paper for all to read. He and the millions of other World War II veterans, especially those who were killed and wounded, deserve to be heard. McEnery's book will rank as a classic in years to come alongside fellow Company K Marine Eugene Sledge's biography With the Old Breed on Peleliu and Okinawa. A great book about men in war.

Stalin's General: The Life of Georgy Zhukov by Geoffrey Roberts, Random House, New York, 2012, 400 pp., maps, photographs, notes, index, $30.00, hardcover.

British historian Geoffrey Roberts has written an exceptional biography of Georgy Zhukov, dictator Joseph Stalin's top general during World War II. It was Zhukov's strategy that proved the decisive factor and defeated the Japanese in Manchuria at Nomonhan, also known as Khalkhin-Gol, in Manchuria in 1939, demonstrating his knowledge of artillery and tank support for advancing infantry. He used this method to defeat the German Army on the long road to Berlin that culminated in a Nazi surrender in May 1945.

Roberts carefully strips away the myth surrounding Zhukov to reveal a complex man who came from humble beginnings, fought in the tzarist army during World War I, and supported the communist cause during the 1917 Russian Revolution to find himself one of Stalin's advisers. Although not a military strategist per say, Zhukov's relentless determination, aggressiveness in battle, and pursuit of the enemy were extraordinary. Decorated numerous times, he stood at Stalin's side during the great victory parade in Moscow at war's end.

Zhukov found postwar politics treacherous (he always remained politically naïve); he was demoted several times and his name was stricken from books written about the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War. Like a Phoenix rising from the ashes, however, Zhukov's popularity rose after Stalin's death when he published his memoirs before his own death in 1974.

Comparing Zhukov to Eisenhower, Montgomery, Patton, and MacArthur, Roberts concludes that he was the "best all-around general" in World War II. His energy, ability to drive his men and instill confidence, albeit his methods included corporal punishment and firing squads, enabled him to succeed when others failed. A wonderful warts-and-all biography of one of the great generals of World War II.

armored units that fought in Normandy and successfully stymied British General Bernard Montgomery's efforts to breach their lines at the crossroads town of Caen for the two months immediately following D-Day. The journals provide a treasure trove of tactics used and decisions made during that period. These two SS panzer outfits destroyed or damaged nearly 500 Allied tanks and vehicles during that time. All the action and events are in chronological order and accompanied by maps and other documents to make it easier for the reader to follow the events.

This rare book deals with two specialized armored units that played a vital role in World War II. However, as the author states, although they performed admirably their fate was, in due course, sealed when they were virtually destroyed by Allied forces as they advanced toward their objective—Berlin.

Red Christmas: The Tatsinskaya Airfield Raid 1942 by Robert Forczyk, Osprey Publishing, Long Island City, NY, 2012, 80 pp., maps, illustrations, photographs, bibliography, index, $18.95, softcover.

Another winner from Osprey publishing! Retired U.S. Army Lt. Col. Robert Forczyk has given an excellent description of the Soviet Army's raid on the German airfield located at Tatsinskaya in December 1942. With the German Sixth Army trapped at Stalingrad, Hitler and his generals formulated a plan to airlift supplies to his beleaguered troops. The Russians, wanting desperately to crush the remnants of the Sixth Army, decided on an audacious scheme to overrun the airstrip that was situated deep behind German lines. In the end, the incursion did disrupt the relief effort as the Red tankers destroyed numerous Luftwaffe aircraft that sat on the ground. But the Soviet armored units soon found themselves trapped and were decimated by panzer units that had been rushed to the scene of the fighting.

As with all of Osprey's books, it contains very detailed maps, illustrations, and photographs. This is highly recommended reading about another fascinating battle during the war on the Eastern Front. □

A Foot Soldier for Patton: The Story of a "Red Diamond" Infantryman with the U.S. Third Army by Michael C. Bilder and James G. Bilder, Casemate Publishers, Havertown, PA, 2012, 294 pp., maps, photographs, $18.95, softcover.



This is a gutsy firsthand account of an enlisted rifleman who served with the 5th "Red Diamond" Division, often referred to as the "forgotten division" of World War II. Michael Bilder landed in France a month after D-Day and participated in all the campaigns with General George S. Patton's Third Army. When it was over, he had survived the Normandy, Northern France, Ardennes, Rhineland, and Central Europe campaigns, earning a host of awards including the Bronze Star.

What makes Bilder's story even more fascinating was his command of the German language. His family were German immigrants, settling in the United States before the war. Often he was asked to act as an interpreter. He also served in Iceland prior to the conflict, a place they referred to as "The Rock."

Together with his son, Bilder has penned a fascinating eyewitness account of war from the viewpoint of a frontline soldier. Although he underwent combat, saw friends die, and ultimately survived, he does not regret his experiences. He is proud to have served and to have done so "in the company of so many exceptional men who were fine soldiers and heroes."

The Me 262 Stormbird: From the Pilots Who Flew, Fought, and Survived It by Colin B. Heaton and Anne-Marie Lewis, Zenith Press, Minneapolis, MN, 2012, 336 pgs., diagrams, photographs, notes, index, $30.00, hardcover.

There is no doubt that Germany was in the forefront when it came to the design, engineering, and manufacturing of aircraft during the war. Many rate the Messerschmitt Bf-109 and Bf-110 as two of the best fighters the Nazis possessed. However, Willi Messerschmitt and his team also planned and saw to fruition the first operational jet plane of the conflict—the Me-262 Stormbird—a remarkable innovation for its time.

The authors have done extensive research detailing the plane's birth from the drawing board, to the test flights, and finally its performance in combat. They have also included interviews from the German pilots who flew it and the Americans who first encountered the Stormbird. The book includes lists of Me-262 German aces, Squadron J-44 and JG-7 losses and victories, and Allied victories against the Stormbird.

One section deals with the Allied and Russ-

Simulation Gaming

IN *VALKYRIA DUEL*, CEL-SHADED GRAPHICS DELIVER AN ANIME SPIN ON A WORLD WAR II SCENARIO.

VALKYRIA DUEL

PUBLISHER Sega
DEVELOPER NHN Japan
SYSTEM(S) PC
AVAILABLE Now (Japan)

Valkyria Chronicles is an interesting franchise. It's one of those series one would assume is more popular than it really is simply due to the overwhelming fan fervor, and their vocal disappointment at the fact that it didn't catch on as blazing hot as it could have in North America. The tactical role-playing games take place in Europa, which substitutes for reality as an alternate world 1935 Europe. Thanks to that setting, there are quite a few parallels between the series and other World War II strategy games, with *Valkyria Chronicles* sporting a very Japanese coat of paint over the turn-based action. A new browser/smartphone-based entry in the series is on the way, but it's unlikely those of us outside of Japan will get a chance to take a turn on the battlefield, at least not without the assistance of fluency or a very thorough desktop dictionary.

Outside of the battles themselves, one of *Valkyria Chronicles* most beloved features is the overall aesthetic. Cel-shaded graphics deliver an anime spin on a very World War II-esque scenario, in which the neutral nation of Gallia attempts to defend itself from the East European Imperial Alliance. Taking up the controller in the role of Gallian Militia members puts players in a highly stylized, watercolor world full of bold, comic book sound effects portrayed via popping onomatopoeia. The first entry, *Valkyria Chronicles* (*Valkyria of the Battlefield: Gallian Chronicles*), was released on PlayStation 3 in 2008, but the series

wouldn't stay on Sony's home console for long.

PlayStation Portable became the new home base for Sega's strategic war when *Valkyria Chronicles II* made its debut in 2010. Despite the smaller size and decrease in power, the same style carried over to the handheld, and thankfully relatively unimpressive sales of the first game didn't stop it from making its way to North America and Europe. While the same might never be said about the latest entry in the series proper, *Valkyria Chronicles III*—which was released for PSP in January 2011, with an updated version following in November of the same year—the new game, *Valkyria Duel,* is nevertheless continuing to keep the cel-shaded battle alive.

Valkyria Duel eschews the traditional turn-based strategy formula in favor of a collectible card game. Players are tasked with building their battalion up through card collection, with over 200 cards available, representing characters from throughout the entire Valkyria Chronicles series thus far. Things do become a bit more familiar, visually at least, when the 3D Character Battles kick into gear. These come about as part of the overall formula, which also includes developing a base camp, becoming a commander and acquiring new troops, and taking control of enemy territories.

The whole thing takes place in-browser, and helpful folks have posted online guides to accessing *Valkyria Duel* even if you're not in Japan. Of course, there's still going to be a heavy language barrier, so keep that in mind before you start looking up ways to dig into the free-to-play experience. As is the case with most free browser games and the like, money is made via optional item transactions that enhance the experience. A user test for *Valkyria Duel* was conducted back in June, and the official site also lists a smartphone app. While collecting *Valkyria Chronicles*-related cards and doing battle with the characters would no doubt be a great time for those invested in the series, Sega's strategy gem is going to need a more substantial fanbase outside of Japan for any chance of further localizations.

PANZER CORPS: AFRIKA KORPS

PUBLISHER Matrix Games, Slitherine
DEVELOPER The Lordz Games Studio, FlashBack Games
SYSTEM(S) PC
AVAILABLE Now

Let's take a break from our usual World War II game scenarios and head to the desert for some expanded skirmishes in *Panzer Corps: Afrika Korps*. *Afrika Korps* is, as one might naturally suspect, an add-on to *Panzer Corps,* a turn-based PC strategy game that has earned a fair share of high praise since its release. While *Afrika Korps* serves as a bonus to existing owners of the original, it also acts as a standalone game for new players, so it shouldn't be diffi-

ian scramble to obtain as much information as they could about the Me-262. Known as Operations Lusty and Paperclip, teams of U.S. Army Air Force Intelligence members, OSS operatives, quickly went about gathering the top German scientists for entry into the United States to work for the government before the Soviets could. Interestingly enough, the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency actually disregarded President Harry S. Truman's direct order forbidding recruitment of scientists who were known Nazis. As history shows, many of these scientists, Nazi or not, were the nucleus of the U.S. space programs. *The Me-262 Stormbird* is an interesting look at a unique aircraft—and the men who designed it—and flew this remarkable plane that propelled the world into the jet age. □

cult to jump right into the desert combat even if you slept on *Panzer Corps* itself.

Afrika Korps takes place in 1941, and has players fighting during the North African Campaign of WWII, making headway into Libya and Tunisia with the German Afrika Korps and its Axis allies. The detailed, turn-based battles against the Allies while squaring off for the Suez Canal, the Arabian Peninsula, and more will be familiar to fans, but *Afrika Korps* adds more than 20 fresh scenarios across its branched campaign. Scenarios range from the aforementioned attempt to secure the Suez Canal to Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Caucasus, British India, and more.

The add-on also includes new multiplayer scenarios; a bunch of new units like gliders and flamethrowing tanks, new weather types appropriate to the desert setting, and improved AI. *Panzer Corps* itself was pretty easy to pick up and play without too much of a learning curve, and even those who skipped out on it shouldn't have too much trouble digging into *Afrika Korps*. There aren't many games on the market that focus on this particular campaign, so it's nice to see a change of scenery in World War II strategy amid so many familiar birds-eye views of the war. □

insight

Continued from page 25

claims that Morley was acquainted with William Stevenson, author of *A Man Called Intrepid*, who directed the New York office of British Security Coordination (BSC) in Rockefeller Center.

BSC was purported to be the most intricate and integrated secret operations organization in history. One BSC's objectives was to aid and encourage U.S. participation in World War II. Stevenson admitted in his book that BSC was "the hub for all branches of British intelligence." However, it was not British propaganda and rhetoric that was responsible for bringing the United States into World War II, but the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent declaration of war by Germany and Italy against the United States on December 11, 1941. It is doubtful that BSC had anything to do with the musical version of *My Sister and I*.

Dr. Fussell concluded his lecture with the sentence, "It is all a testimony to the literary talent of Mr. Stanley Preston Young, who sensed both what the age and the United Kingdom demanded, and who supplied it in a memorable American way."

Although the true story of *My Sister and I* was known for almost a decade, it did not prevent Laurel Holliday, in her book *Children of the Holocaust and World War II—Their Secret Dairies*, from reprinting most of the diary verbatim and representing it as factual. Author Holliday's treatise was published in 1995 by Pocket Books, a division of Simon & Schuster, Inc., for Washington Square Press as the first anthology of children's diaries written during World War II and the Holocaust. Apparently, Ms. Holliday was completely taken in by the hoax that occurred approximately 55 years earlier. Holliday writes, "These diaries tell us what it was like for children to live each day with the knowledge that it could be their last."

While some of the most poignant and moving contributions to World War II literature were written by young people of no literary pretensions, *My Sister and I* does not fall into that category. □

Dr. Sheldon Winkler, a professor emeritus at Temple University, has authored or co-authored six textbooks and over 170 articles and chapters in professional journals and textbooks on a variety of dental and medical topics. A frequent contributor to WWII History, *his book on the music of World War II will be published in January 2013 by Andover Press. He resides in Scottsdale, Arizona,*

bulge airpower

Continued from page 41

ground forces were running out of fuel as well. The Luftwaffe's high command ordered the air force to "immobilize all transport not needed for immediate combat support in order to conserve fuel."

It was a hard day for the Luftwaffe, and a glorious day for the Allied air forces. But perhaps the happiest man on the 23rd was the ebullient George Patton. During the heavy rain and mud of the Lorraine campaign in November, Patton had asked his chaplain, Father James O'Neill, to prepare the now-famous prayer for good weather.

On December 23, the prayer went out to the men of the U.S. Third Army: "Almighty and most merciful Father, we humbly beseech Thee, of Thy great goodness, to restrain these immoderate rains with which we have had to contend. Grant us fair weather for Battle. Graciously harken to us as soldiers who call upon Thee that, armed with Thy power, we may advance from victory to victory, and crush the oppression and wickedness of our enemies, and establish Thy justice among men and nations. Amen."

Supposedly, when the weather cleared Patton ordered that O'Neill be decorated for composing an effective prayer. However, the prayer was not, as the movie *Patton* suggests, composed during the Battle of the Bulge. But Patton did write a prayer himself on the 23rd, asking for clear skies, which concluded:

"Sir, I have never been an unreasonable man, I am not going to ask you for the impossible … all I request is four days of clear weather … so that my fighter-bombers can bomb and strafe, so that my reconnaissance may pick out targets for my magnificent artillery. Give me four days of sunshine to dry this blasted mud…. I need these four days to send von Rundstedt and his godless army to their Valhalla. I am sick of this unnecessary butchery of American youth, and in exchange for four days of fighting weather, I will deliver You enough Krauts to keep Your bookkeepers months behind in their work. Amen."

Patton got his wish. The weather would remain clear for the next four days, and the Allied air forces would dominate the skies over the Ardennes. But severe fighting on the ground and in the air lay ahead. The Allies had won a massive victory in the air with "the war's most beautiful sunrise." □

Author David H. Lippman has been writing on World War II topics for years. He maintains a daily website on the topic and resides in Newark, New Jersey.

british manpower

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General Montgomery, the Allied ground forces commander and the most popular general in the British Army. His critics said that Montgomery's slow-motion offensives and his inability to conduct large-scale maneuvers at Caen had produced a stalemate in Normandy. His critics figured that the way to break the stalemate was to fire Montgomery and replace him with someone who understood offensive warfare.

While Eisenhower, Air Marshal Tedder, and Eisenhower's chief of staff, General Walter Bedell Smith, approved of the move to fire Montgomery; Churchill and CIGS Alan Brooke did not. Since it was unlikely that Alan Brooke would ever abandon his protégé, Churchill's support was critical in building the case against Montgomery. Without Churchill's support, the plot to fire Montgomery was going to fail. Max Hastings wrote, "It is impossible to imagine that Montgomery could have been sacked—whatever Tedder's delusion on that count—without inflicting an intolerable blow to British national confidence."

The plan to fire Montgomery entered its critical phase just as the Americans broke the German line at St. Lo. With the American victory and Brooke's unshakable support for Montgomery, the plot to fire the most popular general in the British Army died an inglorious death.

Tedder was the last officer to keep the plot against Montgomery alive. On the morning of July 25, he called Eisenhower hoping to discuss Montgomery's removal. According to Eisenhower's aide, Harry Butcher, "Ike told him he had talked with the PM [prime minister] and the PM was satisfied [with Montgomery's plans] and Tedder rather uh-huhed, being not at all satisfied, and implying the PM must have sold Ike a bit of goods."

Churchill had visited Montgomery in Normandy on July 21 and was satisfied that his plans for the battle were sound. But there can be little doubt from the historical record that in late July 1944 both Tedder and Eisenhower would have preferred to remove Montgomery from command of Allied ground forces. Of course, such an event did not occur. □

Author William Weidner is a veteran of the U.S. Army. His book Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap *was selected by the Military Writers Society of America as its book of the month in January 2011 and nominated by the group for its 2011 Non-Fiction History Award. He resides in Grand Junction, Colorado.*

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