By Ian Mitchell
Early on the morning of January 31, 1943, Lt. Stanley Edwards, a troop commander in the British 72nd Anti-Tank (AT) Regiment, was roused with news that enemy tanks were moving through their isolated valley in northern Tunisia. Having just gone to sleep at 2 a.m., Edwards threw a trench coat over his pajamas and went out to command his troop of 6-pounder anti-tank guns facing the terrifying sight of German PzKpfw. VI Tiger tanks moving down a dusty road.
Edwards and 1st Troop, A Battery, 72nd AT Regiment were supporting the 5th Battalion of the East Kent Regiment, who in turn were in positions northeast of the Tunisian town of Robaa. Known as the “Buffs,” due to the buff facings of their uniform adopted during the 17th Century, the East Kents had been enjoying a rest since January 16, when it had been relieved and moved to the town of Beja.
The Buffs weren’t new to battle, having experienced a tough time in France in 1940 and recently fought several engagements with both Italian and German troops. Unfortunately, their time in reserve would be short. The following day the battalion’s commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Penlington, handed unit command over to Lt.-Col. A.D. “Ginger” McKechnie, who ordered the men to end their briefest of rests and head back to the front within days.
That order did not endear McKechnie to his command, especially as the officers and men were fond of their old colonel and didn’t know why he’d been relieved. McKechnie had two more strikes against him: he was a Territorial Army (TA) officer, and worse still, he was not even from the regiment. He had been commissioned into The Sherwood Foresters Regiment but spent much of his time with the Honourable Artillery Company. McKechnie probably had hoped that he might be given a grace period to get to know his battalion a little better while they were in reserve before going into combat, but it was not to be. Instead, McKechnie and his unit were quickly on the move and facing a German tank attack in the Robaa Valley on January 31.
At 7:24 that morning, with the main force occupying the small hamlet of Sidi Said, McKechnie’s leading companies were a mile down the road watching with deep concern as a column of German tanks, including at least two huge Tiger tanks, advanced toward them. It appeared to his soldiers that their new commander’s time leading the 5th Buffs might be quite short. After all, if their new boss managed to lose most of his battalion within days of taking command he was unlikely to be around for very long. McKechnie, however, seemed unperturbed.
On January 18, while the Buffs were resting near Beja, German General Von Arnim, the commander of the Axis forces in the north, had developed a plan to take advantage of the overextended Allied positions in northern Tunisia. He had previously identified that the weak, ill-equipped, and poorly supplied French forces located in central Tunisia made a tempting target for his combat-hardened and recently reinforced army. In the middle of January, Von Arnim tasked Major General Webber, the commander of the 334th Infantry Division, with undertaking a new operation, codenamed Eilbote (German for courier or fast express), that would have two aims.
The first part of Operation Eilbote was designed to be a diversion but could still cause significant damage to British forces located in and around the town of Bou Arada.
The main attack was intended to inflict damage on French units of the XIX Corps and split their forces in two by driving over the mountains and down the Ousseltia Valley 100 miles south of Tunis. Arnim’s plan was deliberately conceived to strike close to the boundary between the French XIX Corps and the British V Corps so that it might cut off French forces based on one side of the Dorsal range from those on the other side.
At this point the French, under the command of General Juin held almost half of the Allied front line covering central and southern Tunisia despite the odds—colonial forces were not only poorly equipped, armed, and supplied, but held large swathes of territory against more experienced well-equipped German forces. This made the French extremely vulnerable to German counterattacks led by tanks, modern artillery, and the Luftwaffe, which held local air superiority.
When the Germans launched the opening phase of Operation Eilbote on January 18, 1943, they inflicted significant damage on the French. General Kenneth Anderson commander of the Allied First Army, was forced to send weary British troops to reinforce the French, particularly the Tunis Division of XIX Corps south of the German-held town of Pont Du Fahs 35 miles southwest of Tunis.
The threat created by Eilbote to the French led Anderson to send orders to McKechnie and the 5th Buffs and other units on January 20 to move from Beja to the small town of Robaa Oulad Yaha in the Robaa Valley. There the British 36th Infantry Brigade assumed responsibility for the defense of the valley against a further attack by the Germans.
The original plan for Eilbote assumed the main attack would begin near the Kebir Reservoir, then move briefly down the Robaa Valley to the junction of a road leading over the mountains southeast to the Ousseltia Valley. It was not intended to drive any further down the Robaa Valley.
McKechnie and the 5th Buffs took up positions around the small town of Robaa on January 21, reinforced by a single squadron of the 17th/21st Lancers. On January 25 the battalion moved forward to just northeast of the hamlet of Sidi Said, about eight miles north of Robaa. For the next few days, the 5th Buffs patrolled and improved its positions. Engineers laid mines, and the anti-tank platoon gunners positioned their 6-pounder guns.
Meanwhile, on January 28, substantial reinforcements had arrived with the 6th Royal West Kents from the 36th Infantry Brigade, a squadron of the Derbyshire Yeomanry, and the 12th Royal Horse Artillery (RHA). Additional reinforcements included the U.S. 2nd battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division. The 1st Infantry Division, nicknamed the Big Red One, had landed in Algeria at Arzew and engaged briefly in fighting with Vichy French units before moving to Tunisia in January. It had not yet encountered the German army in battle.
The initial German attack ran into fierce resistance and got bogged down. A combat command of the U.S. 1st Armored Division had been placed under French command and sent to the Ousseltia Valley, and the German offensive was then halted on von Arnim’s orders. However, on January 28, von Arnim ordered Eilbote resumed, and he specifically encouraged an attack down the Robaa Valley.
McKechnie had placed his A and C Companies in positions, respectively, on the north and south side of the main road. His other two rifle companies were located with his Headquarters Company and battalion headquarters about 1.5 miles south and closer to the few mud houses of the hamlet of Sidi Said. The area on both sides of the road had a number of gullies and trees, which made offroad vehicular movement by the Germans difficult and created something of a choke point. His right flank was protected to the southeast by the 6th battalion of the Queen’s Own West Kents and the Americans of the 2nd battalion, 16th Infantry located in the hills east southeast of his location. The 2nd Battalion was commanded by Lt.-Col. Joe Crawford, a tough 38-year-old West Pointer from Texas, ably assisted by his executive officer Maj. Charles T Horner, who had somehow acquired the nickname “Batshit” from his subordinates, presumably for his usual reaction when one of them got into trouble.
Although A Company of the Buffs was shelled and mortared on January 30, there had been no significant signs of a major German armored attack. Meanwhile, Crawford’s G Company had managed to secure a key position on Hill 727, which overlooked the Robaa Valley. During that move the company also incurred some casualties including their company commander, who was killed with a patrol trying to recover a wrecked jeep. The patrol was only able to withdraw because their attached British Forward Observation Officer, Captain Cracknell of the 12th RHA, was able to call down accurate artillery fire. On the night of January 30, the Americans heard engines but could not confirm the location, so no report was made to 36th Infantry Brigade.
Therefore, it was a shock to the 5th Buffs on the morning of January 31, when a column of 12 tanks was sighted moving south down the road. This column was part of Kampfgruppe Lueder named after the commander of the 501st Panzer Battalion (Abteilung) and comprised its 2nd Company supported by the 1st Battalion, 69th Panzergrenadier Regiment and possibly a 2nd company of tanks from the 10th Panzer Division. Most sources state that the leading tanks were two Tigers, but the 5th Buffs’ war diary is unclear on this issue, and German armored tactics were to lead Tiger battalion advances with PzKpfw. III or IV tanks. The leading German tanks advanced while machine-gunning both sides of the road, and the British infantry quickly crouched down in their slit trenches. The soldiers watched with increasing nervousness as the first couple of tanks drove to within 200 yards of their location, then almost up to their positions, and nothing had happened.
Suddenly, a Verey flare shot into the sky and at least 10 anti-tank guns opened up from hidden flank positions on both sides of the road. The German tanks came under fire from at least two troops of 6-pounder anti-tank guns from A Battery, 72nd AT Regiment, Royal Artillery (RA) along with a couple of 2-pounder anti-tank guns of the 5th Buffs—the ace up McKechnie’s sleeve.
The 2nd Troop was commanded by Stanley Edwards, and though his sartorial standards might not have been those expected of a British Army officer he had ensured that his gunners’ aim was true. They scored multiple hits on the three leading tanks. According to one contemporary account, the anti-tank guns waited until the German tanks exposed their sides before commencing fire at distances ranging from 680 to 800 yards, well within their effective range.
According to accounts of the battle, the first five armor piercing (AP) solid shot shells glanced off the sides of the lead Mark VI Tiger, but the next three immobilized it or possibly destroyed it. In tandem with firing their 6-pounder guns, the anti-tank crews also ensured the German tank crews stayed buttoned up as they engaged the tanks with light machine-gun fire, probably using Bren guns. This made it difficult for the German tank commanders and gunners to spot the anti-tank positions or maneuver. What seems to be less clear is whether it was the 6-pounder shells or recently emplaced anti-tank mines that caused the first tank to stop followed by the two that followed. The 5th Buffs’ war diary says two tanks hit mines, while other accounts credit the damage and then destruction of all three tanks to the anti-tank guns. The crew of the first Tiger soon decided that discretion was the better part of valor and abandoned their disabled tank.
Despite this success, neither Edwards nor the Buffs were able to rest on their laurels. The first attack was followed by a second starting at about 8:25 a.m., and this one was supported by German infantry and a second Tiger tank. Within 30 minutes, the first three German tanks had been completely set ablaze, and another three tanks had stopped firing. One of the German tanks in the second group was confirmed as the first Mark VI Tiger tank to be destroyed in Tunisia. The Tiger in the first group remained immobilized. The loss of six tanks seemed to have deterred a further attack, and the Buffs watched the remaining tanks withdraw down the road. But the Germans had not given up, and for the next eight hours the 5th Buffs came under a series of attacks. Eventually, A Company, 5th Buffs, which interestingly was under the command of a Canadian Infantry officer, Major McLachlan, was dislodged from its position on a hill north of the road.
As these events transpired, down in the valley the Americans also found themselves under attack. Company G, 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment under the command of its executive officer, managed to hold on for a time to Hill 727 but was then pushed off the crest. After losing a second position, the battalion was able to stop the German advance with the help of the 12th RHA. Meanwhile, the companies of the 5th Buffs near the road were regularly probed by tank forays and accompanying panzergrenadiers. Both Royal Air Force and Luftwaffe aircraft bombed and strafed troops and vehicles.
Two attacks by RAF Hawker Hurricane fighter-bombers from No. 225 Squadron, during the morning may have helped finish off the destruction of some of the stationary tanks. According to one of the pilots involved in their second attack, the Hurricanes “well and truly clobbered a German infantry unit.” One Hawker was shot down, but the pilot survived. Tragically, an errant British bomb appears to have accidentally caused two friendly casualties.
The remaining immobile Tiger attracted the attention of the British, who wanted to study it. The 5th Buffs’ war diary suggests that an attempt was briefly made to recover it early that afternoon, but it is unclear how that might have been achieved. The only tank unit nearby was the 17th/21st Lancers, and their recovery vehicles might not have had the power to recover the Tiger.
What is clear is that at some point a small party from the 256th Field Company, Royal Engineers sortied into no man’s land to inspect the Tiger and then inspect or immobilize any other remaining German tanks. The engineers were led by Major Brown, a Canadian officer on loan to the First Army, who commanded the 256th Field Company. Brown and his men came under fire, and Brown was wounded. It is likely that the same happened to the German party who tried in daylight to recover their tanks, since they were actively discouraged by the 5th Buffs. It was the Germans, however, who were successful later that night as they managed to recover the immobilized Tiger.
Throughout the day and into the evening, German infantry and tanks endeavored to outflank and destroy the garrison at Sidi Said and the Americans in the hills, but they failed to do so. Moreover, they also suffered significant casualties at the hands of the 25-pounder guns of the 12th RHA, which were directed by observation parties located within the company positions of the 5th Buffs. The East Kents’ infantry companies added to the problems faced by the Germans whenever they tried to advance. In addition, the 12th RHA also hit another German tank and an armored car while several trucks were shelled and bombed by the RAF.
In the hills northeast of the 5th Buffs, the 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry came under further heavy mortar fire and then infantry attack from three sides. After suffering several casualties and the loss of its mortars, the battalion was forced to withdraw again. To their credit and despite their losses, the three American companies G, E and F, then held firm and inflicted significant losses on the Germans. Like all inexperienced Allied troops in Tunisia, they were learning their profession under fire. To the south, the 6th Queen’s Own West Kents were also briefly engaged and had to counterattack and retake a hill lost by the French to an Italian unit.
However, by 10 p.m. that evening all the action died down, and the Germans ended their assault. It had been a busy day for McKechnie, Edwards, Crawford, and many other soldiers, but it ended with the British still in possession of the local real estate while their gallant American allies retained most of their defensive positions in the hills. Although all present expected the Germans to renew their assault the following day, this was not the case. The British positions were shelled, but there were no further attacks as Kampfgruppe Lueder withdrew northward toward Pont du Fahs.
Although there is no formal tally of German losses, it is likely that the Germans probably lost four PzKpfw. III tanks, one armored car, and several trucks destroyed. The action at Sidi Said in the Robaa Valley also led to the complete destruction of one Tiger tank and damage to a second. This event was important as no Tiger losses had occurred during previous battles in late 1942 and the tank was gaining a reputation for being invincible. The remains of the destroyed Tiger were inspected by technical officers from the British Army a couple of days after the battle, and they were able to learn a great deal. In addition to the tank and vehicle losses, the German infantry suffered significant casualties both in the valley and in the hills with estimated casualties of at least 200 killed, wounded, or captured.
The 5th Buffs lost only two men killed that day and a number of wounded, while the anti-tank gunners seem to have led a charmed life with only two casualties identified. The 12th RHA lost at least two of their gunners killed on January 31. In addition, the companies of the West Kents located in the hills to the southeast lost three soldiers killed and a number of wounded during the fighting there. Crawford’s unit suffered five officers and 60 men killed, wounded, or missing. Their pride was more than a little dented as in their first engagement with the Germans they had lost possession of Hill 727 and were unable to regain it. They were relieved by a French unit a few days later.
Although some of McKechnie’s soldiers may have been taking odds on whether their new commander was going to stay in command for long, by the following day all bets were off. McKechnie was a successful stockbroker in civilian life, and he also proved to be an excellent officer. The officers and men of the East Kents quickly learned to respect and then admire their new boss for his coolness under fire that day at Robaa. They also warmed to his avuncular command style though they also learned that he had high standards.
McKechnie would successfully command the 5th Buffs through the rest of the Tunisian campaign, throughout the Sicilian campaign, and in the fights at Termoli and Cassino in Italy, leading the unit nearly all the way to the Sangro River in November 1943 before handing over command. Subsequently and unusually, he would briefly command an Infantry Brigade in Italy, earn an OBE (Order of the British Empire), and after long service back in the TA, retire in 1960. His former battalion ended its war in Austria in 1945 after building a reputation as a formidable fighting unit of the fabled Eighth Army.
The commanding officer of the 5th Buffs was not the only one who learned under fire in the Robaa Valley and went on to build a reputation. It had been the 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry’s first battle with the Germans, and they had been forced to withdraw from the hill they held, though their performance in this action had been worthy of praise. They were a proud outfit and learned from this experience and many others during the rest of the Tunisian campaign and in Sicily. The battalion’s officers and soldiers rapidly became skilled and tough. It is worth noting that Crawford would go on to build a distinguished combat record, first in command of another infantry battalion in Sicily and then as the commander of an infantry regiment in Italy. Two-and-one-half years after the fight in the Robaa Valley, the 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry showed its mettle, landing amid a storm of German fire at Easy Red and Fox Red sectors of Omaha Beach on D-Day in Normandy.
In command of the battalion on June 6, 1944, was 27-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Herbert Hicks, who had been the regimental supply officer for the 16th Infantry in Tunisia and knew all about the battalion’s battle in the Robaa Valley. By now, his battalion’s officers and men were tough and capable veterans of two campaigns and numerous battles, so Hicks and his soldiers fought their way off the beach against the worst of odds. In Hicks’ case this was quite literal as he personally destroyed two German machine gun nests. Other officers and men demonstrated the same level of bravery for officers, and soldiers of the 2nd Battalion were awarded a staggering 21 Distinguished Service Crosses for their actions on D-Day.
The chaos of D-Day meant that companies of the 3rd Battalion, 16th Infantry which were supposed to land on Fox Green to the east actually landed there but also on Fox Red. They also suffered from the heavy German fire, took many casualties, and were initially pinned down. A less experienced battalion might have become bogged down, but not when its commander was now “Batshit” Horner. Chuck Horner’s performance in Tunisia had not gone unnoticed, and he assumed command of the 3rd Battalion in time for the Sicily landings. Horner and his battalion distinguished themselves both in the initial landings and in the later battle of Troina, where his leadership earned him the first of two Distinguished Service Crosses.
Horner had trained his officers and men well, and it was no surprise that one of his officers, First Lt. Jimmie Monteith, played a key role in getting the regiment off the fire swept beach. Monteith’s performance under fire on D-Day earned him the Medal of Honor, awarded posthumously as he was killed later in the day. There is little doubt that Horner used his difficult experience at Robaa in a positive way to later forge his new battalion into one that fought its way off an embattled beach in France and eventually into Germany.
It is also worth noting that despite the many losses the French troops suffered in January-February 1943, they would also learn under fire and be transformed in the crucible of battle. Subsequently in 1943, the French would rebuild, retrain their forces, and equip their units with modern American arms. Later the French troops would also demonstrate that they could achieve great success in combat in the mountains of Italy near Cassino and during Operation Dragoon, the Allied landings in southern France.
That the small battle in the Robaa Valley in Tunisia contributed to the professional development of three excellent combat leaders and forged the fighting spirit and skill of three Allied infantry battalions that later established a battle record worthy of enduring fame.
Ian Mitchell served as an officer in the British Army. Now retired, his first book, The Battle of the Peaks and Longstop Hill, was published in 2019. He lives in Wiltshire, England.
Valuable article, enhanced by the inclusion of information about some of the officers’ subsequent battles. Thank you.
Scott
Thanks for your kind remarks. I was especially keen to show that their experience in Tunisia helped to forge outstanding officers and soldiers in both our armies.
Ian